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9Foreword
Public Administration and Management Department (PAMD) at Babeș-Bolyai 
University, Romania, has been since its establishment in the mid-1990s at the fore-
front of the movement to reinstate and redevelop higher education programs and 
research in public administration in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In most of 
the CEE countries, public administration education during the communist regimes 
was done by party schools and was clearly subordinated to political influences and 
political doctrine. After the collapse of the communist regime in Romania, PAMD, 
with the support of Western European and American partner universities, has been 
instrumental in the development of an interdisciplinary curriculum for public ad-
ministration programs and for supporting empirical research as an important com-
ponent of their mission. PAMD at Babes Bolyai-University is currently recognized 
at both national and international level as a leading teaching, research, and training 
entity in public administration. For two consecutive years, 2018 and 2019, DAMP 
was ranked in the quartile 150-200 in the Shanghai academic ranking, surpassing 
many other similar PA programs from other countries in the CEE region. 
Cluj-Napoca, the city which houses Babes-Bolyai University, is currently expe-
riencing tremendous economic and social growth. Universities are a key engine for 
the growth of the city, together with the IT sector and creative industries. Cluj is 
currently regarded at both national and regional level as a positive example of ur-
ban growth which is the result of cooperation among the city, on the one hand, and 
other relevant stakeholders, on the other hand. The city is praised for implementing 
participatory mechanisms which allow citizens and interest groups to have a say-
ing in how the city develops and in how decides its strategy for the years to come. 
DAMP has provided pro-bono consultancy for the city regarding the drafting of 
local master plans and sectorial comprehensive plans since mid-2000s. Current-
ly, PAMD is deeply involved in conducting different analyses and studies for the 
city and its metropolitan area regarding quality of life and moreover factors which 
make the city of Cluj-Napoca more resilient and sustainable in how it develops 
compared to other cities. 
Due to its leading role in the CEE region in the area of public administration 
higher education, PAMD organizes dissemination and networking events for PA 
scholars and practitioners. One important tool for bringing together academics, re-
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searchers, and practitioners in public administration is the Transylvanian Interna-
tional Conference in Public Administration, held annually in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 
in the months of October or November. The conference allows PAMD to use the 
city of Cluj-Napoca as a living lab for illustrating different practical implications of 
relevant scientific topics and paradigms. This is why, the conference is organized 
in partnership with the City Hall of Cluj-Napoca and the mayor of the city usually 
offers in his welcoming message the municipality’s vision on the topic of the con-
ference. 
In 2019, the Transylvanian International Conference in Public Administration took 
place from 24 to 26 October. This event was envisioned to bring together academics, 
researchers and practitioners in the field of public administration from all over the 
world and to create the framework in which they can exchange ideas, disseminate 
best practices and develop networking opportunities for future teaching, research, 
and capacity building projects. 
The overarching topic for 2019 is collaborative governance, trust building and 
community development. Increasingly, governments and public sector organiza-
tions at all levels are no longer the sole actors involved in shaping the future of their 
communities. The paradigm of governance has implied a transition to multi-actor 
networks which function based on collaboration/partnerships. These networks are 
constantly reshaped through the action of their members as well as under the in-
fluence of contextual factors. Success or failure of such networks often depends on 
complex issues such as building trust among partners and developing a culture for 
shared visions. The conference is designed as a venue for identifying how partners 
belonging to different sectors can cooperate better and to share success stories of 
communities that managed to improve service delivery, to increase cooperation 
among sectors, and to empower their citizens through meaningful participation to 
decision-making processes.
An impressive body of renowned academics and practitioners took part in the 
conference. Their expertise in shaping policies and enhancing the quality of gover-
nance both in their home countries and worldwide is significant.
As part of this conference several separate workshops were held. One workshop 
was addressed to PhDs and young researchers. The workshop on PA journals and 
research included a roundtable discussion on cooperation between two PA journals 
– Teaching Public Administration (Sage) and Transylvanian Review of Adminis-
trative Sciences, produced by the Department of Public Administration and Man-
agement at Babeș-Bolyai University. More broadly, challenges and opportunities 
pertaining to research and teaching in PA were discussed and how different EU 
and American universities can cooperate in this field. The panel on Japan-Romania 
cooperation: Japanese business and academic presence in Romania. Future develop-
ments looked at linkages and cooperation strategies among universities, businesses, 
and public authorities from Japan and Romania. 
11
The present book includes a selection of the papers presented in all sections of 
the conference. The intention of the conference organizers is to disseminate the 
materials discussed during the conference and to generate scientific debates beyond 
the two days event. Papers presented by the PhD students are included, as an op-
portunity given to young researchers to publish the results of their work, even if it 
is still work in progress. 
Our hope is to be able to increase the visibility and reputation of international 
conferences organized by universities/departments. While we acknowledge that big 
and well known conferences such as EGPA (European Group in Public Adminis-
tration) and NISPAcee (Network of Institutes and Schools in public Administration 
from Central and Eastern Europe) play an important role, smaller conferences are 
also crucial for not only their scientific value but also for providing venues for in-
teraction between academia and practice, between practice and PhD students, and 
among a variety of scholars who call public administration their area of interest. The 
book is a natural extension of the conference and serves similar purposes. Moreover, 
PAMD has significant experience in publication of scientific papers. The Depart-
ment publishes independently a prestigious journal in PA, namely, Transylvanian 
Review of Administrative Sciences, a publication indexed by Thompson Reuters in 
Web of Science since 2008. 
We would like to thank all conference participants for attending Transylvanian 
International Conference in Public Administration, 2019 edition, and for their contri-
bution to this book. 
Local conference organizers
Cluj-Napoca, 
4th of August, 2020
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THE NIS DIRECTIVE AND THE SMART CITY
Domenica BAGNATO
Domenica BAGNATO
Managing Director, Hierodiction Software GmbH, Austria 
E-mail: domenica.bagnato@hierodiction.com
Abstract
This contribution attempts to apply the EU NIS Directive (EU 2016/1148) and the corresponding EU 
cyber-security strategy to the smart city. It will present the NIS framework and show in how far it aids in 
meeting its cyber-security challenges – but also where its limits lie for it has to be supplemented by national 
or even sectorial, frameworks. The paper also provides concrete suggestions for developing the directive 
further.
Keywords: NIS Directive, cyber-security, smart city, European Union, cyberattack.
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1. Smart cities – a bright new future with some things to heed
The Internet has forced nations to look well beyond themselves in an effort to 
protect their critical infrastructure, as the internet knows no boundaries and a cy-
berattack can occur from anywhere in the world destroying infrastructure and crip-
pling nations. Member States have been relying on each other for the supply of 
goods or services long before the internet, but it is the nature of the internet open 
cyberspace that has in effect caused Member States to unify their interests, taking 
national security to a new level. National security now means working with Member 
States as never before to find common ground and solutions for defense that go well 
beyond territorial space. This is the framework in which the NIS Directive came into 
being and this paper attempts to put it in the context of the smart cities concept.
There are a number of definitions of the ‘Smart City’ (see Smart Cities Coun-
cil, undated) that provide a good overview. The technical essence arguably is: 
(i) the combination of connected sensors (and to a lesser extent actuators)1, (ii) in-
terconnected applications including internet – and app-based service delivery to 
citizens, and (iii) business analytics, the latter being increasingly augmented by 
the combination of in-memory computing (Prosser, 2018) and artificial intelligence. 
In-memory provides the capability to quickly search terabyte quantities of indi-
vidual transactional data (not just aggregates as in a data warehouse, see Prosser 
(2014) for numerical considerations), and at the same time run algorithms of artifi-
cial intelligence over this data2.
2. The NIS Directive
On the July 6, 2016, the European Parliament passed Directive (EU) 2016/1148, 
commonly known as the ‘Network and Information Systems’ Directive (NIS Direc-
tive)3. The NIS Directive formulates a defense strategy to combat and respond to 
cyberattacks that would endanger the critical infrastructure of Member States. At 
the heart of the problem is not just that critical infrastructure can be tampered, but 
that there is no way to make cybercriminals responsible for their actions without 
the cooperation of Member States. If criminals cannot be made responsible for their 
actions4, then nothing can be done about the crimes they commit, leaving nations 
open to be abused and exploited.
1 Also referred to as the Internet of Things (Holdowsky et al., 2015), whereby hitherto closed infra-
structures are opened up (Ross, 2017).
2 For a relevant commercial application example see SAP Leonardo (SAP, undated).
3 See Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council. In this paper, article, 
annex or recital references without further indication refer to this directive.
4 This notion is most clearly addressed in the UK’s national cyber security strategy (UK Government, 
undated). 
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We should also be aware that cyber security is no longer merely a national task. 
Technology, including the internet, has made the trade of goods and services seam-
less across borders and, hence, the supply of goods and services in all its forms need 
not be limited by its physical location. This has also caused Member States to reflect 
upon their dependency on other Member States in this regard5.
The NIS Directive also asks that Member States consult with the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) in relation to cyber issues 
in order to force Member States to inform themselves of the standard expected for 
cyber-security and -management, so there is no mistake as to the minimum obliga-
tory requirements (Articles 36 and 4).
The directive distinguishes between ‘operators of essential services’ (OES) and 
‘digital service providers’ (DSP). Article 5 gives the criteria for defining OES with 
Annex II listing them (in pursuance of Article 4.4, essentially as (i) electricity and 
energy, (ii) transport6, (iii) banking, (iv) healthcare providers, (v) drinking water 
supply, and (vi) ‘digital infrastructure’. The last point however does not include 
Internet Service Providers, but only (some) of its core functions (cf. Annex II.7)7, 
namely:
 – IXPs, that is nodes to ‘interconnect networks’ (Recital 18) of ‘autonomous sys-
tems’ (Article 4.13)8;
 – Domain Name System (DNS) services; and
 – Top-level-domain (TLD) name registries.
Then, there are Digital Service Providers (DSPs), for whom less stringent re-
quirements apply (see below). These services are outlined in Annex III as: (i) online 
marketplaces, (ii) search engines, and (iii) cloud computing. Whereas the first two 
are clearly defined terms, ‘cloud’, however, appears to be a rather nebulous term 
and is used for a number of technical arrangements9. A more stringent technical 
terminology is recommended. 
The NIS Directive fails to mention Internet Service Providers (ISP) in the list 
of digital infrastructures in Annex II. Internet Exchange Points (IXP) are only the 
junction between ‘autonomous systems’ (Article 4.13); however, the autonomous 
5 This includes inter-twined infrastructures such as the electricity grids or transnational logistic 
chains for fuels; these interdependencies are explicitly recognised in Recital 3.
6 In the context of road transport, however, only road authorities and operators of ‘intelligent trans-
port systems’ (Annex II.2.d). 
7 Another notable omission refers to trust service providers (Recital 7). 
8 ‘Internet exchange point (IXP)’ means a network facility which enables the interconnection of 
more than two independent autonomous systems, primarily for the purpose of facilitating the 
exchange of internet traffic; an IXP provides interconnection only for autonomous systems’.
9 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines the evolving paradigm of the 
‘cloud services’ (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001).
16
system itself is not included, neither as an OES nor as DSP. ‘Autonomous system 
(AS)’ is a clearly defined terminus technicus in the Internet world as: 
‘[...] a set of routers under a single technical administration, using an interior 
gateway protocol (IGP) and common metrics to determine how to route pack-
ets within the AS, and using an inter-AS routing protocol to determine how to 
route packets to other ASes.’ (RFC 4271)
The above definition corresponds to the function of an ISP. Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) also assigns AS numbers to regional internet registries, 
a decentralized process that ultimately ends up at the individual service providers10. 
The directive hence only includes the IXP between ISPs, not the ISPs (‘autonomous 
systems’) themselves. In regards to ‘undertakings providing public communication 
networks or publicly available electronic communication services’, Recital 7 refers 
to Directive 2002/21/EC, which applies to a large number of audio-visual networks 
including TV and radio. This directive mainly deals with fair market conditions, 
frequency allocation and other regulatory requirements. The only reference to net-
work security is given in Article 8.4 (f) whereby national regulators are obliged 
to ensure ‘that the integrity and security of public communications networks are 
maintained’ (Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council).
This glaring omission is neither understandable nor reproducible. It plainly does 
not make any sense. Considering the importance of DSP availability for the Annex 
II services, we would argue to include ISPs in the list of services in Annex II in fu-
ture editions of the Directive (cf. the review clause in Article 23.2).
It should also be noted that there are other inter-dependencies between the OES 
in Annex II: 
 – Electricity and water, both for drinking and hygienic purposes, are inter-twined: 
in most cases, the water supply depends on the availability of electricity be-
cause pumps are needed to produce the necessary pressure in the pipes to de-
liver the water (Petermann et al., 2011, pp. 14, 125). There are only a few excep-
tions, for instance in Alpine areas (e.g., Vienna), where the water supply works 
with the natural pressure of communicating vessels (City of Vienna, undated).
 – Another example would be banking (and thereby the ability to obtain cash) and 
electricity (Sweden, undated). In this context, a cash-less society would pose 
enormous risks in the case of a blackout. In this context, the Swedish decision 
to move to a cash-less society should seriously be reconsidered.
The NIS Directive recognizes the importance of a coordinated approach (as em-
bodied by ENISA), but it does not in the least disregard the responsibility of the 
10 Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (undated); for a list of Austrian Autonomous System Num-
bers assigned to Internet Service Providers see IPinfo (undated).
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Member States:
 – In the first place, this concerns national security (Article 4.3) which also has to 
be seen in the context of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), Article 4.2: 
‘In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member 
State’. 
 – Even beyond that, Article 3 of the NIS Directive determines a ‘minimum har-
monization’ in that Member States may implement measures beyond the min-
imum level required by the directive.
 – The entire Chapter II of the directive finally outlines the national responsibility 
of the Member States. 
3. National strategies 
3.1. General considerations
The Directive calls for national initiatives (Article 7.1) most importantly in re-
gards to:
 – The establishment of a national strategy for network and information system 
security, a risk assessment and a governance framework for achieving it;
 – Measures for preparedness and response; and
 – Education and awareness-raising measures and pertinent research activities.
The key organizational element in this context is the establishment of computer 
security incident response teams (CSIRT, cf. Article 9). Annex I details their tasks, 
most importantly:
 – Incident monitoring on a national level;
 – Alerts and early warning, situational awareness;
 – Incident response; and
 – Cooperation with the private sector, other CSIRT (cf. Article 12) as well as 
ENISA and the Commission (Article 11). 
In this context, ‘situational awareness’ and ‘incident response’ appear to be the 
key elements in any real-world cyber-defense, whereby the former is the key pre-
requisite of the latter. From a practical point of view this imposes the following 
practical requirements:
 – Establish smooth working conditions between entities covered by the CSIRT 
and the CSIRT to ensure a timely flow of information in both directions; this 
includes non-disruptable channels of communication between CSIRT and the 
entities; 
 – A sufficient number of highly qualified personnel to provide the situational 
awareness, to identify threat patterns early on, to devise effective counter mea-
sures and to coordinate and guide entities to limit damage and ultimately re-
solve the security issue; 
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 – Forensic activities to support law enforcement in tracking down the source of 
the disruption; and 
 – Design and disseminate preventive measures.
The key element here is ‘sufficient number of highly qualified personnel’. We 
argue that this is the key factor between a CSIRT that monitors, advises and co-
ordinates and a CSIRT that provides effective incident response as required in the 
directive. 
3.2. Austria
There are seven CSIRTs listed in the ENISA directory for Austria (European 
Union Agency for Cybersecurity, undated): A national CSIRT (cert.at), two for 
financial institutions, the Austrian energy CSIRT, one ISP and two government 
CSIRTs (federal and general public administration and one for Vienna). cert.at also 
lists seven additional CERT (computer emergency response teams (Online Sicher-
heit, undated)) that are however not registered with ENISA. They cover diverse 
areas, such as social security, telecom companies or the Vienna transport system 
(in addition to the Vienna administration CERT). Two observations can be made:
 – The approach is fragmented and not systematically structured; and
 – It may be doubtful if the institutions are sufficiently staffed.
The staff directory of cert.at, the national CSIRT, lists seven team members 
(Austrian National CERT, undated), which is barely sufficient to provide a 24x7 
shift service. This is certainly sufficient for observation, education and information 
dissemination activities, but not even remotely sufficient for incidence response 
in the case of a severe attack on the national infrastructure. It remains to be seen 
whether the situation is substantially different in other Member States. 
3.3. The way forward
3.3.1. The NIS Directive 
The first step appears to be to include ISPs as OES. Not only are ISP services 
essential in themselves, they are integral part of a number of OES already listed in 
Annex II, such as financial services, electricity or transportation. 
Another point concerns the liability of OES. The NIS Directive neglects to ad-
dress the issue of liability to the extent that it would ensure that OES are protected 
(cf. Recital 50). Liability is a decisive factor in ensuring that the best quality of 
goods and services are supplied to the OES and liability should be proportional to 
the impact that a disruption of an Essential Service (ES) would cause. In this way, 
private industry is forced to take responsibility for what it produces and to whom 
it supplies what it produces. 
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3.3.2. Security-sensitive solutions
Standardization means accessibility to technology giving cybercriminals oppor-
tunities to study the technology for security leaks. In this way variation and a move 
away from standard industry software is an advantage11, even if the technology 
may be less sophisticated. On the other hand, it is important to distinguish between 
the latest advancements technologically and that which is proven to be stable and 
secure yet may lack convenient functionality12. 
3.3.3. Soft factors
There is no such thing as a secure information system, however, security is not 
only defined by ‘hard’ technological factors. There are at least three other elements: 
(i) education of users, (ii) proactive measures preventing cyber-crime, and (iii) edu-
cating cyber experts to fill the ranks needed. 
It should become mandatory and a matter-of-fact to teach new (and also ex-
isting) employees cyber-security basics. An example may be the hacking of the 
email server of the Democratic Party in 2016, which reportedly originated from a 
spear-phishing attack on John Podesta, Ms. Clinton’s campaign manager (Murnane, 
2016). Cyber-security training for everybody should become corporate standard. 
Among the proactive measures, the most important seems to be a respectful and 
appreciative work climate. The worst cyber attacker is a disenfranchised, disgrun-
tled or even genuinely maltreated employee who then constitutes a security risk 
(Izuakor, 2019). Proactive measures should be taken to create a positive workplace 
climate to avoid these developments. 
The NIS Directive calls for CSIRTs to be established. However, these response 
teams need to be properly staffed, which requires a trained workforce (cf. also 
Annex I). University but also sub-university level educational institutions should be 
called upon to produce this skilled workforce. 
11 There are, for instance, Linux derivatives specifically geared to non-standard security-sensitive 
applications, such as enGardeLinux (undated). Running security-sensitive applications on gener-
al-purpose (and possibly even outdated) software is not an advisable approach, yet it happens in 
some rather astonishing contexts (Boyle and Farmer, 2017).
12 A technical example may be X-terminals instead of personal computers. X-terminals are display/
entry-only devices without any local software installed. The entire application is run on a server, 
which is then calibrated accordingly. There is no opportunity to attach local devices, such as USB 
sticks, and in most cases, the minimal local software (mainly graphics drivers) is installed on ROM 
(Linux, undated) and hence cannot be altered. Since all user interaction is processed at the server, 
there is a complete log on every user activity including online checks monitoring user activity on 
a real-time basis. 
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3.3.4. Criminal law
The NIS Directive takes a defensive standpoint, and although we do need to 
look at the problem from this perspective, very little has been done to tackle the 
problem from an offensive standpoint, except to adopt measures that deter possible 
cybercrime as in Article 21. This means that Member States are free to decide on the 
penalties for cybercrimes pertaining to critical infrastructure that are committed 
in their state. A European wide penalty system would be more appropriate in this 
context. 
4. Conclusion
The NIS Directive – with all its shortcomings – is a milestone towards a com-
mon European cyber-security space. It provides a common organizational frame-
work and standards, and it provides for cooperation and information exchange. We 
have listed some potential for improvement in the last sections. However, the most 
important conclusion is that the directive does not and cannot be a substitute for 
properly equipped and staffed response teams on the operational level. We would 
encourage Member States to invest in this resource, as the costs incurred are negli-
gible compared to those of a severe incident. 
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The article examines the link between public trust and effective enforcement of legal rules, in the con-
text of regulation and management of public services/services of general interests (SGIs). Considering the 
severe challenges that the European Union and its Member States have to overcome nowadays, trust in 
institutions being responsible for public service delivery at different governance level is a crucial issue. 
Due to the evolution of the legal framework in this area, the EU is an important supranational actor in the 
regulation of such services today, even for those provided at local level. The present paper aims to highlight 
the enforcement problems of those EU law obligations which directly or indirectly concern public service 
provision in the Member States. We will see that the operation of judicial proceedings and other enforce-
ment instruments raises many questions on the effectiveness of EU rules in this particular area. These are 
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European legal framework including the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
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1. Introduction
The article examines the link between public trust and effective enforcement of 
legal rules, in the context of regulation and management of public services/services 
of general interests (SGIs). Considering severe challenges that the European Union 
and its Member States have to overcome nowadays, trust in institutions being re-
sponsible for public service delivery at different governance levels is a crucial issue. 
Due to the evolution of the legal framework in this area, the EU is an important 
supranational actor in regulation of such services today, even for those provided at 
local level. The present paper aims to highlight the enforcement problems of those 
EU law obligations which directly or indirectly concern public service provision in 
the Member States. 
The first part of the paper explores the substantial and procedural rules of the 
relevant EU legal framework. In this context, a particular emphasis is laid to the 
role and degree of discretionary powers left to national authorities in defining the 
underlying concepts and measures needed to take to fulfil the Member States’ pub-
lic service obligations.
We will see that enforcement challenges may also be derived from the terminol-
ogy itself. The operation of judicial proceedings and other enforcement instruments 
raises further questions on the effectiveness of EU rules concerning public service 
provision in the Member States. The second part of the paper focuses on the most 
challenging issues in this field.
Finally, those factors will be examined and tested on the SGI related case-law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU or Court depending 
on the context) which may influence public trust in judicial bodies. In this respect, 
not only the citizens’ perspectives will be focused, but also those of the companies/
other legal entities as actual and potential service providers in the internal market 
of the European Union. We argue that sector specific analysis of trust in EU institu-
tions would have relevance in order to better identify those factors which may have 
an impact on the level of public confidence.
2. Conceptual background
EU law, though it also uses terms evolved at national level (i. e. public utili-
ties or/and public services), has a distinct conceptual framework (for details, see 
Szyszczak, 2017). The EU terminology is based on the categories of Services of Gen-
eral Economic Interest (SGEI), Services of General Interest (SGI) and Services of 
Social General Interest (SSGI) (European Commission, 2006). The former (SGEI) is 
used in primary law texts, without being defined in the Treaty or in secondary leg-
islation. However, in the case-law of the CJEU and EU Commission practice there 
is broad agreement that SGEI refers to services of an economic nature, with the 
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Member States or the EU being subject to specific public service obligations (PSO) 
as compared to other economic activities by virtue of a general interest criterion 
(Cases C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova and C-242/95 GT-Link). The 
term SGI, the closest EU law equivalent to the traditional notion of public services 
(Sauter, 2014, p. 17), is also derived from the practice. It is broader than SGEI and 
covers both market and non-market services which the public authorities classify 
as being of general interest and subject to specific public service obligations (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011).
3. Methodology
The present paper is based on comparative policy investigations and analysis of 
the European legal framework including the case-law of the CJEU. For the empiri-
cal part of the research, we obtained data from Eurobarometer surveys (European 
Commission, 2013; European Commission, 2018), as well as a specific CJEU case-
law database containing a thematic collection of all CJEU cases relating EU Member 
States’ legislation and administrative practice in the provision of services of general 
interests (non-published database of the MTA-DE Public Service Research Group, 
hereinafter SGI case-law database). Annual reports of the CJEU (CJEU, 2000-2018) 
have been also used for statistical analysis.
4. Services of general interest in the European integration 
As a general rule, EU internal market and competition rules apply to services of 
general economic interest as well, save where they fall under specific regulations 
or exceptional clauses of the EU Treaties. In this section, we will briefly outline the 
legal fundamentals relevant to SGIs including those provisions escaping them from 
the generally applicable market rules. 
Article 106(1) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 
TFEU) generally states that public undertakings and those entrusted with special 
or exclusive rights are not exempted from EU competition rules. Article 106(2), 
however, lays down a derogatory regime for services of general economic interest 
(Bauby and Similie, 2016, p. 19), providing that these undertakings are subject to 
EU competition law provisions (that is Articles 101, 102 and 107 TFEU) only in so 
far as the application of such provisions does not obstruct the performance of their 
particular public service obligation. 
Most cases concerning the conflict between EU competition rules and public 
services have been examined in the context of dominance abuse, state aid rules 
(Sauter, 2014, p. 75). Granting exclusive or special rights to an undertaking often 
generates the dominant position itself that is the precondition for unlawful con-
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duct under Article 102 TFEU which, as Article 106(2) suggests, may nevertheless be 
saved by referring to the ‘particular tasks assigned to them’. The legality of public 
monopolies and other entities (often operating as state-owned companies) enjoying 
exclusive or special rights is supported by the freedom of Member States to choose 
their system of property ownership, guaranteed by Article 345 TFEU (Sauter, 2014, 
p. 44).
State aids are in principle prohibited under Article 107(1) TFEU, unless they are 
found to be compatible with the internal market due to their specific objectives 
under paragraphs (2) or (3) of the same provision. In the case of SGEI, however, 
public service obligation compensation (see below) does not qualify as state aid. 
In addition, non-economic SGI a priori fall outside the scope of Article 107 TFEU, 
since state aid rules only extend to services that qualify as economic activities 
(Sauter, 2014, p. 76).
General internal market and competition rules do not apply (or only as back-
ground rules/principles) if SGIs are subject to secondary legislation on specific sec-
tors like electricity, telecommunication, etc. 
Although the above provisions existed from the very beginning of the European 
integration process, their role and significance have changed over time. The ‘Euro-
peanization of public services’ started only in the mid-eighties with the entry into 
force of the Single European Act (SEA). The process of creation of a single market 
engaged by the SEA led to a progressive liberalization, sector by sector (Bauby and 
Similie, 2016, p. 3). As the national markets in transport and energy have become 
integrated with this conception, public service obligations have been obstacles to 
market creation (Opinion of AG Colomer in case C-265/08 Federutility; Prosser, 
2005, p. 121). 
Critical movements against this free market orientation led to the first Commis-
sion Communication on services of general interest of 1996 (European Commission, 
1996), which laid a particular emphasis on the social elements of public services 
as well as the limits of market forces (Prosser, 2005, p. 156). Then, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 1997 has been amended by a new Article 16 of the Treaty of Euro-
pean Community (TEC) which, among the fundamental principles of the EU, rein-
forces the constitutional importance of the role and protection of SGEI obligations. 
As safeguarding public services is primarily the interest of the Member States, the 
provision can be seen as a confirmation of the Member States’ traditional prerog-
atives and discretionary power in the organization of such services (Rusche, 2013, 
p. 102; Schweitzer, 2011, p. 55).
The ‘safeguarding’ provision introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty (ex-Article 
16 TEC, now Art. 14 TFEU) has been slightly (but importantly) modified by the 
Lisbon Treaty, with an express reference to the protection of national autonomy. 
The new provision expressly pointed out the Member States’ competence to pro-
vide, to commission and to fund such services. A Protocol on Services of General 
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Interest (No. 26) was also added to the Treaties (TEU and TFEU). Reading Article 14 
and the Protocol together, there is an even higher emphasis on national and local 
interests and a more state-centered approach seems to be applied to the protection 
of public service values. Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights including 
the right to access to SGEI became binding with equal effect to the Treaties by 
entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. These provisions reflect a political 
signal from the authors of the Lisbon Treaty that there is a need for protection of 
SGEI and particular local interests attached to them against the efforts of liberaliza-
tion (Rusche, 2013, p. 106; Krajewski, 2011, p. 186).
The Commission’s legislative activity from the mid-2000s was largely influenced 
by the case-law of the ECJ. The leading decision is the Altmark judgment of 2003 
(C-280/00 Altmark Trans) in which the Court held that the discharge of PSO is not 
covered by Article 107(1) TFEU where it merely compensates the provider of a pub-
lic service mission for the costs that arise due to the performance of the PSO and 
determined four cumulative criteria which have to be met for not qualifying public 
service compensation as state aid. By declaring this group of financial compensa-
tions out of the realm of the state aid concept, the Court, in essence, largely reduced 
the monitoring and decision-making competence of the Commission over national 
measures granting compensation for public services (Bauby and Similie, 2016, pp. 
8-9), as the judgment allows for a self-assessment by Member States of that issue. 
5. Enforcement challenges in SGI cases
All the above specific features of substantive SGI regulation at the EU level – in 
particular, the strong emphasis on the national competences – have a significant 
impact on procedural aspects as well. Enforcement challenges may be derived from 
the terminology (SGEI, SGI, SSGI) itself since there is a quite unclear borderline 
between the respective terms. The ambiguity of the relevant concepts may raise 
several problems as we will see in the following section.
5.1. Concepts as enforcement challenges
First of all, neither the ECJ nor the Commission provide further precision for the 
concept elements of ‘general interest’ and ‘special characteristics’ of SGEI (Bauby 
and Similie, 2016, p. 20). Within the framework established by fundamental rules 
of EU law, the case law acknowledge that Member States have a wide margin of 
discretion when defining what they consider to be an SGEI or SGI (Case T-106/95 
FFSA and Others). Definitions given by Member States may be subject to control of 
the European Commission only for manifest error (European Commission, 2012) 
and in most cases, these definitions were validated by the CJEU case law (see for 
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instance Cases T-289/03 BUPA and T-17/02 Fred Olsen) and the European Commis-
sion’s practice (Bauby and Similie, 2016, p. 21). Member States thus remain rela-
tively free in determining the scope of those activities which, by reference on the 
SGI-exception clauses examined above, may be ‘saved’ from the generally applica-
ble EU law rules.
Secondly, delimitation between SGEI and non-economic SGI (NESGI) would be 
especially important as only the latter category is exempted from EU internal mar-
ket and competition law rules, though NESGIs are also subject to the most fun-
damental principles of EU law such as transparency, non-discrimination, propor-
tionality or citizenship provisions of the Treaties (Szyszczak, 2017). However, the 
concept of ‘non-economic’ services is not clearly defined in EU law due to political 
choice, economic developments or evolution of users’ needs, the classification of a 
given service can change over time (European Commission, 2012) and therefore it 
is not possible to draw up an exhaustive list of activities that a priori would never 
be economic. Thus, a large ‘grey area’ exists between these two categories (SGEI – 
NESGI), in particular in the field of health, education, social services and housing 
(Bauby and Similie, 2016, p. 16).
5.2. Procedures available at the EU level
In this section, we summarize the most relevant procedural tools at EU and na-
tional level being used for the enforcement of the Member States’ SGI-related ob-
ligations explained above. As was already mentioned, the majority of cases have 
been examined in the context of dominance abuse, state aid rules or sector specific 
legislation.
5.2.1. Enforcement of state aid and competition rules
The effective enforcement of EU state aid rules very much depends on the scope 
of those measures which are notified to the European Commission. As a main rule, 
all new aids must be notified before putting them into effect. There are, however, ex-
ceptions to mandatory notification. As was mentioned above, the Altmark judgment 
largely reduced the monitoring and decision-making competence of the Commis-
sion over national measures granting compensation for public services since aids 
meeting the Altmark criteria became exempted from the notification obligation. The 
Commission’s legislative activity, although it was not its declared aim, definitely 
followed that line raising several concerns for Member States’ compliance.
The Commission is also authorized to investigate cases of suspected infringe-
ment of Article 102 TFEU (prohibiting abuse of dominant position) and to prohibit 
the infringement or impose fines on the firm(s) concerned. Before 2004, the enforce-
ment of antitrust procedure has been only a matter for the Commission. Since then, 
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however, the system has been decentralized by giving the primary enforcement 
role to national competition authorities (NCAs) in the Member State and national 
courts. The reform is significant given the fundamental divergences in attitudes to 
the treatment of public services between different Member States; therefore, on the 
one hand, decentralization could be seen as promoting greater responsiveness to 
national sensitivities but, on the other, it makes a consistent approach more difficult 
given the major differences in national law and policies (Prosser, 2010, pp. 316-317). 
The practice also shows that it is very often a difficult task for the national courts 
to find the right balance between economic and social factors in competition law 
cases concerning public services (especially welfare services) and sometimes even 
the ECJ’s preliminary rulings leave important issues to be solved by the national 
courts (Nistor, 2011, p. 203).
5.2.2. Enforcement before the CJEU
The CJEU has four main procedures: (1) preliminary references from Member 
State’s courts (preliminary ruling procedures), (2) enforcement actions by the Com-
mission (or rather rarely by a Member State) against a Member State (infringement 
procedures), (3) review of the legality of actions of the EU institutions (annulment 
procedures), and (4) the actions for damages against the EU institutions (Conway, 
2018, p. 235). In SGI case-law, the first three (1–3) procedures are relevant, the 
fourth one plays a rather marginal role if any.
The preliminary ruling procedure not only gives an opportunity for national 
courts of being assisted by the Court’s interpretation in the individual case, but 
also serves as a platform for sending message to the Member State concerned on 
the EU-law compatibility of its legislation (or administrative practice) being appli-
cable in the national court’s proceeding. The final judgment is, however, issued by 
the national court deciding the concrete case and its impact on the Member State’s 
infringement is only indirect.
At the EU level, infringement proceedings under Articles 258-260 TFEU are the 
classic methods of supervision of Member States’ obligations under EU law. Decid-
ing whether or not to initiate the procedure and bring an action before the Court 
under Article 258 falls within the discretionary power of the Commission (or an-
other Member State under Article 259 TFEU). If the Court finally concludes that 
the Member State has failed to fulfil its EU law obligations, a declaratory judgment 
is issued which gives no further guidance as to what steps the Member State must 
take to put an end to the infringement. Article 260 infringement proceeding, where 
the Court has the competence to impose fines or penalties, may be initiated only at 
this stage, if the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not 
taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment under the previous 
(Article 258 TFEU) proceeding.
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The parties subject to a Commission decision under the state aid or antitrust 
procedure, have the right to appeal to the General Court for the decision to be 
annulled. Judgments of the General Court can be appealed before the Court of 
Justice by the unsuccessful party, however, these appeals are limited to questions 
of law only.
6. Discussion: public trust and CJEU procedures in SGI related cases
One of the key factors of measuring the effectiveness of mechanisms examined 
above is the level of public trust in institutions being responsible for the enforce-
ment of EU law obligations which directly or indirectly concern Member States’ 
tasks of providing public services to their citizens. In the following, we examine 
survey results related to public trust in CJEU as well as the academic debate on 
these surveys. This analysis enables us to supplement our findings based on the 
SGI case-law database and to draw further conclusions on the nature of EU en-
forcement instruments in this particular area. This is the reason why we focus on 
CJEU surveys only and do not extend our analysis on the European Commission or 
national authorities.
In the academic literature, there is a widespread discussion about the level of 
public trust in and the legitimacy of the CJEU. The findings are quite controversial, 
however, some general conclusion can be drawn on the basis of these. Before going 
into details, it is important to note that surveys examined above cover the whole 
activity of the CJEU since there have been no sector specific survey on trust in EU 
institutions so far, neither at the European nor at the national level. This factor will 
be taken into consideration when formulating our final conclusions on SGI related 
enforcement instruments.
In the absence of systematic information about the attitudes of national courts 
and governments about the CJEU (which goes beyond indirect evidences like fre-
quency of submitting preliminary references to the Court or compliance rate with 
CJEU decisions), the empirical literature on CJEU legitimacy focuses almost exclu-
sively on public opinion data testing public knowledge of and trust in the Court 
(Pollack, 2018, pp. 163-164). These data primarily come from Eurobarometer sur-
veys where the respondents have to answer three overall questions addressing the 
(1) public awareness of, (2) the importance of, and (3) the public trust in the CJEU 
(‘… tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust it?’ – The CJEU). The overall pic-
ture on the basis of these surveys is that the CJEU has generated a relatively high 
level of public confidence throughout many decades, declining precipitously after 
the 2008 financial and economic crises (Pollack, 2018, p. 164).
On the basis of Eurobarometer data conducted between 1999 and 2010, net pub-
lic trust (the percentage of those tending to trust in an institution minus those 
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tending not to trust) in the CJEU had been consistently positive during this period 
(Kelemen, 2012, p. 48). At the same time, the percentage of expressions of trust in 
the CJEU have decreased significantly, from a high of 63% in 1993 to a low of 48% 
in 2013 among all EU respondents, while distrust has more than doubled over the 
same period, from 15% in 1993 to 35% in 2013 (European Commission, 2013; Pollack, 
2018, p. 171).
As Pollack points out, levels of trust have declined in nearly every Member State 
between 1993 and 2013, but, in terms of percentages, there are large differences 
across the countries. In most Northern European countries, including Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the Member States (Austria, 
Finland and Sweden) joined the EU in 1995, support for the CJEU remains high 
and has been largely stable over time. Among the new Member States that joined 
in 2004 and 2007, a majority (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) show somewhat lower but consistently positive lev-
els of net trust in the CJEU over time. The UK has been ‘an outlier’ from the basical-
ly positive trends (Voeten, 2013, p. 425): ‘don’t trust’ responses of UK citizens have 
increased steadily and consistently outpace trust in the Court since 2007 (Pollack, 
2018).
The most striking result has been the collapse of public trust in the CJEU (along 
with other EU institutions) in South European countries like Greece, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal (European Commission, 2013, p. 95). These states began with fair-
ly strong levels of trust in 1993, however, in the years following the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, ‘don’t trust’ responses predominate in all four countries (plus Cyprus) 
(Pollack, 2018). Such a dramatic decline in support of CJEU has been explained by 
‘the generalized resentment of EU-mandated austerity’ which had ‘infected’ popu-
lar views of the Court in those countries and these changes in trust levels are rather 
independent from the actions and decisions of the CJEU itself (Pollack, 2018, p. 173).
By 2018, the balance of opinion between trust and distrust in the CJEU has im-
proved slightly since 2013 at the EU level. Trust is unchanged at 48%, while distrust 
has decreased by four percentage points to 31%, with an equivalent rise in the ‘Don’t 
know’ rate (21%). Similar to the above tendencies before 2013, trust in the CJEU has 
evolved in the EU countries in sharply contrasting ways (European Commission, 
2018, p. 95). Since 2013, it has increased in ten Member States, with striking rises in 
South European countries like Portugal (52%, +18 percentage points), Cyprus (49%, 
+18), Spain (39%, +13) and Greece (48%, +11). However, it has decreased in 16 coun-
tries, very sharply in those joined in 2004, such as the Czech Republic (32%, -24 per-
centage points), Slovakia (40%, -21), Bulgaria (41%, -18), Poland (41%, -18), Croatia 
(34%, -14), Hungary (45%, -13), Estonia (52%, -12) and Slovenia (45%, -9) (European 
Commission, 2018, p. 95).
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Figure 1: Public trust in CJEU in 2018
Source: European Commission (2018)
In general, studies based on Eurobarometer data and other CJEU trust surveys 
conclude that the CJEU is one of the most trusted institutions in Europe. Howev-
er, the level of public support can change over time (sometimes rapidly), as it was 
demonstrated in the state by state survey results. It is also observed that the CJEU is 
quite sensitive towards a broader legitimacy crisis in the EU (Pollack, 2018, p. 173). 
As we have seen from the above analysis, CJEU trust surveys do not address 
specific parameters determining public confidence, most of them raise overall ques-
tions to the respondents. Nevertheless, certain indicators are generally accepted in 
the academic literature and empirical studies as those being able to influence public 
trust in the judiciary. These are especially the outcome of a case, the reasoning of 
the judgment, level of judicial independence, knowledge about an institution, trans-
parency (Team Finland, 2019). Also, efficiency factors (length of proceedings, an-
nual number of closed cases etc.) correlate with higher levels of public confidence.
Most of these factors also serve as quality indicators to measure the performance 
of the judiciary. The concept of ‘quality’ needs, however, further explanation at this 
point. Although there is no single agreed way of measuring the quality of judi-
cial decision-making (European Commission, 2017, p. 4; Bencze and Yein Ng, 2018, 
p. 2), certain common standards must be always considered in this context. Effi-
ciency issues are mostly focused on when it comes to objective evaluations of the 
performance of judicial systems (Bencze and Yein Ng, 2018, p. 1).
As for national judiciary, the European Commission annually publishes its score-
boards (hereinafter EU Justice scoreboards) providing comparative data on quality 
indicators at Member States’ level. Quality, independence and efficiency are the 
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guiding principles of presenting specific metrics like the accessibility of justice for 
citizens and businesses, various dimensions of independency as well as the length 
of judicial proceedings. The scoreboards also lay a strong emphasis on the link be-
tween the efficiency of judicial systems and the economic performance of the EU as 
a whole. ‘Across the EU, mutual understanding and trust in justice systems – their 
quality, independence and efficiency – is essential to the functioning of the internal 
market.’ Quality is also highlighted by the Commission as ‘a driver for citizens’ and 
businesses’ trust in the justice system’ (European Commission, 2017, p. 4). 
These factors are also relevant when assessing the public trust in and the per-
formance of international courts. However, special circumstances must always be 
considered in the evaluation of a particular judicial practice (Bencze and Yein Ng, 
2018, p. 1). Regarding the CJEU, these circumstances are mostly determined by the 
rules governing its jurisdiction, the specific ‘work-sharing’ relation between the EU 
courts and national courts, as well as the style of the jurisprudence, which is influ-
enced by different legal traditions in Europe. As we already established, there are 
three main CJEU procedures where most SGI cases are disposed of: (1) preliminary 
ruling, (2) infringement and (3) annulment procedures.
These procedures are fundamental to the CJEU’s role (Conway, 2018, p. 235) as 
they determine the ways in which citizens and businesses can get access to judicial 
protection at EU level. It is true for all the three types that they can provide rather 
limited or indirect access to CJEU for individuals (i. e. citizens and companies). 
Preliminary ruling procedures (1) are always initiated by a national court which 
may request the CJEU to give a ruling on the interpretation of certain EU law pro-
vision(s) if it is necessary to decide in a case pending before it. Although parties to 
the dispute may initiate that the court requests preliminary ruling, such initiatives 
do not oblige the national court which has a full autonomy to decide whether it 
needs a ruling from the CJEU or not. Infringement procedures, as we have seen, can 
never be launched by individuals. The only thing they can do is the submission of a 
‘complain’ to the European Commission in which they indicate the alleged failure 
of compliance with the Member State(s)’ EU law obligation(s). And finally, actions 
for annulment (3) can be brought by individuals under very strict conditions. It 
makes their opportunities to access to justice in this procedure much more limited 
than for EU institutions or Member States.
The limits for access to justice for individuals are also reflected by the nature of 
legal issues brought before the CJEU in SGI related cases. In this regard, it is inter-
esting to note that Article 36 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights declaring 
the right to access to SGEIs, although it has binding legal effect since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, was invoked and examined on substance in 
one single case of the CJEU (C285/18 Irgita). In all other cases, this provision was 
only mentioned as supporting argument in the Court’s reasoning or in Advocate 
General opinions.
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The question of judicial independence is less contested in relation to the CJEU, 
national judicial bodies are more focused in this respect. Member States’ courts 
play, as was explained above, an essential role in preliminary ruling procedures, 
and are more easily available for citizens and businesses not only in pure domestic 
disputes but also when it comes to the application of EU law. National rules affect-
ing judicial independence were challenged in some recently closed cases (others are 
still pending) but SGI issues were not (yet) concerned by these proceedings.
A logic based on performance indicators relate mainly to the length of proceed-
ings (including average length of court proceedings calculated from actual cases in 
specific areas of EU law) (Jeuland, 2018, p. 141), which is an essential component of 
influencing public trust in the judiciary (European Commission, 2017, p. 1). Timely 
outcome is a fundamental right for all parties which demands efficiency (European 
Commission, 2017, p. 4). As a result of our empirical analysis based on the SGI case-
law database we have found that the average duration of proceedings in SGI related 
cases (closed between 2000 and 2018) is more than eight months longer than that of 
all CJEU cases (closed in the same period of time).
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Figure 2: Average length of CJEU procedures in cases closed between 2000-2018 (in months)
Source: CJEU 2000-2018; SGI case-law database
One of the main reasons for such a huge difference in terms of length of pro-
ceedings between SGI related and ‘normal’ cases might be the complex regulatory 
and economic background to the former cases which may influence the duration 
of procedures in numerous factors (capacity and expertise needed to review the 
Commission’s market analysis, etc.). At the same time, consequences of such rel-
ative long proceedings may be serious in this area. As was pointed out in other 
studies (Horváth and Bartha, 2018; Bartha and Horváth, 2020), the provision of pub-
lic services (especially the public utility sector) may easily become the targets of 
‘nationalist’ or ‘protectionist’ measures or even of a complete sector reorganization 
process. The effective protection of foreign undertakings’ rights that, as a result of 
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these measures, have been excluded from the market, do not seem to be protected 
by CJEU procedures if it takes years to reach the final decision in the given case. 
Such a long period of time is enough to reach the targeted market result of the na-
tional legislator, which cannot be returned by simple modification or replacement 
of ‘bad laws’.
The above factors must be influential on the level of public confidence (especial-
ly the length of procedures in times of economic downturn), even if we accept the 
above conclusion (Pollack, 2018, p. 173) that the decline in trust rather depends on 
the legitimacy and the actions of the EU as a whole than the decisions of the CJEU 
itself. Based on measurement methods (Caldeira and Gibson, 1995, pp. 356-376) oth-
er than Eurobarometer surveys, it is also admitted that public attitudes toward the 
Court is highly sensitive to the use of metric (Pollack, 2018, p. 173).
7. Conclusions
Member States’ obligations under EU law which concern their traditional func-
tion to provide public services to their citizens create a complex system nowadays. 
The present paper sought to outline this set of obligations, by accessing their real 
content in light of a political and legislative ‘Europeanization’ process where the 
rank of public services (Services of General Interest) gradually developed in the 
European integration. In this context, the most challenging issues in enforcement 
of SGI related obligations of the Member States were also pointed out.
We have seen that the operation of judicial proceedings and other enforcement 
instruments raise quite a few concerns on the effectiveness of EU rules in this par-
ticular area which are able to impact the level of trust in EU institutions. We ex-
amined these factors in two dimensions, i.e., on the basis of general CJEU trust 
surveys, on the one hand, and of the particular findings of our empirical research, 
on the other. Our results have proved our initial statement that sector specific anal-
ysis of trust in EU institutions would be justifiable in order to better identify those 
factors which may influence the level of public confidence.
All in all, we can conclude that our findings related specifically to SGI case-
law (access to justice, length of procedure, etc.) are not among those factors which 
proved to increase the public trust in the CJEU. Two important issues should be 
highlighted at this point. On the one hand, procedural rules can provide rather 
limited or indirect access to CJEU for citizens and business and these limits are also 
reflected by the nature of legal issues brought before the CJEU in SGI related cases. 
On the other hand, we have found that the average duration of proceedings in SGI 
related cases is appreciably longer than that of all CJEU cases. As was elaborated 
above, the second factor, in particular, may lead to serious consequences for the 
market position of businesses as well as for the citizens’ right to access to SGIs on 
the internal market and finally on the level of public confidence in the institution.
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Abstract
The usage of elements such as environmental and social responsibility, lifelong learning and value-cen-
teredness is ever more frequent in the mission statements of Transylvanian Hungarian public cultural insti-
tutions, along with objectives such as community building, development of social activity, or promoting par-
ticipative attitudes. At the same time, concepts such as participative theatre, community museum or library 
seem to find their way into these statements as activities where citizens, instead of being mere consumers, 
become participants in the creation of the cultural product.
Participative behavior and cultural education are two concepts impossible to radically separate from 
each other: as participative behavior designates the end, so cultural education represents the means. Thus, 
in the case of performing arts institutions and public collections, typical activities of participative operation 
overlap with different forms of cultural education.
Although in the case of Transylvanian Hungarian cultural institutions, it would be premature to talk 
about forms that have extended into society, the introduction of cultural education programs might indicate 
a slow shift into this direction. The aim of my long-term research is to discover the effect of cultural educa-
tion paradigms, or, in a broader sense, participative operation in the community on the communication of 
Transylvanian Hungarian cultural institutions. In this study, through interviews conducted with leaders of 
Transylvanian cultural institutions, I assess how these institutions position themselves in their own commu-
nities, and what are the means they employ in the service of a specific segment of the experience society 
– young people whose own preferences are not yet fully formed.
Keywords: cultural management, theater pedagogy, museum education, community engagement, cul-
tural vitality.
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1. Commitment to community in organization management
In the annual survey conducted by the Institute for National Cultural Research 
and Development (INCRD – Institutul Național de Cercetare și Formare Culturală) 
regarding cultural supply and vitality, Transylvanian settlements, inhabited most-
ly or significantly by Hungarians, figure among the best ten, with the best scores 
(Croitoru, Becuț Marinescu and Oană, 2019, Croitoru and Becuț Marinescu, 2017). 
The reason for this, on the one hand, is that the bulk of the cultural infrastructure 
is concentrated in the geographical area of Partium and the historical Transylvania, 
whereas on the other hand, the extent of cultural consumption, the presence of 
cultural and creative industries, and last but not least, the attitude of the financing 
institutions, such as the local government.
Besides economic aspects and those regarding supply, education and attendance, 
experts emphasize the role of the decision-makers in the social positioning of (pub-
lic) cultural institutions. Vitality indices regarding 2018 data and published in 2019 
show no significant changes compared to earlier years. Among the 46 Romanian cit-
ies studied, regarding cultural vitality, the first spot is occupied by Cluj-Napoca, fol-
lowed by Sfântu Gheorghe and Miercurea Ciuc, Târgu Mureș is the fifth, Timișoara 
the ninth, Oradea the 14th, Arad the 18th, and Satu Mare the 20th – Odorheiu Secuiesc, 
also assessed in this paper, is not listed (Croitoru, Becuț Marinescu and Oană, 2019). 
The INCRD study shows that the top positions taken by settlements in the Szekler 
region are directly proportional with financing well above the national average, 
with the cultural supply per capita above average as well.
The vitality of the cultural sector is an important index of welfare societies: ‘cre-
ative cities, as forms of expression of cultural vitality, are cities with strong econo-
mies, with above-average job opportunities and human capital, which, due to their 
absorption capacity, overpass settlements that do not support creative industries’ 
(Croitoru, Becuț Marinescu and Oană, 2019, p. 5). Community development with 
a cultural perspective ‘is not only a program designed to develop human capacity, 
but also a complex activity that includes tasks aimed at organizational, community, 
municipal, and regional development’ (Beke, 2001, pp. 377-378; Kolb, 2013), thus, 
with regards to Romanian cultural institutions, decision makers will have an essen-
tial role in this type of social development.
Recognizing this, in the past decade, local governments that have Transylva-
nian Hungarian cultural institutions in subordination appear to show a greater ap-
preciation of the role of performing arts institutions and public collections in city 
and community development. Parallel to this, museums, theatres, concert halls and 
libraries face a real demand for community experience regarding no only the at-
titudes expressed by consumers / visitors / recipients, but also influences the role 
taken by these institutions. ‘Participation-based operation is organizational devel-
opment’ (Arapovics et al., 2017, p. 14) – says dr. Arapovics Mária, a development 
where state-funded cultural and performing arts institutions stop being the only 
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panels that define the canon. Because of the way these institutions are embedded 
into the bureaucratic system, this classic, hierarchical thinking is not easily replaced 
by structures based mainly on participation. And if we consider the financing of 
Transylvanian Hungarian cultural institutions (or those that consistently address a 
Hungarian public as well), it becomes obvious that processes aiming the develop-
ment of participative behavior are further obstructed by insufficient resources and 
infrastructural conditions.
One of the bases of organizational and project management is that leaders are 
able to objectively assess the activity and development of their company. In evalu-
ating the relations between society and organization, this is an especially import-
ant trait, as management efficiency strongly depends on how the organization sees 
itself and where it places itself in its – immediate (professional) and wider (local, 
regional, national, international) community. The organizations studied represent 
a symbolic value, though which they have developed predominantly emotional 
ties with their audience. Performing arts as well as public collections serve the 
wellbeing of individuals – on the level of needs regarding social and self-fulfill-
ment –, demonstrated also by a survey conducted by the Czech National Theatre 
(Hill, O’Sullivan and Whitehead, 2018, p. 49). This shows that patterns of cultural 
consumption depend less on objective factors such as ticket price. In conclusion, 
participation is motivated by matters of socialization (behavioral patterns in the 
family, in the circle of friends, education), as well as the image and the prestige of 
the organization itself.
2. ‘Replacing boredom with experience’ – 
results of a semi-structured interview series. Methodological basis
Between March – May 2019, I have conducted semi-structured interviews with 
managers (or senior employees) of the following 13 Transylvanian cultural institu-
tions: Haáz Rezső Museum (Odorheiu Secuiesc), Csíki Székely Múzeum (Miercurea 
Ciuc), Székely Nemzeti Múzeum (Sfântu Gheorghe), Hungarian Opera Cluj-Napoca, 
Hungarian State Theatre Cluj-Napoca, Teleki Téka (Târgu Mureș), Town Library 
of Odorheiu Secuiesc, Northern Theatre Satu Mare, Maros Ensemble, Háromszék 
Ensemble, Székelyföldi Philharmonic Orchestra, State Philharmonic Orchestra Târgu 
Mureș, Csíki Játékszín Theatre and Ariel Theatre. Among these, some institutions 
are funded by the government, and others by local city and county governments. 
The semi-structured interviews assess three problems. The first part evaluates the 
strengths and weaknesses of the organization in the strategic context of organiza-
tional management. This is the starting point when analyzing the organization’s 
devotion to its mission, while giving important clues to the pre-assessment of the 
efficacy of internal and external communication. In the next phase, the questions 
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were aimed to identify the audience profile as well as the segments addressed by 
the institutions. In this part of the interview, we attempted to clarify how the insti-
tution positions itself in its own social sphere, and what are those groups of audi-
ence to which it is committed. The third and last block of questions focused on the 
practical implementation of cultural education paradigms. The significance of this 
is that these questions help us understand the perceived importance of including 
theatre, museum, concert hall, and library education in the communication strategy 
of the institutions.
3. Research results
The interviewed institutional leaders have diverse qualifications. Art institutions 
are typically led by people with qualifications in the arts, with three of them qualified 
in management. Managers of public collections are also diversely qualified, however, 
among these, there is only one who had not received any formal training in organi-
zational management. Among those questioned, there are four with PhDs. We can 
conclude that Transylvanian cultural institutions are mostly managed by young, yet 
vastly (10-15 years) experienced people, as well as people who have been managing 
their institutions for decades. This diversity might suggest that the different per-
spectives represented by different cultural institutions in the region are somewhat 
explained by a certain generational gap. At the same time, no parallel can be drawn 
between the usage of the means communication and generational identity, although 
the person of the manager is a defining aspect in the use of devices and the tone of 
communication, as well as the value system the organization projects to the outside 
world. However, this study does not aim to study the different aspects of device use. 
The next question of the survey refers to the achievements of the management pe-
riod. Of the 13 managers questioned, 10 emphasized how they managed to change 
the institution’s internal and external communication into a positive direction. 
This aspect is especially important as to the subject of my research, as communi-
ty participation depends, on the one hand, the organizations’ capability to func-
tion and collaborate, and on the other hand, on regular dialogues with the public. 
A precondition for socially integrated operation is transparency and efficiency 
where the institution is led by the synergy of the different departments. At the base 
of this, stands the individual who, within cultural institutions, is more than just an 
executer of orders, but a person with special knowledge who, as a mediator, puts 
his or her abilities and skills into the service of the community and the development 
of cultural capital in society. 
In this context, a statement made by one of the interviewees is quite significant: 
‘There is a loose organizational framework, based on the stance that in a cultural 
institution, employees are purposeful people who strive for self-realization, and for 
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whom creating a cultural product that suits the demands of the public represents 
a value in itself.’ If the individual finds his or her place in the institution, the har-
monization of the organizational units can begin. A responder on behalf of the 
Hungarian State Theatre Cluj-Napoca named the daily work journal the most im-
portant means of inner communication. ‘This is extremely important’ the respon-
dent said, ‘because on the one hand, in the work journal, everybody can see their 
specific tasks for the next day. We rehearse every day, and we have shows almost 
every day. We must know how to prepare from one day to the other, what are the 
necessities that arise.’ On the other hand, a work journal plays a key role in the 
problematic situations that appear during activities, as it objectively records any 
events. ‘Events such as accidents, conflicts, etc. appear inevitably. We are able to 
manage these in time because all information gets to everyone quickly, to all de-
partments of this huge institution: the law department, the financial department, 
etc. Everyone receives the daily report.’
Looking at Transylvanian Hungarian performing arts institutions, there is hard-
ly even one that does not have to share its infrastructure and building with an-
other institution. As such, the key to long-term planning is to establish this inner 
communication where, besides some tension between certain departments (for ex-
ample, conflicts between a theatre’s acting company and its finance department), 
managers have to face typical situations of multiculturalism – an example would be 
Northern Theatre Satu Mare, where a Hungarian and a Romanian company cohab-
itate in the building.
The paradigm shift in external communication after the regime change might be 
best explained by the respondent for the Hungarian State Theatre in Cluj-Napoca, 
who declared the following: ‘Primarily, it is communication. Communication gained 
more and more importance in the life of the Hungarian State Theatre in Cluj-Napoca, 
which means that a completely new structure was established after I was appointed. 
The institutional structure was reminiscent of the1980’s for a very long time. We 
established a marketing department, which includes communication activities. Be-
fore that, in the classic system, there were one or to organizers who informed the 
audience about performances through other institutions, whereas outdoor billboards 
were aimed at people who could not be reached within institutional frameworks. 
However, as the very structure of communication has changed in our entire culture, 
the theatre’s communication was rebuilt around electronic communication.’
The situation is vividly described by the respondent for the Town Library in 
Odorheiu Secuiesc, who illustrates the developmental curve of the institution the 
following way: ‘From a stagnating institution that quietly sailed the lukewarm wa-
ters, we became a dynamic organization where work is done continuously, from 
morning to the evening, Monday to Sunday. So, I think these three things are the 
most important: first, the library has further opened towards public education. Sec-
ondly, besides traditional library functions, we started numerous other types of 
43
activities. And lastly, the institutions turned into a community center. This last 
aspect is still in development. It aims to attract more people to the institution, for 
different reasons.’
The manager of Székely National Museum emphasized the importance of a vis-
itor-friendly institutional profile, naming the openness and hospitality of the per-
sonnel, and the development of professional work as the most important achieve-
ments. Regarding community participation, the respondent mentioned an initiative 
that helped the museum’s previously isolated garden grow into a community space. 
‘People of Sfantu Gheorghe never even knew this garden existed. We had com-
munity events, we joined the events of Saint George Days. We have concerts all 
summer long, as well as meetings with authors… anything goes, really, as long 
as the quality of the event is good. People come in for these events who wouldn’t 
otherwise be interested in the museum only. (…) Now during Saint George Days, 
sometimes even 300-400 people come visit us in just 3 days.’
In conclusion, institutional networks play a very significant role in generating 
community participation. The example of Székely National Museum shows how 
popular events that attract big crowds form the bulk of contemporary cultural con-
sumption, as festivals and other happenings offer experiences to those interested.
Among the positive changes in organization management, inter-institutional 
communication received the most mentions. Respondents revealed that information 
exchanges are particularly important in institutional development. One example is 
the museum network in Székelyland, where not only managers, but also employ-
ees (specialists in museum education) discuss on a regular basis. It is particularly 
important to form professional networks between national and international orga-
nizations, with many respondents mentioning good relationships with Hungarian 
counterparts, which serve as models in some practices of institutional management.
Notably, almost all respondents named infrastructural investments as changes 
for the better as well as conditions in need of betterment. This suggests that al-
though the cultural supply in most Transylvanian is above the national average, 
headquarter problems, as well as issues concerning the technical background work, 
such as digitalization of acceptable working conditions, put a significant burden on 
managers. Employee dissatisfaction also fits into this category. These stem, partial-
ly, from an insufficient number of available jobs, pitfalls caused by bureaucracy, 
but also from a shortage of skilled employees. In this respect, the declaration made 
by the respondent for Székely National Museum is very expressive: ‘Ever since 
I’ve been in office, the governing principle was that is somebody retires, I can hire 
somebody else for the opening, but this is not enough. In this profession, that some-
body should be hired 5 or at least 3 years before the colleague retires, so that the 
new one can learn, because this job has a lot of nuts and bolts.’
With regards to communication, many respondents said that in order to make 
promotional PR campaigns more effective, awareness of the role of the institu-
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tion in society should be raised. As one means to this end, respondents named the 
introduction and development of cultural education practice. About educational 
programs, the respondent for Hungarian State Theatre Cluj-Napoca declared the 
following: ‘It’s the result of many years of pressure, but we also needed people 
who had graduated from the universities where we teach, in order to tackle these 
tasks. Educational performances are conducted with high-school groups or focus 
groups, titled I Wonder What... The program is managed by young, distinguished 
colleagues. T would also help to think about how we can make these educational 
performances better by not only working with people who actually come to the 
theatre, but by going out for them ourselves. We should open towards schools, 
especially because interactive school classes are gaining momentum, and students 
have certain expectations. Exchanging the boredom of literature with an experien-
tial, interactive, performative teaching method. A theatre could add a lot to this.’
The connection between available resources and managerial view is best de-
scribed by the manager of Haáz Rezső Museum, who says the aim is to educate an 
appreciative and addressable target audience. In this respondent’s view, museum 
education is not merely about attracting new members of audience. In fact, it can 
ensure the renewal of the organization in the long run. ‘Regarding the cultural 
projects we have dreamed up, financial resources always prove to be short. There 
are sufficient resources for basic cultural activity, but, under the circumstances, 
we will never make that step ahead. Although it would be high time in Odorheiu 
Secuiesc for cultural services to show a qualitative enhancement. One of the key 
elements in the offer of a museum is providing experience. In this sense, any form 
of contemporary entertainment can be a rival of a museum. There is a great need 
for qualitative development in cultural services if the aim is to educate generations 
who come back for more. The further development of museum education is a pri-
ority in achieving this goal. If institutions wish to put into practice everything that 
is included in their management plan, it is essential to be familiar with the profile 
of their own audience. The institutions studied are theatres and other public collec-
tions that cater for wide audiences, segmenting the audience into target groups is 
necessary if the aim is to manage relatively tight resources in a way that the infor-
mation reaches target groups without much waste coverage’.
The takeaway is that managers and their respective institutions do not allot suf-
ficient resources for market research. Without these, when making plans, they have 
only their practical experience to work with. Responses show that they do not, in 
fact, possess the professional skills needed for organizing and conducting surveys, 
whereas calling in outside talent pertains to significant extra expenses that these 
institutions are unable to afford. 
Theatres and puppet theatres are in a somewhat better situation. These, in some 
cases, produce shows for particular age groups – such as children and youth. De-
spite this, in the case of performing arts institutions, there is still no defined target 
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group, mainly because managers think in terms of demography, and are not ex-
ceedingly concerned about preference-based profiling. In this context, the response 
of the interviewee for the Hungarian State Theatre Cluj-Napoca is noteworthy, as, 
with regards to diverse social groups in the city, it remarks upon the layering of 
the local community: ‘Cluj-Napoca has become a very young city, a lot of software 
engineers have moved here. Their number is somewhere close to 20,000. On the 
streets, in the restaurants, we can see all these young people who have the financial 
means to afford a meal there. One of the problems is how to reach them.’
Consequently, they have realized that different target groups demand the em-
ployment of different communication strategies, but the answer to the why still 
eludes managers as they lack an in-depth knowledge of the segments identified. 
Here, however, they cannot rely on general categories: the prestige of local institu-
tions depends primarily on their perception in the local community. The response 
given by the representative of Haáz Rezső Museum is very suggestive in this re-
spect: ‘In an earlier answer, I have already hinted at the type of visitor we lack, and 
this absence is caused exactly by the inadequate channeling of our message. Steps 
taken towards the tourism industry have not proven to be effective, tourists are still 
the most difficult to reach with our messages. Our long-term investment effort is 
aimed at younger generations; thus, the most intense communication is happening 
through the schools.’
In analyzing visitor segments, it is obvious that institutions rely very much on 
the presence of students in the public school system. Almost each respondent de-
clared that a significant percentage of their audience is represented by this age group 
who, through personal relations, are brought in by teachers. ‘classes whose teacher 
likes to go to museums will come visit us, but also other cultural institutions. It’s not 
the student who must wish to come, it’s the teacher.’ This implies the question of 
teachers’ attitudes which, through occasional consultations and personal relations, 
they attempt to improve. ‘Visitors who are school students come to the museum in 
organized groups, so their teacher and group leader is our link to them, which also 
means that he or she is an efficient communication partner of museum workers.’
In questions regarding cultural education, the position taken by cultural man-
agers is unclear. Museums in Székelyland play a prominent role, having already 
recognized the importance of museum education. The manager of Csíki Székely 
Múzeum in Miercurea Ciuc has declared the following: ‘Education is one of the 
most important duties of a museum. On the one hand, a museum transmits infor-
mation, conveys knowledge, but also entertains and educates. And if it does all this, 
then it becomes the most versatile among all other cultural institutions, and has 
the best chance to be efficient, and achieve the goals set in its mission statement. 
And of course, this educational duty, which means museum education programs, 
has been an extremely important element in our activity in the last decade.’ In this 
case, similarly to many others, good practice is compared to Hungarian institutions: 
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‘One of our employees has formal training in museum education, which is import-
ant because even institutions in Hungary have much more experience and a good 
methodological network in this respect.’
Among those interviewed, Northern Theatre Satu Mare and Hungarian State 
Theatre Cluj-Napoca had their own volunteer program, whereas Hungarian State 
Theatre Cluj-Napoca has started a two-step theatre education program for high-
school students as well. The two philharmonic orchestras included in the study – 
similarly to Romanian philharmonic orchestras in general – regularly organize edu-
cational concerts for preschoolers and students, events which focus more on frontal 
presentation than learning by discovery. Institutions typically do not have regular 
reports on the efficiency of their communication programs. Among the types of 
follow-up used, managers mentioned end-of-season surveys, guest books, as well as 
relatively big events. However, based on the conclusions, are regarded as types of 
compulsory tasks, and are rarely included into the next planning process.
4. Conclusions
This study attempted to shed light on the community roles of Transylvanian 
Hungarian cultural institutions in the context of organizational management. 
Based on interviews conducted with 13 managers out of the 30 cultural institutions 
with significant Hungarian-speaking communities in Transylvania, Partium and 
Banat, it can be stated that the institutions have indeed recognized the importance 
of a live, two-way dialogue with their respective audiences – not without a clear 
connection with laws and expectations regarding the performance of managers. On 
the one hand, it is important to understand that this might be the first time these in-
stitutions face the expectations of socially aware operation, and these expectations 
are often hard to synchronize with the decades-old bureaucratic system. One of the 
important takeaways from the interviews is that Transylvanian Hungarian (and 
Romanian in general) cultural institutions are not prepared for operation based on 
community participation. This, on the one hand, is a matter of financing, as until 
the monthly pay of people responsible for basic activities is still insufficient, and 
there is no separate budget allotted for infrastructural development in the institu-
tions, investments that ensure basic activity will be the top priority. With regards 
to this, the employees’ workload was mentioned several times: in an institution 
without sufficient personnel, one employee will have to take on more tasks at once.
On the other hand, there is a lack of skilled personnel that supports community 
participation, which puts further burden on the institutions. Only an insignificant 
number of institutions studied include a department dedicated solely to tasks re-
lated to public relations, mostly because the system of public servant jobs in the 
country did not follow the changes that have occurred in the cultural sector. There 
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is also a lack of cultural education professionals, a phenomenon attributed to a 
deficient offer in higher education in the field. Respondents reported that their em-
ployees have gained precious practical experience through their relationships with 
other institutions in fields such as museum and theatre education, yet a real attitude 
adjustment is still overdue.
Transylvanian Hungarian cultural institutions – according to national tenden-
cies – rely greatly upon the presence of students in the public education system. 
This implies some significant investments by the organizations concerning rela-
tional capital as well a cultural offer tailored specifically with a particular age group 
in mind. It is obvious that schools have formal relations with cultural institutions 
that are in no connection to each other with regard to their content and offer. In 
practice, this means that the offer of these cultural institutions is not in accordance 
with the expectations of the school curriculum – to be so is desirable because, as the 
managers have also mentioned, if the offer was based on any component of formal 
education, teachers would be more accessible. 
Taking into account all of the above, we can conclude that there is no consensus 
regarding the stimulation of community participation in the Transylvanian cultural 
institutional network. For teachers and outsiders to accept and appreciate these 
initiatives, a coordinated effort is necessary, which, through follow-up work, is able 
to gather qualitative and quantitative information regarding the success of the pro-
grams, and use them to create an integrated cultural and educational policy.
In the century of communication and experience, institutions of knowledge 
acquirement, art perception and the accumulation of cultural capital are changing 
(Jackson, Kabwasa-Green and Herranz, 2006; Watson, 2007). While in the United 
States of America and Western European states, community development is built 
on the synergy of culture and education, in Central and Eastern Europe, the atti-
tude shift that could lead to an open cultural practice based on the participation 
of the visitor/ participant is underway right now. Information-based learning is 
replaced by experience-based events, which has brought about the change of ba-
sic tasks in public collections and the performing arts. Recognizing that the im-
mense potential of cultural institutions could be the key to realizing the ideal of 
the responsible, curious citizen capable of critical thinking and self-expression 
is gaining ground in the Romanian institution system. It is a question of com-
petence, commitment, and perseverance on the part of local communities and 
decision-makers how local initiatives will be able to integrate into the everyday 
comings and goings of a particular social group, and how they can grow into re-
gional or national perspectives. 
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Abstract
Paper intends to highlight and analyze some novelty aspects introduced by the Administrative Code 
in the field of professional training system for public administration, including ‘big four’ categories of per-
sonnel: central appointed officials, local elected officials, contractual staff and emphasizing civil servants. 
This is due to the new access conditions (requirements) introduced, regarding the graduated studies for the 
occupation of certain categories of positions, but also from the perspective of the competence frameworks 
and the training credits system which represents from a legislative point of view an absolute novelty. We will 
also focus on the institutional aspects, as well as those related to the public training provider and other train-
ing providers, the mandatory annual training plan, the standards and some relevant methodological aspects 
concerning initial public administration (PA) education and continuous training. Practicalities, questions and 
points of view are not missing from this study-essay.
Keywords: competence frameworks, training credits system, access conditions, training providers, 
training need analysis, annual training plan, performance appraisal, civil servants.
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1. Preliminaries
The Administrative Code is the newest regulatory act for public administration 
as a whole, it comprised 16 normative acts that were abolished. The Code was adopt-
ed through Government Emergency Ordinance (GEO1), published and entered into 
force on the same day, on the 5th of July 2019, and it contains 638 articles and 6 An-
nexes/Appendices. Articles related to the professional training are, mainly: for civil 
servants: articles 458, 459, for contractual staff: article 551, for local elected officials: 
article 217, for central appointed officials: there are no specific provisions. Now the 
Administrative Code is subject to the Constitutional Court (CCR) analysis accord-
ing to the Constitutional provisions followed by a notification of the Romanian 
Ombudsmen. This main regulatory framework in the field of training for public ad-
ministration is completed with a range of programmatic and strategic documents2, 
but we find that all are outdated and rightly we raise the question ‘what’s next’?
2. To whom does it apply? 
The provisions apply to civil servants3 (high ranking civil servants positions 
(HRCS)4 – secretaries-general, deputy secretaries-general, governmental inspec-
tors, prefects, subprefects; senior civil servants general positions (SCS)5 – general 
directors, deputy general directors, directors, deputy directors, heads of the sector, 
heads of office; regular civil servants general positions (RCS)6 – counselors, experts, 
inspectors, auditors, judicial advisers (counselors), public tender advisers (counsel-
ors)7, centrally appointed officials (dignitaries – ministers, secretary of state and 
undersecretary of state), local elected officials (mayors, deputy mayors, city and 
county councilors) and contractual staff (under a labor contract – officials’ cabinets, 
those who do not have in their job description prerogatives/duties that imply using 
1 GEO no. 57/2019.
2 Strategy on professional training for public administration 2016-2020, adopted through GD 
no. 650/2016; GD no.1066/2008 to approve the rules regarding the professional training of civil 
servants; Strategy for the development of the civil service 2016-2020, adopted through GD no. 
525/2016; Strategy for strengthening the public administration 2014-2020, adopted through GD no. 
909/2014; GO no. 129/2000 regarding adult vocational training; Strategy of education and voca-
tional training in Romania for the period 2016-2020, adopted through GD no. 317/2016; Long Life 
Learning National Strategy 2015-2020, adopted through GD no. 418/2015.
3 The Administrative Code recognized the right and the obligation of the civil servants to get train-
ing programs in order to improve their knowledge in public administration matters/issues.
4 Top management level.
5 Managing level.
6 Executive level.
7 New introduced position by Administrative Code.
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public force/power on executive and managing positions and under a management 
contract – public administrators: commune, city, county – managers).
For occupying a permanent position in HRCS, it is mandatory to have university 
studies, master studies, to graduate specialized training programs delivered by the 
National Institute of Administration (NIA) and to have at least 7 years seniority af-
ter university graduation. For occupying a temporary HRCS position is not manda-
tory to graduate a specialized training program delivered by NIA. We may note that 
about 90% of HCRS in Romanian public administration are temporarily appointed 
in their positions.
For occupying a permanent position of SCS is mandatory to graduate university 
studies, master studies and to have at least 5- or 7-years seniority after university 
graduation depending on the requirements of the position. A new condition in-
troduced through the Administrative Code is to follow/attend a training program 
according to the training credits system or to follow/attend a 30 hours training 
program. We may also note that the Administrative Code introduced for senior 
civil servants, recommendations to follow a specialized program in order to develop 
their skills delivered by NIA.
In order to promote to the next professional-grade, it is mandatory for RCS to 
follow/attend a training program according to the training credits system or to fol-
low/attend a 30 hours training program and to obtain at least the ‘good’ rating in 
the last two performance appraisal processes. 
A new provision regulates that in the competitions for occupying public func-
tions, the subjects and related bibliography must have8: information and topics re-
garding the respect of human dignity, the protection of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, the prevention and combating of incitement and discrimination. This 
fact requires a special training field for members of the competitions’ committees.
Administrative Code introduced some new conditions regarding studies for cer-
tain positions as follow (Table 1):
Table 1: Conditions regarding studies for certain positions
Position Studies Mention
Secretaries general 
of territorial-administrative units (UAT)
Law or
Administrative or 
Political sciences
mandatory
Public administrators – 
commune/city/county managers 
Economics or
Administrative or
Technical or
Law
recommendation
Ethics advisers Social sciences recommendation
8 Administrative Code: article 467, paragraph 2. 
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3. Main issues
According to the Administrative Code, about training participation, the public 
institutions have the obligation to ensure the participation for each public official 
(civil servant or contracting staff) in at least one training program every two years, 
organized by the National Institute of Administration (NIA) or other training pro-
viders. There are no provisions regarding central appointed officials or local elected 
officials in this respect.
Analysis of training need is fulfilled mostly through these two methods: within 
the performance appraisal process – yearly, by civil servant’s superior or proposed 
by civil servant on his/her own evaluation and approved or not by the head of the 
public institution.
Competence frameworks are the reference framework for organizing and de-
veloping the career of civil servants, expressed by all the standards, indicators and 
descriptors used with reference to a person’s ability to select, combine and use 
knowledge, skills and other acquisitions consisting of values and attitudes, for suc-
cessfully solving the tasks established in the exercise of a public function, as well 
as for professional or personal development under conditions of effectiveness and 
efficiency9. 
The norms regarding the content, the competence and the procedure of elabora-
tion and approval of the competence frameworks are approved by the decision of 
the Government (GD), at the proposal of the National Agency of the Civil Servants 
(NACS)10.
Public institutions have the obligation to draw up an annual training plan for the 
civil servants and for the contracting staff, to show the estimation and the distinct 
highlighting of all the amounts foreseen in their budgets for training purposes. For 
civil servants, the model for the annual training plan is approved by the President 
of the National Agency of Civil Servants (NACS) Act. There are no provisions on 
who is in charge of the model document for contractual staff. The annual training 
plan should be the tool/instrument to further support the design of the training 
programs and offers of training providers.
Training credits system11 introduced by Administrative Code is required for 
promotion, both for regular civil servants and senior civil servants, and it will be 
extensively regulated through GD proposed by NACS12. The training system will 
include credited programs/courses, seminars, conferences, study visits, professional 
exchanges. 
9 Administrative Code: article 401, paragraph 3.
10 Notice: There is no deadline for NACS to submit the GD.
11 Administrative Code: article 483, paragraph 3.
12 Notice: There is no deadline for NACS to submit the GD.
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4. Training system or training market? Budgetary matters
Providers of professional training for public administration are ‘a great un-
known’. On the one hand, we have the public provider which is National Institute 
of Administration (NIA)13 with its role temporarily consolidated through Adminis-
trative Code, and on the other hand private providers (most of them commercials 
entities/SMEs companies), but also foundations or associations (NGOs), operating 
through ‘ancient’ GD no. 1066/2008. This last regulatory act has recognized among 
training providers for public administration personnel even universities, but there 
were many interests for those kinds of specific activities until now.
We may classify types of training programs using some criteria as follow: pe-
riod (short-term programs – 3 / 5 / 7 days, and long-term programs (specialized 
programs) – 1 / 3 / 6 / 12 months), location (organized at other locations/training 
resorts or organized at the premises of public institutions), method of delivery (de-
livered in the class-room or delivered in online or as blended learning), choice op-
tions (providers general offers and customized/on-demand).
Practitioners, academics, ‘pracademics’ or independent trainers/freelancers 
could ‘teach’ or ‘train’ within these programs, Administrative Code stipulating14 
that each person from all categories of personnel, can act as a trainer for public 
administration programs and this activity is not an incompatible one.
University, master and Ph.D. studies cannot be financed from the state bud-
get or from the local budgets15. Instead, the following should be eligible and could 
be financed by public institutions: postgraduate training programs, postgraduate 
training, and continuous professional development programs or advanced research 
postdoctoral programs16. Civil servants17 following training programs, lasting more 
than 90 days in a calendar year, organized in the country or abroad, financed in 
whole or in part through the budget of the public institution, from the state budget 
or the local budget, are obliged to commit in writing that they will work in the 
public administration between 2 and 5 years from the graduation/completion of the 
programs, in proportion to the number of training days they have benefited. 
13 (Re) established in 2016 through GO no. 23/2016. Four months after entry into force of Administra-
tive Code, the NIA was (re)abolished by the new Government, and its activity was included within 
Ministry of Public Works, Development and Administration (MPWDA) (November 2019). On April 
30, the Government adopted a GD, not yet published, which regulated the fact that the former NIA 
became a so-called ‘National School of Public Administration’, without legal personality led by a 
pre-middle management civil servant, within the MPWDA (May 2020).
14 Administrative Code: article 462.
15 Administrative Code: article 458, paragraph 9.
16 As they are defined in the National Education Law no 1/2011.
17 Administrative Code: article 458, paragraph 6.
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Payments from the budget18 may cover training fees19, travel costs, and accom-
modation20.
5. Standards and best practices?
It is a tough truth that today there are no standards21, monitoring, and evalua-
tion in training delivery. There is no authority responsible for authorization/licens-
ing or supervising training programs and training providers for public administra-
tion personnel.
Not very far in the past, a range of specific NACS Regulations no. 269 and 
270/201522 established an official and specific PPP model for public training. They 
gave the best results in several indicators: number of participants, number of train-
ing programs, budget revenue and first of all – quality and measuring training in-
struments. It lasted two years (2015-2016), but unfortunately, those best practices 
have not been taken over, and they were abrogated. 
Among the main tasks of the Government, the Administrative Code23 added a 
new and interesting one ‘it provides binding/mandatory standards at central and 
local public administration level to guarantee good administration’, but nothing 
was designned, regulated, piloted or send it into practice yet, even less in terms of 
the public administration training system.
18 We may note that there is a huge lack of authority coming from Ministry of Finance and even 
Court of Accounts in monitoring training costs which are in some cases increasingly multiplied 
compared to the amounts the regulation allowed.
19 The average fee for 1-week training program is of around 200 Eur (plus VAT) at private providers 
and 150 Eur (VAT included) at public provider. 
20 The accommodation including meals according to the Regulation GD no 714/2018 is of around 50 
Eur/day/person, and it can be extended exceptionally at 75 Euro/day/person.
21 There is a single special provision in Administrative Code for civil servants that are ‘ethics advi-
sors’. In this case training standards are elaborated by NACS and training delivery by NIA. Public 
institutions have the obligation to ensure the participation of ethics advisers in the training pro-
grams, organized by NIA. But as we showed previously in the study, the NIA was abolished, and its 
activity was not transferred and is not operational yet.
22 NACS Regulation 269/2015 regarding partnership contracts, establishment of the Register of pro-
fessional training partners for public administration, approval of the contents of the records of the 
training programs carried out and the specific indicators for measuring training activities; NACS 
Regulation 270/2015 for the approval of the documentation of administrative compliance and of the 
compliance with the minimum standards regarding the technical, logistic and didactic capacity in 
carrying out the training programs.
23 Administrative Code: article 25, letter (p). 
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6. Conclusions and some ‘questionable issues’ 
The Administrative Code has tried to bring a number of new concepts to an 
emerging sector, such as the competence frameworks, the training credits system 
and so on, but without bringing the necessary clarity for their sustainable imple-
mentation. Moreover, it has left some compulsory fields of action uncovered in this 
intrasystemic Lego game. 
It is not set a deadline/a legal term for many regulatory acts that the public ad-
ministration personnel expect them (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Deadline for regulatory acts
Regulation Act Responsible Deadline/Status
GD regulating methodology rules of professional training 
for civil servants MPWDA Not established
GD regulating methodology rules of professional training 
for contracting staff MPWDA Not established
GD regulating the activity of public training provider activities 
(former NIA) MPWDA Not established
GD regulating competence frameworks 
for civil servants NACS Not established
GD regulating training credits system NACS Not established
President of NACS Act regulating the model 
for Annually Training Plan NACS Not established
President of NACS Act regulating the standards 
for ‘ethics advisors’ training programs NACS Not established
We are constantly approaching a ‘work in progress’ in this field of training in 
public administration, in which hypotheses, stakeholders’ view, regulators’ view, 
beneficiaries’ view seek their answers and the intersection of a good and sustain-
able re/set-up.
The organization of the training system for the public administration personnel 
is not subject to a common standard, existing with most models of good practice 
applicable, compared and presented in various working meetings, studies, and spe-
cialized publications, and which refer mainly to the legal and institutional bases, 
governance and control structure, financial, managerial and personnel rules, as well 
as at the functions performed, areas in which heterogeneity takes precedence over 
homogeneity, be it the European or the American space.
But the lack of a clear vision and benchmarks in the Romanian domestic space 
creates real difficulties of adaptation and long-term development with consequenc-
es for the public administration and the ‘public’ of the administration.
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Abstract
This study seeks to identify how multi-level governance was achieved throughout the measles outbreak 
in Romania. This study takes the Facebook campaign ‘Vaccines save lives’ as a case study to examine how 
the Romanian Ministry of Health and online users communicate on the issue of vaccination. Applying a 
network approach and content analysis, I aimed at assessing stakeholders in terms of online connectivity 
and shared content. The online connectivity within the Ministry of Health’s online campaign on vaccination 
was analyzed using a social network analysis (NodeXLPro). This network analysis provided insights into the 
degree of interaction among the Ministry of Health and Romanian citizens and into the online users’ roles. 
The shared content of the Top 10 influencers was tackled upon using the Health Belief Model constructs. 
This model was used in assessing the individuals’ attitudes and beliefs when deciding to adopt or not a 
recommended behavioral change.
Keywords: vaccination, immunization, network analysis, influencers, HBM constructs.
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1. Introduction 
Effective risk communication involves various levels of ambiguity and uncer-
tainty (Ulmer et al., 2007). Fear and anxiety were the two emotional responses 
which prevailed in Romania in 2016 and 2017 when the National Institute of Pub-
lic Health1 in Romania confirmed the increasing numbers of cases of measles and 
deaths throughout one year (675 cases in September 2016, to 3,466 cases and 17 
deaths in March 2017 to 10,279 cases in measles and 37 deaths in December 2017). 
This situation brought high levels of uncertainty which were also stirred by emo-
tional-inducing media framings of the measles outbreak and by national anti-vac-
cination movements whose main endorsers were religious groups and Romanian 
known persons (for example, Olivia Steer). This goes hand in hand with ‘a reflection 
of the same phenomenon occurring on an international scale’ (Dascălu, 2019, p. 5).
Within this context of fear and uncertainty, when people try to seek and share 
information, the Ministry of Health decided to launch the online campaign ‘Vac-
cines save lives’ on November 9, 2016 in an attempt to prevent the wide spread 
of measles outbreak. Through this online campaign on Facebook, the Ministry of 
Health (‘desprevaccin.ro’/ ‘aboutvaccine.ro’ as username) tried to provide a collab-
orative perspective on vaccination. This online public campaign belongs to what 
van Asselt and Renn (2011, p. 431) define as risk governance, namely ‘the various 
ways in which many actors, individuals, and institutions, public and private, deal 
with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity’. 
Following Piattoni’s (2010, p. 1) idea about multi-level governance where there 
is a need for ‘(…) increasingly dense networks of public and private, individual 
and collective actors’, Anna Berti Suman (2019, p. 2) highlights the importance of 
multilateral governance in risk situations, which should include ‘multiple actors, 
not necessarily all governmental, that join their efforts for a shared objective’. This 
goes in line with Sellnow et al.’s definition of risk communication, namely ‘(…) 
an interactive process where all parties are given access to multiple messages’ 
(Sellnow et al., 2009, p. 17). Hye-Jin Paek (2016) links effective risk governance to a 
deeper understanding of the communicative process. Paek (2016, p. 1) emphasizes 
that communication is a complex process that ‘requires not only consideration of 
content, but also consideration of how, to whom, at what point, and through which 
channel to deliver the content. Risk communication must also consider the nature 
of risk, people’s characteristics affecting their risk perceptions, and the complex 
media environment’. 
Focusing on a collaborative perspective and following the above-mentioned 
aspects about multilateral governance related to the context of risk‐related deci-
1 http://www.cnscbt.ro/, accessed on January 27, 2018.
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sion‐making, I aim at (1) identifying the network of collective actors involved in 
the Facebook campaign ‘Vaccines save lives’ and (2) determining the consisten-
cy of alignment between the content shared by the Ministry of Health, as a deci-
sion-maker, and the top 10 influencers in the ‘Vaccines save lives’ network. 
2. Theoretical framework
The ways crisis management professionals and researchers perceive, interact 
with, spread information in crises and risks situations to the respective affected 
communities has been deeply transformed by the technological advances of social 
media networks (Veil, Buehner and Palenchar, 2011). White (2012) noted that social 
media became one of the main tools and channels of communication not only for 
those directly involved in crises situations (emergency managers, volunteers, sur-
vivors) but also for the general public looking for information. Besides information 
seeking or sharing, publics use social media also for issue relevance and emotional 
venting/ support (Liu, Bartz and Duke 2011, p. 345).
In his review of best practices in public health risk and crisis communication, 
Covello (2003, p. 5) highlighted the importance of communication channels that 
encourage listening, feedback, participation, and dialogue. Veil, Buehner and 
Palenchar (2011, pp. 119-120) recommend that practitioners should engage social 
media in their daily risk and crisis communication activities, should join the con-
versation, including rumor management, should check all information for accuracy 
and respond honestly to questions or should follow and share messages with cred-
ible sources. 
2.1. Network approach
Within the new paradigm of citizens as prosumers of information, the theoret-
ical frameworks on stakeholders have also changed. Sedereviciute and Valentini 
(2011) make a plea for assessing stakeholders in terms of online connectivity and 
relationships, on the one hand, and of shared content, on the other hand. Thus, the 
two researchers propose a holistic stakeholder mapping model which integrates 
the Stakeholder Salience Model (SSM) with the Social Network Analysis (SNA). 
The Holistic Stakeholder Mapping Model (SMM) proposes a conceptual approach of 
how organizational stakeholders can be identified and prioritized. 
Blending the three attributes of SSM, power, legitimacy, and urgency, with SNA 
measures, such as closeness, degree, and betweenness, Sedereviciute and Valentini 
(2011, pp. 230-232) provide a typology of stakeholders based on their connectivity 
within a certain social media network: lurkers (do not have a central position in the 
network to exploit their messages fast on to others) versus influencers (have con-
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nections within the examined network). As observed centrality plays an important 
role in identifying users. Himelboim et al. (2014) emphasize that centrality helps to 
explain the degree to which an individual or organization is connected to others in 
a network.
Starting from the two types of centralities (degree and betweenness centrality), 
Pervin, Takeda and Toriumi (2014) propose three roles of the online users whose 
visualization was developed three years later (Mirbabaie and Zapatka, 2017):
 – information starters are identified using the metric of in-degree, which implies 
how often a participant node has been retweeted; 
 – amplifiers are identified through the out-degree centrality (how many times a 
node/ an online user retweeted the message of another node/ online user); 
 – transmitters are identified with the metric of the betweenness centrality which 
measures how often a node lies on the shortest paths within the whole net-
work. Betweenness centrality provides the node’s importance and power. 
The definition of a transmitter (Pervin, Takeda and Toriumi, 2014) coincides 
with Sedereviciute and Valentini’s (2011) definition of an influencer since he/she 
has connections within the examined network.
 
Figure 1: Visualization of an information starter (left), amplifier (middle) and transmitter (right)
Source: Mirbabaie and Zapatka (2017, p. 2174)
Thus analyzing social media and extracting the potential stakeholders is import-
ant for an organization (Sedereviciute and Valentini, 2011, p. 230) since these (un-
known) stakeholders through their favorable position within a network ‘can influ-
ence other members by propagating certain content within social media using their 
numerous ties or an exceptionally good position within a network’. Therefore, this 
study attempts to assess the content shared on vaccination and to identify the con-
nectivity among stakeholders within the ‘Vaccines save lives’ Facebook communi-
ty. Using the Stakeholder Mapping Model (SMM) and Pervin, Takeda and Toriumi’s 
(2014) typology of online users, the following research questions will be addressed:
RQ1: How dense is the interaction among the stakeholders within the ‘Vaccines 
save lives’ Facebook community?
RQ2: What types of online stakeholders are present within this Facebook com-
munity?
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2.2. Brief insights into the Health Belief Model (HBM)
Developed by Rosenstock (1966), the HBM model included four parameters: 
perceived susceptibility (individuals’ assessments of the likelihood of contracting a 
disease), perceived severity (individuals’ perception regarding the seriousness asso-
ciated with contracting a particular health condition), perceived benefits (positive 
consequences related to adopting a healthy behavior) and perceived barriers (factors 
that prevent individuals from adopting a preventive health-related behavior). Re-
searchers (Champion and Skinner, 2008; Diddi and Lundy, 2017) argued that per-
ceived susceptibility and severity may combine to form a single construct, which 
they refer to as perceived threat. Two more constructs were added: self-efficacy (the 
degree of confidence individuals have in order to perform the recommended behav-
ior) and cues to action (specific stimuli triggering individuals to adopt the recom-
mended behavior, Champion and Skinner, 2008).
Studies showed that (1) educating patients about vaccine benefits and health-
care professionals’ vaccine recommendations may increase the vaccination rate in 
future awareness campaigns (Coe et al., 2012); (2) since perceived barriers (vaccine 
side effects and safety) are of great concern on social media, Guidry et al. (2015) 
consider that health educators should use more narratives focused on the stories 
of those saved through vaccines; (3) the relationship between the exposure to a 
public health campaign and behavior should be mediated by four constructs: barri-
ers, benefits, efficacy, and threat (Jones et al., 2015). In a multistage campaign, once 
self-efficacy and threat are high and perceived barriers are low, then perceived ben-
efits may influence a behavioral change, thus establishing a causal chain between 
barriers and benefits (Jones et al., 2015).
Given the main objective of the ‘Vaccines save lives’ campaign, namely to bring 
a behavioral change (Romanians to vaccinate their children and thus to stop the 
measles outbreak), this study will explore how the HBM constructs were used in the 
‘Vaccines save lives’ network, namely in the posts and comments of the Ministry 
of Health (Facebook username ‘desprevaccin.ro’) and in the content issued by Top 
10 influencers/ transmitters. The last question of this study will be the following:
RQ3: What are the frequency of HBM constructs used by Top 10 influencers/ 
transmitters and the consistency of alignment between the HBM constructs 
used by these influencers? 
3. Methodology
Sampling. The data will include all the Facebook posts and comments found 
on the ‘Vaccines Save Lives’ Facebook page from November 9, 2016 to November 
9, 2017. These data were collected using NodeXL Pro software program in order to 
determine the ‘Vaccines save lives’ network. The Top 10 influencers/ transmitters’ 
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posts and comments were collected with QDA miner 5.0.15. The sampling resulted 
in 345 posts and comments, out of which 222 posts and comments were uploaded 
by the main decision-maker, the Romanian Ministry of Health. In the sampling, I 
excluded comments which were not associated with vaccination and I also included 
those posts with external links (videos or links to news articles). 
3.1. Network analysis
In the network analysis, I used the two stages presented by Sedereviciute (2010) 
in the utilization of the holistic Stakeholder Mapping Model. 
Stage 1. The data were collected using the NodeXL Pro software program. This 
program helped in extracting the stakeholders present within the ‘Vaccines save 
lives’ Facebook community and in identifying the general connectivity of users 
through network density. The network obtained was analyzed in terms of degree 
centrality and betweenness centrality in order to classify the stakeholders as infor-
mation starters, amplifiers and transmitters (influencers). Whereas degree centrality 
shows the number of direct ties one node/ stakeholder has in relation to other nodes 
stakeholders within a network, betweenness centrality shows the degree to which a 
node/stakeholder facilitates information exchanges between less central actors of 
the network, thus serving as an intermediary to spread an important message. 
Himelboim et al. (2014, p. 367) mention that the operationalization of online 
users should give priority to in-degree centrality as it ensures the direction of in-
formation toward the public and to betweenness centrality since it ‘measures the 
extent that the actor falls on the shortest path between other pairs of actors in the 
network’.
The operationalization for the Facebook ‘Vaccines save lives’ group of the three 
types of online users in terms of connectivity was the following:
 – information starters – online users identified in terms of the in-degree cen-
trality values. They are the online users whose information embedded in posts 
and comments was considered relevant to be commented upon, thus receiving 
replies to their comments or posts. 
 – amplifiers – online users identified in terms of the out-degree centrality val-
ues. They are the online users who replied to other users’ messages (posts or 
comments).
 – transmitters – online users identified in terms of the betweenness centrality 
values. They are powerful in terms of the network connectivity. 
Stage 2. After the assessment of nodes’ In-Degree, Out-Degree and Betwenness 
Centralities, I provided a more in-depth analysis of the content posted and shared 
by the stakeholders acting as transmitters (influencers) in order to determine their 
interest in vaccination. 
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3.2. Content analysis
The coding scheme was developed using the literature on HBM constructs (see 
2.2) and then it was uploaded in QDA miner 5.05.15. It included the following codes 
and sub-codes (Figure 1, Cmeciu, Coman and Coman, 2018):
 
Figure 2: The coding scheme (QDA miner 5.05.15) – HBM constructs
Source: Cmeciu, Coman and Coman 2018
The posts and comments were coded by two independent coders who were pre-
viously instructed on the significance of each HBM construct. The intercoder reli-
ability analysis resulted in a value of 0.80. For the individual HBM constructs, the 
intercoder reliability values were 0.79 (perceived threat), 0.80 (perceived benefits), 
0.78 (perceived barriers), 0.81 (cues to action) and 0.80 (self-efficacy).
4. Findings 
4.1. The network of online users – ‘Vaccines save lives’ campaign
The network (Figure 3) was obtained from the NodeXL Graph Server. The graph is 
directed. The graph’s vertices were grouped by cluster using the Clauset-Newman- 
Moore cluster algorithm. The figure was laid out using the Harel-Koren Fast Multi-
scale layout algorithm. 
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Figure 3: Network analysis – ‘Vaccines save lives’ Facebook page 
Source: The author
RQ1 focused on the interaction among the stakeholders within the ‘Vaccines 
save lives’ Facebook community. As the graph metrics shows (Table 1), there were 
74 stakeholders (including the Ministry of Health) who took part in the debate over 
the campaign on vaccination and 10 groups by cluster were formed. 
Table 1: Graph metrics – ‘Vaccines save lives’ Facebook page
Graph Metric Value
Graph Type Directed
Vertices 74
Total Edges 291
Graph Density 0.024941725
NodeXL Version 1.0.1.392
The network density as the ratio of existing possible connections among stake-
holders in the network provides insight into the first research question regarding the 
density of interaction. The value of 0.024941725 is considered of very low estimate2, 
2 The measure for density can vary from 0 to 1, the density of a complete graph being 1 (Scott, 2013, 
p. 70). 
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which proves that the ties created by the active users for this specific debate on the 
vaccination issue in Romania present a low numerical value. As a consequence, the 
graph may be considered very sparse. 
RQ2 referred to the identification of the types of online stakeholders present 
within the ‘Vaccines save lives’ Facebook page. Figures 4 and 5 depict the degree 
centrality of the network in terms of In-Degree and of Out-Degree, thus infor-
mation starters and amplifiers could be identified. The statistical analysis of the 
In-degree (Figure 4) suggests that only ~33% (n = 25) of the online users possess an 
In-degree of 0, showing that stakeholders’ comments on vaccination did not receive 
a reply within the examined network. As observed in Figure 4, the majority of the 
remaining users (~40%, n=28) possessed an In-degree of one while there was only 
one user, desprevaccin.ro, who had the highest value of In-degree (44). This discrep-
ancy between desprevaccin.ro/ The Ministry of Health (in-degree value = 44) and all 
the other online users (in-degree values ranging from 4 to 1) could be explained by 
the fact that The Ministry of Health was the only online user who made Facebook 
posts, all the other online users with an in-degree value up to 1, becoming informa-
tion starters as commenters who received replies to their comments. 
1%
4%
9%
11%
40%
35%
Value 44 Value 4 Value 3 Value 2 Value 1 Value 0
Figure 4: In-Degree Centrality (in terms of values) – the ‘Vaccines save lives’ Facebook page network
Source: The author
The Out-degree distribution (Figure 5) shows that ~19% (n=14) of the users pos-
sessed an Out-degree of 0, whereas the highest majority (~ 59%, n = 44) had the 
out-degree value of 1, meaning that the degree of replying to other user’s messages 
(posts and comments) was very scarce.
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Figure 5: Out-Degree Centrality (in terms of values) – the ‘Vaccines save lives’ Facebook page network
Source: The author
Since the importance and power of a user in a network increases when its Be-
tweenness Centrality increases, we wanted to determine the Top 10 influencers 
ranked by Betweenness Centrality (see Table 2). The value of Betweenness Cen-
trality provides an insight into the role of transmitters/ influencers. We analyzed 
the Top 10 influencers ranked by Betweenness Centrality in terms of their In and 
Out-degree Centrality. This operationalization will give priority both to out-degree 
and in-degree. So we were interested both in the influencers who received replies to 
their comments/ information starters (incoming ties) but also in those who posted 
comments/ amplifiers (outgoing ties). 
The top 10 influencers ranked by Betweenness Centrality were part of the first 
five groups by cluster (see Figure 3). The size of the nodes as influencers varies 
according to their value (see Figure 3). The bigger the circle, the higher the node’s 
Betweenness Centrality, thus the user facilitated more information exchanges be-
tween less central nodes of the network. As observed, besides desprevaccin.ro, there 
were six other users (O.C, male in G3, A.B, female in G5 and I.M., male and R.P., 
female in G2, E.D., female and O.D-D., female in G4) who acted as information ex-
changers between other commenters on vaccination. 
Although the first group had the highest number of users (n = 30) and despre-
vaccin.ro is the first influencer/ transmitter in the Top 10 influencers (see Table 
2), this was the group with the lowest interaction among its users, the majority 
communicating only with the central node. G2 and G4 contained most of the in-
fluencers in the network, in G2 there were five influencers and in G4 there are six 
influencers. Unlike the other groups where there can be traced a central node, G4 
was the group where every user communicated with at least two other users inside 
or outside the group.
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Table 2: Top 10 online users
Influencers/ transmitters
(Betweenness centrality value)
DespreVaccin.ro 1712.583
O.C., male 240.333
A.B., female 110.833
E.D., female 74.333
L.B., female 65.750
A.I., female 63.000
I.M., male 62.500
O.D-D., female 60.000
D.S., female 60.000
R.P., female 60.000
Source: Betweenness Centrality/ transmitters/ influencers – ‘Vaccines save lives’ Facebook page network
The Ministry of Health (desprevaccin.ro) was the most active user. The high dis-
crepancy between the Betweenness Centrality values of desprevaccin.ro and all the 
other influencers in Top 10 clearly shows that the Romanian Ministry of Health 
got involved in the stakeholders’ conversations, both in posting comments and in 
getting replies to its comments. 
As it could be observed from Table 2, besides desprevaccin.ro (The Ministry of 
Health), the Top 10 influencers/ transmitters belong to the wider civil society (on-
the-ground citizens, as Berti Suman (2019) labels them). But among these citizens, 
some of them could be identified either as endorsers of the ‘Vaccines save lives’ 
campaign or as the founder of the largest pro-vaccination Facebook group (82,290 
members in August 2019).
This classification of the ‘Vaccine save lives’ network users into influencers/ 
transmitters, amplifiers and information starters was followed by a more in-depth 
analysis in order to determine the degree of relevance of their comment contents. 
For the content analysis we selected the posts and comments of the Top 10 influ-
encers/ transmitters. 
4.2.	 Top	10	influencers’	shared	content 
– frequency and consistency of alignment
The shared content of the Top 10 influencers (transmitters) will be tackled upon 
using the Health Belief Model constructs (perceived threat, perceived benefits, per-
ceived barriers, cues to action, self-efficacy) since this model is used in assessing 
the individuals’ attitudes and beliefs when deciding to adopt or not a recommended 
behavioral change.
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As the network analysis showed, desprevaccin.ro (Ministry of Health in 
Romania) was in Top 10 influencers/ transmitters, actually being the most active on-
line user (n = 222 posts and comments). Table 5 shows the distribution of sub-con-
structs for each HBM construct for Ministry of Health and Top 10 influencers. 
Table 3: Distribution of HBM (sub-)constructs – Facebook posts of the Romanian Ministry of Health 
and Top 10 influencers (generated by QDA miner 5.0.15)
 
Although perceived threat is the mostly used HBM construct in the online posts 
of the Ministry of Health, the most prominent sub-construct focused on medical 
benefits (Pben-medical benefits, n = 56, 25.30%), followed by two types of threats 
(Pthr-vaccination medical repercussions – n = 35, 15.80%; Pthr-non-vaccination se-
verity – n = 33, 14.90%) and social barriers (Pbar-social factors – n = 31, 14%). Fo-
cusing on the diseases’ vaccination could prevent, the Romanian Ministry of Health 
did not let aside the possible side effects and the number of victims if parents do 
not vaccinate their children. The information about vaccination repercussions and 
non-vaccination severity was present in the posts of the Ministry of Health as links 
to the external website of the ministry or of other medical sources. 
The Ministry of Health used loss-framed messages when referring to the an-
ti-vaccination movement. Seen as a social barrier, this movement was considered to 
have caused the high number of children who were not vaccinated. In its posts, the 
Ministry of Health used interviews with doctors or representatives of the National 
Society of Family Medicine. These credible sources provided explanations about the 
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conspiracy theory beyond vaccination, thus counterbalancing well-known myths 
about the side-effects of vaccination, promoted by online manipulative experts (e.g. 
‘Vaccination causes autism’, ‘Vaccines exist just for pharmaceutical companies to 
gain profit’, or ‘Vaccines cause exactly the same disease they are supposed to fight 
against’).
In Top 10 influencers’ comments, the most prominent sub-construct is cues to 
action focused on external stimuli (n=27, 21.95%), followed by social barriers 
(Pbar-social factors – n = 23, 18.69%) and low efficacy (n = 23, 18.69%). 
Online users were reluctant about the efficiency of the ‘Vaccines Save Lives’ 
campaign and mentioned the commercial interests lying beyond the agreements be-
tween the Romanian Ministry of Health, pharmaceutical companies and media. Four 
of the top 10 influencers (A.I. – female, A.B. – female, L.B. – female, E.D. – female) 
posted angry comments demanding the Ministry of Health (desprevaccin.ro) to 
provide posts on side-effects as well (‘We kindly ask you to make a video about 
the possible side effects! This is CORRECT INFORMATION!’, L.B., Nov. 10, 2016). 
These online users made a plea for non-compulsory vaccination (‘We do not want 
compulsory vaccination, we can judge for ourselves, we are not animals!’ A.I., Nov. 
10, 2016.) since they were concerned about the safety of the vaccines and about 
possible diseases which vaccination might bring. Fear was a salient emotion used 
in their comments, especially when they provided their personal experience. One 
of the Top ten influencers told her personal story about the death of her daughter 
(‘Not all kids tolerate what you promote. My daughter died immediately after the 
BCG vaccine.’, A.I., Nov. 10, 2016). These personal stories were combined with a 
distrust in pharmaceutical industry and Romanian government. Media was also 
accused for having generated a false emotional state which triggered a propaganda 
for vaccination (‘Why are not the cases of the children who suffered after vaccina-
tion made public? Why must parents cry their pain out loud on Facebook? (…) Our 
trust in the Ministry keeps on decreasing. A.B., Nov. 10, 2016). 
The other five of the Top ten influencers (O.C. – male, O.D-D. – female, D.S. – female, 
R.P. – female, I.M. – male) provided pro-vaccination comments. Although the low 
efficacy of vaccination and medical repercussions as perceived threats were em-
phasized by the four anti-vaccinators in Top 10 influencers/ transmitters, the other 
five pro-vaccination online users provided the cues to action sub-construct, encour-
aging parents to report cases of side effects and to vaccinate their children. They 
framed the anti-vaccination movement as a perceived barrier (social factor) because 
the anti-vaccinators used their children’s deaths to stir vaccination hesitancy and 
also followed the advice coming from other online anti-vaccinators instead of ac-
quiring information from competent medical sources. They used gain-framed mes-
sages by mentioning their personal experiences on vaccination and made a plea for 
parents to think at a larger scale. In their opinion, vaccination should go beyond 
protecting one’s child, and it should focus on protecting others. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions
As mentioned in the introduction of this study, risk governance focuses on var-
ious ways in which public and private, individual and collective actors deal with 
risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt and 
Renn, 2011, p. 431; Piattoni, 2010, p. 1). The polyphony of voices present during a 
risk and crisis situation should be closely linked to what Piattoni (2010) identifies 
as a multi-level governance since dense networks of collective actors are formed 
especially through online environment. 
In this study multi-level governance related to the issue of vaccination in Roma-
nia was tackled upon on two levels: at the level of online connectivity (the network 
of collective actors formed throughout the ‘Vaccines save lives’ campaign) and at 
the level of shared content of the Top 10 influencers.
Previous research (Veil, Buehner and Palenchar, 2011; Tirkkonen and 
Luoma-aho, 2011, etc.) showed that during crisis or risk communication joining the 
conversation on social media and having an ongoing dialogue with users are two 
important elements to preserve an online communication between authorities and 
users. The network analysis showed that the Romanian Ministry of Health got in-
volved in a real-time dialogue with online users, being the most active user in Top 
10 Influencers. It provided not only posts on vaccination, but also replies to users’ 
comments. The network on the ‘Vaccines save lives’ Facebook page was not formed 
of a high number of users (n = 74). The analysis on the shared content of the in-
fluencers/ transmitters showed that two biased discussions on vaccination prevail: 
reluctance toward vaccination versus trust in vaccination. The HBM sub-constructs 
associated with reluctance were ‘cues to action’, ‘perceived social barriers’ and ‘low 
efficacy’. In line with previous studies on the perception of online users on various 
epidemics (Tirkkonen and Luoma-aho, 2011; Faasse et al., 2016), the Romanian on-
line users also expressed their distrust in the authorities’ competence to handle the 
outbreak and their revolt against the Romanian government, media and medical 
companies for having induced an emotional state to justify the bill on obligation 
of vaccination. This goes in line with some of the findings of the 2017 IRES survey: 
40% of the surveyed persons consider that the ineffectiveness of measles control 
in Romania should be linked to the frequent changes of health ministers, while 
another 40% are of the opinion that the Ministry of Health being unable to handle 
the situation is the main cause for the national shortage of vaccine supplies. This 
survey also highlighted that 27% of surveyed individuals believe that mediatization 
of cases of vaccination side-effects is one of the main reasons for the decrease in 
vaccination in Romania.
Gain-framed messages were used by the other half of the Top 10 influencers. A 
public health campaign (Jones et al., 2015) on vaccination should take into account 
four HBM constructs (barriers, benefits, efficacy and threats). Jones et al. (2015) 
highlighted the fact that a causal chain between barriers and benefits should be 
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established. As the analysis showed, the two most salient HBM constructs used 
by the Romanian Ministry of Health were perceived threat (vaccination medical 
repercussions) and perceived medical benefits. This goes in line with the results of 
the IRES 2017 survey on public perception on the bill of vaccination in Romania: 
87% of the surveyed persons are of the opinion that the vaccination benefits far 
outweigh potential side-effects. The other pro-vaccination users from the Top 10 
influencers focused their content on social interaction among their family members 
and other community members. The Ministry of Health’s engagement did not limit 
to the positive-laden aspects of vaccination. The Romanian Ministry of Health also 
mentioned vaccination medical repercussions as perceived threats, thus highlight-
ing the importance of engaging the other users in discussing the negative aspects 
related to vaccination (Guidry et al., 2017)
Ștefan Dascălu (2019, p. 5) considers that ‘despite the overall positive views 
on immunization and possibly because of the inefficient implementation of public 
health measures, the dangers associated with vaccine preventable diseases, such as 
measles remain an important problem’. This analysis of the multi-level governance 
of vaccination revealed that there are three levels to be taken into account:
 – the micro-level: tragic personal experiences of parents who vaccinated their 
children. Such personal stories combined with a state of anger towards the 
Romanian political and medical system may constitute important arguments 
against vaccination. The IRES survey showed that parents’ personal opinions 
(17% of the respondents) were one of the causes of the vaccination decrease. 
 – the mezzo-level: the structure of a public campaign. The ‘Vaccines save lives’ 
campaign focused on creating a dialogue between the online users, healthcare 
practitioners and the Ministry. The Facebook page and the website provided 
information about immunization and about the benefits of a high vaccination 
coverage. The dialogue was created but some of the comments revealed that 
not all the content was read, especially that was embedded in links to other 
sites. Thus a future online vaccination campaign should embed texts or info-
graphics related to side-effects and not links to such threats, which may not 
be accessed by users. Information sources constitute one important element of 
an online campaign. 72% of the surveyed individuals (IRES survey) considered 
that family doctors have the obligation to inform parents about the vaccina-
tion benefits and risks. Despite this opinion, a study on the HPV vaccination 
campaign in Romania (Crăciun and Baban, 2012) showed that using doctors as 
credible sources may not be a good choice since they may be associated with 
an ineffective health care system. 
 – the macro-level: an ineffective national legislative framework on vaccination. 
There is no legislative framework which should outline the precise responsi-
bilities of the concerned parties. The only working official document on vac-
cination is the national calendar on vaccination. The Romanian government 
provides the vaccines as part of the national immunization program free of 
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charge, but parents still had to pay for vaccines because of the vaccine short-
age and they may still choose whether to vaccinate their children without any 
legal justification (Dascălu, 2019) although throughout the ‘Vaccines save lives’ 
campaign the Ministry of Health proposed a vaccination bill which was not 
enacted into a law.
Limitations of the study. A comparative analysis of the vaccination campaigns 
implemented by various European governments may bring a greater insight into 
the online users’ connectivity and shared content. Interviews which PR practi-
tioners in the health domain may explain what strategies are used to tailor the 
messages throughout various disease outbreaks. 
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Abstract
Social media is spreading on the entire earth rapidly changing the way of communication and interac-
tions in different areas of human life. Used in early stages by people who wanted to stay connected with 
their friends and families, social media became in time a tool used by public organizations to promote trans-
parency, to foster democracy and to keep governments’ agencies accountable. Supreme Audit Institutions 
(SAI) have an important role in promoting transparency in the public sector. They use social media platforms 
to interact and communicate more with citizens, but in many cases their activity on social media is influ-
enced by different variables. The purpose of this study is, on the one hand, to explore whether and how SAIs 
from EU Member States are using Twitter as a way to improve their transparency, and, on the other hand, 
we will seek to understand if the organizational model of SAI, the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 as 
defined by Transparency International and the fact that their independence is established by law or not, can 
influence the activity of SAIs on Twitter. In the end, we will propose a model for Supreme Audit Institutions 
for the diffusion of information on Twitter.
Keywords: social media, public sector, Supreme Audit Institutions, transparency.
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1. Introduction
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) are traditional institutions with an important 
role in promoting transparency in the public sector, but sometimes their activity 
is put under a question mark, especially in those countries where their message 
is not very clear and is not getting to the decision factors. That is why, in order to 
be able to promote transparency, SAIs need to be as transparent as possible in the 
first place. SAIs needs to adopt communication strategies, in order to improve their 
transparency (González, López and García, 2008). Websites and social media are 
two tools that should be implanted in SAIs communication strategies to guarantee 
the success of the external communication (INTOSAI, 2010a, pp. 11-12). Social me-
dia networks have gained popularity over the last decade, allowing people to create 
and sustain relationships with others (Boyd and Ellison, 2007), to communicate, 
and share content in a social environment (Porter, 2008; Tepper, 2003; Zheng and 
Zheng, 2014).
International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) has pub-
lished International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI) 20 and 21 
(INTOSAI, 2010b; INTOSAI, 2010c) and compliance with these standards can trans-
form SAIs into an example of transparency and accountability (Garde Sanchez, 
Rodriguez Bolivar and Alcaide Munoz, 2014).
2. Sailing through the social media concept
The term ‘social media’ refers to that part of media designed for social inter-
action and is centered on it. Social media is associated with different kind of web-
based technologies and services such as: blogs, microblogs (Twitter), social sharing 
services (YouTube, Flickr, Stumble Upon, Last.fm), text messaging, discussion fo-
rums, collaborative editing tools (wikis), virtual worlds (Second Life), and social 
networking services (Facebook, MySpace). These technologies enable users to com-
municate, interact, edit, and share content in a social environment (Porter, 2008; 
Tepper, 2003; Zheng and Zheng, 2014).
Kaplan and Haenlein are viewing social media as a group of internet-based ap-
plications that are ‘built on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 
2.0 and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content’ (Kaplan 
and Haenlein, 2010, p. 61).
Social media, which has become part of our everyday life (Ellison, Steinfield 
and Lampe, 2007) is seen by scholars as equivalent to traditional news media 
(Chouliaraki, 2008).
The importance of social media is growing from one day to another, as more and 
more people are using the platforms.
At the level of 2016 it has been calculated that there were around 2.44 billion 
social media users around the globe (Statista, 2016) and since then, every day, more 
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and more people started to use one or more of the types of social media tools de-
scribed below:
 – Blogs are websites managed by authors, whose content is presented in a struc-
tured format and is related generally to a defined subject. Blogs allow users to 
record comments at the end of each article. Blogs have been used by many gov-
ernment agencies to promote open communication with citizens, who, in their 
turn, can use non-governmental blogs to promote openness when the govern-
ment has a certain resistance to transparency (Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes, 2012);
 – Wikis are special websites where voluntary users can create articles that can 
be modified, corrected and amended in a controlled fashion by other users. 
Two of the most known wikis are Wikipedia.org, which is an online encyclo-
pedia, and Wikileaks.org – a non-government sponsored wiki supported by a 
community of hackers and activists which promote openness and fight against 
corruption by releasing sensitive information related to any government in the 
world (Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes, 2012);
 – Mashups are resources or services that combine the data or functionalities 
of at least two other sources to create a new application, resource or service 
(Brito, 2008; Robinson et al., 2009). One popular mashup is the Chicago Crime 
Map which merges the Google Map application with Chicago crime rate data. 
The Chicago Crime Map evolved into EveryBlock (www.everyblock.com), 
and it provides a range of local data in the major US cities (Bertot, Jaeger and 
Grimes, 2012);
 – Social networks are platforms used to exchange personal and professional 
information. Most of these social networks allow users to build online com-
munities where they can connect and interact with other users who have sim-
ilar interests and to interconnect from one of these platforms to another. For 
instance, users can create YouTube channels and Facebook pages, and then 
they can create links or include materials from other websites. Among the key 
elements of the social network service we can identify the ability for a user to 
create a profile, the ability for users to create a list of other users who have a 
shared connection or similar interests and the ability to view the connections 
made by other users in the network (Boyd and Ellison, 2007; Bertot, Jaeger 
and Grimes, 2012). Examples of popular social networking services include 
Facebook, Orkut and LinkedIn.
 – Media-sharing services (video, photo/image, audio) are platforms that allow 
users to view, discuss, upload, distribute and store digital content in a social 
environment. Examples of various media-sharing services include photo/im-
age (Photobucket, Picasa, Flickr) and video (YouTube, Vimeo, Dailymotion) 
(Bertot, Jaeger and Grimes, 2012);
 – Microblogging services are platforms that usually are combining features 
of social networking and blogging technologies and allow users to broadcast 
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small messages or updates to a specific group or community. Popular examples 
of microblogging applications are Twitter, Jaiku and Tumblr (Bertot, Jaeger 
and Grimes, 2012).
According to Statista, ‘one of the leading statistics companies on the internet, 
heaving a team of over 250 statisticians, database experts, analysts, and editors’, 
the most popular social network in April 2017 was Facebook with 1,968 million ac-
tive users, followed by WhatsApp (1,200 millions), YouTube (1,000 millions), Facebook 
Messenger (1,000 millions). In top ten we can also find Instagram (600 million) and 
Twitter (319 million) (Statista, 2017).
So, as we can see above, social media is spreading on the globe very quickly, 
conquering one step by another billions of people.
3. Barriers and drivers for the adoption of social media 
in the public sector
Though is used by billions of people, social media is still a new technology that 
must be better understood in terms of its benefits and risks. Several countries, in-
cluding the U.S., have developed some social media guidelines focusing on their 
benefits, risks and strategic components, in order to assist public agencies to achieve 
best practices in the domain of social media (CIO, 2009). Benefits in terms of so-
cial media are defined as ‘providing of advantages through social media usage that 
promote and enhance well-being’ (Khan, Swar and Lee, 2014). Some researchers 
are seeing in social media a tool for transparency, openness and democratization, 
efficiency, user convenience, accountability, citizen involvement, and improved 
trust (Mäkinen and Wangu Kuira, 2008; Lathrop and Ruma, 2010; Noveck, 2009; 
Chang and Kanan, 2008; Chun et al., 2010; Cromer, 2010; Dorris, 2008; Kuzma, 2010; 
Landsbergen, 2010).
Social media channels are step by step diffusing across all levels of government 
and help to connect government with citizens and other organizations to strength-
en the government – citizens relationship (Khan, Swar and Lee, 2014). Social media 
allow citizens initiatives to hold governments accountable (Mergel and Bretschnei-
der, 2013), and help a government to create a better image for itself among citizens 
(Khan, Swar and Lee, 2014).
The social media tools have also been used with success in several critical sit-
uations such as: the microblogging service Twitter during the East Coast snow 
storms in 2010 (Gregory, 2010), the use of Facebook to coordinate the Arab Spring 
in 2011 (Marks, 2011), and the call by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) to use social media instead of phone lines to check in with friends and 
family during earthquakes and hurricanes in late 2011 (Fugate, 2011), and all these 
indicate that social media became a trusted communication channel in the public 
sector (Mergel, 2012a).
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The diffusion of social media in public administration has generated a big in-
terest among researchers and has a multidisciplinary character (Boyd and Ellison, 
2007). Many scholars are highlighting that US federal agencies are using blogs, 
wikis, and social networking sites, among other social media, to create records, to 
disseminate information and to communicate with citizens for several years (Barr, 
2008; Brown, 2008; Snyder, 2009; Wyld, 2007).
Moreover, social media use in the public sector can be seen as a technological 
innovation and a transforming agent (Chun and Reyes, 2012), as informing citizens 
about what their governments are doing can encourage accountability and, more 
importantly, transparency (Chun et al., 2010; Cromer, 2010). Others, like Mergel 
(2012b), consider the application of these tools in the public sector as the ‘fifth 
wave’ of information and communication technologies (ICTs).
Spannerworks (2007, p. 5) has created an entire list of social media’s benefits 
applicable to the public sector institutions, such as:
1. ‘participation: social media encourages contributions and feedback from every-
one interested, blurring the line between media and audience;
2. openness: most social media services are open to feedback and participation. 
They encourage voting, comments, and sharing of information with rare barri-
ers to accessing and making use of content;
3. conversation: whereas traditional media is about broadcast, content transmit-
ted or distributed to an audience, social media are better seen as conversation-
al, two-way interaction channels;
4. community: social media allows communities to be formed quickly and com-
municate effectively around common interests; and
5. connectedness: social media thrives in their connectedness, exploiting hyper-
links and combining different kinds of media in one place’. 
Although there are many benefits of social media use in the public sector, it also 
involves some risks which result in skepticism and concern. By risk we understand 
a ‘combination of uncertainty plus seriousness of outcome involved’ (Bauer, 1967, 
p. 23).
The social media risk refers to ‘the likelihood that a negative social media event 
will happen (multiplied by) the impact that negative event will have if it does hap-
pen’ (Webber, Li and Szymanski, 2012, p. 3).
Some of these barriers are related to privacy (Chang and Kanan, 2008; 
Sola-Martinez, 2009; Tisselli, 2010; Bertot, Jaeger and Hansen, 2012; Bryer and 
Zavattaro, 2011; Dadashzadeh, 2010; Landsbergen, 2010; Sherman, 2011), security 
issues – the risk of inserting malware into governments’ websites, accuracy, re-
cords management and administration-specific requirements (Bertot, Jaeger and 
Hansen, 2012; Bryer and Zavattaro, 2011; Dadashzadeh, 2010; Landsbergen, 2010; 
Sherman, 2011), multi-cultural impact (Vitkauskaite, 2010), effects on productivity 
(Wilson, 2009), social inclusion, data management and accessibility (Bertot, Jaeger 
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and Hansen, 2012). There are also scholars who believe that social media tools 
themselves are ineffective (Baumgartner and Morris, 2010), and that are doing a 
lot of damage to democratization (Shirky, 2011), and that they affect the user’s pro-
ductivity in the workplace: ‘once addicted to social media, users tend to spend more 
time browsing and socializing on social network sites. The use of social media that 
can cause a lack of productivity in the workplace can be considered a waste of time’ 
(Khan, Swar and Lee, 2014).
4. Social media and the transparency of Supreme Audit Institutions
The impact of the internet on the improvement of the interactivity, transparen-
cy, and openness of public sector entities has been highlighted by many authors 
(La Porte, Demchak and Friis, 2001; Demchak, Friis and La Porte, 2000; Drüke, 2007; 
La Porte, Demchak, and De Jong, 2002), and all of these elements are seen as posi-
tive values to increase citizen trust in governments (Demchak, Friis and La Porte, 
2000; Kim et al., 2005). Transparency is highlighted as a key element of good gover-
nance too (Kim et al., 2005) and is defined as ‘the availability of information about 
an organization or actor allowing external actors to monitor the internal workings 
or performance of that organization’ (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, p. 55), and by being 
transparent ‘the veil of secrecy’ is lifted (Davis, 1998, p. 121). In a simple way of 
saying, transparency is ‘the ability to look clearly through the windows of an insti-
tution’ (den Boer, 1998, p. 105). 
In one research Bonsón et al. (2012) are highlighting that we can obtain im-
provement in terms of public sector transparency by using content syndication and 
social media platforms as a way to bring the public sector agenda and activities 
closer to citizens and provide news and information in the platforms used by the 
public. Moreover, in their opinion, at the core of social media for local entities is 
standing the concept of transparency (Bonsón et al., 2012). SAIs are considered to 
be one of the institutional pillars that contribute to enhanced integrity (Martini, 
2012), ‘transparency and accountability; fairness and equity; efficiency and effec-
tiveness; respect for the rule of law; and high standards of ethical behavior in pub-
lic management – which are fundamentals of good governance and represent the 
basis upon which to build open government’ (OECD, 2005, p. 28). The work of 
the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) in pro-
moting greater accountability, transparency, and efficient and effective use of pub-
lic funds for the benefit of citizens is supported and recognized by the Resolution 
A/RES/66/20916 of United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UN, 2011).
Adopting good transparency and accountability practices by SAIs is strengthen-
ing ‘the auditing organisms’ public image in the eyes of the citizens and would con-
tribute to legitimizing their authority to control’ (Mendoza Zúñiga, 2013, p. 101).
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Though the SAIs have an important role in promoting transparency in the public 
sector, sometimes their activity is put under questions, especially in those countries 
where their message is not truly clear and is not getting to the decision factors. So, 
to be able to promote transparency of the SAIs, who must be transparent as much 
as possible in the first place, to improve their transparency, SAIs need to adopt 
communication strategies, as Gonzalez, Lopez and Garcia are suggesting in one of 
their studies (2008).
INTOSAI recognizes that communication is the factor that can influence the 
success of SAIs’ work and indicates that the internal and external communication 
has a strategic role that contributes significantly to the efficient work of the com-
munity of SAIs, designing, since 2010, homogenous procedures in the field of SAIs 
communication (INTOSAI, 2010a).
Another reason for SAIs to have good communications with media comes from 
the fact that media might act as a bridge to citizens and the citizen’s view of public 
services. Sometimes public opinion, as expressed by the media, can provide added 
support and impact for audit topics and audit reports (INTOSAI, Appendix to ISSAI 
3100, undated; UN DESA, 2013).
The reason why some SAIs are considering that they need to have a good com-
munication is, on the one hand, because these institutions must justify their exis-
tence and, on the other hand, as a way to increase their credibility (Waerness, 1999; 
Barrett, 2000).
To show that it is aware of the importance of communication for the success of 
SAIs’ work, INTOSAI has published the ISSAI 20 and 21. INTOSAI is also encour-
aging all member SAIs to share and disseminate as much information as possible 
concerning their activities promptly through social networks, online collaboration 
tools and other digital media, and any other relevant communication technology to 
be developed in the future (INTOSAI, 2010a).The reason for using the modern com-
munication technology is because greater use of this technology can make commu-
nication ‘faster, more reliable, broad-based and economical’ (INTOSAI, 2006).
These new technologies will bring in the near future a change in communica-
tion between SAIs and their target groups, who will no longer be just consumers 
of information, but also producers of information and active participants in the 
decision-making process (González-Díaz, García-Fernández and López-Díaz, 2013).
In the use of different channels of communication is important not to forget the 
need ‘to integrate both traditional and social media’ (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010, 
p. 65) into a so-called ‘ecosystem whereby everybody works together to achieve 
a common goal’ (Hanna, Rohm and Crittenden, 2011, p. 273) which, in the case of 
SAIs would be the improvement of transparency and accountability.
INTOSAI is aware of the speed with which things are evolving in the online 
space and understands the importance of the internet. As they are saying ‘SAIs 
acknowledge that websites and social media are two tools that should be implant-
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ed in their communication plans to guarantee external communication success’ 
(INTOSAI, 2010a, pp. 11-12).
SAIs are being encouraged by INTOSAI to use alternative mechanisms to release 
their audit reports and disseminate their content in user-friendly formats, such as:
1. videos posted on YouTube, including videos of SAI representatives testifying 
before legislative bodies;
2. podcasts posted on iTunes and available on RSS feeds, such as taped interviews 
of SAI executives discussing their recent products;
3. updates to SAI Facebook pages or other social media, providing information on 
new products, open recommendations, and financial or other results of audits;
4. messages sent via Twitter feeds to alert legislative and executive officials, citi-
zens, academics, and others to the publication of new SAI products;
5. graphics and visual images from reports posted to Flickr or SlideShare;
6. the use of QR (quick response) codes, sharing widgets, and mobile phone apps 
to allow users to quickly access the SAI’s website and products;
7. online chats and blogs with SAI executives on topics relating to recently issued 
products, current issues, etc.;
8. appearances by SAI executives on television and/or radio shows (including 
participation in public/academic debates);
9. simplified presentations of the technical audit reports that are designed to 
reach a popular audience; and 
10. public dissemination points at the SAIs’ official locations, such as interactive 
touch screens delivering news and items of interest regarding the SAIs at the 
entrance to the SAIs’ establishments’ (Bowling, 2013, p. 61).
The response to the impulse given by INTOSAI has not been long awaited, as 
Supreme Audit Institutions across the world are getting more and more involved on 
social media and are using their accounts for different purposes:
1. The Netherlands Court of Audit (NCA) is using Twitter to ‘announce new NCA 
reports, to direct users to their website, and to make NCA followers aware 
of parliamentary debates about their reports’ (UN DESA, 2013, p. 19). NCA 
has been extensively crowd sourcing using social media. In 2011 they also 
launched through LinkedIn the ‘Action Plan Teacher’ internet forum and the 
‘Passion for public accountability’ project (UN DESA, 2013).
2. National Audit Office (NAO) of UK uses a wide range of social media as a way 
‘to provide alerts to subscribers when new work is produced’ (NAO, 2016).
3. The State Audit Office of Latvia (SAO) has launched a video blog on their 
YouTube channel with the purpose of informing citizens about the findings 
revealed during the auditing process, in a dramatic style, allowing citizens in 
this way to access and understand complicated reports without prior or spe-
cialized knowledge. The videos are being created in collaboration with students 
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from Latvian University to avoid ‘speak audits’ and are also uploaded on SAO’s 
homepage, and are posted on the most popular social networks in Latvia, in-
cluding Twitter, which is used by 90% of Latvian politicians, media people and 
leading authorities, and are shared among the biggest Latvian media, with local 
governments and non-governmental organizations. By using these forms of 
communication, SAO wants to promote ‘a more prudent and effective handling 
of taxpayers’ money’. In their vision, none of the officials or politicians like 
to be ‘under the spotlight of a video story which is widely shared on social 
networks – especially when they are depicted as money wasters or unskilled 
managers and, even more so, if the story is told by a popular TV personality’ 
(EUROSAI, 2015). 
4. According to the GAO, ‘SAIs are improving their websites with Web 2.0 tech-
nology and have started to use social media, regarding them in some cases as 
a strategic element’ (GAO, 2010, p. 7). The GAO has set for itself the goal of 
improving ‘efficiency and effectiveness in performing GAO’s mission and de-
livering quality products and services to the Congress and the American peo-
ple’, and in order to do so the GAO started to use a Facebook page, a Twitter 
account, a YouTube channel and a Flickr page, to share its work with 
Congress and citizens – ‘Facebook and Twitter for news reports, testimonies, 
and podcasts and YouTube and Flickr for videos and report graphics, respec-
tively’ (GAO, 2010).
4.1. Types of organizational models of SAIs
There are some scholars who suggest that there are major differences among 
the SAIs belonging to INTOSAI in the way how they are creating their commu-
nication strategy as a means of enhancing their transparency and accountability 
depending on various factors: media systems (Mediterranean or polarized pluralist, 
Northern European or democratic corporatist, or North Atlantic liberal models) and 
types of SAIs’ structure (Anglo Saxon or Westminster, Napoleonic or judicial, and 
the board or collegiate models) (González-Díaz, García-Fernández and López-Díaz, 
2013; World Bank, 2001; Van Zyl et al., 2009; Santiso, 2008; OECD, 2011).
Due to the fact that different models have closer ties to different institutions, for 
instance the Court model to the judiciary, the Board model to the legislature, and 
the Westminster model to the executive (Santiso, 2009), the model could, in theory, 
influence the likelihood of greater transparency as suggests a study operated on a 
number of 16 SAIs of the Westminster model, 8 of the Judicial model, and 6 of the 
Collegiate model.
Evidence shows that countries with Westminster and Board models present a 
greater average of transparency practices (8.8 and 8 practices, respectively) com-
pared to countries that have adopted a Judicial (6.8) model (EIP, 2014).
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Standard typologies of Autonomous Agency Audit (AAA) classify them accord-
ing to their institutional features and functions and include three ideal types of 
AAAs: the monocratic model, the court model and the board or collegiate model.
 – The monocratic model is prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US, 
the UK or Canada, and, in Latin America, in Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Chile;
 – The court model is followed by the Roman law countries such as France, Italy 
or Spain, and, in Latin America, Brazil and El Salvador; and
 – The board model is an institutional hybrid and is adopted by countries such as: 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and, in Latin America, Argentina and Nicaragua 
follow this model (Santiso, 2009; Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2006).
Three main organizational models of SAIs exist:
1. Westminster model, also known as the Anglo-Saxon or Parliamentary 
model, found in the United Kingdom and most Commonwealth countries includ-
ing many in sub-Saharan Africa, some European countries such as Ireland and 
Denmark, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland and Latin American countries such as Mexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia. 
Though this SAI has a single head, with the title ‘Auditor General’ or ‘President’, 
the authority exercised by the head of the SAI varies. In some cases, all important 
decisions are made by, or approved by, the President (Auditor General), in others, 
the authority can be delegated to subordinate officials within a strategic and cor-
porate planning framework for the whole office. The SAIs from this model are in-
dependent bodies that report to the Parliament and the staff of this type of SAI are 
trained accountants and auditors. The audit office has no judicial function and the 
traditional type of audit carried out is financial audit. However, the tenure of office 
of the head of the SAI is usually term limited; however, in some cases the position 
is held until retirement (EIP, 2014; World Bank, 2001; DFID, 2004; Committee of the 
Heads of the SAIs of the European Union, 2004; Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2006).
2. Judicial or Napoleonic model, found in Greece, Turkey, Belgium, the Latin 
countries of Europe including Spain, Italy, Portugal, France, francophone Africa 
and Asia, and several Latin American countries including Brazil and Colombia, 
El Salvador; often referred to as courts of audit or courts of accounts. In Franco-
phone Africa, this model may co-exist with general state inspectorates, some of 
whom may be nominated as the country’s SAI. They are usually part of the execu-
tive but independent of specific ministries and departments (EIP, 2014; World Bank, 
2001; DFID, 2004; Committee of the Heads of the SAIs of the European Union, 2004; 
Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2006). SAIs of this type have judicial and administrative 
authority and are governed by collegiate/board bodies composed of judges, with 
members which act on equal term and one judge is named as ‘President’. The staff 
of the courts of audit is formed by qualified lawyers. Though the traditional purpose 
of this type of SAI is to conduct compliance audits, in our days they conduct finan-
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cial audits and performance audits too. The SAIs from this model are independent 
of both the legislative and the executive branches of government. This type of SAI 
does not depend on the legislature for follow-up, however less parliamentary in-
volvement can mean less pressure, and thus less transparency for a SAI.
3. Board or Collegiate model, found in some European countries including 
Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, the Slovak Repub-
lic, the EU – the European Court of Auditors, also in Argentina and Nicaragua, 
and Asian countries including Indonesia, Japan and the Republic of Korea (EIP, 
2014; World Bank, 2001; DFID, 2004; Committee of the Heads of the SAIs of the 
European Union, 2004; Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 2006). These SAIs have no ju-
dicial functions and the ‘President’ may still have a significant influence on the 
decisions made in the collegial process. In this system, the audit board prepares 
and sends an annual report to the cabinet, which sends the report further to the 
Parliament (World Bank, 2001).
5. Methodology
This study aims to understand if SAIs from EU member states are using their ac-
counts on social networks such as Twitter to improve their transparency and in the 
same time to see if there is any connection between factors such as: the Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2016 as defined by Transparency International, the fact that their 
independence is enforced by law or not and the organizational model of SAI can 
influence their activity on Twitter. Based on the results obtained we will propose 
a model for Supreme Audit Institutions on how to share information on Twitter.
A preliminary investigation has been conducted to identify which one of the 
following social media platforms: Twitter, Facebook or YouTube is being used by 
SAIs from the 28 EU Member States. In order to find out, two methods were applied. 
On the one hand, an investigation was conducted to see if there are links from the 
SAIs’ official websites of the EU Member States to their accounts on social media. 
The second method was applied to those SAIs of EU Member States for which is 
impossible to identify on their official websites links to their social media accounts. 
In this situation, different queries were used on the internet search engine www.
google.com, such as: ‘their name + twitter’ e.g. ‘cour des comptes on twitter’. The 
existence of an account on each one of these platforms was codified with ‘1’ and 
the absence of an account was codified with ‘0’. Results are indicating that 15 of 28 
SAIs included in sample are using Twitter, 10 are using Facebook and 10 are using 
YouTube.
Based on the above results from the preliminary investigation we decided that 
our research will be focused on investigating only Twitter accounts of SAIs in-
cluded in our sample. YouTube and Facebook accounts will be used in our future 
research.
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In order to find out if SAIs are using social media as a way to improve the trans-
parency and if the model of SAI, the Corruption Index and the fact that the inde-
pendence of the SAI is established by law or not, is influencing the disclosure of this 
type of information on Twitter or not, we will create a checklist containing a list of 
items based on ISSAI 21 and Bowling (2013, p. 61). Each item from this checklist will 
be scored with 0 for non-disclosure or 1 for full disclosure.
The higher the number of items from our checklist is disclosed by SAIs on their 
Twitter accounts, the more transparent those SAIs will be.
By answering to the second question of our study we will be able to under-
stand whether the activity of SAIs on social media can be influenced by variables 
such as: the model of SAI, the Corruption Index and the fact that the indepen-
dence of the SAI is established by law or not. In this sense, we will use the website 
www.birdsonganalytics.com to extract information about the activity of each one 
of the Twitter accounts of SAIs included in our sample. The website www.birdson 
ganalytics.com is operated by Digital Tomorrow Today Limited, a company regis-
tered in England and Wales under company number 04453239.
The data retrieved will be coded into a checklist with 0 if the SAI is publishing 
that type of information and 1 if the SAI is not publishing that type of information.
The results will help us to understand how and if the Corruption Index, the 
type of SAI, and the fact that their independence is established by law or not, are 
influencing the total number of followers, the most active day and hour for follow-
ers and SAIs, the number of hash tags and the total of tweets, retweets and replies 
from their accounts. The number of followers that one SAI has on Twitter can show 
us how much the citizens of that country are interested in that SAI’s activity. The 
number of hash tags, followings, user mentions can show us how much the SAI is 
involved in spreading information about their work and the level of their openness.
The number of tweets, retweets, replies is showing us how much that SAI is 
involved in spreading information related to their work through their Twitter ac-
count. Moreover, we can check to see if the day when the SAIs are more active is 
correlated with the day when their followers are more active, and based on that we 
can propose to SAIs to provide more information on their accounts at those hours 
and in those days when their followers are more active so that their impact is much 
more consistent.
6. Disclosure of results
We have created a checklist for a sample of 28 SAIs of EU Member States to 
identify which of these have an account on Twitter, Facebook or YouTube. The 
existence of an account was codified with ‘1’ and the absence of an account was 
codified with ‘0’.
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The results from Appendix A1 revealed that 15 out of 28 SAIs included in the 
sample are using Twitter, 10 are using Facebook, and 10 are using YouTube. The 
same Appendix indicates that only 7 of the 28 SAIs have accounts on all these 3 
social media networks. Since the majority of SAIs have accounts on Twitter we 
decided that it will be more appropriate to conduct our research only on Twitter.
We have identified 15 SAIs as having accounts on Twitter, but the SAIs of 
Germany and Portugal never had activity on Twitter so we excluded them from our 
research, and our final sample is formed in the end of 13 SAIs.
Further, we have used the website www.birdsonganalytics.com and www.twi 
tonomy.com to extract information about the activity of each one of the Twitter 
accounts of the SAIs included in our sample.
6.1. Type of information shared through the Twitter account
6.1.1. The Westminster Model
According to our results, the SAI of UK is the only one from the Westminster 
Model which shares information about all the items detailed in our checklist and, 
from all SAIs from this model, only the SAIs of Latvia and UK are sharing informa-
tion about announcements related to job vacancies. There are just 3 SAIs (Latvia, 
Lithuania and the UK) which are sharing links to INTOSAI website and only the 
SAI of UK is sharing podcasts related to the SAI’s activity.
As per the results, 75% of all SAIs from this model are publishing information in 
INTOSAI language, 87% of SAIs are publishing information about different events 
organized by SAI or to which the SAI is going, are publishing articles in press, or 
are publishing photos and videos. All SAIs are publishing information about their 
reports and links to their official website. A low rate of transparency can be regis-
tered for: the podcasts section, as only 10% of SAIs are publishing this kind of infor-
mation; announces related to job vacancies, as only 25% of SAIs are publishing this 
kind of information; links to INTOSAI website, as only 37% of SAIs are publishing 
this kind of information.
The influence of the Independence Score
As we can see in Appendix A SAIs who have the independence score 0.67 are 
publishing the same type of information, except Denmark, which does not share 
information in an INTOSAI language. On the other hand, SAIs who have the in-
dependence score 1 are not totally homogeneous as there are differences between 
countries regarding the Events section and Announcements related to jobs vacan-
cies. The SAI of Poland, which has the independence score 0, is sharing the same 
kind of information as the one of Denmark which has the independence score 0.67.
The influence of the Corruption Index
By analyzing the results, we can observe that there is no pattern that could put 
us in the position to say that the decision of sharing a certain type of information 
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through Twitter by SAIs from the Westminster Model is influenced by the Corrup-
tion Index.
6.1.2. The Court Model
In the Court Model, the results of the analyzed data are much more homoge-
neous than the ones from the Board Model and the Westminster Model, and they 
seem to be influenced by the Corruption and Independence indexes only in a small 
measure. The SAI of France has the highest Corruption Index and Independence 
Score inside the Court Model and is also publishing more information on social 
media as the one of Italy. However, the difference is not too high, and the results 
might be influenced by the fact that there are only 2 SAIs included in our sample 
for this Model.
6.1.3. The Board Model
In the Board Model, the results do not appear to be influenced so much neither 
by the Corruption Score, nor by the Independence Score, but the fact that our entire 
sample is formed by only 13 SAIs might have an influence over the results, so we 
should extend our sample for a better view over the results.
6.2. Overall results
If we are analyzing the overall results, there is a low rate of transparency related 
to the vacancy of jobs inside SAIs, as from 13 SAIs analyzed only 3 SAIs (Latvia, UK 
and the Netherlands), meaning 23% are publishing this type of information. A total 
of 4 SAIs, meaning 30%, (Denmark, Poland, Italy and Sweden), are not publishing 
content on Twitter in an INTOSAI official language and 2 SAIs, meaning 15%, are 
not publishing information about events which involve the participation of the SAI. 
All SAIs are publishing information related to their reports and links to their official 
websites. On the contrary, only 4 SAIs (Latvia, Lithuania, UK and Slovakia) are pub-
lishing links to INTOSAI’s website. A percentage of 77% of the total of the analyzed 
SAIs are publishing information in photo and video format, and 85% of the analyzed 
SAIs are sharing press articles related to the SAI’s work.
6.3. SAI and followers’ activity
The number of tweets, retweets, and replies of SAIs from the Westminster Mod-
el does not seem to be influenced by the Corruption Index and the Independence 
Index according to the resulted data from our sample.
On the other hand, the results for SAIs from the Court Model are indicating that 
the Corruption Index and the Independence Score might influence the number of 
tweets, retweets, and replies. In this case the number of tweets, retweets, and re-
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plies for the SAI of France is higher than the number of tweets, retweets, and replies 
for the SAI of Italy.
In the Westminster model, the most active day for tweets and retweets is 
Wednesday for 5 out of 8 SAIs. In the replies’ case the most active day for 3 SAIs is 
Tuesday.
As the results are indicating, the followers of SAIs from the Westminster model 
are much more active on Wednesday. Though most of the SAIs from this model are 
more active on Wednesday, there are SAIs which have no synchronization in their 
activity with their follower’s activity:
1. For tweets is the case of Finland (Thursday), Latvia (Tuesday), Poland (Thurs-
day);
2. For retweets is the case of Estonia (Thursday), Finland and Latvia (Tuesday); 
and
3. For replies is the case of Finland (Tuesday), Latvia (Tuesday), Lithuania (Mon-
day), Poland (Thursday), UK (Friday).
SAIs from the Court Model are more active on their Twitter accounts when their 
followers are more active, precisely Wednesday, apart from Italy concerning the 
tweets (Friday).
Followers of SAIs from the Board Model are more active on Wednesday, but 
only the SAI of Slovakia in the case of tweets is more active on Wednesday. SAIs of 
Netherlands and Sweden are more active on Tuesday or Thursday.
7. Conclusions
The objective of this study was to identify and to explore whether and how SAIs 
from the 28 EU Member States are using Twitter as a way to improve their trans-
parency and, on the other hand, we aimed to understand whether the activity of 
SAIs on Twitter could be influenced by variables such as the model of SAI, the Cor-
ruption Index and the fact that the independence of SAI is established by law or not.
As the results indicate, except the SAI of Lithuania (Tuesday) and the SAI of 
UK (Monday), the day when all followers of the SAIs of all other countries from 
our sample are more active on Twitter is Wednesday at different hours, but most 
of them somewhere between 5 – 8 p.m. In this context, we propose that each SAI 
adopts a new approach related to their tweeting activity, and become more active 
on Twitter when their followers are more active, so that the impact of their activity 
increases.
As the results are indicating, the SAIs’ followers are more active on Twitter on 
Wednesday, except for UK (Monday) and Lithuania (Tuesday). Moreover, except 
for 2 SAIs (Latvia and Finland), in all other cases, on average, the number of tweets 
in a day is somewhere between 0 and 1.
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We also could observe that there might be a small correlation between the Court 
Model and the type of information tweeted by SAIs, but we could not identify any 
important correlation between the Westminster Model and the Board Model and 
the type of information tweeted by SAIs included in these models.
8. Further research
In further research we will seek to see if the sentiment for each one of the user-
names of SAIs from our sample is positive, negative or neutral.
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Appendix A1 
Presence on social media of EU countries
EU Countries
Account Type
Twitter Facebook Youtube
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, France, Netherlands, Poland, UK 1 1 1
Austria, Portugal 1 1 0
Italy, Sweden 1 0 1
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Slovakia 1 0 0
Malta 0 1 0
Czech Republic 0 0 1
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, Spain 0 0 0
Total 15 10 10
Source: Authors’ projection
Appendix A2 
Defining the variable Corruption Index, Independence and SAI type
SAI CI Independence Type of SAI
Austria 75 0.67 Westminster
France 69 1 Court
UK 81 0.67 Westminster
Italy 47 0.67 Court
Denmark 90 0.67 Westminster
Finland 89 0.67 Westminster
Netherlands 83 1 Board
Sweden 88 1 Board
Estonia 70 1 Westminster
Latvia 57 1 Westminster
Lithuania 59 0.67 Westminster
Poland 62 0 Westminster
Slovakia 51 0 Board
Source: Transparency International (2016)
Appendix A3 
Defining variable ‘How the independence 
of the Supreme Audit Institution is established from the executive’
The independence of the National Audit Body from the executive is established by Independence
Constitution 1
Law 0.7
Administrative regulation 0.3
Not defined explicitly 0
Source: Authors’ projection
97
A
pp
en
di
x 
A
4 
Ty
pe
 o
f i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ar
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
so
ci
al
 m
ed
ia
SA
I
Ty
pe
 o
f i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ar
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
so
ci
al
 m
ed
ia
 S
co
re
 [0
, 1
]
To
ta
l
Co
nt
en
t i
n 
IN
TO
SA
I l
an
gu
ag
e
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
to
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 e
ve
nt
s
Re
po
rts
 
of
 S
AI
Ar
tic
le
s 
in
 p
re
ss
An
no
un
ce
 re
la
te
d 
to
 va
ca
nc
y o
f j
ob
s
Po
dc
as
ts
 re
la
te
d 
to
 S
AI
’s 
ac
tiv
ity
Ph
ot
o 
& 
Vi
de
o
Li
nk
s t
o 
SA
I s
ite
Li
nk
s t
o 
IN
TO
SA
I s
ite
Au
st
ria
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
6
De
nm
ar
k
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
5
Es
to
ni
a
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
4
Fi
nl
an
d
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
6
La
tv
ia
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
8
Li
th
ua
ni
a
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
6
Po
la
nd
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
5
UK
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
To
ta
l
6
7
8
7
2
1
7
8
3
-
Fr
an
ce
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
6
Ita
ly
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
5
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
7
Sw
ed
en
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
3
Sl
ov
ak
ia
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
6
To
ta
l
2
2
3
3
1
0
1
3
1
-
98
A
pp
en
di
x 
A
5 
SA
I a
nd
 fo
llo
w
er
s’
 a
ct
iv
ity
SA
I
SA
I a
nd
 F
ol
lo
w
er
s 
ac
tiv
ity
 2
1.
09
.1
6-
25
.0
5.
17
To
ta
l T
we
et
s
Tw
ee
ts
 o
n 
av
er
ag
e 
/ d
ay
Re
tw
ee
ts
Re
pl
ie
s
To
ta
l 
Ha
sh
ta
gs
Ha
sh
ta
gs
/T
we
et
M
os
t a
ct
ive
 d
ay
 fo
r S
AI
M
os
t a
ct
ive
 d
ay
 
fo
r f
ol
lo
we
rs
M
os
t a
ct
ive
 h
ou
r 
fo
r f
ol
lo
we
rs
Tw
ee
ts
Re
tw
ee
ts
Re
pl
ie
s
Au
st
ria
20
3
0.
82
6
86
18
1
0.
89
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
Tu
es
da
y /
 
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
6:
00
PM
De
nm
ar
k
24
0.
1
3
0
57
2.
38
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
no
ne
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
5:
00
PM
Es
to
ni
a
1
0
0
0
0
0
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
/ T
hu
rs
da
y
Th
ur
sd
ay
no
ne
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
8:
00
AM
Fi
nl
an
d
51
0
2.
06
22
0
44
48
4
0.
95
Th
ur
sd
ay
Tu
es
da
y
Tu
es
da
y
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
10
:0
0A
M
La
tv
ia
10
52
4.
26
42
7
14
9
45
0.
04
Tu
es
da
y
Tu
es
da
y
Tu
es
da
y
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
7:
00
PM
Li
th
ua
ni
a
27
0.
11
4
7
32
1.
19
Tu
es
da
y /
 
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
/ M
on
da
y
M
on
da
y
Tu
es
da
y
7:
00
AM
Po
la
nd
87
0.
35
0
0
0
0
Th
ur
sd
ay
Tu
es
da
y /
 
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
Th
ur
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
7:
00
PM
UK
17
9
0.
72
16
24
51
0.
28
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
Fr
id
ay
M
on
da
y
8:
00
AM
Fr
an
ce
21
5
0.
87
15
10
7
21
8
1.
01
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
7:
00
PM
Ita
ly
12
0
0.
49
2
2
25
6
2.
13
Fr
id
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
5:
00
PM
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
78
0.
.3
2
7
0
49
0.
63
Th
ur
sd
ay
Th
ur
sd
ay
Tu
es
da
y
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
7:
00
PM
Sw
ed
en
77
0.
31
0
0
82
1.
06
Tu
es
da
y
Tu
es
da
y
no
ne
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
7:
00
PM
Sl
ov
ak
ia
19
1
0.
77
4
0
35
0.
18
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
Th
ur
sd
ay
Fr
id
ay
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
2:
00
PM
99
THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
IN COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE, TRUST BUILDING 
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
Cosmina CRĂCIUNESCU (TIMOFTE)
Cosmina CRĂCIUNESCU (TIMOFTE)
PhD Candidate, Doctoral School of Administration and Public Policy, 
Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, 
Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
Tel.: 0040-264-431.361
E-mail: craciunescucosmina@gmail.com
Abstract
The role of artificial intelligence (AI) in public administration and collaborative governance becomes 
more and more acknowledged. The main objective of the paper is to present a qualitative analysis of the role 
of AI in matters of collaborative governance. Now, artificial intelligence represents an important part of the 
modern society. AI has the great capacity of generating significant benefits for the people and the overall 
economy. Moreover, a system of collaborative governance proves necessary for an ethical implementation 
of the newest technologies involving artificial intelligence. 
The creation of restrictive policies with regard to the use of AI will aid in the proper implementation 
of the most advanced technologies while minimizing risks. On the other hand, through the collaboration 
between the public and the private sectors, a more secure, homogenous and developed society could be 
created. Collaborative governance has the potential of breaking the barriers that were in the way of the 
expansion of knowledge within the society, and through the involvement of artificial intelligence, new levels 
of functionality could be achieved. Moreover, taking into consideration the fact that artificial intelligence 
cannot be corrupted, a process of trust building among the community will be able to emerge.
Keywords: collaborative governance, trust building, artificial intelligence, public sector.
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1. Theoretical viewpoints – AI in the public sector
The use of information technology and artificial intelligence plays a major role 
in present times, as public innovation programs have been drafted around the 
world. According to Tony Blair ‘Information technology is changing our lives: the 
way we work, the way we do business, the way we communicate with each other...’ 
(Bekkers, Duivenboden and Thaens, 2006, p. 3).
In the middle of the array of changes that occurred because of the development 
of artificial intelligence, and the power acquired by technology, the government 
intends to become the head of these developments. In this respect, the notion of 
e-government was developed lately, in the light of a new form of public manage-
ment, that eventually ‘brought a shift in the value priorities away from universal-
ism, equity, security and resilience toward efficiency and individualism, coming to 
redefine the role of the people within a society’ (Bekkers, Duivenboden and Thaens, 
2006, p. 7)
With regard to the delivery of public services, the introduction of intelligent 
automation will eventually create connected spaces where the occupant experience 
will be largely improved. On the other hand, the energy sector is heavily investing 
in automation, artificial intelligence and robotics in order to enable an effective 
knowledge transfer, providing a workplace experience that is able to meet ‘a digi-
tal-first, millennial talent pool’ (Greisler and Stupak, 2007).
The innovation of the public sector is an ongoing process, as the public arena is 
constrained to comply with the new rules and regulations that come into place due 
to the introduction of the most advanced technologies. OECD adopted the Declara-
tion on Public Sector on May 22, 2019 (Santos, 2019, p. 1). 
Since the introduction of artificial intelligence in most of the employment ar-
eas, the newest technologies brought about a revolution within the public sector. 
Starting with the 1950s, when artificial intelligence was created, the world entered 
a new phase, where all the processes started to go through automation. Eventually, 
automation became one of the most pressing needs of the modern society, due to 
the fact that the flow of information is very fast, and the pace of living escalated 
quickly during the past years. 
Along with the insertion of artificial intelligence, the functionalities of the soci-
ety and the companies changed, calling for innovation in multiple sectors. In this 
respect, the processes of automation were introduced nearly everywhere, starting 
in the most advanced areas of the world, such as Western Europe, the United States 
and the United Arab Emirates. 
The public sector is going through a phase of renewal for the past years, as more 
technologies were implemented, eventually answering to the needs of the custom-
ers. It is important to take into consideration the fact that the public sector is still 
flawed, and that there are still plenty of issues that could be addressed through the 
introduction of artificial intelligence. Some of the examples that could be brought 
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to light are the bureaucracy and the waiting lines for processing different requests 
and documents. 
AI refers to automation that goes beyond the physical automation of the tasks 
that previously took a human brain to be completed, to automation of activities 
such as conversation, data analysis and other activities (Miller, 2017, p. 3). 
The UN report of 2019 covers various AI projects that are piloted, implemented 
or planned by the governments across three applications, namely, citizen engage-
ment, improvement of the operational efficiency, AI strategies for policy and leg-
islation. The AI applications in government are nascent at the present time, as the 
governments need to overcome several hurdles in order to successfully adopt the 
new technologies (Bharadwaj, 2019).
With regard to the AI applications, the government leaders will need to invest 
in the upgrade of their legacy within the IT systems. Eventually, the failure of do-
ing so, may result in various compatibility issues at the point where the software 
needs to be integrated. On the other hand, the leaders of the governments will have 
to make sure their departments have the necessary computing resources for an AI 
project. This implies the introduction of the cloud computing solutions, but the fact 
that more technology that is expensive needs to be used is another aspect worth 
considering (Bharadwaj, 2019).
The introduction of intelligent automation and the use of artificial intelligence 
already started to have a great impact over the workforce. Exploiting technology 
will eventually enable workforce transformation, being a process that will create 
highly adaptable and change-ready enterprise environments capable of meeting the 
demands of our digital world (Accenture, 2016, p. 8).
Artificial intelligence is a very important aspect of government, with various 
applications that are already running in order to reduce backlogs and cut several 
costs. AI also helps predict fraudulent transactions and identify criminal suspects 
through the most advanced facial recognition techniques (Eggers, Schatsky and 
Viechnicki, 2017).
Since the replacement of the public administrative officials by robots is still a 
sensitive topic, technology may make the government tasks more efficient, by com-
plementing the skills of the public officials. In this manner, the promise of AI would 
be fulfilled, as humans and computers will be able to combine their strengths in 
order to achieve better and faster results (Eggers, Schatsky and Viechnicki, 2017).
Public servants are using AI in order to make it easier to detect fraud, to make 
welfare payments and make easier decisions when it comes to issues such as im-
migration. AI can also be used in planning infrastructure projects and answer dif-
ferent queries of the citizens (Martinho-Truswell, 2018, p. 1). The implications of 
introducing machine learning in the public administrative systems is related to hu-
man involvement. Since the humans cannot still be fully replaced, there is a need 
to recognize the fact that the government services will eventually become more 
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efficient and tailored to the needs of the population (Martinho-Truswell, 2018, 
p. 1). Customer service chat bots represent an early area of government applica-
tion, as well as the use of websites and portals as means of answering questions 
that constituents are placed into the position of calling an office and ask a question 
(Hawthorne, 2017).
It is clear that artificial intelligence brought about great changes in the public 
sector. Some of the advantages and disadvantages of the use of AI will be briefly 
presented. The most important advantage would be that of providing the necessary 
information to the citizens when in need of collecting data. Another advantage is 
represented by the capacity of information storage by robots. This storage would 
be achieved with the help of the technologies implemented, in order to create an 
artificial neural network that will resemble the mechanisms of the human brain. 
The artificial neural network resembles the human brain, only that it is capable of 
being involved in faster processes, delivering more accurate information than the 
human nature. The third advantage would be the increased capacity of the robots 
to process information and apply it according to the needs and environment. Yet, 
the fourth major advantage represents the fact that the robots will not be capable 
of being rude to the people, always in charge of the situation. Last, but not least, 
the robots will be able to provide the best solutions to the problems of the people, 
without the danger of being manipulated or wanting to go against the interests of 
the citizens. More importantly, there is no such possibility to bribe the robots in 
order to get the job done. The ticket machines for waiting in lines will disappear, 
as the AI assistant will be able to do a thorough scanning of the people in the room 
and divide the tasks by categories and the needs of the people. 
Major disadvantages would constitute the inability of the robots to fully un-
derstand the situations, especially the most complex ones, such as explaining the 
history of a relationship between two people that eventually ended in divorce. Also, 
they are not capable of displaying empathy, so it will be hard to relate to them 
when confronted to a certain issue. Another disadvantage would be represented by 
the costs of the implementation, and the fact that there will be the need for multiple 
power sources that we do not afford to have. In addition, there will be a need for 
engineers to perform maintenance work on the robots, which is costly. 
2. Collaborative governance and trust building
Collaboration refers to working in conjunction with others (Wanna, 2008, p. 3). It 
implies actors, who are individuals, groups or organizations, which are cooperating 
in some manner. The participants are in a relationship of co-laboring with others 
on terms and conditions that are subject to great variation (Wanna, 2006, p. 3). At 
its very core, the term ‘collaboration’ was originally used in the 19th century, along 
with the development of the industry. Collaboration became a fundamental norm of 
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utilitarianism, social liberalism, collectivism, along with mutual aid, involving sci-
entific management and organizational theory (Agranoff apud Wanna, 2008, p. 3). 
Collaboration attracts a positive ‘spin’ in most of the cases (Wanna, 2008, p. 3). It 
brings positivity and creativity to any project, involving beneficial outcomes. The 
collaborative endeavors can also involve the achievement of an outcome or can be 
related to the prevention of something happening (Wanna, 2008, p. 3).
Collaboration involves cooperation in order to build commonality, improve con-
sistency and align activities that pertain to different actors. Secondly, it can be rep-
resented by the process of negotiation, involving a preparedness to reach a compro-
mise and the ability to make trade-offs. Collaboration can involve oversight roles, 
in the actions of checking, as well as pulling together and central coordination. 
According to Ansell and Gash (2008), collaborative governance is known ‘as a 
governing arrangement where one or more public agencies are engaging the non-
state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consen-
sus-oriented, and deliberative, and that aims to make or implement public policy or 
manage public programs or assets’ (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p. 543).
Within a system of collaborative governance, the process of problem solving 
begins with the identification of a specific situation characterized as undesirable. 
Attempts of defining the problem and find the root causes are made. This process 
proves to be a nearly impossible task, because of the societal problems described 
as ‘…inherently resistant to a clear definition and an agreed solution’ (Head and 
Alford apud Waardenburg et al., 2019, p. 388).
Collaborative governance has emerged in response to the failures of the down-
stream implementation, along with the high cost and politicization of regulation. 
Moreover, it has developed as an alternative to the adversarialism of interest group 
pluralism and to the accountability failures of managerialism. In addition, the trends 
toward collaboration also arise from the growth of knowledge at the level of soci-
ety, coupled with the growth of the ‘institutional capacity’. The increase in knowl-
edge is directly proportional with the increase in the institutional infrastructures, 
thus increasing the demand for collaborative bodies (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p. 544).
In the instance where the stakeholders do not have the necessary capacity, along 
with organization, status or resources to participate, as well as taking into account 
the circumstance when they cannot participate on equal footing with the other 
stakeholders, the collaborative governance process will be prone to manipulation 
by stronger actors. The problem of power imbalance arises, in the moment when 
important stakeholders do not have the organizational infrastructure to be repre-
sented (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p. 551).
Collaborative governance may be defined as a form of general arrangement, 
as scholars refer to as an ‘agency relationship’. These types of bonds usually have 
two main players, one referring to the ‘principal’, whose interests are being served, 
and the other one ‘the agent’, being tasked with serving those particular interests 
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(Donahue and Zeckhauser, 2011). There are two main reasons or outcomes that 
are followed in a system of collaborative governance, namely better outcomes and 
more resources (Donahue and Zeckhauser, 2011).
2.1. Trust Building
A successful collaboration would prove to be impossible without trust. While 
the existence of trusting relationships represents the ideal situation in a collabo-
rative environment, the common practice appears to be that suspicion, rather than 
trust, is the starting point (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p. 561).
Two factors are of maximum importance when it comes to a trusting relation-
ship. The first is concerned with the formation of expectations in regard to the 
future of the collaboration. These expectations are generally based on past experi-
ences, reputation or past behavior, as well as on formal contracts and agreements 
(Ansell and Gash, 2008, pp. 561-562). The second factor involves risk taking, in the 
sense that the partners need to trust each other enough in order to be able to initi-
ate the collaboration. 
According to Rousseau, trust ‘includes confident expectation along with a will-
ingness to be vulnerable, as the critical components’ (Hosmer et al. apud Nielsen 
and Evans, 2004, p. 240). In general, scholars have agreed to view trust as ‘one’s 
belief or expectation about the likelihood of having a desirable action performed by 
a trustee’ (Nielsen and Evans, 2004, p. 240).
The concept of trust building can be simplified by explaining the way the man-
agement of aims works. One has to take into account the fact that sometimes it is 
better to get started on some smaller, but tangible action, in order to allow trust to 
develop slowly. On the other hand, in the circumstance when an immediate need to 
attain a major objective is paramount, this approach does not prove neither efficient 
nor effective. In the example of urgent situations, expectation forming along with 
trust building have to be simultaneously managed, alongside other activities that 
involve trust building (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p. 558).
Trust is known to accelerate exchanges in the economy, as the actors gain ac-
cess to more information about the ‘predictability of other’s behaviors so as to be 
able to identify reliable partners’ intentions about future intentions based on di-
rect experiences with previous business relationships…’ (Larson apud Nielsen and 
Evans, 2004, p. 245).
3. Collaborative governance and community development
In the context of community development, collaborative governance can arise 
either with the engagement of the community, resource management, conflict reso-
lution or public networks, offering a large spectrum of typologies reflecting applied 
perspectives (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 160).
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Some of the scholars categorize the collaborative processes as coming from very 
specific contexts, such as those arising from conflict, as well as those that start with 
a shared vision (Gray apud Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 160). According to Gray, 
the two contexts affect the motivations of the participants, proceeding in crossing 
these dimensions with two distinct outcomes, namely the exchange of information 
and the joint agreement (Gray apud Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 160).
4. Narrative analysis – the role of AI in collaborative governance, 
trust building and community development
With regard to the practical aspects of the present article, the method used in 
the work is qualitative, illustrated by content analysis, document analysis and nar-
rative analysis. Because it is impossible to extract the absolute meaning from the 
data, an exploratory research is conducted. Content analysis is a qualitative meth-
od of research referring to the study of documents and communication artifacts, 
used to examine patterns in communication in a systematic manner (Bryman, 2011, 
p. 289). Narrative analysis is one qualitative method used by researchers to create a 
thematic version of a phenomenon in an attempt to gather detailed information on 
the topic (Figgou and Pavlopoulos, 2015, p. 546). The objective of the research is to 
present a qualitative, narrative analysis of the role of artificial intelligence in collab-
orative governance, along with illustrating the connections between governance, 
trust building and community development. 
With regard to the insertion of AI in the practices of collaborative governance, 
for the analysis that will be developed in this section, there is a series of aspects 
that have to be taken into account. The purpose of the analysis is to elaborate on 
issues such as engaging the community, resource management, public network-
ing, planning, education, as well as trust building with the involvement of artificial 
intelligence.
When it comes to community engagement, there are several issues that need 
to be addressed in connection to the introduction and use of artificial intelligence. 
The development of machine learning and artificial intelligence is very expensive, 
and at the present times, there are only few companies that can really afford its 
introduction in their affairs. In order for machine learning to be widely used and 
adopted, there is a need for it to lower its development costs. These costs can only 
lower with the use of open source development and a decentralized product devel-
opment (Mitra, 2018, p. 4). 
Moreover, the community behind the implementation of artificial intelligence is 
able to allow for the access to a large amount of data. The wisdom and experience 
of the community, bringing together people from different backgrounds and loca-
tions, can result in innovative approaches to gather and work with the data that 
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is placed at the disposal of the citizens. The members of the community can bring 
their data to the project, creating a space of trust and collaboration.
Through the trust building that takes place in the community, companies can 
emerge from societies and communities with shared values, beliefs and a bigger 
vision that serves the long-term interests of those communities. The future of Ar-
tificial Intelligence and Machine Learning will definitely be in the hands of the 
community, rather than driven by the elitist society. In order for AI to reach its full 
potential, there will be a need for the construction of a global community across 
countries, encompassing at the same time, the different perspectives and values. 
It is only in this manner, that great products can be developed, responding to the 
needs of the society and providing solutions to the pressuring problems of the pres-
ent and the future (Mitra, 2018, p. 5).
At the level of management, it is clear that managers pertaining to various levels 
will have to adapt to the world of smart machines. It will not be long until artificial 
intelligence will be able to take over the administrative tasks that take up most 
of the time of the managers, successfully completing them, at a much lower cost. 
AI is capable to automate most of the administrative tasks, and it could be able to 
take over bureaucracy very soon. When it comes to management, AI can set up the 
schedules of the employees, allowing for a smoother flow of distributing informa-
tion in a timely manner. Moreover, it will be capable to take over the basic manage-
rial tasks, allowing for sick days, leave of absence or other related issues.
AI will definitely be able to augment the managerial capacities, also allowing for 
the collegial interaction between the people and the machines. In addition, the use 
and implementation of AI in collaborative governance, in this case, management, 
will leave room for more creativity and allow leaders to express and implement 
their ideas (Kolbjørnsrud, Amico and Thomas, 2016, p. 4).
4.1. Public networking 
The public networks are considered a fundamental characteristic of the modern 
society, as the contemporary researchers should undertake the study of decision 
making, along with organization and management. The governance networks are 
those in which the link actors, who can be either individual or institutional, these 
being ultimately responsible for the formulation of law that the public administra-
tion puts into effect (Opolski, Modzelewski and Kocia, 2013, p. 100). Governance 
networks are stable relations between various governmental and private groups in 
which decision making in regards to policy occurs (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 
apud Opolski, Modzelewski and Kocia, 2013, p. 100). Moreover, the involvement of 
AI in public networking already has a significant impact on the community world-
wide, due to the fact that the spread of information takes place in a faster and more 
secure manner. 
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4.2. Planning
In order to overcome various challenges that arise in collaborative governance, 
the management activities should focus on building institutional capacities for 
joint-action, such as the creation of common standards for the purpose of data col-
lection and processing. On the other hand, Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 546) describe 
the different effects that a communication strategy can have on the management of 
a collaboration. In this case, the attractor effect occurs at the moment when the col-
laboration produces tangible outcomes, showing the value of joint-action through 
quick wins. The positive learning feedback is another determinant of success in 
creating politically neutral spaces, reducing cultural barriers and increasing net-
working (Mikhaylov, Esteve and Campion, 2018, p. 15).
4.3. Education
At the level of university, the schools are encouraged to collaborate with the 
industry and the business sectors, for the purpose of engaging with the community 
for the promotion of innovation, along with the transfer of knowledge and entre-
preneurship (Mok, 2017, p. 3). 
In 2010 two municipalities along the Danish Union of Early Childhood and Youth 
Educators established a partnership concerned with inter-organizational collabora-
tions for the purpose of innovating the quality-management methods for daycare 
governance. The problems shared within the partnership involved the management 
of the service quality of the daycare. New laboratory projects were initiated, in or-
der to explore new quality management methods. Eventually, many stakeholders 
became involved in the process. The collaborative governance designs are contin-
ually negotiated in both the design and implementation phases (Plotnikoff, 2015, 
p. 209). The insertion of artificial intelligence in education comes forward as a natu-
ral process, due to the fact that the schools have to adapt to the requirements of the 
work ethics and environments.
It is necessary to place emphasis on the fact that the insertion of the most ad-
vanced technologies in the matters of the administration have created spaces for 
change. With the use of technology, a new paradigm of collaboration has emerged. 
The new concept of open government seeks to include society in governmental 
processes for the purpose of increasing efficacy, efficiency, along with citizen satis-
faction (Charalabidis and Koussouris, 2012, p. 27).
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5. Conclusions
AI represents a significant aspect of the contemporary society. Its future is di-
rectly dependent on the development of the community. When it comes to col-
laborative governance, the community can benefit from lower costs of the imple-
mentation along with the use of artificial intelligence, which will represent a plus 
for the social environment. Moreover, the costs of the implementation of the new 
technologies and artificial intelligence can significantly drop in the instance where 
collaborative governance comes into play. Collaborative governance calls for the 
engagement of the community in almost all areas of public life. As for the area 
of public networking, various governance networks are formed, in which the link 
actors are responsible for the laws that are placed into effect by the public adminis-
tration. Public networking knew a significant boost along with the implementation 
of artificial intelligence.
At the level of planning, collaborative governance calls for joint action from the 
institutions, in order to function properly. It is important to bring to light the fact 
that AI calls for a great improvement in the governance area, as it can ease pro-
cesses of communication, networking and development. In the area of education, 
even though the concept of collaborative governance is relatively new, it seems 
that it would constitute a good idea to be implemented, improving both the com-
munication skills and other important social and technical abilities for students and 
teachers in the community.
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Abstract
The sovereign debt crisis which started in late 2009 and engulfed many European Union member states, 
especially in the Southern and Eastern part of the block, represented an unprecedented situation due to the 
fact that most of the affected countries were part of the Euro zone and thus subject to the single monetary 
policy promoted by the European Central Bank, leaving fiscal policy as the only tool available to respond to 
the challenges posed by the macroeconomic context, as observed at a national level. This led to a series of 
extraordinary fiscal policy decisions, most of which endorsing austerity and fueling debates on whether this 
austerity approach would generate the expected results. It is the objective of this paper to study, a decade 
after their implementation, the impact of these fiscal policies in selected EU member states, shedding more 
light on what worked and what seemed to falter.
Keywords: austerity, sovereign debt crisis, economic recovery and fiscal policy.
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1. Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis which started in late 2009 can be regarded as a con-
tinuation of the financial crisis that hit the private sector beginning with 2007, as 
it caused increased government deficits prompted by considerably lower tax rev-
enues and increased government spending needed to tackle issues such as rising 
unemployment or bank bailouts (Parnell, Spracklen and Millward, 2017). The crisis 
represented an unprecedented situation for the European Union due to the fact that 
most of the affected countries were part of the Euro zone and thus subject to the 
single monetary policy promoted by the European Central Bank, leaving fiscal pol-
icy as the only tool available to respond to the challenges posed by the macroeco-
nomic context, as observed at a national level. Most hit were Southern and Eastern 
European Member States, which, based on previous long periods of extraordinary 
fiscal expansion, saw their government finance indicators deteriorate at an unprec-
edented rate, a situation that prevented them to successfully access the markets for 
(re-)financing their debt and had to rely on bailout packages from international in-
stitutions. However, such bailout packages came with stringent conditions from the 
creditors, leading to a series of extraordinary fiscal policy decisions, most of which 
endorsing austerity and fueling debates on whether this austerity approach would 
generate the expected results. Approximately a decade later, the effects of these 
austerity measures are fully visible, allowing for deep analysis that could greatly 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of responses to future such crises. It is the 
objective of this paper to study, a decade after their implementation, the impact 
of these fiscal policies in selected EU member states, shedding more light on what 
worked and what seemed to falter.
For the purpose of this research, we adhere to de understanding of austerity pro-
posed by Blyth (2013, p. 2) who defines austerity as ‘a form of voluntary deflation 
in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public 
spending in order to restore competitiveness which is (supposedly) best achieved by 
cutting the state’s budget, debts, and deficits’. However, as Parnell, Spracklen and 
Millward (2017) point out, the voluntary character described by Blyth is sometimes 
actually the result of external actors (most likely creditors) imposing such measures 
as a condition for providing with the much-needed financial rescue packages.
In this context, we recognize the case of Greece as presenting the most potential 
for conducting such an analysis, as it had by far the most acute dynamic, thus mak-
ing certain effects and relations most visible. Portugal, Italy and Spain present with 
similar research opportunities on the effects of austerity, but with lower intensity. 
Regarding Ireland, which is the other country that inspired the already famous 
PIIGS acronym, the fundamental difference from the other four heavily affect-
ed Euro zone Member States lies in Ireland’s fast current account improvement, 
which, as Regan (2014) argues, had nothing to do with fiscal austerity measures, 
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but was a consequence of an export-led growth regime fueled by high levels of US 
investments in the Irish economy, investments triggered by other types of policies 
that boosted Irish comparative advantage and successfully managed to attract FDIs 
in capital intensive industries. For this reason, the paper focuses on Greece and, to 
a lesser extent, on Portugal, Italy and Spain.
2. A snapshot of the crisis
The focal point in the sovereign debt crisis which started in 2009 is, as Lim, 
Moutselos and McKenna (2019) note, the fact that heavily affected economies, with 
default looming, often do not have any satisfactory resolution options as they are 
unable to access financing on international markets at affordable interest rates (if 
at all), creating major obstacles in financing government expenditures and meeting 
debt obligations. Looking at the case of Greece (who exhibited the most severe 
fiscal situation), the inability to receive financing from the markets is illustrated in 
Figure 1, depicting exorbitant yields for government bonds with a 10-year maturity.
 
Figure 1: Greece’s 10 years government bond yields (%)
Source: World Bank
Being far from a market failure, this situation was a direct consequence of the 
extremely poor state of Greek public finances, characterized by increased deficits 
(Figure 2) and a staggering debt to GDP ratio, which mounted fast from 126.7% in 
2009 to 172.1% in 2011 (Figure 3).
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Figure 2: Greece’s public deficit (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank
 
Figure 3: Greece’s public debt (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank
Similar (although not this desperate) situations were valid for Portugal, Italy 
and Spain, putting a lot of pressure on their government financing costs. However, 
unlike Greece and Portugal, which are small economies, the Italian and Spanish 
cases represented a real danger to the future of the Euro zone, as an Italian or 
Spanish default would have represented a Euro-catastrophe. This made the situa-
tion more complex, especially from a Greek perspective. Due to its participation 
in the single currency area, Greece did not have access to the two economic policy 
instruments that could have made its situation easier: currency devaluation and 
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inflation via an aggressive cut of interest rates. Paradoxically however, it was ex-
actly this Euro zone membership that presented Greece with an extra argument in 
the negotiations with the Troika (a term used to denote the consortium made out 
of the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission), as a Greek default would have given a poor signal to already anx-
ious markets, which had the potential of creating a contagion effect and spelling 
doom for more heavyweight Italy and Spain. 
As it is not our objective to analyze the Greek bailout negotiations, the focus 
will be put on the effects of resulting austerity measures, with more and more 
such policies being implemented with each of the 3 bailouts starting from 2010, 
leading to a staggering fourteen austerity packages targeting virtually all fiscal 
areas – a course of action that has clearly put its mark on economic growth. Fig-
ure 4 depicts the evolution of Greece’s GDP growth rate between 2009 and 2018, 
while Figure 5 illustrates the country’s yearly GDP in the same period, showing 
a prolonged contraction trend that led to a staggering negative 34% difference 
between a EUR 330 billion GDP in 2009 and a EUR 218 billion GDP in 2018. This 
severe contraction, besides the obvious depiction of precarious economic activity, 
actually represents a major obstacle in Greece’s debt repayment struggle, as the 
weakening of the economy means that debt has risen in relative terms (Figure 3), 
an effect which is contrary to the objective of the austerity policies of achieving 
faster debt repayment.
 
Figure 4: Greece’s GDP growth rate (%)
Source: World Bank
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 Figure 5: Greece’s GDP (billion EUR)
Source: World Bank
Looking at the cases of Spain, Portugal and Italy, one can identify a similar 
(although not as severe) pattern, marked by austerity driven negative economic 
growth and its effects on the debt to GDP indicator.
3. Austerity, a debatable solution
Despite the determination with which international creditors (mostly under the 
form of ‘the Troika’) pushed for the implementation of severe austerity policies in 
debt encumbered states seeking for bailouts, the efficiency of this particular solu-
tion was subject of intense debate. However, what were at the moment of acute 
sovereign debt crisis mere forecasts, whose results were favoring one approach or 
the other, now, a decade after the onset of the crisis, economists have the possibility 
of analyzing real data that provide with the inputs that are needed in order to better 
understand the effects of austerity and design future policies that are based not on 
predictions, but on actual facts. 
In most cases, austerity measures were demanded and eventually imposed by 
international creditors by deploying inducements or coercive threats as an instru-
ment to reshape the policy preferences of national governments (Lim, Moutselos 
and McKenna, 2019). This is certainly applicable to the Member States that were 
affected by the sovereign debt crisis and had to resort on the financial help of in-
ternational institutions, but, in the case of crisis struck EZ members, especially in 
the case of Greece, whose fiscal situation was most severe and thus the absence 
of a bailout agreement and the consequential Greek fallout was constituting an 
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increased threat of contagion, with dire consequences for the single currency area, 
the pressure was bi-directional, a situation that provided Greek negotiators with 
arguments to partially resist the Troika’s vigorous demands for severe austerity 
measures. Analyzing the Spanish and Italian cases and their negotiations with in-
ternational financing institutions, Badell et al. (2019) argue that the attitude to-
wards European integration is also likely to play a role in resisting pressures for 
starker austerity formulated by the creditors.
Taking the analysis one step further, Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2018) distin-
guish between Expenditure Based (EB) and Taxed Based (TB) austerity measures, 
concluding that: (1) EB measures have, on average, a small negative effect on out-
put growth, while TB, which are associated with longer recession periods, have 
much more meaningful effects on output; (2) investment growth tends to respond 
positively to EB measures and negatively to TB measures; (3) consumption and net 
exports respond negatively to both EB and TB. The same authors show that these 
effects hold even in the case of substantial austerity plans, like the austerity pack-
ages that were introduced in Greece, Spain, Portugal or Ireland during the govern-
ment debt crisis that started in 2009, confirming that TB austerity measures induce 
deeper recessions than those falling within an EB approach.
In this context, Papadopoulos and Roumpakis (2018) show that the austerity 
policy approach contributed to deepening the recession in the Southern European 
states, as it affected the existing welfare model made out of employment securi-
ty, home ownership and pension adequacy and destabilizing the traditional fam-
ily model, with familial household facing high levels of indebtedness, substantial 
income reductions and lower socioeconomic security. Their findings are comple-
mented by the research of Branco et al. (2019), who conclude that, in the cases of 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, austerity prompted structural reforms on labor market 
regulation and social protection endured almost a decade later, with just a few cases 
reporting significant policy reversals, most of which were the result of a change in 
the ideological makeup of government (Portugal in 2015, Spain and Italy in 2018). 
This being said, the same authors identify (1) declining unemployment, (2) expand-
ed EU level governance and market-based supervision and (3) resistance to change 
due to interests and constituencies emerging from the new realities as favoring 
policy continuity at the detriment of core reversals. Such a view is confirmed by 
Wren-Lewis (2016), who shows that some degree of austerity was inevitable in 
the Euro zone countries hardest hit by the sovereign debt crisis, but, in the same 
time, the extremely high level of unemployment that followed such measures could 
certainly have been avoided. Similarly, Engler and Klein (2017) show that austerity 
measures implemented in Italy, Spain and Portugal between 2010 and 2014 con-
sisting in (sometimes severe) cuts in government expenditures and increases of 
taxes were unsuccessful in reducing the debt/GDP ratio of these countries and are 
susceptible of contributing to the subsequent recession. Referring to the Portuguese 
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case, Weeks (2019) shows that seven years after Portugal received the ‘rescue finan-
cial package’ from the international institutional creditors, youth unemployment is 
high (more than one third), with public and household debt and corporate liabilities 
levels registering extremely high levels, roughly double the indebtedness levels re-
ported in the mid-2000s. 
Focusing on the financial sector, Bergman, Hutchison and Jensen (2019) study 
how EU policies, including domestic austerity programs, have impacted percep-
tions of sovereign and bank default risk in Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy, the EZ 
member states that were hit hardest by the sovereign debt crisis. After conducting 
a thorough econometric analysis, they conclude that domestic austerity programs 
‘did not systematically move CDS spreads for either sovereign debt or bank bonds’, 
attributing this lack of effect to either the fact that these austerity measures did not 
restore confidence in sovereign debt or bank solvency, or to the fact that they were 
fully anticipated by the markets.
In addition to its economic shortcomings, the post 2009 severe austerity ap-
proach taken by many EU countries has also represented failure from a health-
care perspective, as an increasing number of suicides and increasing numbers of 
people being unable to access care were reported (McKee et al., 2012). Also, as 
Lopez-Valcarcel, Beatriz and Barber (2017) report, cuts in public spending during 
the economic crisis may have reduced the fairness of the healthcare system by 
impeding access to health services. These findings are in line with the conclusions 
of Kyriopoulos, Nikoloski and Mossialos (2019), who show that Greek household 
health expenditures were negatively affected by the austerity policies, highlighting 
the importance of complementary measures aimed at protecting basic healthcare 
during prolonged economic recessions.
Moreover, Pottier and Delette (2019) argue that the implementation of austerity 
measures and structural reforms based on the ordo-liberal economic model could 
have endangered the EU project due to the fact that it enabled populist and Eu-
rosceptic political parties to gain more influence, while putting pressure on the 
perception of sovereign democracy in those countries where austerity was imple-
mented despite their rejection by the people, an example being the results of the 
Greek referendum on the subject. The findings of the paper of Papadopoulos and 
Roumpakis (2018) confirm the pressure that ordo-liberal austerity measures have 
applied to a fragile European integration process.
4. Conclusion and Looking Ahead
The body of research consisting of numerous papers analyzing the policy ap-
proach based on introducing severe austerity measures to struggling governments 
are probably well captured by the conclusions of Gechert, Horn and Paetz (2019) 
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who, after estimating the effect of fiscal policy shocks on potential output, argue 
that the austerity measures taken in the Eurozone countries after the crisis were 
‘badly timed and thus not only deepened the crisis but may have caused evitable 
hysteresis effects’. However, at this point perhaps the most practical use of eco-
nomic research on the case study represented by policy reactions to the sovereign 
debt crisis in Euro zone Member States is ensured by focusing on applying the deep 
knowledge of the complex interaction between austerity and economic slowdown 
facilitated by such analysis to developing more efficient (and implicitly less eco-
nomically disruptive) ways of addressing similar issues in the future. 
For this purpose, it is in the first phase important to recognize that, in the af-
termath of the European sovereign debt crisis, the fiscal policy approach is de-
fined between the opposing pressures of two categories of factors: (1) sound fi-
nance demands from institutional creditors and financial markets and (2) protec-
tion and safety demands from domestic democratic constituencies (Moury and 
Afonso, 2019). Moreover, we underline the argument of the same authors according 
to which the failure to accommodate both these sources of tension could result in 
sub-optimal outcomes, as was the case of Italian disregard for EU rules in favor 
of more lax spending backtracked due to the pressure from markets. The under-
standing of the interaction between these two antagonistic forces is thus crucial in 
addressing future similar situations and successfully using the results of the past 
austerity centered fiscal therapies for designing more efficient responses. 
From this perspective, possible solutions could be linked to debt mutualization 
through the creation of the highly controversial ‘Eurobonds’, that would equalize 
the borrowing requirements among all Eurozone countries – a rational but politi-
cally improbable action (Weeks, 2019). Indeed, such an approach, although presents 
with unchallengeable economic merit, is blocked by formidable political resistance, 
as the European identity is not strong enough so that political leaders from Member 
States with sound fiscal parameters could convince their constituents of picking up 
the debt burden of those less fiscally disciplined, a state of fact that denotes the con-
solidation of the dichotomy between monetary and fiscal policy that induces Euro 
zone structural fragility (Dan, 2014). Moreover, as Maniu (2018) notes, the reluc-
tance of a mutual tackling of debt during the Greek crisis has fueled Euroscepticism 
in both professional and common European settings, with political commitment 
backing the single currency being overall weak (Masini, 2018). In this context, we 
highlight the more realistic prescription arguing that high degrees of public debt 
should be tackled through a ‘balanced policy mix of structural reforms, mild aus-
terity measures, and if possible, budget reallocation in favor of investment’ (Engler 
and Klein, 2017). 
As a concluding remark, we argue that no matter what challenges future eco-
nomic developments will hold, understanding the errors of the austerity response 
constitutes an indispensable step in blueprinting better reactions to future fiscal 
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crises. Although hardly representing any consolation to those involved with the 
economies that suffered as an effect of excessive austerity, one can remember a 
famous quote attributed to Thomas Edison (Elkhorne, 1967, p. 52): ‘I have not failed. 
I’ve just found 10,000 ways that won’t work’. Let this be one of those 10,000 ways.
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Abstract
The hypothesis of the paper is that the resilience of small communities can be engaged by inter-munic-
ipal cooperation. The economy of scale of public services is a great challenge for the small communities 
in Europe. The review of the international models will focus on the models based on the merge of the mu-
nicipalities and on the models based on the engagement of inter-municipal cooperation. The literature on 
these reforms will be reviewed. Based on the hypothesis, the regulation on inter-municipal cooperation and 
service provision of the rural areas in Hungary in the last two decades will be shortly presented. As part of 
this research, empirical research was carried out in a Hungarian rural area, which has a strong inter-munic-
ipal cooperation. Similarly, empirical research has been carried out in a Slovenian rural area which is based 
on the merge of the small communities. The advantages and disadvantages of the inter-municipal model, 
and the model based on the merge of the communities were compared in the paper: efficient units of public 
services provision can be established not only by the merge of the communities but by the establishment of 
inter-municipal associations. Although decision-making is more complicated, the small communities could 
be more resilient based on this model, because the flexibility and the community building of the small mu-
nicipal model prevail as well. The merge of the municipalities offers more efficient decision-making, but the 
resilience engaged by the grassroots service provision requires some administrative actions in this model. 
Keywords: inter-municipal cooperation, small municipalities, merging of municipalities, comparative 
analysis, Hungary, Slovenia.
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1. Introduction
In Hungary, the system and the provision of public services have changed rad-
ically in the last decade. Previously, the system was based on a strong, but frag-
mented municipal system and the reforms of the early 2010s were driven by cen-
tralization – and partly on concentration – of public service provision (Balázs and 
Hoffman, 2017, pp. 13-15). The regulatory methods and the related budgetary sup-
port system were adjusted to serve this aim. Although a new centralized public 
service provision system has been created, the municipal administration was con-
centrated by the establishment of the joint municipal offices which can be consid-
ered as obligatory inter-municipal cooperation (Hoffman et al., 2016, pp. 464-465). 
The primary research method is a jurisprudential one, but the effects of the 
regulation and the practical outcome of the new system of municipal finance will 
be analyzed as well. An empirical study was carried out in a Hungarian and a 
Slovenian rural area, through which the differences of the inter-municipal approach 
and the merge of the communities can be observed. 
First of all, I would like to have an European overview, in which we would like to 
analyze the transformation of the rural governance in the European countries, and 
to analyze the trends of changes. After the short review, I would like to analyze the 
transformation of the Hungarian system, and the effects of the reforms, especially 
the transformation of the municipal roles. The resilience of the small communities 
can be observed by these changes because the former paradigm has been radically 
changed in the first half of this decade. Therefore, empirical research is required for 
the analysis of these tasks. Thus, The Department of Administrative Law of Faculty 
of Law, Eötvös Loránd University has accomplished a research on the inter-munic-
ipal cooperation of the rural areas. In our research, we put an emphasis on the fact 
that the presence of inter-municipal cooperation in the Hungarian municipal sys-
tem serves as a tool of self-governance and resilience tool in the continental local 
government systems (Pálné Kovács, 2016, p. 585).
2. Methods and approaches of the comparative municipal law 
The analysis is focused on the legal regulations on inter-municipal cooperation. 
Primarily the regulation on municipal system and tasks were analyzed. Beside the 
jurisprudential analysis, the research also included an empirical inquiry regarding 
the role of the inter-municipal cooperation in a given rural area. The jurisprudential 
analysis focuses on the Hungarian regulation. It will be shown that the Hungarian 
municipal system is a fragmented one which is based on the municipal status of the 
small communities, comparative research was carried out in a country with a simi-
lar municipal system: partly based on the merged small communities and partly on 
the inter-municipal cooperation of these units. 
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The practice of a Slovenian rural area has been analyzed, as well. The empirical 
research – which has been based on the jurisprudential and financial analysis of the 
facultative service provision of several municipalities – was based on a qualitative 
method. Semi-structured interviews were done from the summer of 2018 to the 
spring of 2019. The number of municipalities was limited due to the pilot nature of 
the research and the limited resources. The research was focused on the analysis of 
several characteristic municipalities in detail. 
The selection of the analyzed rural area has been based on the hypothesis that the 
task performance of the smaller municipalities could be based on the cooperation 
with a given rural area (Nagy, 2017, pp. 24-25). We have examined similar rural units 
(with approx. 9,000 inhabitants) in Hungary and in Slovenia. Both have a central 
community, which has approximately 5,000 inhabitants, and the economy of both 
areas is based on the significant role of tourism. The micro-region of Balatonlelle 
(Hungary) has been analyzed in Hungary. Its central community is Town Munic-
ipality Balatonlelle, which has approximately 5,000 inhabitants, and 6 – mainly 
small – municipalities belong to the surrounding area (the 6 municipalities have a 
total population of approx. 3,500 inhabitants). In Slovenia, a similar area was ana-
lyzed: the municipality of Bled. It is a merged municipality with three communities; 
the central one is Bled at the Lake Bled with 5,500 inhabitants. 
3. Inter-municipal cooperation 
and fragmented spatial structure in Hungary 
3.1. Fragmented spatial structure in Hungary and its consequences: 
a short historical review 
Hungary has a fragmented spatial structure. The majority of the Hungarian mu-
nicipalities had less than 1,000 inhabitants in 2010 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Population of the Hungarian municipalities (1990-2010)
Year
0-499 500- 999
1,000-
1,999
2,000-
4,999
5,000-
9,999
10,000-
19,999
20,000-
49,999
50,000-
99,999 100,000- All
Inhabitants
1990 965 709 646 479 130 80 40 12 9 3,070
2000 1,033 688 657 483 138 76 39 12 9 3,135
2010 1,086 672 635 482 133 83 41 11 9 3,152
Source: Szigeti (2013, p. 282)
The governance of the rural areas in Hungary has been based on this condition, 
and the (inter-communal) cooperation had a significant role. Although after World 
War II, Hungary belonged to the Communist Block, the transformation of the spa-
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tial structure had similar ways from the 1960s, when a new tool of the rural gover-
nance appeared: the merger of the municipalities. The main form of this merging 
process was the formation of the common village councils (községi közös tanács). 
Although merging communities was an important element of the new reforms, 
the intercommunal associations were reborn. The cooperation between towns and 
villages was not solved by the merge of the municipalities, and the town areas were 
not universal in the 1970s (Balázs and Hoffman, 2017, p. 9). In 1990 a new, local 
government system was established by the Amendment of the Constitution and by 
the Act LXV of 1990 on the Local Self-Governments (hereinafter: Ötv). This system 
was a two-tier, but local-level centered system. The local-centered nature of the 
Hungarian local government system was strengthened by the system of voluntary 
inter-municipal associations. Article 44/A of the amended (former) Constitution 
declared that the right to cooperate is a fundamental right of municipalities. These 
rights had similar constitutional protection as human rights, only at a lower lev-
el. Therefore, the introduction of a compulsory inter-municipal association system 
was very difficult (Verebélyi, 1999, pp. 30-36), almost impossible, due to the require-
ment of a broad political consensus (two-third majority act) to establish them.
Meanwhile, local public service systems – which were built on the duties and 
responsibilities of the local governments – had several dysfunctional elements. 
The main dysfunctional element was the fragmented spatial structure which was 
strengthened by democratic changes, as a counterpart to former Communist times: 
where compulsory inter-municipal associations (the above presented common vil-
lage councils) treated size inefficiency problems. As it was mentioned, this type of 
inter-municipal cooperation was the merger of villages practically, as village coun-
cils and their administration were basically amalgamated. This compulsory form 
was unpopular among Hungarian municipalities; therefore, it disappeared with the 
democratic changes, giving opportunity to a disintegration tendency in the transi-
tion period (Hoffman, 2009, pp. 130-132). 
This fragmentation and the related size inefficiency problem was tried to be 
solved by inter-municipal cooperation. The inter-municipal system of the Ötv was 
based on voluntary cooperation. The new types of associations could not stop the 
disintegration because of their voluntary nature and the poor financial support pro-
vided by the central budget. In 1994 a partial review of the regulation took place. 
The paradigm of the voluntary inter-municipal cooperation remained but supple-
mentary funding from the central budget was introduced by the legislation for the 
establishment of inter-municipal associations and for their service delivery (Balázs 
and Hoffman, 2017, pp. 10-12). As a result of these reforms, the number of inter-mu-
nicipal associations radically increased after 1997 (see Table 2). 
The joined form of municipal administration was stimulated as well. The estab-
lishment of joint municipal clerks was strongly supported by the central budget. 
The disintegration tendencies of Hungarian local administration stopped at the end 
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of the 1990s, giving place to the concentration of the municipal administration in 
rural areas. In 2004, a new type of inter-municipal association was introduced by 
the Hungarian legislation – the multi-purpose micro-regional association – based 
on the French inter-municipal association form ‘SIVOM’. The central government 
significantly supported service delivery through associations: in 2004, the share of 
the special subsidies for them was 1.19% of the whole central government subsidies 
for local governments, and in 2011 it already reached 2.91% (Hoffman, 2011, p. 31). 
A pure concentration tendency could be observed in the field of the Hungarian 
local public services from the late 1990s. The problems of size inefficiency and econ-
omies of scale were tackled within the municipal system by inter-municipal asso-
ciations. A centrally encouraged inter-municipal system seemed to be a key for the 
resilience of the small municipalities, which can provide the basic services jointly 
for their inhabitants (Szabó, 2019, pp. 105-106). 
3.2. The transformation of the framework: new challenges 
after	the	municipal	reforms	of	the	first	years	of	the	2010s	
The legal status of the Hungarian municipalities is determined by the new con-
stitutional rules on the local self-governance. The former regulation was changed 
radically, the former decentralized model of the Ötv has been transformed by the 
new Constitution – the Fundamental Law of Hungary – and by the new Munici-
pal Code – the Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on the Local Self-Governments of Hungary 
(hereinafter Mötv). Formerly the right to self-governance was institutionalized as a 
collective right by the Constitution, but the Fundamental Law defines the elements 
of the self-governance as competences. The Constitutional Court stated that the 
local governments do not have fundamental rights, therefore they cannot sue con-
stitutional complaints. Practically, the legislation has a very broad competence to 
define the legal status of the municipalities. 
Table 2: Number of the inter-municipal associations responsible 
for public service provision between 1992 and 2005
Year Number of the inter-municipal associations responsible for public service provision
1992 120
1994 116
1997 489
1998 748
1999 880
2003 1,274
2005 1,586
Source: Belügyminisztérium (2005, p. 205)
127
A simple solution has been chosen by the central government to reduce the 
fragmentation of the public service system: the most problematic service provisions 
were centralized and now they are performed by the local agencies of the central 
governments (Nagy, 2017, pp. 23-25). The main tasks of the education, inpatient 
care, residential social care, and residential child protection are performed by these 
agencies. The maintenance of the state-run schools belongs to the responsibilities 
of the Klebelsberg Center which has been defined as a central government agency 
with regional bodies (Fazekas, 2014, p. 299). The residential social care and children 
protection institutes are maintained by the county directorates (agencies) of the 
Directorate General of the Social and Children Protection. The inpatient health care 
institutions are maintained by the National Healthcare Service Center. The local 
governments are mainly responsible for the local public utilities, for the mainte-
nance of the kindergartens, for basic social care, for basic services of child protec-
tion, and for cultural services. The municipal tasks have been significantly reduced, 
which is reflected by the size of the local government expenditure: before the re-
forms, in 2010 the total local government expenditure was 12.8% of the GDP, while 
in 2017 it was 6.0% only (see Table 5).
Table 3: Local government total expenditure in Hungary (in % of the GDP) 2002-2017
Year 2002 2006 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Local government 
total expenditure 
(in % of the GDP)
12.9% 13.0% 12.8% 11.6% 9.4% 7.6% 7.9% 8.1% 6.0% 6.3%
Source: Eurostat (2019)
The new municipal legislation tried to reduce the fragmentation of the spatial 
system by strengthening the towns which could now be responsible for service 
provision for the small municipalities of their town area as well. The legislator re-
tained inter-municipal associations in a simplified form, with only one type of the 
inter-municipal association, which is a multi-purpose one with legal personality, 
managed by a council. Even though the former unincorporated forms should have 
been transformed, instead they just disappeared. A new type of the association 
evolved. It can be described as an umbrella organization because the former inde-
pendently organized associations – which did not have legal personality – could 
be mainly integrated into this new type of inter-municipal association (Nagy and 
Hoffman, 2014, pp. 309-312). Because of the lack of the incentives and the central-
ized municipal tasks – practically the main tasks of the former associations were 
centralized, and these tasks are performed now by the central government and by 
its agencies – the number of the voluntary association seriously – by approx. 40% 
– dropped (see Table 4).
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Table 4: Number of the (voluntary) intercommunal associations in 2013 and 2014
Year Number of (voluntary) intercommunal associations
2013 1185
2014 709
Source: Balázs and Hoffman (2017, p. 16)
The freedom of establishment of municipal bodies has been reduced by the insti-
tutionalization of the joined municipal administrations. A new, compulsory form of 
the inter-municipal cooperation has been established by the Mötv: the joint munic-
ipal office (Balázs, 2014, p. 426). Villages of the same district (járás) having less than 
2,000 inhabitants are obliged to take part in these associations1. Villages having 
more than 2,000 inhabitants and towns can take part in such an association, if they 
become the headquarter municipality of these offices.
The small municipalities faced new challenges: several important municipal 
tasks – especially the education and partly the culture and social care – have been 
centralized, the former state aid for the (voluntary) inter-municipal cooperation 
has been reduced, and an obligatory joint municipal administration model has been 
introduced.
4. Consolidation of the new structure and the inter-municipal cooperation 
as a tool for the resilience of small municipalities
4.1. The new model of the joint municipal administration
The new model is based on the limited responsibility of the municipalities and a 
joint municipal administration model. It seemed that the inter-municipal adminis-
tration will be based on the obligatory joint administration, which was introduced 
during the first half of the 2010s. These joint municipal offices – which have been 
institutionalized as an obligatory inter-municipal cooperation (Swianiewicz and 
Teles, 2019, pp. 132-122; Rozsnyai, 2019, pp. 18-19; Fazekas, 2018, p. 217) – became 
the common form of the administration of the Hungarian rural municipalities (see 
Table 5). 
1 There are only a few exceptions: the common office could have less than 2,000 inhabitants, if at 
least 7 municipalities take part in the cooperation, or if the population is at least 1,500 inhabitants 
and the protection of the right of the (national) minorities requires the independent office. I would 
like to note that this – ethnic minority-based exception – has been modelled after the administra-
tion of three villages in county Vas, which have Slovenian majority.
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Table 5: Number of joint municipal offices and independent municipal offices in 2014 and 2018
Year
Joint municipal offices Number of the (independent) 
municipal offices 
(mayor’s offices)
Number of local 
municipalities 
in Hungary 
Number of joint 
municipal offices
Number of participant 
municipalities
2014 749 2,632 521 3,176
2018 738 2,632 546 3,178
Source: Balázs and Hoffman (2017, p. 17); Szabó (2019, pp. 102-106)
The reason for this transformation is that most of the Hungarian local self-gov-
ernments have less than 2,000 inhabitants. The fact that at least 2,000 inhabitants 
should be provided by the joint municipal offices resulted in a dual system. In those 
counties which have a very fragmented spatial structure (especially in Northern 
Hungary and in Western and Southwestern counties) the joint municipal offices 
were established by more than three (sometimes more than 4 or 5) village munic-
ipalities, and the (independent) municipal offices (the mayor’s offices) are rare. In 
the Eastern and in several Central counties, where the average population of the 
municipalities is relatively high, the number of the members of the joint municipal-
ities are lower (mainly 2 or maximum 3), and the independent municipal offices are 
more common (see Table 6).
Figure 1: Average number of members of joint municipal offices in 2018
The administration of small municipalities is now based on the inter-municipal 
model, which can be distinguished as a concentration of the municipal administra-
tion. Several advantages can be observed: the administration of the small villages 
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became more professional because the former ‘mini offices’ were abolished. Al-
though the majority of these offices have approximately 12-15 civil servants, it is 
a progress compared to the former system, where offices in the small villages had 
only 5-6 civil servants typically. 
4.2.	 Based	on	the	joint	municipal	offices	–	the	rebuilding	of	the	system 
of inter-municipal voluntary associations 
The number of the inter-municipal voluntary associations has been decreased 
significantly after 2013. This decrease has had multiple reasons. First of all, the mu-
nicipal tasks have been reduced significantly after 2011/2012. The majority of the 
public education institutions (elementary and secondary schools, vocational edu-
cation and hostels for the schoolboys and schoolgirls), the residential child care, 
the majority of the residential social care services, and several cultural tasks were 
nationalized, thus the municipal nature of the tasks was abolished. The options for 
creating an inter-municipal cooperation have been limited by the new public ser-
vice provision model (Hoffman et al., 2016, pp. 461-465). 
Secondly, the support of the budget for encouraging inter-municipal cooper-
ation has been reduced. This support was an important factor in the increasing 
number of inter-municipal associations during the late 1990s and 2000s (Hoffman 
et al., 2016, pp. 457-459). 
Thirdly, the umbrella associations are preferred by the new regulation on in-
ter-municipal association. The legal personality of the associations required more 
complex administrative structures; therefore, several inter-municipal associations 
have been merged into larger ones (Balázs and Hoffman, 2017, pp. 15-17).
A silent transformation of the Hungarian inter-municipal system can be ob-
served. Although the number of associations was significantly decreased in 
2013/2014, the trend has changed in the last years (see Table 7).
Table 7: Number of the (voluntary) intercommunal associations from 2013 to 2018 
Year Number of (voluntary) intercommunal associations
2013 1185
2014 709
2018 1000
Source: Balázs and Hoffman (2017, p. 17); Szabó (2019, pp. 102-106)
It is obvious that the former model has been partially rebuilt. The rebuilding of 
the system of voluntary inter-municipal cooperation can be analyzed by the review 
of the number of these associations by counties (see Table 8). 
The number of voluntary inter-municipal associations is higher in those coun-
ties which have fragmented spatial structure. A correlation can be observed by the 
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comparison of the number of these voluntary associations to the number of the 
joint municipal offices. The joint municipal offices can be interpreted as a ‘catalyst’ 
of the inter-municipal associations. The joint administration put forward a joint 
public service provision model, thus the management of the service provision sys-
tem of the small villages has been strengthened by the new model. Although the 
joint municipal offices have been a catalyst, the state aid has remained limited. The 
voluntary decision of the municipalities resulted in the increasing number of this 
cooperation which was based on the effectiveness of the service provision and the 
requirement of the quality of the provision in the small villages, as well. The role 
of the small communities is preferred by the new rules on inter-municipal cooper-
ation because the principle in the decision-making is the ‘one member – one vote’, 
thus the small villages have a relatively significant influence on the decisions of the 
associations. 
Table 8: Number of the (voluntary) intercommunal associations by counties in 2018 
County Number of (1st tier) municipalities Number of villages
Number of voluntary 
inter-municipal associations
Bács-Kiskun 119 97 48
Baranya 301 287 85
Békés 75 53 25
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 358 329 86
Budapest 24 0 2
Csongrád 60 50 33
Fejér 108 91 27
Győr-Moson-Sopron 183 171 50
Hajdú-Bihar 82 61 36
Heves 121 110 59
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 78 56 37
Komárom-Esztergom 76 64 14
Nógrád 131 125 43
Pest 187 133 61
Somogy 246 230 68
Szabolcs-Szatmár Bereg 229 201 93
Tolna 109 98 48
Vas 216 203 50
Veszprém 217 202 66
Zala 258 248 69
Hungary 3178 2809 1000
Source: Szabó (2019, pp. 102-106)
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The profile of these associations has been transformed in the last year. During 
the 2000s the associations were established partly for the classical administrative 
tasks and for public service provision. Because of the obligatory establishment of 
the joint municipal offices, the new inter-municipal associations are mainly based 
on the joint public service provisions. The main field of the joint administrative task 
management is the joint municipal office. The joint service provision is based on the 
municipal offices; the territorial scope is different from the 2000s. The new cooper-
ation is mainly a cooperation of the neighboring villages (so-called micro-districts) 
and not the cooperation of the towns and villages in a small (micro) region. 
5. A comparative case study: social care provision by an inter-municipal 
association (in Hungary) and by a merged municipality (Slovenia). 
The case study of Balatonlelle (Hungary, Somogy County) and Bled 
(Slovenia) 
5.1. Framework of the comparison 
The Hungarian and Slovenian municipal systems can be considered as similar 
ones. This is also attributable to the fact that partly due to the small size and pop-
ulation of the country, equaling roughly one-fifth of Hungary, the Slovenian mod-
el is based on strong centralization. As an important difference between the two 
systems, however, is that a single-tier system of local government is established 
in Slovenia, notwithstanding several attempts at reform (Setnikar-Cankar, 2011, 
pp. 641-643). Moreover, although the high level of concentration implemented in 
the socialist era was eased in the course of local government reform in 1993 and 
1994, it remains relatively concentrated. Currently, 212 municipalities operate in 
Slovenia, 11 of which are city municipalities. This means that the Slovenian local 
governments cover an average of 9-10,000 inhabitants, and are generally composed 
of several architecturally separate municipalities. In other words, Slovenian local 
governments cover a unit corresponding to a Hungarian micro-district. Although 
the system is concentrated, there are major differences in municipality size: the 
largest one, Ljubljana, has 283,000 inhabitants, while the smallest one, Hodoš, has 
375 inhabitants. Taking this into account, the role of partnerships is significantly 
smaller within the Slovenian system; the Slovenian model does not require manda-
tory partnerships. Solutions involving partnerships are strongly encouraged on a 
sectoral level2.
2 Voluntary inter-municipal associations promoted with financial incentives play a key role in local 
law enforcement in Slovenia, and Slovenian partnerships also perform important tasks in regional 
development and regional coordination (Bačlija-Brajnik, 2018, pp. 251-253). 
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Regarding social tasks it is necessary to note that the tasks of Slovenian lo-
cal governments are relatively limited; they are directly responsible for providing 
home assistance, home assistance with a signaling system, certain crisis services, 
and home meal services, but they are only required to provide access in relation to 
other services. Thus, the involvement of local governments in this area is signifi-
cantly more limited than in Hungary, although by providing such basic services, 
Slovenian municipalities are key actors in the provision of social services (Hlebec, 
2017, pp. 496-505). The differences and similarities suggest that the systems of the 
two states lend themselves to comparison. The analysis of the Slovenian solutions 
is particularly interesting because these are applied within a concentrated and cen-
tralized system, where small municipalities are not independent; practically all – 
even the smallest local government – consist of several municipalities. In contrast, 
within the system aimed at maintaining the independence of small municipalities, 
cooperation between local governments and best practices emerging from it may 
obviously play an important role.
5.2. Example of successfully providing services within a partnership: 
Joint Family and Child Welfare Service of Balatonlelle and Partnership 
for Internal Control 
Balatonlelle has traditionally demonstrated best practices in the provision of 
services through partnership and in cooperation between the micro-district cen-
ter and its catchment area. Since 2005 some social services in Balatonlelle have 
been provided through an inter-municipal association called the Joint Family and 
Child Welfare Service of Balatonlelle and Inter-Municipal Association for Inter-
nal Control. The inter-municipal association currently has seven municipalities3 as 
members. The multi-purpose sub-regional inter-municipal association – with the 
participation of 14 local governments up to 2013 – had been the direct precedent to 
this association. Due to the termination of the small regional system by the Mötv, 
the association was significantly transformed. It continued to operate basically 
within the neighboring municipalities of Balatonlelle, i.e. it became essentially a 
partnership at (peri-urban) micro-regional level (Pálné Kovács, 2016, p. 594). Taking 
into account the substantial reform of the mandatory tasks of local governments 
implemented since 2012, the provision of municipal welfare gained in relevance 
in partnership cooperation. The partnership provides social services through the 
Common Family and Child Welfare Service of Balatonlelle. Such services include 
a social kitchen, including three cooking kitchens operated in different municipal-
ities. Home assistance is provided with the help of 5-6 employees; there are more 
3 Balatonlelle, Karád, Látrány, Visz, Somogytúr, Somogybabod, Gamás.
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than one hundred people who may receive care. The population pyramid of the 
municipalities is unfavorable; there are many old people, therefore it is also import-
ant to provide care for the elderly in smaller neighboring villages. Currently, 30 old 
people can be provided care in the daytime. Although not comprising part of the 
institutions of the partnership, there is a club for the elderly in Balatonlelle that is 
open to the inhabitants of partnering local governments free of charge. Home as-
sistance with a signaling system and parental assistance is also provided, and since 
2016 family and child welfare services are provided in the form of a partnership. 
In the course of developing the partnership, the aim was to establish an efficient, 
coordinated, but at the same time citizen-friendly system of services that also sup-
ports the conservation of municipal identity. Although the partnership is seated 
in Balatonlelle, it has several branch offices, and the employees taking part in the 
organization of services generally conduct their activity in the given municipalities. 
Thus, joint and efficient organization of services is connected to a municipality-cen-
tered system, where everybody can access basic services at their own place of res-
idence, without travel. In the course of providing services, the public employees of 
institutions cooperate with the representative bodies and mayors of municipalities, 
thus mayors also have a clear picture of needs when having to determine municipal 
funds, and service personnel can also indicate to mayors and representative bodies 
the life situations in need of and entitled to intervention. 
The ‘one member – one vote’ principle, noted above, strengthens focus on mu-
nicipalities within the association, serving as a quasi-guarantee for full consider-
ation of aspects of small municipalities. In the course of the interview conducted 
in the autumn of 2018, the mayors participating in the associations emphasized 
that according to the municipality’s estimates, its costs would increase by 40% if it 
had to provide these services independently, at the municipal level, but at current 
standards. Within the scope of welfare services, general practitioner services have 
for a long time operated within the framework of an independent inter-municipal 
association. 
5.3. Bled – joint local government of the small city and its region
Owning to similarities with Balatonlelle, the local government of the Slovenian 
city of Bled also provides an appropriate basis for comparison for the analysis of 
partnerships. Partnerships play a lesser role also on account of the one-tier local 
government system in Slovenia (Setnikar-Cankar, 2011, pp. 641-643). There are no 
mandatory partnerships, but there are sectoral areas in which the establishment of 
partnerships is supported, such as local law enforcement (Bačlija-Brajnik, 2018, pp. 
251-253). 
Bled does not operate a complex partnership scheme like Balatonlelle, especially 
not in the area of substantial social administration as is the case in Balatonlelle. In 
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this area Bled – in addition to funding provided by the state – performs its man-
datory duties and provides financial support (Nagy et al., 2019, pp. 169-174). Social 
services, namely, are provided by the municipality in Bled. Thus, tasks are per-
formed within a merged framework of local government instead of the partnership 
scheme operated in Balatonlelle. The conservation of the identity of smaller village 
‘parts of the municipality’ (with 1,500 and 1,000 inhabitants) (essentially villages 
under one local government) under one local government with Bled is a priority 
within the merged system, although municipal identity is to be primarily conserved 
by means of cultural services. In the course of providing social services, the service 
system seated in Bled provides the services. Separate service points in parts of the 
municipality were not organized, but obviously, efforts are made to ensure that 
the carer and not the cared is mobilized, if possible. The central location and good 
accessibility of the Bled unit is the main reason for the above, strongly centralized 
organization of services. 
6. Conclusions 
The provision of public services in small villages can be organized differently, 
but two main approaches have been evolved: the inter-municipal cooperation and 
the merge of the municipalities. A third solution is the centralization of the services 
when the provider is an agency of the central government. These models have been 
analyzed – mainly in the light of the transformations of the Hungarian regulation. 
In Hungary, the inter-municipal approach became more significant during the late 
1990s and in the 2000s, but the reforms of the 2010s resulted in a strongly central-
ized model. Although the Hungarian model became one of the most centralized in 
Europe, the inter-municipal system has been partly rebuilt in the second half of this 
decade, and it was based on the joint municipal offices. The new model was an evo-
lutionary one, and it focuses on the effective service provision of the small villages. 
It is an element of the resilience of these small municipalities. 
In 2018 and 2019 this inter-municipal approach was compared to an approach 
based on the merge of the municipalities by an empirical case study. The service 
provision of a similar Hungarian and Slovenian rural area was compared. It is clear 
that the Hungarian solution has been more complex, but it fulfils its main aim: an 
effective service provision for a town and its neighboring villages. The Slovenian 
model is a simpler one, but the small villages have a limited role in that approach. 
An inter-municipal model can be a tool for the resilience of the small villages: 
their independence and identity can be guaranteed meanwhile an effective service 
provision model can be established. 
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Abstract
In an increasingly technological world, Virtual Reality (VR) is an emerging innovation that promises to 
profoundly impact the socio-economical context. The scope of the study is that of understanding the users’ 
perception on their VR experiences in general, and the potential use of VR technology as part of the digital 
government. Navigating virtual offices, attending public meetings remotely, job training, digital visualizing 
and interaction with data, city branding with immersive experiences, etc. are some of the possibilities that 
can enhance citizen-public administration interaction. Methodologically, the research uses an opinion sur-
vey. The main emphases are on the ease of use and the usefulness of VR, attitudes towards it, use intentions 
and emotional flow. The results show a rather positive perception on the use of VR from the point of view 
of ease of use, of usefulness and emotional implications. However, there are no clear correlations between 
this VR general opinion and the potential use of VR in public administration. To the best of our knowledge, 
the issue of VR and e-government is still poorly addressed. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of 
individuals’ perspectives can help local authorities to further plan the digitalization of its services. 
Keywords: Virtual Reality (VR), E-Government, public administration, Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM), PAD Affective Model.
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1. Introduction
As technologies are being overwhelmingly rapidly introduced in different com-
panies and public institutions, successful technology adoption is important for the 
full participation of all the entities in modern society (Partala and Saari, 2015). In 
this context, the present study aims to understand the users’ perception on their 
Virtual Reality (VR) previous experiences in general, and on the potential use of VR 
technology as part of the digital government. 
A computer-based technology that uses head-mounted eye goggles, VR (or vir-
tual environment, artificial word) stimulates a three-dimensional situation in which 
the user experience has the feeling of being present (Grudzewski et al., 2018). VR 
is a simulation in which computer graphics are used to create a visually real-time 
interactive and realistic experience in which the synthetic world responds to user 
commands (e.g., verbal, gesture). The interactivity and human sensors are responsi-
ble for the feeling of immersion, of taking part in the action on the screen, of feed-
back, and on manipulating and touching the graphic objects (Burdea and Coiffet, 
2003; Mazuryk and Gervautz, 1996). As immersive 360◦ video is a very important 
element of VR (Li et al., 2017), past researches have shown that VR represents a 
mix of three I’s. While it is clear that VR is both interactive and immersive, by be-
ing not only an environment, an interface, but an application that solves real-time 
problems, it also implies imagination (the ability to perceive non-existing things) 
(Burdea and Coiffet, 2003).
Having a wide applicability potential, VR is used for simulation systems for the 
training of pilots, astronauts, drivers, for experiments and simulations in the med-
ical field, for modeling and visualization in the scientific fields, in computer-assist-
ed design, for creating computer games and animations, for branding, marketing, 
and tourism, for live events, education, retail, real estate, healthcare, research, etc. 
(Kassaye, 2007; Chiou et al., 2008; Bessis and Dobre, 2014; Marasco et al., 2018; 
Grudzewski, 2018; Flavián, Ibáñez-Sánchez and Orús, 2019). Considering that, to 
the best of our knowledge, the use of VR in e-government is still poorly addressed, 
a comprehensive understanding of individuals’ perspectives will help local author-
ities to further plan the digitalization of its services.
The present paper is a descriptive multiple case study. Being a pilot investiga-
tion, it has no explanatory or predictive valance. The analysis aims to better com-
prehend the general insight on the use of VR from the point of view of emotional 
reaction and the point of view of perceived ease of use and usefulness. Moreover, 
the paper intends to assess to what extend VR is considered a proper digital per-
spective on public administration.
The originality and novelty of the paper is threefold. First, still being a poorly 
addressed issue, the link between VR and public administration is considered. Sec-
ond, the perception of VR is assessed through both the Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM) and PAD Affective Model (pleasure-arousal-dominance). Third, the 
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addressed case study in Romania, a country eager to consume technology, yet 
found itself in its early stage of e-government implementation. 
2. Technology and government
Moving forward from the moment in which e-government has simply consisted 
in the creation of a web page, nowadays, e-government implies a more in-depth 
digital transaction with the citizen (Ndou, 2004). In the context in which the public 
sector implies information exchange and collaboration, e-government refers to a 
technology-based modernization of the public sector by identifying and developing 
the organizational structure, by interacting in new and various way with the indi-
viduals and other stakeholders, and by reducing the cost of the organizational pro-
cess (Alenezi, Tarhini and Masa’deh, 2015; Mirchandani, Johnson and Joshi, 2008). 
E-government provides fast, inexpensive, trustworthy, reliable services and sup-
poses an enhanced and open-communication process (Mirchandani, Johnson and 
Joshi, 2008; Ndou, 2004; Zhang and Chen, 2010). In addition, e-government implies 
avoidance of personal interaction, higher empowerment to the individuals, conve-
nience for the individuals to receive the services how and when they want them, 
savings for all the stakeholders, personalization possibility, time efficiency, confi-
dentiality, ease of use, enjoyable experiences, the accuracy of information, safety, 
and visual appeal (Mirchandani, Johnson and Joshi, 2008; Ndou, 2004).
The most common applications on which government can use digital reality 
are the following ones: simulate environments (e.g., for training), create immer-
sive experiences (e.g., in the tourism domain, for museums visitors), visualize and 
interact with data, enable maintenance, enhance education, improve public health 
and safety, support investigations and case management (Briggs et al., 2018). Tózsa 
(2013) is proposing a list of VR applications that can function in public administra-
tion. Among the most interesting ones are the following: choosing avatar figures, 
entering and navigating in the virtual offices, downloading and uploading informa-
tion, entering real-time dialogue, attending public meetings, making appointments, 
initiating administration procedures, etc. (Tózsa, 2013).
Describing the digital reality ecosystem (virtual reality, augmented reality, 
mixed reality, immersive perspective, 360 video), Briggs et al. (2018) stress the ben-
efits it has on government institutions: it enables individuals, referred to as custom-
ers for governments (Osborn and Gaebler apud Ndou, 2004), to perform tasks faster 
and more accurate by providing the best information at the right time; it overcomes 
the shortages of distance by connecting resources with needs; it can improve the 
effectiveness of training, and it makes it less costly. 
VR technology is considered to have a great impact on consumers and on the 
way they perceive services and products (Grudzewski et al., 2018). By digitalizing 
142
the communication process, the organizations can provide cutting-edge, optimal, 
more productive, dynamic experiences (Flavián, Ibáñez-Sánchez and Orús, 2019; 
Guth and Brabham, 2015), ensuring higher standards of transparency and privacy 
protection (Szabo et al., 2016). Likewise, considering that public organizations have 
external-facing applications in which the experience of end-users is very import-
ant, virtualization technology is fundamental (Government Technology, undated). 
User-centric services are considered to increase the trust level in government and 
increase general satisfaction (Szabo et al., 2016). In this respect, a potential intro-
duction of VR public services needs a previous assessment on the way this tech-
nology is perceived in general and projected on public administration in particular.
3. Technology and emotions
There is an increasing organizations’ effort to implement IT innovation for both 
operational improvements and strategic advantages (Bala and Venkatesh, 2016). 
Technology adoption is believed to be a dynamic process characterized by strong 
emotions in users and, thus, by a high predictive power (Deng, 2017).
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989), developed based on the 
Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), aims to explain the user’s 
perception and behavioral intention on a certain technology. Thus, technology 
adoption or non-adoption become important outcomes (Partala and Saari, 2015). 
The main two variables are: the perceived usefulness (the probability that by using a 
specific tool will enhance an individual performance) and the perceived ease of use 
(the degree to which the use of a certain technology is free of effort) (Davis, 1989; 
Wang and Sun, 2016; Venkatesh and Bala, 2008; Vaportzis et al., 2017). There are 
positive and significant relationships between these two variables and the attitude 
towards the use and the adoption of a certain technology (Ferreira, Da Rocha and 
Da Silva, 2014; Chuttur, 2009). Later studies have extended TAM by adding vari-
ables as individual differences (socio-demographical variables), system character-
istics, social influence and facilitating conditions, technology anxiety (Venkatesh 
and Bala, 2008).
User experience includes all the elements that affect an individual’s interaction 
with a product, a system, a technology (Partala and Saari, 2015). The literature talks 
about three components that can shape a future behavior: the perception of instru-
mental qualities (usefulness and usability of the system), the perception of non-in-
strumental qualities (appeal and attractiveness), and emotional reaction (Kujala 
et al., 2011). However, emotions are perceived to play the central and the most per-
vasive role in understanding an experience (Partala and Saari, 2015).
A technological implementation is believed to be assessed in two dimensions. 
While, on one hand, there is the evaluation of threats and opportunities in respect 
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to the personal aim, on the other hand, there is the potential control the individu-
al has on the expected outcome of the technological completion (Deng, 2017). By 
combining the transactional model of stress and handling with the coping model 
of user adaptation (CMUA), Bala and Venkatesh (2016) consider two processes ap-
proached by individuals within a changing environment (as can be the case of VR 
implementation in public administration). The first process, cognitive appraisal, re-
fers to the evaluation of the relevance for the well-being of an individual (whether 
the person has anything at stake regarding the event and whether the individual 
has the resources to exert control over the situation to prevent harm or improve 
the benefits). The second process, adaptation, deals with cognitive and behavioral 
efforts to manage stressful events either by applying problem-focused strategy (the 
aim is to solve the problem at hand) or emotion-focused strategy (the aim is to 
reduce the emotional distress). Thus, CMUA evokes four adaptation strategies in 
the IT context: benefit maximizing, benefit satisficing, disturbance handling, and 
self-preservation (Bala and Venkatesh, 2016)
Therefore, the link between technology use and emotions is increasingly import-
ant. Technology, as fully integrated into our daily routine, has the potential both 
to arouse emotions in the users and to influence the way these are materialized 
(Serrano-Puche, 2015). Lately, emotional perspective, along with cognitive con-
structs, social judgment, risk perception, and attribution, is continuously incorpo-
rated within technology acceptance research (Venkatesh, 2000; Deng, 2017; Tsoy, 
2017). In accordance with the flow theory, Csikszentmihalyi (1990) suggests that an 
enjoyable experience depends on the degree to which one feels in control of a cer-
tain task, one is encouraged to have a playful, exploratory and balanced behavior.
A taxonomy on emotions states that they can be discussed from two perspec-
tives. On one hand, the dimensional perspective stresses that emotions can be 
grouped into valence and arousal. On the other hand, the discrete perspective of-
fers a wider set of emotions (ten positive and ten negative emotions) grouped into 
the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS model) (Watson, Tellegen 
and Clark, 1988; Partala and Saari, 2015). On the same respect, Beaudry and 
Pinsonneault (2010) consider that there are four classes of emotions: challenge 
emotions that are dependent on the assessment of opportunity and high control, 
as excitement, hope; achievement emotions that are evoked by opportunity and 
low control, as happiness and relief; deterrence emotions that are induced by threat 
and high control, as anxiety and distress; and loss emotions that are determined by 
threat and low control, as anger and frustration. 
In 1974, Mehrabian and Russell have developed PAD Affective Model (Mehra-
bian and Russell, 1974). They consider that all the emotional responses can be ma-
terialized into a combination of three particular dimensions: pleasure-displeasure, 
arousal-non-arousal and dominance-submissiveness (Li, Ye and Yang, 2017; Rach-
man, Sarno and Fatichah, 2016). The first two dimensions are initially grouped into 
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the Circumplex Model of Affect; the dominance dimension is only later integrated 
into PAD (Zhang et al., 2017). Pleasure-displeasure dimension refers to happiness 
and enjoyable states (Li, Ye and Yang, 2017; Hall, Elliott and Meng, 2017). The con-
cepts used for assessing the level of pleasure are happy-unhappy, pleased-annoyed, 
satisfied-unsatisfied (Bakker et al., 2014). The rich of happiness, satisfaction or fun 
is vital in the consumption decision of a high-tech product (Ferreira, Da Rocha 
and Da Silva, 2014). Arousal-non-arousal dimension evokes a mental attentiveness 
that ranges from sleepy to frantic (Li, Ye and Yang, 2017; Hall, Elliott and Meng, 
2017). The main adjectives used are stimulated-relaxed, excited-calm, wide awake-
sleepy (Bakker et al., 2014). The last dimension, dominance-submissiveness (in con-
trol-controlled) signifies the range between influential, powerful, in control, on one 
hand, and lack of control, influenced, submissive, dominated on the other hand 
(Mehrabiam, 1996; Li, Ye and Yang, 2017; Verma and Tiwary, 2017; Liu and Sourina, 
2012). It is believed that the highest in the sense of dominance towards a certain 
technology, the more positive is the attitude towards adoption (Ferreira, Da Rocha 
and Da Silva, 2014).
In the endeavor to combine cognitive and affective variables for explaining tech-
nology acceptance, Kulviwat et al. (2007) develop the Consumer Acceptance Tech-
nology (CAT) model as a combination between TAM and PAD. In order to further 
develop this initial model, Ferreira, Da Rocha and Da Silva (2014) propose Consum-
er Acceptance and Readiness for Technology model (CART). The main variables 
are technology readiness, relative advantage, perceived usefulness, perceive ease 
of use, pleasure, arousal, and dominance as shaper elements for attitude towards 
adoption and adoption intention (Ferreira, Da Rocha and Da Silva, 2014).
4. Methodology
In the context of rapid technological evolution, the aim of this research is that 
of investigating the perception of the individuals on VR in general and on the po-
tential use of VR in public administration. The research method used is an online 
opinion survey.
Based on the above literature, the following hypotheses are developed:
H1. The more positive is the attitude towards the previous VR experience and 
towards future intentions, the more utility is projected in the use of VR in public 
administration.
H2. The more VR technology is perceived as easy to use and useful (TAM), the 
more utility is projected in the use of VR in public administration.
H3. The more pleasure, arousal, and dominance (PAD) is perceived in respect 
of previous VR experiences, the more utility is projected in the use of VR in public 
administration.
The research model is schematically presented below (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: The research model
5. Sample
The sample of the research is composed of a convenient sample (N=96) formed 
exclusively of people that have used VR helmets before. From the socio-demograph-
ical perspective, 80% are young people under 23 years old (M=22.28, SD=5.621), 63% 
are males, and 71% either graduated from or work in the IT industry. Although al-
most 20% of the respondents own a VR helmet, 75% have experienced VR less than 
5 times. The context of using VR varies between the contexts of different events, 
festivals, conferences, museums. However, the main circumstances in which the 
VR helmet has been used are games and IT development departments of different 
companies. 
Based on the Global Attitudes Towards Technology Measure (GATTM) (Edison 
and Geissler, 2003) (where 1 means Very technophobe and 4 means Not at all), as 
expected, the highest majority (more than 70%) of the respondents do not consider 
themselves as being technophobes at all (M=3.59, SD=.719).
6. Results
The general attitude on the use of VR is measured in two ways. First, a general 
question (on a 4-point scale, where 1 means Very much and 4 Not at all) on how 
much the individuals have enjoyed using VR has been addressed (M=3.22, SD=.684). 
This variable has been transformed into a dummy variable (Attitude on VR_1) to be 
used in correlational relationships. Second, the PAD attitude scale has been adapt-
ed for VR use from the Hall, Elliott and Meng’s (2017) research on Facebook use. 
The scale (α=.940, M=4.247, SD=.907) assesses the attitude towards the existing ex-
perience with the system on four dimensions (bad-good, negative-positive, unfa-
vorable-favorable, unpleasant-pleasant). Out of these dimensions, through average 
computation, a continuous variable (Attitude on VR_2) has been created. 
When measuring the general attitude on the use of VR, the data show a paradox. 
On one hand, more than 89% of the respondents claim that they have rather not 
enjoyed the VR experience (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: The general attitude on the use of VR
On the other hand, when asked to declare their experience based on the four 
abovementioned dimensions (bad-good, negative-positive, unfavorable-favorable, 
unpleasant-pleasant), the data show a very positive general attitude on the use of 
VR for more than 75% of the respondents (Figure 3). 
 
 
    
    
Figure 3: The attitude on the VR experience on the four dimensions
The same paradox is present when the future behavioral intention of using VR 
is discussed. The general intention to use VR in the future (If you were to use VR 
again, would you use it?) is measured by a 4-point scale, where 1 means Very much 
and 4 Not at all (M=3.36; SD=.618). For the purpose of the analysis, this variable has 
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been transformed into a dummy variable (Future intention_1). PAD intention scale 
(Hall, Elliott and Meng, 2017) (α=.946, M=3.203, SD=1.055) also measures the inten-
tion to use the system in the future, on a 5-point scale on two dimensions (I plan 
to spend a lot less time using VR – I plan to spend a lot more time using VR; I plan 
to use VR a lot less frequently – I plan to use VR a lot more frequently). Through 
average computation, these dimensions have been transformed into one continuous 
variable (Future intention_2). 
As Figure 4 shows, almost 95% of the respondents claim that they would rather 
not use VR headset in the future. At the same time, puzzlingly, when the same ques-
tion has been asked in terms of time spent and of frequency, the intention is rather 
positive. Most of the individuals claim that they would use VR at least the same as 
they did before (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4: The general attitude on the future intention to use VR
    
Figure 5: The future intention of using VR in terms of time spent and of frequency
For measuring the technology acceptance, TAM model has been adapted for VR 
use according to the scale developed by Tuominen et al. (2016). It uses a 7-point 
scale, where 1 means Totally disagree and 7 means Totally agree. It is divided into 
three dimensions: perceived ease of use (α=.823; M=5.5208; SD=1.12429), perceived 
usefulness (α=.898; M=4.0556; SD=1.50839), and emotional flow (α=.945; M=5.5378; 
SD=1.17620) (see Table 1).
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Table 1: The dimensions used for the TAM model
Dimensions Items M (SD)
Perceived ease 
of use
(TAM_PEU)
Learning to use the Virtual Headset was easy for me. 5.91 (1.290)
I did not find it difficult to get the VR headset to do what I wanted it to do. 5.16 (1.496)
I found the VR headset flexible to interact with. 5.32 (1.504)
It was easy for me to become skillful at using the headset and the content 
within. 5.70 (1.258)
Perceived 
usefulness
(TAM_PU)
I believe using VR headset has possibilities of enhancing the effectiveness 
in the present socio-economic context. 4.09 (1.680)
I believe that using VR headset would increase my productivity in the pres-
ent socio-economic context. 3.86 (1.702)
I believe VR headset could be useful in the present socio-economic context. 4.21 (1.582)
Emotional flow
(TAM_EF)
I enjoyed experiencing the virtual reality through VR headset. 5.85 (1.314)
I thought to experience 3D virtual world was quite enjoyable. 5.89 (1.289)
I would describe the virtual reality experience very interesting. 5.85 (1.369)
The virtual reality experience was fun. 5.93 (1.308)
I felt carried away while experiencing the virtual reality. 4.93 (1.643)
I felt as if I was a part of the virtual reality environment. 5.19 (1.618)
I felt deeply about the virtual reality environment. 5.53 (1.582)
When experiencing the virtual reality, my attention was totally focused. 5.65 (1.429)
Experiencing the virtual reality excited my curiosity. 5.57 (1.456)
Experiencing the virtual reality was interesting. 5.88 (1.336)
When experiencing the virtual reality, I felt that I’m in control. 4.69 (1.623)
The data show that, in most cases, the respondents agree that the VR system is 
easy to use. Moreover, they perceive the VR headset as moderately useful consider-
ing their daily routine and the socio-economic context. Emotionally, they consider 
the VR experience as being fun, enjoyable, interesting, and attractive. 
PAD Affective Model scale (Hall, Elliott and Meng, 2017) is composed of six 
items for the pleasure dimension (α=.847; M=1.9063; SD=.67573), six items for the 
arousal dimension (α=.720; M=2.4063; SD=.61073) and six items for measuring dom-
inance dimension (α=.781; M=2.7934; SD=.76844). The items are measured on a 
5-point scale on a continuum. The items have been translated in Romanian by two 
specialists and, additionally, they have been also compared with the French trans-
lated scale developed by Detandt, Leys and Bazan (2017) (see Table 2).
The data show that most of the people feel happy, pleased, content, hopeful, re-
laxed, wide-awake, and aroused while being exposed to VR experience. Moreover, 
within the pleasure dimension, the perceptions are the most positive ones.
The perceived attitude on the use of VR in public administration is measured by 
using a general question on the appropriateness of the use of VR in government 
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(VR in PA – dummy variable) (M=.90, SD=.308). More than 89% of the respondents 
claim that the use of VR in public administration is a good idea. Likewise, the in-
dividuals have been asked to name public administration services that would fit 
the use of VR (open-ended question). While some of them have been positively 
surprised by this perspective claiming they have never thought about, others have 
imagined exact situations in which VR can improve public services. The most nu-
merous answers indicate the use of VR for client services. Either it is about virtual 
assistance, info points or interactions with officeholders, the respondents underline 
the need for a better communication flow within public institutions. Mapping is 
another perspective in which VR is considered a feasible solution. Either it is indoor 
(guiding the pathway within city hall, visiting museums), or outdoor (visiting the 
town), tourism is believed to fit the use of VR to a high degree. Finally, VR is con-
sidered important to be used in education, in hospitals, and emergency institutions, 
as police, especially for different types of simulations.
For better measuring the link between VR and public administration, a list of 
possible VR situations has been created. The individuals are asked in which of the 
following situations the VR technology would be useful within the public admin-
istration context. The items are measured on a 4-point scale (where 1 means Not at 
Table 2: The dimensions used for the PAD model
English version M (SD)
Pleasure dimension
(PAD_PL)
Happy-Unhappy 1.95 (.826)
Pleased-Annoyed 1.73 (.876)
Satisfied-Unsatisfied 2.07 (.874)
Content-Melancholic 1.19 (.907)
Hopeful-Despairing 1.99 (.968)
Relaxed-Bored 1.79 (.928)
Arousal dimension
(PAD_AR)
Stimulated-Relaxed 2.02 (1.076)
Exited-Calm 2.51 (1.105)
Frenzied-Sluggish 2.64 (.809)
Jittery-Dull 3.49 (1.016)
Wide-awake-Sleepy 1.86 (.763)
Aroused-Unaroused 1.92 (.854)
Dominance dimension
(PAD_DO)
In control-Cared for 2.40 (1.041)
Controlling-Controlled 2.90 (1.081)
Dominant-Submissive 2.52 (.906)
Influential-Influenced 2.75 (1.056)
Autonomous-Guided 2.93 (1.308)
Important-Awed 3.27 (1.235)
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all and 4 means To a very high degree). They are inspired by Tózsa (2013) and Briggs 
et al. (2018), but not limited to it. The main presented situations are the following: 
virtual-navigation within department and offices of the organization, virtual par-
ticipation at the public meetings, virtual training for a job, visualization and digital 
interaction with data and documents, visualizing public leaders’ profiles, virtual 
navigation throughout the town, virtual navigation at events, digital visualization 
of the town history, and digital interaction of the disabled persons (see Table 3 and 
Figure 6). 
Table 3: The perception of the use of VR in public administration
The use of VR in public administration M (SD)
Virtual navigation within department and offices of the organization 2.68 (.935)
Virtual participation at the public meetings 3.20 (.958)
Virtual training for a job 2.86 (1.012)
Visualization and digital interaction with data and documents 2.93 (1.078)
Visualizing public leaders’ profiles 2.70 (1.037)
Virtual navigation throughout the town 3.52 (.794)
Virtual navigation at events 3.28 (.959)
Digital visualization of the town history 3.59 (.658)
Digital interaction of the disabled persons 3.56 (.765)
 
Figure 6: The positive perception of the use of VR in public administration
The most feasible and liked situations in which VR is associated with public 
administration are twofold. On one hand, VR is perceived as a beneficial tool for 
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facilitating participation in public meetings held within the government’s local or 
national institutions. On the other hand, tourism is again considered as a very ap-
propriate context for a VR experience. The majority of the respondents consider the 
virtual navigation throughout the town or the digital visualization of the town’s 
history as efficient ways of using VR helmets. Moreover, the need for a digital in-
teraction of disabled persons is underlined.
7. Discussions 
Based on the descriptive analysis, it can be stressed that VR experience is per-
ceived in a rather positive manner from all points of view. However, in order to test 
the hypothesis, a more inferential approach should be developed. Thus, by trans-
forming all the needed variables into scales, a set of Pearson correlations is con-
ducted. Table 4 shows the main results.
The data show that technophobism is significantly related to the pleasure of us-
ing VR (r =.231, sig.=.024) and to the attitude on VR (r =-.227, sig.=.026). As expect-
ed, while one is less technophobe, the VR experience is more appealing and more 
positive. However, relationships are low. Women, rather than men, consider VR 
emotional flow experience more positive (r =-.239, sig.=.020).
There is a medium significant relationship between the technology acceptance 
of VR in general and the attitude on it (r =.522, sig.=.020). Out of the TAM, it can 
be stated that a positive perception on the ease of use of VR determines a positive 
attitude on the use of VR (r =.479, sig.=.000). 
A similar relationship is developed between the emotional perception of VR and 
VR acceptance (ease of use and usefulness) in general (r =-.483, sig.=.000). Although 
the general affective perception on VR is moderately connected to the attitude on 
VR (r =-.460, sig.=.000), the pleasure dimension of using VR is pretty strongly cor-
related to the attitude on VR use (r =-.631, sig.=.000); the more pleasure derives from 
the VR experience, the more positive is the attitude on VR technology. 
The future intention of using VR is intensely associated with technology accep-
tance in general (r =.527, sig.=.000) and with the perceived usefulness in particular 
(r =.478, sig.=.000). Interestingly, while the attitude on VR, as stated above, is cor-
related with the perceived ease of use, the future intention of using VR is rather 
linked with how useful that particular technology is perceived to be. Emotionally 
speaking, a high level of pleasure (r =-.486, sig.=.000) and a high level of arousal 
(r =-.384, sig.=.000) are correlated with a positive intention to use VR in the fu-
ture. As expected, a positive attitude on previous VR experience is significant, yet 
not strongly correlated, with the future intention of using this technology (r =.428, 
sig.=.000).
Contrary to expectations, the perception of VR in public administration is not 
necessarily part of any significant relationship. Although not in a strong manner, 
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the future intention of using VR is negatively and significantly correlated with the 
attitude on the use of VR in public administration (r =-.285, sig.=.008). It means that 
a positive intention of using VR in the future implies a negative reaction to the VR 
use for public services. Being such an unexpected and somehow contradictory to an 
observed reality result, further research is undeniably needed.
8. Conclusion and research perspectives
In a context in which the topics as VR use in social sciences and VR use in public 
administration are poorly addressed, this paper aims to define which are the atti-
tudes on VR previous experiences and how these can be linked with attitudes on 
the potential use of VR in public administration. The Technology Acceptance Model 
and PAD affective model, both adapted for VR equipment, have been used. 
Considering the above-discussed results, on the existing sample, the three devel-
oped hypotheses do not validate. The attitude on the use of VR in public administra-
tion is significantly correlated neither with the previous attitude on VR experience 
nor with the perceived ease of use, usefulness or emotional implications on VR. The 
only significant and negative correlation refers to the link between the attitude on 
the prospective use of VR in public administration and the attitude on future pur-
poses of using VR. 
The limits of the paper are twofold. On one hand, the sample size of the research 
is small. Aiming to have a sample formed exclusively of individuals that have al-
ready tested VR headset, the access to such people has been limited. As VR is rather 
new, still developing, expensive, and immersive technology, only a few Romanians 
have managed to experience it. Moreover, due to the minimum VR experience, the 
responses might have been biased in a desirable manner. Second, since the VR per-
spective on public administration is on its early stage, validated inventories are still 
to be developed.
However, this research is a starting point for future empirical approaches. The 
quantitative perspective can be continued by developing experimental settings in 
which the VR experience can be controlled and can be customized for public admin-
istration specific content (e.g., virtual tours of public offices or art institutions, vir-
tual participation to public meetings, etc.). In addition, a more qualitative approach 
can also be developed. A set of semi-structured interviews might add valuable in-
formation. While the specialists from IT companies, that are working on a daily 
basis with VR technology, can offer a comprehensive insight on its potential, public 
administration experts can complete the previous approach with more contextual 
based information. 
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Abstract
South Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987 was mass-ascendant and movement-driven in nature. 
The grand democracy coalition included the opposition party and various civil society groups such as stu-
dent organizations, labor unions, churches, and social movements. The civil society actors continued to put 
immense pressure on the post-transitional governments to dismantle the authoritarian political structure 
and dispense with undemocratic administrative practices. Political authoritarianism in South Korea during 
1961-1987 was closely associated with the ‘developmental state’, which effectively delivered the country’s 
unprecedented economic development. Public sector reform after the democratization, therefore, inevitably 
entailed the weakening, if not dissolution, of the developmental state, with a view to making public gover-
nance and policymaking more transparent, responsive, efficient, participatory, and collaborative. This paper 
probes the genesis and development of collaborative governance in South Korea, focusing on the public sec-
tor reform of the Roh Tae Woo government (1988-1993) and the Kim Young Sam government (1993-1998). 
The Roh government created the Administrative Reform Committee in May 1988, and the Kim government 
created the Presidential Commission for Administrative Reform in April 1993. Even though both agencies 
engaged civilians in the reform process, it was the Ministry of Government Administration for the Roh gov-
ernment and the Ministry of Finance and Economy for the Kim government that played the leading role in 
building collaborative governance, which demonstrates that the launching of collaborative governance in 
South Korea was very state-driven. Based on the detailed case study of South Korea, this paper ultimately 
offers comparative insights and implications for other countries.
Keywords: Public sector reform, collaborative governance, state-society relations, state’s strategic 
choice, South Korea.
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1. Introduction
As was the case with many European countries, public sector reform in South 
Korea (hereinafter Korea) during the past 30 years or so has made great strides in 
transforming the way public agencies are run and public policies are made in the 
country. An important transition took place from a practice in which the state had 
enjoyed a dominant position in the policy-making process over civil society to a 
new mode of decision-making in which the government had to cooperate with civil 
society and allow the latter to stay engaged in the policy process. The net conse-
quence of this transition is that power relations between the state and civil society 
in policy-making have changed from one of verticality and hierarchy to one of hor-
izontality and equality. This important shift in state-society relations has prompted 
the state to tolerate and eventually accept ‘collaborative governance’, going beyond 
the traditional emphasis on public officials and formal institutions in the practice of 
public administration.
One of the noticeable features of ‘collaborative governance’ is a collective and 
deliberative process in which public officials and non-state actors work together 
to make and carry out public policies (Doberstein, 2016, p. 820; Ansell and Gash, 
2008, p. 544). Different modes of collaborative governance include various types 
of partnerships among the state, civil society, and the private sector, ranging from 
joined-up government to hybrid arrangements such as public-private co-manage-
ment regimes (Agrawal and Lemos, 2007).
However, there exist myriads of collaborative governance partnerships. Their 
specific form and mode vary considerably from country to country depending on 
how the state-society relations have developed in the specific context. Furthermore, 
differing types of collaborative governance scheme can be initiated either by the 
state, the private sector, or the civic sector, depending on the concrete circumstanc-
es in which these different sectors interact with one another.
Whether initiated by the state or by non-state sectors, collaborative governance 
has drawn a lot of attention from scholarly and policy communities in recent de-
cades. That collaborative governance is in great vogue effectively points to the limits 
of the traditional governance based on bureaucratic hierarchy. Government agen-
cies acting alone can no longer address policy issues efficaciously. Nor does it solve 
coordination problems commonly found with regard to intergovernmental organi-
zations as well as civil society associations. In order for the government to resolve 
social problems and deliver public services effectively, collaborative governance is 
needed as an institutional arrangement through which government representatives 
work and cooperate with society. Meanwhile, the involvement of citizens in the 
policy process provides them with an opportunity to experience and learn about 
democracy and bring their own ideas and interests to fruition.
In this respect, collaborative governance benefits both the state and society. Such 
possible benefits – either implicit or explicit – prompt Huxham (1993) to coin the 
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term ‘collaborative advantage’ to refer to the synergistic effects produced between 
and by the collaborating actors. Apparently, ‘collaborative advantage’ claimed in 
collaborative governance is a desirable component that creates ‘good governance’. 
It has been argued, however, that the emergence of collaborative governance does 
not automatically lead to the birth of collaborative advantage. If not properly man-
aged, collaborative advantage fails to obtain due to the complexity of the concerned 
institutions and the competing and conflicting interests of state and non-state ac-
tors, which instead result in a paralysis of collaborative governance. 
Collaborative governance does not always succeed. Nor is collaborative advan-
tage always obtained. The specific outcomes of collaborative efforts largely depend 
on how collective decision-making regimes are designed/defined and how the rele-
vant participants are identified/determined. Rigg and O’Mahony (2013) cite a high 
level of frustration among participants failing to achieve their goals, poor manage-
rial relationships, and low trust as the main impediment to effective collaborative 
efforts. Despite optimistic predictions for collaborative advantage and high hopes 
for synergistic effects, collaborative governance does not always succeed and does 
not always satisfy the relevant actors.
The actual effectiveness of collaborative efforts notwithstanding, it is already an 
undeniable fact that collaborative governance has been introduced and commended 
as a major alternative to traditional bureaucratic governance in many countries, 
including Korea. Focused on the actual transition in the state governance structure, 
this paper probes how the policy decisions under collaborative governance differ 
from those made under traditional bureaucratic governance. Hence, the focus of the 
study is to scrutinize the extent of collaborativeness in the real-existing collabora-
tive governance in Korea.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze and evaluate the extent of collabo-
rativeness of Korea’s ‘collaborative governance’ by looking into the restructuring 
policies of the central government during the Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) and the 
Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) administrations. We will show that collaborativeness 
was limited and partial in reforming public agencies. In other words, ‘collaborative 
advantage’ according to Huxham, was not substantive in the case of Korea. The 
main reason for the lack of collaborative advantage in Korea lies in that the emer-
gence and development of collaborative governance were primarily state-initiated 
and a result of the state’s strategic choice. 
The Korean governments under the two presidents were strongly motivated to 
showcase their ‘democratic’ characteristics by distinguishing themselves from the 
previous authoritarian governments that had largely maintained a heavy-handed 
stance toward and exercised control over civil society. We argue that collaborative 
governance in Korea was a state-initiated and state-led project and a product of the 
state’s strategic choice. This argument challenges Rhodes’ (1994) argument for ‘the 
hollowing out of the state’. In Korea, ‘hollowing out’ has never happened. Instead, 
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the transformation of the state was focused on the state’s new ability to ‘steer’ civil 
society. The state basically remained intact despite the introduction of collaborative 
governance, featuring and upholding state resilience (Chandler, 2014). 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section will provide a theoretical over-
view of the contexts from which collaborative governance originates, to evaluate 
the design and management of collaborative arrangements. This evaluation is criti-
cal because it can condition the way state and civil society actors interact with each 
other and also it can determine the nature of policy outputs. Using the theoretical 
lenses, the subsequent section will examine the government reform efforts under 
the two Korean governments to illustrate what actually happened. After that, the 
reform politics will be discussed, focusing on how public officials and civil soci-
ety actors acted together and surveying the drivers that propelled collaborative 
arrangements. The analysis will demonstrate the low level of collaborativeness, 
marginalizing the participants from civil society in favor of elite bureaucrats. One 
of the important causes of the lack of collaborativeness can be found in the legacies 
of the developmental state. During the heydays of the developmental state, i.e., 
in the 1970s and 1980s, public officials prided themselves on working as a key to 
the nation’s economic development, without significant social challenge against 
the strong state’s course of action. In the final section, which is the conclusion of 
the paper, we reflect on the features of Korea’s bureaucracy-centered institutional 
design that impede collaborativeness and try to draw theoretical and policy impli-
cations for future research and for other cases.
2. A theoretical review of collaborative governance
There is nothing particularly novel about public servants collaborating with so-
cial actors. However, in the past years, collaborative governance is drawing more 
and more attention across countries as well as policy areas, with special emphasis 
put on public sector reform (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Centered around the involve-
ment of society, ‘collaborative governance’ can be defined as a ‘governing act or 
arrangement where non-state stakeholders engage in public agencies to collective-
ly make or implement public programs’. Collaborative governance is often called 
‘participatory governance’ or ‘civic engagement’. Importantly, the extent of citizen 
involvement differs considerably, depending on the country where the collabora-
tive arrangement is employed.
What determines the varying extent of citizens’ involvement? An answer to this 
question provides a critical clue to understanding the emergence and development 
of collaborative governance. It is also closely linked to uncovering the origin and 
scope of collaborative governance in the country concerned (Emerson, Nabatchi 
and Balogh, 2012, pp. 2-4). In the literature, a special emphasis has been put on 
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identifying those conditions that should be present for collaborative arrangements 
to emerge and operate. Identifying these conditions could help us explain why civic 
engagement becomes prominent and how public administrators respond to societal 
demand, both of which largely depend on the existing characteristics of state-so-
ciety relations. The collaborative governance paradigm acknowledges that either 
public agencies or civil agents acting alone are unable to achieve policy goals and, 
therefore, it is imperative to establish appropriate inter-sectoral collaborative ar-
rangements and prevent them from falling apart (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992). 
It also explains how the state, in its effort to satisfy citizens’ needs, determines 
and adjusts the level of collaborativeness in collaborative governance. All in all, 
the interactive dynamics developed between the state and civil society shapes the 
contents of collaborative arrangements and the extent of their collaborativeness. 
To understand and evaluate collaborative dynamics, a multilayered context of 
political and socioeconomic influences in which collaborative governance emerges 
and evolves should be taken into account (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996). These polit-
ical and socioeconomic influences represent external conditions that often open 
new possibilities for collaborative governance. The contextual conditions can either 
facilitate or discourage civic engagement, which naturally leads to different trajec-
tories of collaborative governance. They can serve either as constraints or as cata-
lysts depending on the availability of drivers of collaborative acts, the fundamental 
components of which include leadership and consequential incentives (Emerson, 
Nabathci and Balogh, 2012, p. 9). Leadership points to the arbiters or deciding of-
ficials in a position to mobilize resources, to deal with collaborative action, and to 
sustain it (Schneider et al., 2003). Consequential incentives refer to internal as well 
as external opportunities inducing the operation of collaborative arrangement.
Not all contextual conditions join with the drivers to bring about a high level of 
collaborativeness. Rather, the level of collaborativeness is usually contingent upon 
a framework that outlines how collective actors run through tasks, make the nec-
essary agenda, and design and implement collaborative decision-making. In order 
for collaborative governance to function, a framework called ‘process management’ 
should be established (Edelenbos and Klinjn, 2006). Collaborativeness tends to be 
conditioned by formalized coordination mechanisms delineating institutional de-
sign and ground rules for collective decision-making and participation in the policy 
process. This has to do with the question of how to create collaborative structures. 
The key issue is who is in charge of managing the collaboration. Of particular con-
cern is the issue of a meta-governor who decides the way of running the collabora-
tive arrangement (Klijn, 2008). Who would serve as the process manager between 
public officials and civic participants? It is usually bureaucratic officials that take 
a leading role in managing collaboration as the process manager (Bardach, 1998; 
Grubbs, 2000). As a result, the involvement of citizens is determined by how the 
officials view civic engagement and define the nature of collaboration, which in-
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evitably manifests the state’s strategic choice in collaborative governance. When 
the bureaucratic perspective prevails, collaborative advantage for non-state actors 
would prove superficial. This means that the collaboration acts are possible only to 
the extent that public officials accept and approve.
As such, the state-society relations affect the quality of collaborative arrange-
ment, thus leading to either success or failure of collaborative governance. Pub-
lic officials who can influence collaborative dynamics as the meta-governor are 
in a position to identify shared issues worthy of discussion, articulate objectives, 
and decide the way of communicating with civil society actors. Turning to pub-
lic sector reform, the scope and method of reform and the nature and substance 
of involvement of non-state actors are decided by the bureaucrats. Depending on 
their perception of the situation, they can discreetly suppress or circumvent soci-
etal demands. This is because they possess the institutional authority to steer the 
society, most ideally based on the framework of ‘principled’ engagement (Emerson, 
Nabatchi, and Balogh, 2012, p. 11).
Figure 1: A framework for emergence, maintenance, and development of collaborative governance in Korea
Source: The authors
Utilizing the theoretical framework presented above, we examine in this paper 
the restructuring and reform process of central government agencies under the 
Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam governments in Korea to analyze and assess 
the nature of collaborative decision-making. Focused on the state’s strategic choice 
and the differing extent of collaborativeness, and with a view to providing a better 
understanding of the emergence and development of collaborative governance in 
Korea, we try to answer the following questions in particular: (1) What prompted 
collaborative arrangement to come into being?; (2) How did state and society actors 
work together to bring about the transformation of government agencies and bu-
reaucratic roles?; (3) What factors affected the bureaucrats’ intention and ability to 
‘manage’ participants from civil society?
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3. Collaborative governance and public sector reform under the Roh Tae 
Woo (1988-1993) and Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) governments
To trace the origins of collaborative governance in public sector reform in 
Korea – particularly concerning the restructuring of the two central governments 
– it is crucial to emphasize democratization in 1987 and the consequential strate-
gic leadership of the government based on the declaration of economic liberaliza-
tion in 1994. The political juncture in 1987 served as a trigger; the state’s strategic 
leadership capable of designing collaborative structures led to the development of 
collaborative governance in favor of state bureaucrats, marginalizing civic actors. 
Most importantly, the nature of the collaborative governance framework newly 
introduced in the country was heavily affected by the lingering legacies of the past 
state-society relations.
Both Roh and Kim governments were inaugurated in the midst of immense pop-
ular hope for greater democracy. The authoritarian period, which persisted from 
1961 to 1987 (with the brief exception of October 1979-May 1980), was finally over, 
and citizens expect comprehensive democratic reforms, including public sector re-
form. The Roh Tae Woo government, soon after its inauguration, pledged to get 
rid of past authoritarianism and set up the Presidential Administrative Reform 
Committee (PARC) in May 1988 as a collaborative arrangement. Likewise, the Kim 
government established the Presidential Commission for Administrative Reform 
(PCAR) on April 20, 1993, which was similarly intended to function as a collabora-
tive body. 
Obviously, the creation of collaborative institutions was a sign of departure 
from authoritarian developmentalism that had prevailed during the three decades 
of pre-democratic era. While allowing civic engagement to affect the reform of 
government agencies, the two governments promised to become more democrat-
ic. Generally, the introduction and operation of these collaborative governing ar-
rangements were aimed at improving public involvement by providing citizens 
with opportunities to exercise voice and make the government more responsive 
and citizen-centered (Nabatchi, 2010).
However, defying such conventional wisdom and common expectations, we ar-
gue that these two democratic governments installed state-centered collaborative 
arrangements without much meaningful joint-working and, as a result, the partic-
ipants from civil society were mainly neglected. The introduction of the collabora-
tive arrangements was primarily a symbolic political gesture to show the people 
that the democratic government would carry out reform by faithfully reflecting and 
executing the will of the society. In order to empirically support our argument, we 
will compare the reform proposals generated by the collaborative institutions with 
what were actually reformed, with a particular focus on the role of bureaucrats in 
the process. In this regard, we will examine how the two collaborative institutions 
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were managed, what reform measures they came up with, and how state bureau-
crats responded to the initiatives from social actors, to determine the extent of 
collaborativeness and evaluate collaborative governance.
3.1. Collaborative governance
The Roh Tae Woo government was the first democratic government in 
Korea after almost three decades of harsh political authoritarianism. The transition 
to democracy in 1987 was enabled by an inclusive grand coalition between the 
opposition political party and the social movement that united students, workers, 
religious leaders, and ordinary citizens. Prodded by the high hopes the Korean so-
ciety harbored about democracy, the Roh government began to seek changes in the 
state system and made efforts to enhance people’s trust and participation in the 
administrative reform process. It launched the PARC to make the policy-making 
process open and accessible to people. The PARC was established on May 13, 1988 
and remained active until July 1989. It consisted of 21 members who represented 
academic, economic, media, legal, labor sectors, and women. As many as 40 gov-
ernmental personnel supported the activities of the committee. These staff members 
were dispatched from the Ministry of Government Administration (MOGA) whose 
main job was to oversee human resource management of the central government 
(Korea Institute of Public Administration, 2015, p. 210).
In a similar way, the Kim Young Sam government pledged to accomplish a ‘New 
Korea’ with clean politics and a strong economy. The PCAR was set up in 1993 
and operated until 1998. It included 15 members, all of whom were civilians, and 
had 20 working-level officials. As such it was also a mixture of public and private 
actors. Committee meetings were conducted in a manner of discussion, involving 
stakeholders, experts from academia, and the relevant ministries, to determine the 
reform agenda (Hwang, 2008, p. 474). The outcomes of the meetings had to be re-
ported to the Presidential Office that teamed up with public officials many of whom 
were from the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to set the direction of the reform 
efforts. The participation of the general public in collaborative governance was de-
signed to broaden the social basis of the restructuring reform and to distinguish the 
incumbent government from the previous authoritarian predecessors. One of the 
most distinctive features associated with the PCAR was that a bottom-up method 
was adopted in which not only the standing members but also the general public 
were allowed to submit reform proposals (Hahm and Kim, 1999, p. 483).
Inaugurated when the memory of the 1987 democratization still remained fresh 
and full of pride in that the newly elected president, who had been one of the most 
iconic spearheaders of the democracy movement of the 1970s and the 1980s, was 
the first ‘civilian’ president after 1960 with no military connection, the Kim gov-
ernment benefitted from another driving force for continuing public involvement 
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in the government re-organization process. It was the president’s own charismatic 
leadership particularly concerning the declaration of Segyehwa (globalization) ini-
tiative in 1994, which was chiefly about internationalizing the Korean economy to 
join the OECD. Economic liberalization along with political democratization was 
already accepted as a norm among opinion leaders in the civilian sector. Govern-
ment officials also acknowledged that the efficacy of state intervention would swift-
ly decline as the private sector, that had benefited from the developmental statism 
of the past decades, grew to the point where it dared to challenge the state for the 
sake of increasing its own interests (Lee, 2000, p. 125). Heeding the growth of social 
forces, the economic liberalization initiative with a view to lessening the state’s 
control of the private sector provided a justifying rationale for government struc-
turing and reform reliant on social influences, aimed at making the government 
more effective and boosting free market activities.
In the context of growing emphasis on economic liberalization, the PCAR fo-
cused on reform that would make the government more responsive to the Segyehwa 
policy and to accelerate restructuring such as the consolidation and integration of 
economic ministries. Strongly motivated by President Kim’s personal political am-
bition to obtain Korea’s membership in OECD during his term of office, the opera-
tion of the PCAR was rapidly instrumentalized to carry out political campaigns to 
publicize Korea’s economic prowess to the international community. In sum, the 
collaborative governance attempts during the Kim government couldn’t fulfill their 
public purpose and instead worked to accomplish the president’s political agenda, 
thus making the PCAR arrangement fail to serve as a ‘toolbox’ to address public 
problems (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015; Scott and Thomas, 2017, p. 193).
3.2. Public sector reform
The Roh government’s PARC brought in civilian participants representing 
various walks of life to push for revamping the central government departments. 
Allowing even labor representatives to participate in the policy-making process 
shows how inclusive the collaborative arrangement was, considering that one of 
the critical factors that had contributed to the persistence of developmental statism 
in Korea during the 1970s and 1980s was effective labor exclusion, as was common-
ly found in other developmental states in East Asia (Lee, 2011). Despite such inclu-
siveness, however, most of the committee’s reform proposals were either simply 
unacceptable or ironically conducive to an increase in bureaucratic power. Pres-
ident Roh, who took office in 1988, emphasized equitable distribution of wealth 
and national reconciliation for a greater democracy in his inaugural speech. In ac-
cordance with these principles of state administration, the focus of governmental 
reform should have been put on dealing with the expansion of new demands from 
the public, and therefore on enhancing governmental responsiveness and the qual-
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ity of public service through de-bureaucratization. Yet, the outcome of the reform 
confirmed that the traditionally strong bureaucratic power still remained superior 
to society, a reality deeply embedded in the strong state vs. weak society relations 
(Kim, Han and Jang, 2008). Such historically embedded state-society relations basi-
cally limited the functioning of the PARC as a collaborative arrangement and made 
it degenerate into a state-centered instrument.
In July 1989, the PARC proposed the abolition of the Ministry of Power and 
Resources (MOPR) to integrate it with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
(MOCI), and submitted an idea that the Ministry of Culture and Public Relations 
(MOCPR) and the Ministry of Sports (MOS) were merged to create the Ministry 
of Culture and Sports (MOCS). At the same time, it recommended the abolition 
of Korea Forest Service (KFS), and the establishment of Statistics Korea (SK) and 
Korean National Policy Agency (KNPA) (Kim, 2014, pp. 250-251). Arguing that the 
value of a pilot bureaucratic organization was decreasing with democratization and 
economic opening, the committee also proposed a reduction in the function of the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) that had served as the key state agency for eco-
nomic and social development during the era of developmental statism. 
Of these reform proposals, the creation of the MOCS, SK and KNPA was ac-
cepted. Yet, proposals for abolishing ministries or for reducing the functions of 
powerful ministries were rejected: i.e., neither MOPR nor KFS was abolished, and 
the functions of the EPB were not reduced. In short, proposals for establishing new 
agencies were accepted; proposals for organizational elimination or functional re-
duction were rejected. These developments in Korea, characterized by the expan-
sion of state bureaucracy, make stark contrast with the general direction of public 
sector reform in the West during the 1980s. There, NPM-centered reform efforts 
equipped with neo-liberal roots asserted that the public would be more satisfied 
with the government if the public sector were downsized (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Con-
trary to the idea of minimal or limited government, the consequence of reform 
measures implemented in Korea ironically made a collaborative institution such as 
the PARC work as an agent to promote the interest of the bureaucracy.
The restructuring reform efforts continued through the PCAR during the Kim 
government. The collaborative committee prepared a revised proposal for revamp-
ing the government in June 1993. The main points contained in the proposal includ-
ed the following (Ha, 2011, pp. 379-380). First, the EPB, which was on the verge of 
functional reduction during the previous government, was again slated to be abol-
ished. In its place, a new Office of National Planning (ONP) would be created. But 
the ONP would be designed only to collect data and coordinate economic policies, 
while respecting other central government ministries’ policy autonomy as much 
as possible, unlike the way the EPB had worked during the developmentalist era. 
Second, the Ministry of Social Overhead (MOSO) was recommended to be newly 
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established, after the Ministry of Construction (MOC) and the Ministry of Trans-
portation (MOT) were abolished. Third, the MOGA was to be discontinued and the 
Civil Service Commission (CSC) would be established under the Presidential Office, 
in charge of overseeing the government’s personnel management. Fourth, the Min-
istry of Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA) and the Ministry of Labor (MOL) were 
to be abolished to transfer the relevant works to other ministries.
As had been the case with the Roh government, in which the plan to merge the 
MOPR into the MOCI was rejected by the former’s strong bureaucratic opposi-
tion, almost all proposals during the Kim administration for de-bureaucratization to 
abolish or consolidate ministries similarly faced enormous bureaucratic resistance. 
The reform proposals made by the PCAR were in danger of becoming obsolete, 
while the committee itself was on the verge of becoming defunct. It was President 
Kim’s declaration of the globalization initiative, Segyehwa, in 1994 that resuscitated 
the government reform measures, with an emphasis on the need to meet the inter-
national standard by liberalizing the economy and by joining the OECD. Thanks to 
the presidential declaration, the discussion on the reform proposals were resumed 
at the collaborative forum to be finalized in December 1994. The reactivation of the 
reform discussion was possible, owing to Kim’s leadership in turning the situation 
around by announcing the presidential initiative of Korea’s globalization. The lead-
er was capable of securing resources and support for collaborative governance and 
collaborative problem-solving (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2015). In this regard, the 
declaration served as a type of consequential incentive, putting pressure on the 
relevant participants to preserve collaborative governance (Emerson, Nabatchi and 
Balogh, 2012, p. 9).
In spite of such collaborative problem-solving efforts, the reform outcomes were 
a duplicate of those of the Roh government, meaning that the bureaucratic power 
became more augmented. The EPB, whose dismantlement was recommended, was 
reborn into the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) through a merger with 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The proposal to establish a new MOSO failed and 
instead the MOC and the MOT were merged into a single Ministry of Construction 
and Transportation (MOCT). The idea of dispensing with the MOGA and of estab-
lishing the CSC came to nothing as well. Far from abolition, the MOGA ended up 
with becoming more powerful by being reorganized as the Ministry of Government 
Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) through integration with the Min-
istry of the Interior (MOI) when the successor government under President Kim 
Dae Jung came to power in 1998. Also, all the ministries that had been asked to be 
decommissioned were basically retained.
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Table 1: A summary of reform proposals and outcomes resulting 
from collaborative governance in Korea, 1988-1998
Collaborative 
governance 
institutions
Reform proposals Reform outcomes
PARC 
(Roh government)
Abolition of MOPR 
to integrate it with MOCI Unimplemented
Merger of MOCRT and MOS 
to create MOCS Implemented
Abolition of KFS Unimplemented
Establishment of SK & KNPA Implemented
Reduction in functions of EPA Unimplemented
PCAR
(Kim government)
Abolition of EPB 
to newly create ONP
Unimplemented, EPB reborn as MOFE 
via a merger with MOF
Abolition of MOT and MOC 
to newly create MOSO
Unimplemented, MOT and MOC 
merged into MOCT
Dismantlement of MOGA 
to newly set up CSC
Unimplemented, MOGA reborn 
as MOGAHA during the successor 
government by merging it with MOI 
to increase its bureaucratic power
Dismantlement of MOHSA and MOL 
to hand over their functions to other 
ministries
Unimplemented, MOHSA and MOL 
still existing
Source: The authors
4. The politics of interpreting and instituting collaborative governance
As is clear from Table 1 above, most of the reform proposals during the two 
governments were unimplemented. On the contrary, execution of the reforms only 
strengthened and consolidated bureaucratic power. Such outcomes of collaborative 
decision-making particularly frustrated those participants from the civil society 
who expected the democratizing governments to respond more actively than the 
previous authoritarian ones to their citizens’ demand for reform. Using newly in-
troduced collaborative governance mechanisms, citizens expected and demanded 
that the two democratic governments produce ‘public values’, not vested bureau-
cratic values. The disappointing result of the reforms revealed that the power of 
public officials, especially of elite bureaucracy, remained strong even after vari-
ous collaborative governance institutions were introduced in the aftermath of the 
mass-ascendant democratization in 1987.
When it comes to the elite bureaucracy, two points are of particular impor-
tance: the MOGA for the Roh government and the EPB for the Kim government. 
In 1998 when the PARC emerged, the MOGA was in a position to influence the 
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reform process from the beginning. The elite bureaucracy was allowed to dispatch 
its own officials to the collaborative committee, whose jobs were to collect relevant 
data, analyze the current organizational situation of the ministries subject to the 
review for reorganization, and report everything to the committee. These are close-
ly associated with the making of norms and rules leading to agreement on reform 
goals, which constitutes collaborative structures (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2015). 
Utilizing the informational advantage in favor of itself and far superior to those 
participants from civil society, the MOGA, which had been in charge of managing 
government organization, played the role of mega-governor easily by pushing for 
the reform in a way that kept the society under control as had been the case during 
the 1970s-1980s at the height of state developmentalism.
President Kim Young Sam’s charismatic leadership style helped to keep collab-
oration windows of opportunity open (Kingdon, 1995). As civil society demand for 
democratization got stronger, however, the PCAR faced increasing resistance from 
bureaucrats. In an effort to escape the legitimacy crisis, the government declared 
the globalization initiative. It provided consequential incentives for collaborative 
governance to become normalized. These developments in Korea suggest that even 
when the initial condition of a strong popular call for democratization still favored 
a collaborative framework, more specific drivers and momentums like the presi-
dential Segyehwa initiative proved essentially instrumental for collaboration gover-
nance to persist (Crosby and Bryson, 2010). In the midst of economic liberalization 
the Kim government pursued, the EPB that had had ample bureaucratic autonomy, 
capable of leading the state-guided economic development during the authoritari-
an period, discovered and took the opportunity to maintain the dominant hold on 
the reform process. The EPB, which came under attack as those policy measures 
aimed at liberalizing the economy emerged more critical, asserted that in an era 
of increasing globalization, the state would be more likely to become embroiled 
in fierce competition across the globe. As such, the EPB argued that coordination 
and integration efforts rather than decentralization would be much more needed to 
address the globalization challenge.
Simply put, the elite bureaucracy cleverly responded to the strong societal de-
mand for public sector reform and restructuring by those arguments claiming that 
such cosmetic measures as organizational repackaging, functional conversion, and 
mission redefinition would be more than sufficient. Collaborative reform measures 
paradoxically strengthened the bureaucratic power. It was in this context that the 
powerful pilot agency during Korea’s developmentalist era, the EPB, was merged 
with the MOF to re-emerge as the MOFE, also known as the ‘super ministry for 
economic affairs’. As a result, the reform champions, as mega-governor in collab-
orative governance, were the public officials from the EPB: they played a leading 
role in pushing for the economic globalization policy under the Kim government. 
Similarly, the MOGA was able to sidetrack the popular pressure for disintegration, 
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when the need for integration and coordination was increasingly recognized and 
emphasized down the road (Halligan, 2010).
5. Conclusion
As we reviewed in the preceding sections, the public sector restructuring and 
reform process utilizing collaborative governance during the Roh and Kim govern-
ments in the immediate aftermath of Korea’s democratization in 1987 was centered 
on the state bureaucracy. The elite bureaucracy such as the EPB and the MOGA 
played the role of meta-governor. In fact, the reform was not really based on col-
laboration between the state and society. There was not much room for partnership 
or joint work because elite bureaucrats stayed powerful enough to control civilian 
participants, taking advantage of huge information/data asymmetry and the poli-
cy expertise they enjoyed. The newly introduced collaborative governance mech-
anisms emerged, evolved, and operated in the specific historical context that was 
embedded in the existing ‘strong state vs. weak society’ relations. 
These relations, in turn, had been formed in the course of state-led econom-
ic development under the authoritarian regime. Even though the mass-ascendant 
and movement-driven democratization combined with unprecedentedly successful 
economic growth increased the popular pressure for public involvement, the po-
litical juncture enabled by the democratization provided only an initial condition 
for collaboration to emerge. It was ultimately the elite bureaucrats that exploited 
information asymmetry vis-à-vis civil society, designed collaborative structures in 
favor of their interests, and discreetly marginalized civil society participants. The 
indigenous and antecedent conditions of state-society relations heavily affected the 
functioning of collaborative governance, disclosing that the level of collaborative-
ness was superficial after all.
Drawing on Jessop’s (2016) notion of a strategic relational approach, collabora-
tive governance under the Roh and Kim governments was interpreted to be a state-
led policy choice for the democratizing governments to increase their legitimacy 
and authority over civil society. As it became more and more difficult to control 
and govern the society that spoke up for citizens’ needs, the state elite coped with 
the increased societal needs by using collaborative governance as a pacifying mech-
anism to continue social control and to maintain policy dominance. To put it sar-
castically, collaborative governance could prove nothing more than a contentless 
gesture and a largely symbolic ritual, with little impact on the existing power im-
balance between the state and civil society. In this regard and in conclusion, about 
present and future attempts at introducing and developing ‘collaborative gover-
nance’ in Korea and across the world, analysts must not be fooled by the façade of 
the reform – what matters much more is what is really and substantively changing. 
Yes, we should not ‘judge a book by its cover’!
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Abstract
The co-participation, co-creation and co-production of citizens has attracted a lot of interest in academ-
ic and political fields in the last decade. Participatory budgeting is perceived as a direct democracy, which 
influences better engagement of citizens in public services and public decision-making. With participatory 
budgeting, local officials can promote transparency, which decreases corruption and improves the effective 
use of public resources. In the paper, we present the development of participatory budgeting at local level in 
Slovenia and some first evaluations. In 2019, almost 10% of all municipalities in Slovenia include participa-
tory budgeting in their budgeting process. On average, the municipalities with a larger population and higher 
budget revenues introduced participatory budgeting. At the same time, irrelevant correlation was found with 
the higher transparency budget index.
Keywords: participatory budgeting, direct democracy, local government, Slovenia.
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1. Introduction
Managing fiscal resources at local level is usually determined by several tasks 
and public services that should be provided at local level and determined by reg-
ulation. Therefore, for local governments, a large part of their budget is used for 
fulfilling these obligations. Nevertheless, there is some space, especially in the field 
of investments or additional non-profit services, for using local public resources. 
The co-participation, co-creation and co-production of citizens have attracted a lot 
of interest in academic and political fields in the last decade. Collaborative gover-
nance improves trust in the public administration, and can become a way for better 
cooperation between policy, politicians, and citizens. One of the decision-making 
processes through which citizens can deliberate and negotiate over the distribution 
of public resources, is participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting allows cit-
izens to decide how a particular part of public resources will be spent. Such direct 
democracy influences better engagement of citizens in public services and public 
decision-making. With participatory budgeting, local officials can promote trans-
parency, which decreases corruption and improves the effective use of public re-
sources. 
Traditional and bureaucratically oriented public administration has not paid 
much attention to encourage citizens to engage in decision-making. With the devel-
opment and always-new models of public administration management, and above 
all new public management, the participation in the decision-making has become 
an increasingly important element. The Strategy on Innovation and Good Gover-
nance at Local Level (Council of Europe, 2007) considers citizen participation to be 
one of the twelve principles of good governance. In the strategy, the participation is 
included in the first principle, which emphasizes that citizens are important in the 
decision-making related activities at local level, whereby manners of cooperation 
with the public should be clearly defined. Furthermore, the strategy indicates that 
all citizens should be able to participate in decision-making directly, or through 
intermediary bodies/associations, with particular reference to decision-making re-
lated to the use of public funds. 
Although participatory budgeting is not directly mentioned, it is clear from the 
indications that this principle also includes the approach to drawing up the budget 
at local level. Institutions and various researchers draw attention to citizens’ partic-
ipation in the decision-making as an important element of public service efficiency, 
greater legitimacy of government, and citizen confidence (e.g. OECD, 2017; Pina et 
al., 2010; Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007).
Participatory budgeting in Slovenia is a relatively new phenomenon, which 
started about five years ago at local level. The regulation on budget at central and 
local level does not include any premise for participatory budgeting. If we want to 
be precise, the constitution even declined the role of citizens in connection with the 
public budget. Despite the strict regulation, participatory budgeting is developing 
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slowly at local level, where more and more municipality councils involve citizens 
in their decisions about local budget spending. 
In this paper, we present an overview of the participatory budgeting in Slovenian 
local government. We analyze the portion of budget spending determined by the 
participatory budgeting process, the way participatory budgeting is implemented, 
and how successful the engagement of citizens is. We try to test two assumptions:
1. The way and practices of participatory budgeting at local level in Slovenia are 
similar to cases and procedures in other countries.
2. The smaller municipalities and municipalities with a higher online transparen-
cy budget index in Slovenia implement participatory budgeting in their budget 
preparation process.
The paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, a literature review 
about participatory budgeting is presented. The next chapter presents methodolo-
gy of the research and research results. Conclusions and discussion conclude the 
paper.
2. Participatory budgeting
In the literary reference, participatory budgeting is presented as an innovative 
approach to empowering citizens as experts who are familiar with the operation 
of the community in which they live (e.g. Russon Gilman, 2016; Wampler, 2000; 
Allegretti and Herzberg, 2004; Sintomer, Herzberg and Rocke, 2008). Most partici-
patory budgeting definitions represent it as direct democracy in the adoption of the 
budget (Shah, 2007). Furthermore, Shah (2007) also highlights the importance, not 
only of co-decision in the budget process, but also the opportunity for citizens to 
become familiar with the activities of the local community, and to propose, debate 
and affect the allocation of public resources. Therefore, it is not merely an element 
of empowering citizens to participate in decision-making, but also a tool to educate, 
integrate and promote good, effective public administration. 
Numerous authors (Shah, 2007; Russon Gilman, 2016; Wampler, 2000; Birskyte, 
2013; Allegretti and Herzberg, 2004; Schneider and Baquero, 2006; Lerner, 2011) 
highlight the importance of participatory budgeting, as it also enables participa-
tion in the decision-making for vulnerable groups in the society. In addition to the 
aforementioned advantages, the majority also indicate a number of other positive 
effects of participatory budgeting; namely, better budget transparency, better pub-
lic services, greater citizen satisfaction, greater confidence in the functioning of the 
authorities, etc. 
The authors Birskyte (2013) and Švaljek, Rašić-Bakarić and Sumpor (2019) also 
draw attention to the obstacles that can arise in the participatory budgeting; name-
ly, the risk that powerful interest groups introduce their ideas and desires, create 
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clientelism, and deepen injustice. Another obstacle is that elected decision-making 
representatives lose their legitimacy in the decision-making process. In some coun-
tries, citizens’ participation related to the budget is also problematic in view of the 
adopted legislation (Vodušek and Biefnost, 2011), which prevents such participa-
tion of citizens. Given that participatory budgeting is mostly implemented at local 
level, obstacles are often related to the ability of the local communities to complete 
the entire process. It involves the constraints arising from institutional capacity, or 
an inadequate attitude of decision-makers towards the idea. The process needs time, 
the implementation of certain procedures, and the involvement of decision-makers 
in evaluating the adopted initiatives. An important obstacle to participatory bud-
geting is the citizens themselves, who are not willing to participate in the process 
because of insufficient knowledge of the process, and disengagement. Beckett and 
King (2002) also note that most citizens are more focused on achieving their own 
short-term goals than pursuing longer-term goals that are relevant to the commu-
nity as a whole.
Sintomer, Herzberg and Rocke (2008) set out the conditions that must be ful-
filled in order to be able to speak of participatory budgeting. It is important that 
it involves a repetitive process and not just a one-off attempt. The largest process 
promoter is the World Bank (2013), which sets out steps in the process that are 
consistent with the usual budget adoption process at local level. The only difference 
is that participatory budgeting starts before the first stage, i.e. the stage of drafting 
the budget. In the previous process, the citizens are to identify investments and 
projects that are in accordance with the needs of the local community; this is fol-
lowed by a step, in which proposals are assessed in terms of feasibility, relevance, 
and meaningfulness, and incorporated into the draft budget through the established 
local budget adoption process, which is usually submitted to the certifying author-
ity by the mayor. 
2.1. Participatory budgeting in Europe 
The participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1989, in response to pov-
erty alleviation (Schneider and Baquero, 2006), is indicated in most literary resourc-
es involving participatory budgeting as the first example of participatory budget-
ing. According to some estimates, the results of this first measure, which contin-
ued in the following years, improved public infrastructure and its accessibility. The 
process is now well-defined, and the number of participating citizens who propose 
projects, is continuously increasing. In the decade that followed, the process first 
spread to most Latin American countries, and later, to other parts of the world. To-
day, it is found on all continents. 
In 2011, Vodušek and Biefnost (2011) drew up a report on the use of the par-
ticipatory budgeting of the members of the Council of Europe. Nine (Belgium, 
178
Bulgaria, Denmark, Georgia, Greece, Finland, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Ukraine) 
of the 27 countries that participated in the analysis, defined in their legislation that 
the public should be involved in the drawing up or adoption of the budget. Most of 
these countries use websites to get the information on the draft budget; the text is 
rarely sent to interested groups (e.g. in Austria). Some countries enable comments 
on the published draft budget on a web portal, or organize meetings for the interest-
ed public. Although the proposal is in a public debate, none of the above-indicated 
countries has laid down in the legislation that proposals should be taken into con-
sideration. The analysis therefore clearly shows that it is more about informing the 
public about the draft budget, and not so much about co-deciding on the drawing 
up of the budget. According to the analysis, we can conclude that the participatory 
budgeting, as used in Brazil, fails to exist. Nevertheless, we should take a closer look 
at the experience of individual local communities, which are still in the minority in 
most European countries; however, there are participatory budgeting practices at 
local level in all parts of Europe (Allegretti and Herzberg, 2004). 
European examples of participatory budgeting indicate that they are mostly en-
couraged in a different way, as they are mostly politically motivated, or part of 
the modernization of the public governance at local level. Europe also encounters 
some resistance to direct democracy in the budget adoption, because of concerns 
that the elected authorities will lose legitimacy, and consequently, interest groups 
or non-profit organizations with a long tradition of cooperative involvement fail to 
play an active role in the attempts to introduce participatory budgeting. Further-
more, the examples which are implemented in Europe, indicate that so far, they 
have not been effective in empowering the most vulnerable groups in society, as 
individual examples have succeeded in activating young people, but not disabled 
persons, migrants, etc. (Allegretti and Herzberg, 2004).
2.2. Development of participatory budgeting in Slovenia 
In 2017, Slovenia reached 69 out of 100 points in terms of an overall budget 
transparency assessment within the Open Budget Transparency survey (Interna-
tional Budget Partnership, 2017). The worst-rated part of its transparency is the 
assessment of public participation in budget adoption, where it only obtained 11 
points, and is therefore among the worst rated in the region. The assessment jus-
tification clearly shows that public participation is best assessed in terms of the 
legislation and supervisory bodies; however, Slovenia has failed to obtain points in 
relation to the implementation of public participation. The assessment is given for 
the state budget; however, this also applies to local budgets. 
In the local public finance area, the legislation stipulates that the municipality 
must submit a draft budget for public debate before its adoption by the municipal 
council. There are 212 municipalities in Slovenia, of which 11 are urban munici-
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palities. Municipalities in Slovenia differ according to several criteria, as there are 
multiple ratios in terms of the number of inhabitants or the area. The same could 
be argued for budget revenues and expenditures, as municipalities deviate from the 
average by more than 20%. This demonstrates great diversity of Slovenian munici-
palities, not only in connection with indicators, but also in the manner of manage-
ment and cooperation with citizens. A major problem is the legal obligations that 
represent i.e. a fixed part of municipal budget spending, the part of the budget that 
the municipality is to provide for the performance of its tasks. The municipalities 
may only spend the remaining part according to their own needs. This mostly in-
volves investment spending.
As already mentioned, the legislation provides for a public debate on the munic-
ipal draft budget, and most municipalities in Slovenia respect this provision. Almost 
90% of municipalities publish a draft budget for public debate on their websites 
(Klun, Benčina and Umek, 2019). A relatively large percentage of municipalities 
inform their citizens about the proposed expenditure from the budget in the coming 
years. The legislation does not stipulate that municipal councilors should take into 
account public proposals and comments when adopting the budget. It is therefore 
more about the principle of transparency than public participation in budget adop-
tion. Nonetheless, some municipalities have committed themselves to the introduc-
tion of participatory budgeting. 
The first attempt in this respect was carried out in 2015, by the municipality of 
Maribor (the second largest municipality in Slovenia); however, the results were 
poor, as the municipality encountered considerable unresponsiveness from citi-
zens. Consequently, the idea was put aside until this year, when the municipality 
will once again try to implement participatory budgeting for 2020, but this time, 
only in one of the district communities. Participatory budgeting at local level was 
successfully implemented for the first time in Ajdovščina and Komen, which started 
the process in 2016 (for fiscal years 2018 and 2019). The municipality of Ajdovščina 
invited citizens to participate with a lot of promotion, clear instructions, and a 
transparent process. The process was carried out in such a way that citizens, or 
a group of citizens, drew up an initiative on the prescribed form, which could not 
exceed a certain amount of funds. The total amount of the budget earmarked for 
participatory budgeting was also determined. Several workshops were held in local 
communities during the promotion of the participatory budgeting, where the pro-
cesses and rules of the submission of the initiative were presented to the citizens. A 
special committee, which evaluated the received proposals according to known and 
predefined criteria, was set up. The selected proposals were then put to the vote. 
The voted proposals were included in the draft budget, and in the adopted budget 
(Municipality of Ajdovščina, 2019). 
Similarly, the process was carried out in the Komen municipality. The assess-
ment of the participatory budgeting in the above-indicated municipalities showed 
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that, in this respect, 31 projects in the total amount of EUR 360,000, were carried out 
in the Ajdovščina municipality, and 22 projects in the Komen municipality in the 
amount of EUR 120,000. The Ajdovščina municipality continued its practice in 2018 
for the next two budget years, during which a special youth section was introduced. 
The participatory budgeting in the municipality of Kranjska gora was first imple-
mented only for a specific target group, i.e. young people. Only young people could 
participate in the vote and initiative. They were activated through various youth 
organizations in the municipality (Danes je tvoj dan, undated). 
3. Research on participatory budgeting at local level in Slovenia
Through this research, we intended to verify how many municipalities in 
Slovenia have already introduced participatory budgeting, to determine the process 
of the participatory budgeting introduction, and see if any characteristics of the 
municipality affect the introduction. We collected the data by visiting the websites 
of all the municipalities in Slovenia, and through the Google search engine by typ-
ing in the keywords ‘participatory budgeting of the municipality’. We decided to 
use the search engine, because websites of certain municipalities are not transpar-
ent, lack specific budget-related subpages, or the invitation to submit initiatives in 
connection with participatory budgeting are part of the current news that changes 
on a weekly basis. 
The data obtained enabled us to make a list of municipalities which are intro-
ducing, or have already introduced, participatory budgeting, and review ways of 
participatory budget process implementation. We also used data on the estimated 
budget transparency index for 2018 (Klun, Benčina and Umek, 2019), data on pop-
ulation (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2019), and data on budget 
revenues for 2018 (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Slovenia, 2019) for all 
municipalities. 
After reviewing the websites, we can conclude that by 2019 a larger number 
of municipalities have started the participatory budgeting introduction process in 
Slovenia. In 2019, a total number of 21 municipalities, i.e. 9.9% of all municipalities 
in Slovenia, introduced the participatory budgeting process. On average, munici-
palities allocated between 0.2% and 4% of the budgetary resources for the partic-
ipatory part of the budget. Most of these municipalities had no, or low, budget 
deficit in the previous year. It should be noted however that a large proportion of 
the budgetary resources in Slovenia, both at national and local level, is determined 
based on the execution of statutory duties. According to some estimates, this share 
ranges between 90 and 95% of budgetary resources; therefore, the possibility for 
participation relates only to a relatively small proportion of resources. 
The fact that this has been a highly topical subject in the last year is further sup-
ported by the website announcement of one of the municipalities, that it would in-
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troduce participatory budgeting in the next budget year. The City of Ljubljana (the 
capital) argues on its website that participatory budgeting has been implemented 
for a long time, as all citizens have the opportunity to submit initiatives – not nec-
essarily related to the budget alone – through their web portal, at any time. As indi-
cated above, the initiatives are then reviewed and considered by the representatives 
of the district communities; moreover, many initiatives are realized. Regardless of 
this, the portal for the submission of initiatives was not considered participatory 
budgeting, because it is not linked to the budget adoption process; furthermore, the 
processes for evaluating proposals and their role in the budgetary expenditure is 
not clear. In the analysis of the websites, we have determined that many initiatives 
for the introduction of participatory budgeting have been made by representatives 
in the municipal council, which is evident from the minutes of meetings of this 
body in several municipalities. There are only a few citizens’ initiatives for the in-
troduction of participatory budgeting on the Web.
After reviewing the processes for the implementation of the participatory bud-
geting published by municipalities, we can observe some common features of par-
ticipatory budgeting of Slovenian municipalities:
 – All municipalities published a call for proposals, rules for submitting initia-
tives, and set other conditions (e.g. that the initiator can only be a citizen of the 
municipality);
 – Proposals are collected and assessed at local community or special commission 
level;
 – Some municipalities limited the total amount earmarked for the participatory 
budget; others limited the value of the individual initiative within that amount; 
only two municipalities did not set a value framework; and
 – All municipalities collect proposals for investment spending within the frame-
work of the participatory budgeting.
In the light of the common features of participatory budgeting processes in 
Slovenian local self-government, we can conclude that the processes meet the cri-
teria or steps foreseen by the World Bank, and those introduced in other countries. 
However, a direct link between all practices abroad cannot be provided, since the 
review of different sources shows that practices abroad differ, and that there are no 
uniform processes.
In continuation, we wanted to verify if the municipalities which have introduced 
participatory budgeting have any common features. We examined the degree of in-
ter-connectivity in terms of the size of the municipality, population, the amount of 
budget revenues, data on whether the budget proposal is published online, and the 
estimated value of the budget transparency index. The inter-connectivity analysis 
is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Spearman correlation coefficient between selected variables
Participatory 
budgeting
Spearman’s rho
Number of inhabitants
Correlation Coefficient ,244**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000
N 212
Budget proposal available 
on the municipality web page
Correlation Coefficient -,015
Sig. (2-tailed) ,823
N 212
Online budget transparency index
Correlation Coefficient ,066
Sig. (2-tailed) ,337
N 212
Budget revenue
Correlation Coefficient ,308**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000
N 212
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Source: Authors’ own contribution
The table shows that there is a statistically significant and positive correlation 
between the size of the municipality, in terms of population and the amount of bud-
get revenues. Transparency indicators show no statistically significant impact. We 
can conclude from the verification, that greater financial and institutional capacity 
impacts on significant potential for the introduction of participatory budgeting in 
Slovenia. This is also in line with some other research that draws attention to the 
fact that a sufficient number of citizens is required in order to realize participatory 
budgeting.
4. Conclusion
Attempts to introduce participatory budgeting at local level in Slovenia are be-
coming more relevant, especially in 2019. This is partly due to the recent elections, 
since participatory budgeting has been introduced mainly in municipalities where 
new mayors were elected. In the next two years, it will become clear whether or not 
this will be an ongoing budget adoption process. Furthermore, it will be interesting 
to see if the process expands. Interestingly, the Slovenian municipalities have cop-
ied the participatory budgeting processes from each other, and are therefore imple-
menting participatory budgeting under similar rules. The data analysis we conduct-
ed confirmed our expectation that larger municipalities and municipalities with 
more resources implement participatory budgeting more easily, as they have larger 
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institutional and staffing capacities. On the other hand, in larger environments, it 
is more likely to reach a wider range of initiatives, and avoid potential deficiencies 
of participatory budgeting; in particular, it is less likely for certain stakeholders to 
exercise power. It is surprising that municipalities, in which participatory budget-
ing is introduced, fail to achieve a higher transparency index. We should seek the 
reasons for the fact that the index for 2018 is considerably uniform in most munic-
ipalities in Slovenia. 
A more detailed analysis of the proposed projects shows a difference from the 
first experience of participatory budgeting in Latin America, and content similar-
ity to European examples. The largest number of initiatives through participatory 
budgeting in Slovenia relates to the arrangement of safe routes, parks and spaces 
for children. Fewer initiatives have been promoted or implemented in connection 
with vulnerable groups, especially disabled persons. However, two municipalities 
implement a participatory budget specifically for the youth group, which means 
that vulnerable and minority groups will have to be separately encouraged. 
Local communities still have much work to do in order to further develop par-
ticipatory budgeting. As mentioned at the outset, it is first necessary to change 
governance models; only then can the ideas of direct democracy be more easily 
developed. The fact that the two largest associations of municipalities in Slovenia 
have organized a consultation on the topic of participatory budgeting, indicates a 
considerable expansion of initiatives this year. It has often been mentioned in the 
discussion that certain incentives could be part of the country’s policy, which could 
encourage further development, or even financially support municipalities that in-
troduce participatory budgeting by amending legislation so as to allocate a part of 
the funds to selected projects. Thorough research in Slovenia will only be possible 
in the future, once the results of the introduction of a participatory budget are 
known, and when the trend spreads to more municipalities. The current percentage 
of municipalities is too small for in-depth analysis.
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Abstract
The article will be aimed at presenting the legal possibilities for inter-municipal and cross-sectoral co-
operation at all levels of local government in Poland, and the presentation, based on empirical studies, of 
both the type of tasks thus determined and the assessments of the effectiveness of their implementation. 
The adopted hypothesis assumes that the establishment of appropriate legal instruments for inter-munic-
ipal and cross-sectoral cooperation can be an effective tool for local and regional development. The first 
part of the article is supposed to analyze the legal forms of inter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation 
in Poland. The article comprises both the basic forms of this cooperation such as: inter-municipal unions, 
administrative arrangements, commercial companies, local associations of municipalities, and other forms, 
including in particular: agreements between local government units and so-called other partners, metro-
politan networks, consortia, clusters and ‘local action groups’. The second part of the article addresses the 
results of empirical studies, which demonstrate the scope and types of tasks being implemented in the 
forms of inter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation in Poland. The article presents the main results of 
the research that has been carried out: (1) The forms of inter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation cur-
rently taking place in Poland are not sufficient in terms of creation and implementation of the development 
policy; (2) The applicable forms of inter-municipal cooperation are not fully effective in fulfilling the tasks 
assigned; (3) In particular, new legal forms of cross-sectoral cooperation should be established at all levels 
of local government in Poland. 
Keywords: inter-municipal cooperation, cross-sectoral cooperation, municipal tasks, local government, 
Poland.
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1. Introduction
The paper will be aimed at presenting the legal possibilities for inter-munici-
pal and cross-sectoral cooperation at all levels of local government in Poland, and 
the presentation of tasks thus determined, based on empirical studies. The adopted 
hypothesis assumes that the establishment of appropriate legal instruments for in-
ter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation can be an effective tool for local and 
regional development. The idea behind the two major reforms of the Polish public 
administration system introduced in 1990 and 1998 was the implementation of nor-
mative solutions that were supposed to be based on the so-called ‘partner model of 
local government’ (Izdebski and Kulesza, 2004, pp. 244-248), which was then com-
plemented by the partnership with the private sector (Izdebski, 2007, p. 70).
This is why on the one hand the paper is supposed to analyze the legal forms 
of inter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation in Poland. The presentation will 
comprise both the basic forms of this cooperation such as: inter-municipal unions, 
administrative arrangements, commercial companies, local associations of munici-
palities, and other forms, including, in particular: agreements between local govern-
ment units and so-called other partners, consortia, clusters and ‘local action groups’.
On the other hand, the paper will address the results of empirical studies, which 
demonstrate the scope and types of tasks being implemented in the forms of in-
ter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation in Poland, in particular at the ‘gmina’ 
(commune) and ‘powiat’ (district) levels and as part of vertical unions. 
2. Methodology
The methods used in the article are both the legal dogmatic method and those 
based on empirical research. The legal dogmatic method was used to analyze and 
evaluate the legal forms of inter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation at all 
levels of local government in Poland. In order to verify the hypothesis that the es-
tablishment of appropriate legal instruments for inter-municipal and cross-sectoral 
cooperation can be an effective tool for local and regional development, the article 
presents the results of the research obtained using the method of survey and the 
analysis of the official data on the topic.
3. Legal forms of inter-municipal 
and cross-sectoral cooperation in Poland 
The legal possibility of using certain forms of inter-municipal and cross-sectoral 
cooperation in the Polish legal system originally covered only communes. In 1990, 
the Act on local government provided for three forms of cooperation: inter-com-
munal unions, municipal agreements and associations of communes. Special laws 
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also provided for certain forms of cross-sectoral cooperation, covering especially 
associations and foundations. Another legal form of inter-municipal cooperation 
emerged in 1998 as a result of the introduction of a new three-level fundamental 
administrative system of division into communes (gminy), districts (powiaty) and 
regions (województwa), thereby complementing the structure of local government 
in Poland with district government and regional government (Brezovnik, Oplotnik 
and Vojinović, 2015, p. 41; Hoffman, 2018, pp. 16-17). It is worth mentioning that in 
the history of local government in Poland, some forms of inter-municipal coopera-
tion emerged as early as in the legal order of the Second Polish Republic (inter-war 
Poland). 
The applicable legal forms of cooperation between local government units are 
presented in the table below.
4. Legal forms of inter-municipal cooperation in Poland
4.1. Municipal unions 
The municipal union as a form of inter-municipal cooperation in the Polish legal 
order can exist in both horizontal and vertical arrangements. This is so because the 
Polish legislature provided for the possibility of establishing an inter-communal 
union, an inter-district union, and since 2015 a district-and-commune union (Arti-
cle 64-73b of the Act on commune government, Articles 65-72 and Articles 72a-72c 
of the Act on district government). Polish law does not allow the establishment of 
unions of regions, vertical unions with regions and unions with entities that do not 
constitute local government units.
Municipal unions are to be created for the purpose of joint exercise of public 
tasks (Koroblowski, 2015, p. 299). They can also be established to provide joint 
administrative, financial and organizational support for municipal organizational 
units, municipal cultural institutions or others legal persons classified as belong-
ing to the sector of public finance. It is about creating a kind of common support 
centers that should allow for better use of the staff and property resources held by 
the parties.
The municipal union has legal personality and carries out public tasks on its 
own behalf and at its own risk. As a result, the union can act in the spheres of 
both public and civil law. The rights and obligations of the local government units 
regarding the exercise of tasks as part of a municipal union are transferred to the 
union. Thus, there is a transfer the public tasks to a legally, structurally and finan-
cially separate entity (Karpiuk and Kostrubiec, 2017, p. 165). The prevailing view in 
the Polish literature is that the performance of public tasks by a municipal union 
can also relate to the powers of the law-making bodies of local government units 
(Dąbek, 2007, p. 187). 
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The decision to undertake cooperation by the bodies of local government as part 
a municipal union is in principle voluntary. The Polish legislature did not introduce 
restrictions on the number of participants in a municipal union (Swianiewicz and 
Teles, 2019, p. 123). However, the prevailing scholarly opinion is that the number 
of participants in a union should depend on the possibility of effective implementa-
tion of public tasks. There is also no legal obstacle for communes or districts to be 
simultaneously participants in several municipal unions. There are no territorial or 
temporal restrictions in the legal regulations governing municipal unions. There-
fore, the units forming a municipal union do not have to be adjacent to each other 
and the union may be established for a definite or indefinite period. The legislature 
has not introduced a detailed regulation on the system and principles of operation 
of the union, leaving them to be more precisely defined in the norms laid down in 
the charter of the municipal union (Ofiarska, 2012, pp. 303-304). 
The legislation governing the system of commune and district local govern-
ment in Poland also provides for the possibility of transforming an already exist-
ing union of districts or inter-communal union into a district-and-commune union. 
Such a transformation only requires a change in the charter of the union. The dis-
trict-and-commune union, on the date of announcement of the charter, assumes all 
rights and obligations of the transformed union.
Municipal unions are subject to liquidation based on the rules and procedure 
specified in their charters. At the end of the liquidation proceedings, the union 
notifies the voivode (regional governor) and submits a request that the register be 
deleted from the register. Relevant studies show that the most common cases of liq-
uidation of a union include: (1) the performance of the goal(s) for which the union 
was established and (2) dissatisfaction of the member communes about the quality 
of the union’s operation. Currently, there are 313 inter-communal unions, 7 district 
unions and 8 district-and-commune unions registered in Poland. 
Table 2: Inter-communal unions, inter-district unions and commune-and-district unions
Inter-communal 
unions
Inter-district 
unions
Commune-and-district 
unions
Number of units
(communes, districts) 2477 314 -
Number of districts 313 7 8
Source: Author’s own study
The scope of activity of municipal unions in the light of the studies carried out is 
presented in the table below (as of September 30, 2019).
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Table 3: Inter-communal unions, inter-district unions and commune-and-district unions. Tasks
Tasks Inter-communal unions
Inter-district 
unions
Commune-and-district 
unions
Local public transport 23 1 7
Common handling of the district’s 
and commune’s organizational units - - 1
Activation of the local labor market 1 - 1
Computerization of the land 
and building records - 6 -
Environmental protection 121 - -
Water and sewage management 18 - -
Municipal waste management 86 - -
Gasification 14 - -
Renewable energy sources 11 - -
Road management 4 - -
Source: Author’s own study
4.2. Municipal agreements 
In the light of the legislation regulating the system of local government in 
Poland, municipal agreements may occur in horizontal and vertical arrangements. 
The first group includes: (1) inter-communal agreements (Article 74 (1) of the Act 
on communal government); (2) agreements of districts (Article 73 (1) of the Act 
on district government) and (3) agreements of regions (Article 8 (2) of the Act on 
regional government). The group of vertical agreements includes: (1) agreement on 
the transfer of tasks to a district or commune by the region (Article 8 paragraph 
2 of the Act on regional government); (2) agreement on the transfer of tasks to a 
commune by the district (Article 4 (5) of the Act on district government). 
Municipal agreements in the Polish legal system may be concluded between all 
local government units. The basis for their conclusion is a resolution of the legisla-
tive body of the local government unit to agree to cooperate under the municipal 
agreement. The very act of agreement itself is concluded by the executive body 
of the local government unit. The agreements may be only cover existing public 
tasks, i.e. those specified by applicable law, which belong to the jurisdiction of local 
government (Cieślak, 1985, p. 114). The essence of the legal structure of agreements 
being concluded is ‘entrusting’ the execution, or in the case of inter-communal 
agreements – the transfer of specific public tasks, to another local government unit 
(Ofiarska and Ofiarski, 2012, p. 99; Leoński, 1995, p. 58). The conclusion of an agree-
ment does not therefore lead to the creation of a new entity having legal personal-
ity, as in the case of a municipal union.
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The agreements of local government units in Poland are based on the principle 
of voluntary participation. The legislature has not introduced any restrictions on 
the decision to conclude an agreement, shape its content or withdraw from the 
agreement (Sikora, 2019, p. 85). In general, there are also no territorial limitations, 
except for agreements concluded with the participation of regions. In the latter 
case, the agreement may be concluded only with communes or districts from the 
territory of the region. Certain restrictions appear only in the case of vertical agree-
ments. For agreements between communes and a district or region, and between 
districts and a region, the transfer of tasks may take place only in one direction, i.e., 
downward (Karpiuk, 2014, p. 41). The delegation of tasks in the opposite direction 
is not legally possible. Such a solution is in accordance with the principle of subsid-
iarity (Grążawski, 2007, p. 31).
The municipal agreement is a relatively flexible form of inter-municipal coop-
eration. The Polish legislature has not introduced procedural requirements for the 
conclusion of these agreements. In particular, there is no need to adopt organiza-
tional documents such as, for example, a charter. However, the agreement must 
be published in the regional official journal, which, according to some authors, is 
a prerequisite for its entry into force (Bandarzewski, Chmielnicki and Kisiel, 2006, 
p. 90). The conclusion of the agreement takes place by submitting a statement of will-
ingness to conclude it, which does not mean that it is a civil-law act. The prevailing 
opinion among scholars of administrative law is that the municipal agreement is a 
public-law act, although it has the feature of a bilateral act. The parties to the agree-
ment are peers and none of them has a dominant position (Brzezicka, 2000, p. 47).
There is no register of municipal agreements in Poland, so the determination of 
their number and subject matter poses serious difficulties. In the light of surveys 
carried out in 2013, sent back by 849 communes out of 2479 all Polish communes 
(34.25%) and 140 districts out of 314 all districts in Poland (44.59%), the following 
areas were defined in which communes and districts entered into agreements. 
Table 4: Inter-communal agreements and inter-district agreements
Inter-communal agreements Inter-district agreements
Transport (21%, 100) Social welfare services (43%, 101)
Education (19%, 94) Transport (20%, 47)
Social welfare services (12%, 59) Education (8%, 19)
Waste management (10%, 48) Entrepreneurship/labor market (7%, 16)
Water and sewage management (9%, 44) Geodesy and cartography (3%, 7)
Health care (3%, 14) Culture (3%, 8)
Energy management (2%, 11) Health care (3%, 7)
Public security (2%, 11) Public security (3%, 6)
Environment protection (2%, 10) Other (10%, 22)
Other (20%, 95)
Source: Porawski (ed.), 2013, p. 25.
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4.3. Commercial law companies
In the Polish legal order system, commercial law companies can be a form of 
both inter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation. Companies are a form of in-
ter-municipal cooperation mainly in the sphere of municipal management. It is 
therefore about performance of a public utility task which aims to meet the col-
lective needs of the population in a current and uninterrupted way by providing 
publicly available services (Article 1 (2) of the Act on municipal management). The 
legal bases for inter-municipal cooperation as part of commercial law companies 
are primarily the provisions of the Act on municipal management of 1996. 
The legal regulations governing the participation of local government units in 
commercial companies, but in the public sphere only. In this respect, local govern-
ment units may create limited liability companies or joint stock companies. They 
may also accede to such companies.
Beside the sphere of public utility, a commune may establish or accede to com-
mercial law companies only in strictly statutorily defined cases (Article 10 (1-3) of 
the Act on municipal management). These in particular are the unmet needs of the 
community on the local market, or the pursuit of banking, insurance or education 
activities. As regards districts, the possibility of creating or accession to companies 
outside the sphere of public interest was excluded. The regions may, in turn, estab-
lish commercial law companies outside the public sphere only in the area of promo-
tional, educational, editorial and telecommunications activities for the development 
of the region (Article 13 (2) of the Act on regional government).
The Polish legal system is not so liberal in choosing the purpose of econom-
ic activity undertaken by the local government in the form of a commercial law 
company and thus hinders the independent identification of the needs of the local 
community, whereas the changing economic situation in Poland entails the need to 
develop legal opportunities for cooperation of local government units in the form 
of commercial law companies. Unfortunately, the Act on municipal management, 
effective since 1996, does not allow the use the full potential and investment pos-
sibilities of local government units. This negatively affects not only the economic 
development of the region, but also can exclude local government from specific 
areas of local or regional services over time. 
In the light of surveys carried out in 2013, the areas of cooperation between 
communes and districts as part of commercial law companies are presented in the 
table below (rate of return of survey questionnaires: 849 communes – 34.25%; 140 
districts – 44.59%). 
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Table 5: Areas of cooperation as part of commercial law companies
Areas of cooperation
as part of commercial law companies Commune District
Waste management 13%, 107 -
Local social and economic development 7%, 56 23%, 21
Water and sewage management 12%, 105 -
Entrepreneurship/labour market 15%, 124 20%, 18
Health care 2%, 20 11%, 10
Transport 7%, 55 9%, 8
Energy management 8%, 67 5%, 5
Housing 6%, 52 -
Social activation 3%, 22 -
Promotion 2%, 21 3%, 3
Environment protection 2%, 21 -
Tourism 2%, 18 -
Education - 5%, 5
Development of personnel and management systems in public administration - 3%, 3
Sport and recreation - 3%, 3
Other 21%, 176 18%, 16
Source: Porawski (ed.), 2013, p. 35.
4.4. Associations of local government units
Every local government unit in Poland, i.e. commune (Article 84 (1) of the Act 
on communal government), district (Article 75 (1) of the Act on district govern-
ment) and region (Article 8b (1) of the Act on regional government) is entitled to es-
tablish associations. However, only in the case of communes the legislature set out 
the condition that associations may be created by communes in order to support 
the idea of local government and defend common interests. The above requirement 
does not apply to associations formed by districts and regions. The prevailing schol-
arly opinion, however, assumes that associations formed by districts and regions 
can be established primarily in the sphere of culture, economy and environment 
protection (Celarek, 2012, p. 256). 
Associations created by local government units may be local, regional or na-
tionwide (Kostrubiec, 2011, p. 262). An association is a separate legal entity and 
obtains legal personality upon entry into the National Court Register. At least 
three founders are needed to create an association by local government units. 
Detailed regulations on associations, which also apply to local government units, 
have been set out in the Law on Associations of 1989. In the light of this act, 
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the association is a voluntary, self-governing, permanent union with non-profit 
objectives (Article 2 (1) of the Law on Associations), which means that local gov-
ernment units have, first of all, the freedom to decide on participation, seceding 
or termination of the association. Secondly, local government units may inde-
pendently define the association’s goal, structure and program. Thirdly, the goals 
of associations created by local government units must be long-term. Fourthly, 
the non-profit nature of associations makes it necessary to allocate the proceeds 
to the implementation of statutory objectives (Karaś and Skipioł, 2012, p. 180). 
The organization, tasks and manner of operation of associations are to be set out 
in their charters.
Under Polish law, associations of local government units are not corporations 
of public law. Therefore, it is not possible to transfer to them any powers of a 
sovereign nature. Associations may not be established to jointly perform public 
tasks. This is done by other legal forms of cooperation which have already been 
referred to, such as municipal unions or agreements. The local government unit 
may entrust the association with performing the unit’s tasks, but it still has the 
possibility of independent fulfilment of these tasks and is held responsible for 
this. Associations of local government units can also obtain the status of a ‘public 
benefit organization’. Their purpose is to pursue socially useful activities in the 
sphere of public tasks (Article 3 (3) point 2 of the Act on public benefit and vol-
untary activities).
Associations of local government units may pursue an economic activity on 
general terms, allocating the income for the achievement of statutory objectives. 
The literature, however, notes that the negative factor affecting the development 
of associations as a form of inter-municipal cooperation are the provisions of 
the Accounting Act (Karaś and Skipioł, 2012, p. 197). A number of responsibil-
ities related to financial reporting and accounting are an important nuisance in 
the functioning of the associations of local government units. The complex sys-
tem of control over associations formed by local government units (including the 
voivode (regional governor, courts of law), regional chambers of auditors, etc.) is 
also an obstacle to the effective implementation of the tasks in the analyzed form 
of inter-municipal cooperation.
The areas of cooperation of communes within local associations in the light of 
surveys are presented in the table below (rate of return of survey questionnaires: 
849 communes – 34.25%; 140 districts – 44.59%). 
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Table 6: Areas of cooperation as part of local associations
Areas of cooperation
as part of local associations Commune District
Local social and economic development 14%, 77 13%, 17
Supporting the idea of local government 10%, 58 14%, 19
Environment protection 9%, 53 4%, 6
Tourism 8%, 55
Promotion 7%, 42 5%, 7
Culture 7%, 41 -
Cooperation (regional, international) of local government units 6%, 35 11%, 15
Entrepreneurship/labor market 6%, 33 5%, 7
Social activation 6%, 32 7%, 9
Education 4%, 23 -
Development of rural areas 4%, 20 5%, 6
Geodesy and cartography - 4%, 6
Public security - 5%, 6
Transport - 5%, 6
Other 19%, 104 22%, 29
Source: Porawski (ed.), 2013, p. 42.
5. Forms of cross-sectoral cooperation in Poland
5.1. Agreements of local government units with so-called other partners
The agreement is a relatively widely used form of cooperation in the Polish le-
gal order. The institution of agreement is seen in various situations which require 
reciprocal contractual arrangements of local government units with other legal 
entities. The prevailing opinion among scholars of administrative law is that at 
least one of the parties to the agreement should be an entity that carries out the 
public administration functions. The sphere of powers and obligations which have 
been covered by the agreement must fit within the scope of the independent deci-
sion-making powers of the parties to that act (Stahl, 2016, p. 492).
Agreements of local government units as examples of the form of cross-sectoral 
cooperation, identified on the basis of surveys, may include, in particular: (1) agree-
ments between local government units with non-governmental organizations in to 
carry out social assistance tasks (Article 25 of the social assistance act); (2) agree-
ments of intent to cooperate with NGOs; (3) partnerships for the development of 
social entrepreneurship; (4) agreements with regional and local development agen-
cies; (5) agreements on the joint implementation of projects under operational pro-
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grams financed by the European Union; (6) agreements on pro-development coop-
eration with universities; (7) agreements on promotional cooperation with cham-
bers of commerce; (8) agreements with sports clubs; (9) agreements with non-profit 
organizations of legal professionals on legal and civic consultancy.
5.2. Consortia
The concept of consortium has not been defined in the form of a legal definition 
in the Polish legal system. The consortium is the relationship established under a 
contract resulting in a legal relationship. The Parties to the consortium undertake 
to act and to pursue the common economic goal assumed by the consortium. Thus, 
they undertake to work together. The consortium is, in essence, a contractual form 
of economic cooperation between economic operators, including local government 
units, concluded for the purpose of pursuing a specific project, usually single one. 
An example of a consortium as a form of cross-sectoral cooperation is the Con-
sortium for the ‘Poznań’ Brand (Konsorcjum Marki ‘Poznań’). It is a consortium of 
permanent marketing cooperation between the city of Poznań and the undertak-
ings operating on its territory. The purpose of this consortium is to ‘achieve syner-
gies between the image of the City and its cooperating institutions’.
5.3. Clusters
Clusters, like consortia, are not a statutory form of cooperation involving local 
government units. However, an attempt was made in the Polish legal system to de-
fine this form of cooperation under the Ordinance of the Minister of the Economy 
of 2 December 2006 on the granting of financial assistance by the Polish Agency for 
the Development of Entrepreneurship not related to operational programs (Journal 
of Laws of 2018, item 315). According to § 14a (4) of this Act, the cluster shall mean 
the spatial and sectoral concentration of economic development or innovation en-
tities involving at least ten economic operators engaged in economic activity in the 
territory of one or more neighboring regions, competing and cooperating within 
the same or related industries, and mutually linked through an extensive network 
of formal and informal relationships.
The literature stresses that support for such initiatives (clusters) by local govern-
ment units may be a method to increase innovation and upgrade the economy in a 
given region. Clusters being established in Poland on the initiative or with the par-
ticipation of local government units are created in particular within such industries 
as energy, tourism and construction. One of the best-known clusters in Poland is 
the ‘Aviation Valley Cluster’, which was established in 2003 on the initiative of the 
town of Mielec and several other communes.
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5.4. Local action groups
Local action groups as forms of cross-sectoral cooperation were introduced to 
the Polish legal system in connection with Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005 
of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricul-
tural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). The Polish legislature finally defined 
the status of local action groups under the Act of 7 March 2007 on supporting 
rural development with the participation of the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development under the Rural Development Programme for 2007-2013. The 
establishment and functioning of local action groups are generally governed by the 
provisions of the Act – Law on Associations. 
Local action groups are peculiar types of associations which have legal personal-
ity. For the establishment of a local action group, at least 15 members are required, 
i.e., natural or legal persons, including local government units, which constitute 
the founding committee. Supervision over local action groups is exercised by the 
voivodeship marshal. 
The essence of creating local action groups is the permanent connection of repre-
sentatives of the public sector at the local level with social organizations and enter-
prises. Therefore, local action groups are a form of tri-sectoral cooperation of local 
government units. They are a legal form of cooperation serving an effective policy 
of local development of rural areas. This regards joint performance of tasks which 
result from the implementation of the local development strategy. On the basis of 
Polish experience, they concern in particular the improvement of living quality, con-
ditions and standards for inhabitants of rural areas, the providing of conditions for 
the development of entrepreneurship in rural areas or promotion of local products. 
Among the dysfunctions related to the functioning of local action groups, ad-
ministrative law scholars point to a high degree of bureaucratization of procedures 
and the possibility of using the groups as a form of cooperation only in relation to 
rural communes. 
5.5. Local tourist organizations 
Regional and local tourist organizations are autonomous organizations that op-
erate in the sphere of tourism development and promotion. The tasks of regional 
and local tourist organizations include: (1) tourist promotion of their area of activ-
ity; (2) supporting the functioning and development of tourist information facil-
ities; (3) initiating, consulting and supporting the plans for the development and 
modernization of tourist infrastructure, and (4) cooperation with the Polish Tourist 
Organization.
The provisions of the Act – Law on Associations apply to the creation and op-
eration of regional and local tourist organizations. Members of these organizations 
can be both natural and legal persons, in particular local government units, met-
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ropolitan unions and organizations of entrepreneurs in the field of tourism and 
associations operating in this field (Article 4 (2) point 1 of the Act of 25 June 1999 
on the Polish Tourist Organization).
The goal of regional and local tourist organizations is mainly to integrate tour-
ism activities in the region. Therefore, they do not constitute a universal form of 
cross-sectoral cooperation. A total of 16 regional and 121 local tourist organizations 
are currently registered in Poland. 
6. Conclusions
Within the Polish legal system, the cooperation between local government units 
may take different legal forms, depending on the goal that the local government 
units want to achieve by undertaking joint actions. In a situation where the objec-
tive is to perform public tasks, the cooperation may take the form of inter-commu-
nal and district unions, agreements or associations. Undertaking by local govern-
ment units’ other activities than performing public tasks allows for the selection of 
other forms of cooperation. 
The cooperation of local government units in Poland is voluntary, which means 
that forms of cooperation and the establishment and liquidation of specific forms of 
inter-municipal and inter-sectoral cooperation may be freely chosen. 
Based on the analysis of functioning forms of inter-municipal and cross-sectoral 
cooperation in Poland, the following theses can be proposed: (1) the forms of in-
ter-municipal and cross-sectoral cooperation currently taking place in Poland are 
not sufficient in terms of creation and implementation of the development policy; 
(2) the applicable forms of inter-municipal cooperation are not fully effective in 
fulfilling the tasks assigned; (3) in particular, new legal forms of cross-sectoral co-
operation should be established at all levels of local government in Poland. 
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1. Trends in anti-corruption enforcement in Italy
Corruption has existed since ancient times, and it is still nowadays a major prob-
lem of contemporary society, a real ‘world emergency’ indeed; the efforts to fight 
it are widespread not only at national level, as the phenomenon has long been the 
focus of particular attention by the United Nations (2003)1, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the OECD (2005)2, the Council of Europe (1999) and 
the European Union.
According to the most consolidated accepted definition, given by Transparen-
cy International, the leading international NGO in curbing corruption worldwide, 
corruption is ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (whose main forms are 
bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion), and it constitutes a dishonest action that 
destroys people’s trust and prejudices democratic and moral values.
The phenomenon appears even more odious when it refers to the relationships 
between citizens and public officials (the specific sphere we will be dealing with 
in this paper), since it infringes the constitutional principles of impartiality and 
efficiency of the public administration, as well as the duty to fulfil public functions 
with discipline and honor.
The indicator most commonly used to determine a country’s level of corruption 
is the ‘Corruption Perception Index’, developed by Transparency International in 
1995 and published every year3. 
The 2019 ranking (Transparency International, 2019) has unfortunately con-
firmed Italy’s critical position: the country scored 53 out of 100 – with zero being 
highly corrupt and 100 very clean – ranking Italy 51st out of 180 countries world-
wide and 25th out of 31 countries in Western Europe. 
This negative position is also confirmed by the updated information of the Eu-
robarometer (2014); the survey (promoted by the European Commission in 2014 
and aimed at providing an overview of citizens’ opinion and experiences regarding 
corruption) reveals the image of a country with major problems in terms of legality 
and public ethics, although with very considerable regional differences.
1 The ‘United Nations Convention Against Corruption’ (2003) is the only legally binding universal 
instrument against corruption, currently signed by 174 countries.
2 According to the ‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions’ (2005), ‘each Member State must take the necessary measures to ensure that 
conduct constituting an act of passive corruption or active corruption by officials is a punishable 
criminal offence’. Many other acts have been enacted by OECD to pursue the objectives to combat 
corruption developing cooperation efforts, also in the field of public procurement. See e.g. OECD 
(2008, 2009, 2015). 
3 Transparency International, the well-known non-governmental organization dedicated to fighting 
and monitoring corruption worldwide, publishes two reports of great importance every year: the 
‘Global Corruption Barometer’ and the ‘Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)’.
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It should also be pointed out that the economic damage suffered by a country 
due to corruption appears to be difficult to assess precisely in monetary terms: the 
estimate is 3% of world GDP, 120 billion euros in the whole European Union and, 
with reference to Italy, 10 billion euros per year.
Italy’s strategic anti-corruption approach has long almost entirely relied on the 
repression side and still today judicial activity remains strongly engaged towards 
the suppression of often particularly serious corrupt behaviors (European Commis-
sion, 2014, p. 3).
Corruption in public administration is regulated in the Criminal Code (art. 318-
322), whereas corruption between private individuals falls within the provisions of 
the Civil Code (art. 2635), with very severe sanctions which often foresee, as part of 
the judgment of conviction, the interdiction from public offices.
Even if Italy has long been considered one of the most corrupt advanced econo-
mies, according to some scholars (Merli, 2019, p. 342), until the late 1960s, corrup-
tion was essentially confined to the country’s ruling elite. From then on, ‘it became 
a common and socially accepted behavior, spread across all social strata and involv-
ing an even larger number of low- and middle-level politicians and bureaucrats’. 
Over the years there has been a change in the panorama of the main actors 
involved and the corruption system centered on the political parties in the early 
90s of the last century has become more pervasive and more difficult to identify 
(Vannucci, 2019, p. 23).
Many factors have contributed to the spread of corruption, such as especially 
over-regulation, the complexity of legal rules, the excess and inefficiency of bureau-
cracy, the proliferation of organized crime, the economic and social gap between 
the northern and southern part of the country, the tax evasion, the slow delivery 
of justice.
A significant reinforcement of measures aimed at suppressing corruption took 
place in 1990s, when a season of judicial inquiry called Mani Pulite (‘Clean Hands’) 
and Tangentopoli (‘Bribesville’) started. The strongest impact of the active role of 
the judiciary against corruption was on the political system, as the investigations 
has led to the downsizing of the leading parties of that time and the disappearance 
of other smaller parties, leaving the space for newcomers to politics. On the eco-
nomic side, the effects of the inquiries provided (on the short run) a reduction in 
corruption cases and in the costs of public procurements, which had been seriously 
affected by kickbacks.
As on the long run many high-profile cases of corruption continued to emerge, 
it was considered necessary to start a deeper reflection on the measures taken in 
Italy until then, recognizing that the efforts could no longer be limited to the field 
of criminal law but they also had to involve the administrative sector.
205
2. Towards a new balance between sanctions and prevention
A new area of studies has thus begun to develop and taking inspiration from 
other countries’ experiences the fight against corruption has been oriented not only 
to hit the pactum between briber and corrupt, but also to prevent and contain the 
‘administrative malpractice’, the ‘maladministration’ (that is, in a broader sense, a 
series of behaviors that go beyond corruption in a strict sense, such as for example 
resistance to change, formalism, indifference to efficiency, hostility towards new 
technologies, overstaffing, nepotism).
Since the cultural background of a person greatly influences his choices regard-
ing illegal behavior, the Italian legislator has thus undertaken a radical change in 
the approach to the phenomenon of corruption.
On the one hand, it was decided to continue to strengthen criminal law, increas-
ing sanctions related to corruption and including new offences; on the other side, 
noting that combating corruption is not only a task of criminal courts and police 
force, internal administrative controls have been foreseen and criminal law was 
supplemented by other instruments aimed at combating behaviors without crimi-
nal relevance, which, however, represent the basis of potential unlawful conducts.
New rules have been thus enacted stigmatizing some specific behaviors and 
above all aiming at preventing them, in order to create a cultural humus favorable 
to the consolidation of a culture of legality. 
Furthermore, an independent administrative agency – the Italian Anticorrup-
tion Authority – has been established and its activity is specifically aimed at com-
bating and preventing corruption.
This institutional progress represents a significant new element in the Italian 
anti-corruption strategy, to which the important contribution of the constitutional 
jurisprudence should be added (see Constitutional Court Judgment no. 30 of 2012). 
The Constitutional Court has better specified the content of some constitutional 
provisions, affirming for instance that art. 97 of the Constitution must be considered 
inspired by the aim of guaranteeing both ‘good administration’ and its efficiency, 
as well as the ‘transparency’ of the work of public administrations; this principle, 
not expressly provided for in the Italian Constitution of 1948, has become, as we 
shall see later, one of the main tools for preventing corruption (Legislative Decree 
no. 33 of 2013).
The real turning point occurred in 2012, with the entry into force of Law no. 
190 laying down ‘provisions for preventing and fighting corruption and illegality 
in public administration’ (the so-called ‘Anti-corruption Law’), introducing an an-
ticorruption system which is similar to prevention-based models already applied in 
other countries.
This is the first Italian legislator’s attempt to establish an organic framework to 
fight corruption, by balancing and coordinating preventive and repressive measures. 
206
The absolute novelty of this new approach is represented by the key role as-
signed to the administrative prevention of corruption (compared to the few initia-
tives adopted in the past).
This law was adopted to align the Italian legal system with guidelines in inter-
national conventions, but its main purpose was to prevent and fight corruption 
perpetrated by individuals within the public administration or linked to it. 
As concerning the repressive measures, the Italian Criminal Code was amended, 
introducing – inter alia – the new crime of ‘trading in influence’, reformulating the 
crime of extortion, increasing the penalties for several crimes (misappropriation of 
public funds, bribery relating to lawful and unlawful acts, judicial bribery, miscon-
duct).
It should also be mentioned that the Criminal Code has been then further mod-
ified, as the Law no. 69 of 2015 (the so-called ‘anti-corruption law’) reintroduced 
the crime of ‘false accounting’ and increased the penalties for crimes related to 
corruption4. 
However, the major element of significance for our study is that the 2012 law 
has introduced new instruments aimed at ‘preventing’ corruption; it represented 
the legal basis for a series of implementing rules that do not concern criminal law in 
the strict sense, since the Government was delegated to issue an ad hoc legislative 
decree on transparency, a new regulation on incompatibility (which will be consid-
ered further in this paper), and to adopt a national Code of conduct for employees 
of the public administrations (2013).
Moreover, the anti-corruption law for the first time introduced provisions (which 
have been strengthened with the passage of Law no. 179/2017) on the protection 
of whistleblowers for reporting corruption within the public sector. The provisions 
are applicable to employees reporting wrongdoing under the condition that they do 
not commit libel or defamation or infringe on anybody’s privacy. The information 
can be disclosed by the employees only to their superior, the judicial authority or 
the Corte dei Conti (the accounting judge). 
The new rules apply to all public administrations in a narrow sense, public eco-
nomic bodies, private-law entities under public control; with regard to the objective 
4 The reintroduction of false accounting is particularly important, since it was the simplest and most 
widespread way to conceal the exit of company money, necessary for the payment of bribes. Now 
this crime is punished with imprisonment from 3 to 8 years (if the company is listed) and from 1 to 
5 years (if it is not listed). The crime of false accounting, which often revealed other illicit activities, 
including corruption, previously abolished, was reintroduced. Penalties were made harsher for 
both perpetrators and the beneficiaries of corruption. Further changes concern the rules about col-
laborators of justice (the discount of the penalty increases), the conditions necessary to access the 
plea deal (which now provide for the advance and full payment of the price or profit of the offence) 
and the monetary sanctions that must be incurred by those convicted of embezzlement, extortion 
or bribery. 
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scope, the 2012 law covers a generic notion of corruption and illegality in public 
administration, without specifying behaviors in a strict catalogue. 
An important role is played by the National Anti-Corruption Authority. The law 
provides a system of ‘plans’ aimed at establishing guidelines and specific measures 
for the prevention of corruption. The authority (to which we will return later) is 
responsible for approving the ‘National Anti-Corruption Plan’ aimed at analyzing 
the causes and risks of corruption, identifying any action capable of preventing 
and combating it, providing guidance to public administrations in preparing their 
specific plans.
Each administration is required to approve its own three-year ‘anticorruption 
plan’ and appoint a ‘person responsible for corruption prevention’ (in addition to 
the staff rotation in high risk working position, the strengthening of administrative 
transparency, the adoption of a Code of Conduct, a whistleblowing system).
Consequently, the 2012 law represents an absolute novelty also as regards an 
ethical perspective, concerning the organization of public administrations. Preven-
tive anticorruption measures reveal an attempt to ‘judicialize ethic’, as an authentic 
value to be pursued, together with the strict legality of administrative action and 
the guarantee of its efficiency and impartiality.
The greater attention devoted to the ethical dimension would allow to better 
contrast forms of residual administrative malpractice and maladministration, that 
is to say those practices which are not unlawful in a legal sense, but which are con-
trary to other rules of efficiency and good performance. This would also require a 
further effort to better define the content of the code of conduct of the institution, 
strengthen the training of employees, better clarify a mentoring function, stream-
line the organizational procedure, enhance the auditing system and the evaluation 
of ethical behavior.
3. The Italian Anti-Corruption Authority 
The Italian Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) is a public independent body of 
composite nature which combines the role of effective public procurement policy 
supervisor and the role of body in charge for fighting against illegality and corrup-
tion by ensuring transparency.
As concerning the public procurement system, we briefly remember that, since 
the Green Paper of European Commission of 1996 about ‘Public procurement in the 
European Union’, EU suggested to Member States to entrust the supervision of its 
contracting entities to an independent authority, following the model of Sweden. 
The aim of the introduction of this authority should be to ‘prevent behavior giving 
rise to complaints, thereby reducing the potential burden on national courts and 
tribunals as well as on the Community institutions’.
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These suggestions have been translated into legal rules in 2004, when the 
Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC provided that in order to ensure their im-
plementation Member States may, among other things, establish an independent 
body endowed with the power to oversight the public procurement procedures, 
also gathering information and data about public contracts.
Those tasks were (at least formally) already fulfilled in Italy after the establish-
ment of the Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts (created in 1994 but 
in operation from 1999), in charge of monitoring public procurements by fostering 
compliance with principles of fairness and transparency; within the authority an 
‘Observatory on public procurements’, was created as an office in charge of collect-
ing information on public contracts all over the country.
The authority had only oversight powers, as it could not sanction infringements 
and it never had ‘quasi-judicial’ competence. Remedies against administrative mea-
sures or inaction were, also in the field of public procurement, the judicial ones 
before administrative courts. In this regard, it should be observed that public pro-
curement litigations still represent a huge part of the workload of administrative 
courts and the legislator has been always trying to reduce it.
The authority’s powers were increased in 2006 (including the power to impose 
sanctions) but the law of 2012 has provided for the creation of a ‘super-enforce-
ment’ Anti-Corruption Authority (which was operational in 2013 and then deeply 
reorganized in 2014), absorbing the competences of the former Italian Authority on 
Public Procurement, as the legislator wanted to concentrate all powers in the hand 
of one body (Law no. 125 of 2013, art. 5, c. 3)5.
As concerning more specifically the anti-corruption and transparency tasks, the 
authority has now the power to rule, to oversight and to punish in the field of 
transparency, anti-bribery, public procurement (and referred to this latter field, it 
has also the power to judge).
Legislative Decree no. 50 of 2016 gave to the authority, inter alia, two new com-
petences; the body is actually in charge of issuing guidelines, to support contracting 
entities and to improve the quality of procurement procedures; it can also issue 
binding pre-litigation advices, as an optional and ancillary non-judicial remedy in 
addition to the traditional judicial ones.
However, it should be noted that the main function of the new authority is the 
prevention of corruption within public administrations and in companies owned or 
controlled by public bodies. 
This activity shall not have the character of a formal control but it takes the form 
of monitoring contracts and public offices within the most risky sectors, guiding 
5 The Authority is now composed by a President and four members and the rules set forth for their 
appointment ensures a high level of independence and expertise.
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behaviors and procedures of public servants, according to a model that has received 
the consent of the OECD (and which was applied for the first time on the occasion 
of the monitoring of Expo 2015). 
Also worthy of mention is the effort of the authority to develop a new set of cor-
ruption risk indicators, which should be differentiated by territory, sector, and level 
of government and initially applied to the areas of waste management, education, 
social services and procurement. The objective is to identify anomalies in public 
contracts relevant for the anticorruption authorities (Merloni, 2019, p. 54).
4. ‘Preventive’ approach: publication and transparency obligations
Among the strategies carried out in order to prevent corruption, we should 
mention the mechanisms aimed at ensuring that citizens are able to access data and 
documents held by the public administration, pursuant to principles of transparen-
cy and ‘full accessibility’. 
Legislative Decree no. 33/2013 enhanced forms of ‘civic access’, through the 
publication of such data and documents on institutional websites (usually, there is a 
dedicated section named ‘transparent administration’), with a view to improve ‘ex-
tensive control on how institutional tasks are carried out and public resources are 
employed, as well as to promote the participation in public debate’ (art. 5, para. 2). 
Publication and transparency obligations are imposed, among others, to politicians 
and public officers in managerial positions in general, for example with regard to 
their financial and income records (the same obligations are imposed to their spous-
es and their first and second degree relatives). 
However, the Constitutional Court has recently ruled on the constitutionality 
of such legislation (Judgment no. 20/2019), after being asked to decide whether or 
not this measure was ‘proportionate’ with regard to another fundamental right, 
protected by national and supranational law as well, i.e. the right to data protec-
tion, read in the light of the equality principle enshrined in art. 3 of the Italian 
Constitution (as integrated by EU principles guaranteed by Directive 95/46/EC and, 
nowadays, by Regulation (EU) 2016/679) and, in particular, of the need to respect 
necessity, proportionality, purpose limitation, adequacy and minimization princi-
ples in data processing operations. 
Hence, the Constitutional Court clarified that, whilst transparency obligations 
imposed to politicians are rooted in popular consensus and, consequently, in the 
need to allow citizens to assess whether politicians, since they took office, benefit 
from increases in their income and assets (even through their spouses and close 
relatives), ‘and whether this is coherent with remunerations they get for carrying 
out their duties’, imposing the same obligations with regard to all those who have 
a managerial role in public offices, without any distinctions, is disproportionate to 
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the objective of fighting corruption in public bodies. The publication of such a huge 
amount of data would also imply the risk to frustrate the ‘same needs to correct 
information and, consequently, of oversight on institutional responsibilities and 
on the use of public resources, on which legislation on transparency is grounded’. 
Hence, the Court agreed with the Italian independent authority tasked with fight-
ing corruption that this measure would generate ‘lack of clarity due to confusion’ 
because of the ‘unreasonable lack of a prior selection of information that is most ap-
propriate to pursue lawful aims’. At the same time, the Constitutional Court shared 
the European Court of Human Rights’ stance, which, in a similar situation (Magyar 
v. Hungary), held that ‘the public interest cannot be reduced to the public’s thirst 
for information about the private life of others, or to an audience’s wish for sensa-
tionalism or even voyeurism’ (para. 162).
Therefore, the Constitutional Court maintained that the legislator should have 
‘made a distinction according to different degrees of exposure of different public 
offices to the risk of corruption, and to the scope of each particular function, pro-
viding, coherently, different levels of pervasiveness and completeness of income 
and financial record to be published’. Consequently, the Court made a distinction 
itself, keeping these obligations alive only for particular categories of managerial 
tasks, i.e. those who ‘manifestly carry out activities linked to political bodies, with 
which the legislator assumes the existence of a relationship of confidence, to the 
point that these offices are conferred by the competent Minister’. However, at the 
same time, the Court remarked that the legislator should promptly reform this area. 
While waiting for a legislative reform after the Constitutional Court’s remarks, 
it is still possible to say that the legislator, in the meanwhile, carried out further ‘an-
ti-corruption’ strategies, more recently with Law no. 3 of 9 January 2019, named by 
journalists ‘sweeping out corruptions’. This law, besides cracking down sanctions 
and reforming crimes against the public administration, has also introduced further 
rules on transparency of political parties and political movements.
In order to deal with the sharp and uncontrolled increase of political founda-
tions and think tanks mainly aimed at financing political parties and political move-
ments, ‘also taking into account their capacity to circumvent transparency obliga-
tions, accounting provisions and oversight mechanisms’ (Ronga, 2019, p. 5) that 
should instead be applicable to them (it is important to remember that, since 2014, 
public financing has been prohibited, according to Law no. 13/2014), the legislator 
imposed that all financing and donations that exceed an established threshold have 
to be tracked. At the same time, political parties and movements are prevented 
from receiving financial contributions from people or entities that refuse to pub-
licly acknowledge such transfers of money (the violation of this obligation implies 
administrative pecuniary sanctions). 
The equivalence, with regard to publication and transparency obligations, of 
foundations, associations and groups, on the one hand, parties and movements, on 
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the other hand, when the composition of managing bodies depends, totally or par-
tially, on the political decision or, alternatively, when managing bodies are made 
up of members of parties or movements (even when they took office up to ten years 
ago), entails – as scholars correctly argued – a ‘more or less generalized extension 
of organizations under scrutiny’. This situation entails that, also in such a circum-
stance, it is necessary to monitor a very high number of entities, with the addition-
al difficulty to identify which entities are subject to these obligations (Guarantee 
Committee, 2019, p. 3). 
It is furthermore possible to highlight that Law no. 3/2019 also inhibited political 
parties and movements from receiving contributions, economic aid or other forms 
of financial assistance from ‘government or public bodies of foreign states’, as well 
as from ‘legal entities’ based in foreign states. Such a prohibition can be easily 
explained because of the ‘need to control transfers that, due to tax reasons related 
to their different country of origin, are exempted from Italian tax obligations and, 
therefore, from the scrutiny of Italian authorities on money transfers or on the 
abovementioned different forms of financial aid in favor of Italian political organi-
zations’ (Ronga, 2019, p. 10).
5. Incompatibility regime and bans on assigning a mandate 
Among other ‘preventive’ actions adopted in order to implement Law no. 
190/2012, it is also possible to mention obligations arising from Legislative Decree 
no. 39/2013. In order to prevent interferences or overlaps between politics and ad-
ministration, as well as conflicts of interests, this decree regulates cases in which 
it is forbidden to confer some mandates as well as incompatibility, with regard to 
managerial, administrative or similar roles in local authorities. 
A ‘ban on assigning a mandate’ means, more precisely, that it is (permanently 
or temporarily) impossible to assign a mandate to those who were criminally con-
victed on offences against the public administration, or held an office in private 
entities regulated or financed by public administration, or carried out professional 
offices in favor of them. In addition, these bans apply to those who have been a part 
of political bodies, while the reasons of ‘incompatibility’ – meaning that the person 
has to choose which office to carry out – apply when there are offices in public ad-
ministrations and private entities controlled by public actors or financed by them, 
as well as when professional activity of representative offices in political bodies are 
carried out.
In order to enforce these provisions, the person who supervises the implemen-
tation of the ‘anti-corruption plan’ for each administration and/or entity has an 
oversight role and, in cases of potential violation, he has to report to the Corte dei 
Conti (tasked with ensuring administrative accountability), as well as to ANAC, 
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which will adopt all measures it is competent for. Consequently, when a mandate 
is assigned in breach of such provisions, the contracts are null and void and, most 
importantly, it is necessary to sanction the members of bodies that have conferred 
null and void mandates. 
With regard to the implementation of this provision, ANAC has issued a 
‘circolare’ on May 14, 2015 and, more recently, reported to the Government and 
the Parliament on February 7, 2019 (ANAC, 2019, p. 1). In this last document, they 
complained that there is no exception to the ban on assigning a managerial of-
fice in local health authorities and those who stood for the European, national, 
regional and local elections in electoral districts that comprise that territory in 
which the sanitary authority is located, or to those who, in any way, held political 
offices that could give them an unlawful advantage with regard to future offices, 
when they already held managerial offices (with executive functions) in the same 
administration. 
The rationale of Legislative Decree no. 39/2013 is that the legislator wanted to 
avoid, ex ante and from a general perspective, that ‘carrying out certain activities/
functions facilitates favorable situations to obtain managerial and similar position’, 
in this way ‘causing the risk of corruption to unlawfully gain this benefit’. As a 
matter of fact, in this circumstance, ANAC held that this risk cannot exist. Rather, 
such ban would violate art. 51 of the Italian Constitution. Therefore, the Constitu-
tional Court urged the legislator to introduce such exception in the cases at issue. 
6. ‘Repressive’ actions bans on standing 
for elective and government offices
Besides the aforementioned preventive actions, aimed at preventing or, at least, 
mitigating corruption, Law no. 190/2012 also provides for ex post repressive mea-
sures, i.e. aimed at banning the possibility, for some people, to stand for elective 
or governmental offices, if they were definitively convicted on serious crime or, 
anyway, incarcerated for a certain number of years.
It is true that the first organic legislation on this subject had already been framed 
by art. 5 of Law no. 55 of March 19, 1990, which provided that conviction for some 
particularly alarming crimes, incompatible with the exercise of a political right, 
precluded the possibility to carry on the (already taken) mandate to elective role at 
the local and regional level; only with amendments brought by art. 1, para. 2 of Law 
no. 16 of January 18, 1992, convictions for some crimes have been mentioned as 
precluding circumstance to stand as a candidate, being the rationale (according to a 
consolidate stance of the Constitutional Court) the need to ‘protect public order and 
public security, free determination of elective bodies, efficacy and efficiency of pub-
lic administrations in order to deal with a situation of national emergency, involv-
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ing the interests of the civil society’6, with the objective, eventually, ‘to prevent and 
fight the risk that criminal organizations are involved in public administrations’ 
and, hence, to safeguard ‘fundamental interests of the State’, that could be compro-
mised (Constitutional Court Judgment no. 352/2008). It is necessary to clarify that 
these preclusions, that the person could not remove, could be considered inadmis-
sible only as long as it is necessary to protect other interests having constitutional 
rank, following to the general rule of necessity and reasonable proportionality of 
such a limitation.
However, nowadays, Decree Law no. 235 of December 31, 2012, which imple-
ments arts. 63 and 64 of Law no. 190/2012, provides that this preclusion must be ap-
plied also with regards to the members of Parliament (both domestic and European 
one) and to those who hold governmental offices (whose mission is elective).
Such an extension of this legislation, therefore, casts doubts with reference to 
the same nature of the measure and its retroactive applicability to crimes that took 
place before the reform. The Constitutional Court7 ruled many times on this point. 
It confirmed a previous stance (Constitutional Court Judgment no. 407/1992) and 
reiterated that measures such as the prohibition to stand for elections, decadence 
and suspension are not sanctions and, more precisely, they ‘are not criminal pen-
alties or consequence of a criminal conviction, but rather consequence of the lack 
of a subjective requirement to access or keep mandates’. In more detail, ‘in cases of 
decadence or mandatory suspension from elective charges that are provided by the 
norms at stake, it is not necessary to ‘impose a sanction that changes according to 
the different gravity of the crimes, but rather it is necessary to assess a lack of an 
essential requirement to keep the public elective mandate’ […], within the power 
to establish eligibility requirements with which art. 51, para. 1, Italian Constitution 
vests the legislator’. 
It is clear that, outside the scope of application of art. 25, para. 2 of the Italian 
Constitution, ‘laws can act retroactively, respecting several limits that this Court 
established and deal with the safeguard of fundamental values of the society, which 
protect the addressees of the provision at stake as well as the legal system itself’. In 
this way, the immediate application of new preclusions to those who were elected 
before it entered into force, ‘is a reasonable answer to the need that the legislation 
itself tends to accommodate. In cases of evident unlawfulness in the public adminis-
tration, it is reasonable that a (non-definitive) conviction for some crimes (in this re-
gard, crimes against the public administration) implies the need to temporarily sus-
pend the person convicted from their duty, in order to avoid that the administration 
is ‘biased’ and to guarantee the credibility of the administration before the public’. 
6 See Constitutional Court, judgments nos. 407/1992, 197/1993, 288/1993, 118/1994, 295/1994, 
132/2001, 25/2002, 352/2008, 118/2013.
7 See Constitutional Court Judgments nos. 236/2015, 276/2016, 214/2017.
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As a matter of fact, also the idea, which is particularly widespread among 
scholars, that this measure is substantively ‘criminal’ in nature (in the light of the 
well-consolidated substantive approach adopted by the Strasbourg judge, since the 
well-known case of Engel v. The Netherlands (1976), aimed at establishing whether 
sanctions provided by domestic law are criminal in nature and are covered by arts. 
6 and 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights), was held ill-founded by the 
Constitutional Court with decision no. 276/2016. The Constitutional Court conclud-
ed that ‘from the framework of guarantees enshrined in the European Convention 
of Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, the obli-
gation to impose a provisional administrative measure, as suspension from elective 
mandate as a consequence of a non-definitive criminal conviction, do not infringe 
the prohibition to punish someone without a law’.
If this is the situation with regard to how this measure is legally framed, there 
are still some difficulties (and in particular) with regard to the prohibition to stand 
for parliamentary elections. 
On the one hand, remedies against exclusion orders adopted by electoral of-
fices appear quite limited. Such orders can be appealed before the National Cen-
tral Office, but it is not possible to apply anticipatory measures that candidates 
to other elective mandates can enjoy. On the other hand, when preclusions arise 
after lists are presented or before proclamation, their existence would be assessed 
by the Chamber to which the person belongs when elections are verified or even 
afterwards, respecting what is provided by art. 66 of the Italian Constitution. There 
is a risk (which has already materialized8) that such procedure undermines ‘the 
interest of the Parliament to guarantee the presence of components who respect 
the requirements to participate in the parliamentary assembly, among which the 
absence of criminal convictions’. 
7. Prevention of corruption and improvement 
of efficiency in public administration
In attempting to evaluate all the initiatives adopted in Italy against corruption in 
recent times, we must assume that, almost 30 years after the start of ‘Mani Pulite’, 
something has surely changed in the country. However, some new large-scale in-
8 See, in particular, the Senate resolution (morning session no. 787 of 16 March 2017, available at 
http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/1009219.pdf.), that did not approve the forfeitu-
re due to ineligibility proposed by the Council of elections and parliamentary immunity for Senator 
Minzolini, already definitively sentenced for the crime of embezzlement following the sentence of 
two years and six months of imprisonment and the measure of temporary interdiction from public 
offices for a period of the same duration.
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vestigations show that corruption is still widespread and also the political system 
remains vulnerable to it9.
For this reason, more intense efforts have been made, trying to achieve a better 
balance between repression and prevention, strengthening the role of the Anti-Cor-
ruption Authority (public procurement remains one of the areas most infested with 
corruption, even if more transparency was introduced) and enacting more severe 
criminal provisions.
It is probably too early to tell if these measures will bear fruit and have full 
implementation; it is also true that prevention takes much longer to produce an 
impact, although it is an indispensable complement to the repression.
The Corte dei Conti has stressed10 its major effort for combating corruption and 
developing its fundamental function of prevention, aimed at driving public admin-
istrations in the proper and responsible use of public resources. The institution’s 
role is particularly strategic with regard to its relationship with territorial author-
ities and local administrations, to which it provides an independent advice that 
promotes a culture of efficiency and sound financial management.
The accounting judge has highlighted the urgent need to complete the frame-
work of preventive measures against corruption, simplify the rules, reduce hy-
per-legislation and support the digitalization of administrative procedures (even if 
this entails the need to reach new balances between the principle of transparency 
and that of protection of privacy and personal data, also in light of the new Euro-
pean regulation in this area), in a country where rules on conflict of interest and on 
lobbying have still not been approved. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that the Anti-Corruption Authority has recent-
ly published its report11 on the corruption in Italy in 2016-2019 (ANAC, 2019), based 
on the measures taken by the judicial authority in the last three years.
Between August 2016 and August 2019, 117 ordinances of preventive detention 
for corruption have been issued by the judicial authority; 152 cases of corruption 
9 We can remember i.e., from the second half of the 1990s, the inquiries on the ‘MOSE’ project, the 
flood-barrier system in Venice, on the Expo in Milan, and on ‘Mafia Capitale’ in Rome.
10 See the speech of the President of the Corte dei Conti at the opening of the judicial year 2019, 
February 15, 2019, available at https://www.corteconti.it/Download?id=c224ac02-6fb9-4bde-b5d2-
404bb7a73390
11 In October 2019, the president of ANAC, presenting this report to the foreign press, said that na-
tional corruption has changed its nature, becoming ‘pulviscolare’ and slippery, with the frequent 
dematerialization of bribes. Those last ones are no more only economic compensations, becoming, 
for example, hiring of relatives, meals, overnight stays, different kinds of benefits (and even sexual 
services). Their modest value is also indicative of how easily the civil service is ‘sold’. The economic 
counterpart remains instead dominant in the ever wider and labyrinthine world of international 
corruption.
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have emerged, practically in all regions but especially in Sicily, Latium, Campania, 
Apulia, and Calabria.
74% of the cases of corruption affected the field of public procurement, while 
26% were related to different areas (competition procedures, administrative proce-
dures, building permits, corruption in relation to judicial acts, etc.).
The strong engagements of the judiciary could be considered as the evidence of 
a curios paradox concerning Italy’s negative ranking in the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI): the more you fight corruption, on the repressive plan, the more you 
probably increase the citizens’ perception of living in a country affected by a high 
level of corruption.
The CPI is not an objective indicator indeed and it should be differently con-
ceived; it is based on the ‘perception’ and not on the measurement of real existing 
corruption (Tartaglia Polcini, 2018, p. 4). Nevertheless, the common use and refer-
ence to this marker has unfortunately huge consequences on the national economy, 
as it discourages investments and innovations, but, more importantly, it weakens 
citizen’s trust toward institutions, which is the most essential and indispensable 
element to ensure cultural, social and economic development of a country.
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Abstract
Education and vocational training are some of the pillars of local development, considering that human 
resources are one of the most important categories of resources, both in the public and private sectors. The 
strategies of the European Union in this regard encourage the promotion of equity, social cohesion and the 
implementation of programs that encourage lifelong learning. A healthy and sustainable social framework 
considers the material well-being, but also the educational well-being of the citizens, proposing in this sense 
an increase of the literacy rate at the country level, at the same time with the increase of the percentage of 
the graduates of higher studies.
The National Strategy for Sustainable Development Romania 2030 ensures a quality education and also 
the promotion of the opportunities in order to prepare the new generations for the challenges of the future, 
by developing a constructive thinking that will lead to a sustainable economic and social progress.
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1. Introduction: The role of education for sustainable development 
Education has various valences among which the most important are its role in 
the economic development (a well-trained workforce may lead to economic pros-
perity), its social role (through social education we learn about equal opportuni-
ties), the cultural role (being important in preserving and sharing our traditions 
and national identity to future generations), and last but not least its role in our 
personal development (each person evolving according to his/her own potential 
guided by the principle of lifelong learning). Thus, the National Strategy for Sus-
tainable Development in Romania states that schools can be efficient only if they 
are in permanent connection and relation with children, family, community and so-
ciety, underlining once again the main values of education: flexibility, trust, equity, 
solidarity, effectiveness and autonomy1.
Education for Sustainable Development, as defined by UNESCO in 2014, ‘allows 
every human being to acquire knowledge, skills, attitudes and values necessary to 
create a sustainable future’. This idea is based on that proposed in 1987 by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development United Nations (the Brundtland 
Commission).
The strategy for Education for Sustainable Development has been adopted in 
Romania in 2005 (the summit in Vilnius). In 2015 Romania adopted the Agenda for 
Sustainable Development 2030 which had 17 objectives, education quality being the 
fourth objective, and in 2016 in Batumi it was discussed the necessity to implement 
education for sustainable development to achieve these goals (Ministerul Educației 
și Cercetării, undated). 
2. The importance of education for the development of society
Murga-Menoyo (2009) argues that ‘education is a valuable process in it-
self’. The importance of developing the educational system for the overall 
progress of a community cannot be denied, public policies in this area be-
ing essential. The progress at the society level imperatively implies paying special 
attention to the education chapter, transforming it into a strategic priority at the 
macroeconomic level.
Moreover, vocational education and training are some of the main points on the 
Europe 2020 agenda, together with a series of indicators necessary to be achieved, 
as strategic targets. Analyzing the Europe 2020 Strategy, we identify as main ob-
jectives of the above mentioned field: (a) increasing the employment rate of the 
1 For further details please visit https://www.edu.ro/sites/default/files/Educatia%20ne%20uneste%20
%20Viziune%20asupra%20viitorului%20educatiei%20in%20România.pdf, pp. 2-3
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population segment between 20-64 years old at a minimum of 75%; (b) increasing 
the allocation of GDP for research and development to 3%; (c) reduction of school 
dropout up to 10%; and (d) increasing the number of graduates of higher studies to 
at least 40%.
Other strategic objectives found on the European agenda aim to increase the 
participation rate of adults in life-long-learning programs, increasing the literacy 
rate of the population, improving the skills of children and teenagers in the lit-
erary and exact sciences, introducing compulsory education, preschool education, 
increasing the employability rate of young graduates up to 34 years old from 76.5% 
to at least 82%.
The literature states that ‘education has a strong impact on economic devel-
opment’ (Popescu and Diaconu, 2009); higher education institutions, on the other 
hand, ‘commonly play a role in community development’ (Thompson, 2014). The 
arguments for the previous statements are the following: ‘human capital is an in-
put into the production function; the factors that involve the endogenous growth 
– especially the technological progress are correlated to the human capital stock’ 
(Popescu and Diaconu, 2009).
Although a topic very debated in the media and in the political field, the mea-
sures to improve the present educational system are not yet effective to align 
Romania at the level of the Western states, imposing not only greater financial al-
locations, but also important changes in mentality, oriented towards progress and 
increase of the quality of the entire educational process.
‘No country has achieved constant economic development without considerable 
investment in human capital’ (Ozturk, 2001). However, most of the times, the statis-
tics show us a lower level of involvement from this point of view, both in the case 
of the states with low financial possibilities, and in regions characterized by poor 
development. These statistics are based on the official data provided by the World 
Bank and Eurostat.
Regarding Romania, the latest data available correspond to the period between 
2000 and 2016, the government spending reaching to a maximum of 4.3% of GDP in 
2006, the minimum limit being 2.9% in 2000.
The target from this point of view is 6% of GDP allocation for education, but 
so far, as can be seen from Figure 1, this goal has never been achieved. A greater 
investment in education would surely lead to better long-term results, also deter-
mining, from a professional point of view, a correction of the discrepancies be-
tween what already is and what should be achieved in the future in the vocational 
training field. 
The native abilities of the students and the awareness of their talents (Veladat, 
Yazdani and Navehebrahim, 2011) is not yet a central point in the school, and a per-
sonalized educational route specific to each individual is difficult to achieve. In the 
secondary, high school or higher education career counseling services are limited, 
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and the impact is small, the effects being felt later in the professional career, when 
many graduates of higher education wish in time to make a professional retrain-
ing or re-orientation (Ishola, Adeleye and Tanimola, 2018), instead of specializing 
in the initial field of training. Moreover, the relationships between students and 
teachers are often not able to encourage academic development, being limited to a 
very formal approach, which does not generate a sense of belonging to the group 
or community.
According to Eurostat, the current literacy level of the population in Romania is 
99%, a level similar to that recorded throughout Europe, the data presented by Eu-
rostat indicating that Romania has the lowest percentage allocated to the national 
budget for education, ‘almost two times lower than the European average’. Further 
on, it is important to mention that the European average is 10.5% in the case of peo-
ple who have attended a form of education or vocational training in the last four 
months, while in the case of Romania, this percentage is only 1.1%, according to 
official statistics, the professional training becoming rather a task or an individual 
concern of the employee and less of the employer, very few institutions or compa-
nies offering specialized programs for employees.
In order to adapt the education system to the needs of society and to make a sig-
nificant contribution to local development, a series of official documents designed 
to draw concrete directions of action in this regard have been elaborated, namely: 
National Lifelong Learning Strategy 2015-2020; Strategy for Reducing Early School 
Leaving 2015-2020; Strategy for Education and Vocational Training in Romania for 
the period 2016-2020; and National Strategy for Tertiary Education 2015-2020.
Meanwhile, great attention was paid to digital skills, for a better integration in 
the labor market, and the universities were encouraged to set up Students Entre-
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Figure 1: Government expenditure on education (% GDP)
Source: World Bank and Eurostat
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preneurial Society, in order to develop among the students the spirit of competi-
tion and entrepreneurial initiatives, focusing on the practical side of learning and 
promoting an entrepreneurial culture meant to encourage partnerships between 
the business environment and the university one. These aspects are to be further 
developed with respect to the horizon 2030, by promoting diversity and inclusion, 
at the same time with equal opportunities and more active involvement of local 
authorities in the process of lifelong learning.
According to Order no. 5090 from August 30, 2019, issued by the Ministry of 
National Education, ‘to substantiate the project of the schooling plan, within the 
geographical criterion’ it is necessary to follow: ‘1. the promotion of dynamic mea-
sures for the access to education of all children and students, allowing the equitable 
coverage of all areas both in the urban and rural areas, with vocational training 
offer throughout vocational and technical education; 2. the development of pro-
fessional qualifications that capitalize on the local tradition and the potential of 
socio-economic development, correlated with the possibilities of socio-professional 
insertion’.
These aspects would concern, at least tangentially, the elimination or diminution 
of some imbalances present on the labor market, underlining on the one hand, the 
lack of specialists in certain fields of activity, as well as the over qualification of spe-
cialists in other fields, the labor force not being yet used efficiently, the results being 
often insufficient to generate economic and social progress for local development.
Further on beyond these specific aspects we must not neglect the economic and 
social implications of reforms in the educational field. Macroeconomic progress 
is certainly closely linked to measurable results. The implications of social nature 
will thus include changes in the labor market, from the point of view of the quali-
fications of the labor force, on the one hand, as well as from the perspective of the 
indicators of the nature of the unemployment rate, the employability, even of the 
level of individual development of the personnel on the other hand. The 2019 Euro-
pean Commission reports, while appreciating the progress made with regard to the 
previous recommendations that had been formulated to Romania by the European 
Union, nevertheless qualify them as ‘limited’, especially since most of the measures 
taken have overlapped with difficult periods of time from the macroeconomic point 
of view, which resulted in the slowing or even stopping from obtaining ‘concrete 
results in the implementation of the reforms’ (2019 Country Report on Romania, 
European Commission).
The European Commission qualifies the fiscal – budgetary policy applied in the 
case of Romania as an ‘expansionist’ one, having as consequences significant devi-
ations from the targets necessary to be reached, while mentioning the insufficient 
access of the population to quality education, noting an increased level of school 
dropout in some underdeveloped regions of the country, or in disadvantaged com-
munities.
225
In these situations, the objective of ensuring equal opportunities for all students 
becomes intangible, adapting the education system to the needs of the labor market 
becoming much more difficult.
3. Case study. An analysis of the education context in Romania 
for the period 2000-2018
3.1. Research methodology
The case study aims to establish the connection between the importance of edu-
cation and the level of economic development of a country or region. In this regard, 
a primary analysis of the statistical data on a series of representative indicators for 
the education field was carried out, the analyzed period being 2000-2018. Based on 
the conclusions obtained from the content analysis of the specialized reports, it was 
proposed the testing of the intensity of the connections between the two aspects 
mentioned above.
The specific objectives of the research consisted of:
• OS1 – analysis of the quantitative indicators regarding the educational field in 
Romania, between 2000 and 2018;
• OS2 – data analysis of the total number of graduates by education levels and 
the economic and social implications of the observed trends; and
• OS3 – analysis of the correlation between the number of secondary school 
graduates and the Gross Domestic Product at the level of Romania for the time 
period 2000-2017.
3.2. Statistical data
A qualitative analysis regarding the current educational system is difficult to 
carry out taking into account several considerations, including:
 – regional disparities with areas of Romania where the educational system is 
very poorly represented both in number of schools or teachers, as well as in 
the level of student performance, compared to others where the results are 
completely in opposition;
 – the level of professional training of teachers and the evolution over the years; 
and
 – the different perception of the pupils/students, and parents regarding the no-
tion of education in general, perception that largely depends on the level of 
culture, but also on previous experiences.
The Romanian National Institute of Statistics indicates the following data re-
garding the quantitative evolution of the main indicators in the field of education:
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Unfortunately, we observe a decreasing trend in terms of the total number of 
school units. If at the beginning of the analyzed period (2000/2001 school year) there 
were 24,481 school units, in the 2017/2018 academic year, their number decreased 
to 7,047. This may be due to a whole set of factors, among which the most signifi-
cant are the drop in birth rate, the decrease of population in general, and external 
migration, which led in time to a reduction of the number of classes and also to the 
abolition of some educational units, especially in the rural or less developed areas 
of Romania, where the small number of students is not enough to form a class, and 
often the students end up traveling for miles every day to complete their education.
A significant decrease can be noticed especially between 2000 and 2007, reaching 
from over 24,000 school units to just over 8,000. The same situation can be observed 
in the case of higher education institutions, their total number decreasing from 126 
in 2000/2001 to 95 at the end of the analyzed period. This is in contradiction with 
one of the items on the agenda of the Europe 2020 Strategy, namely the increase in 
the number of graduates of higher studies, a fact also reflected by the total number 
of students, where we observe a fluctuation. The peak year is represented by the 
period 2009/2010, the lower number of students being enrolled in the academic year 
2016/2017 – 531,586 people.
The above data can also be represented as follows:
Simultaneous with the general – negative evolution of the number of school 
units, of the total number of pupils/students, and of higher education institutions, a 
breakdown can be made by education levels. Thus, in the case of secondary educa-
tion, the total number of graduates between 2000 and 2018 decreased by more than 
40%. Regarding high school education, on the other hand, the number of graduates, 
although lower at the end of the analyzed period, does not mark a percentage re-
duction as great as it was expected, and the approximation of the total number of 
high school graduates to the total number of secondary school graduates indicates 
the desire for continuing their studies.
Promoting a quality education and lifelong learning opportunities is one of the 
main points set out in the National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Roma-
nia 2030, which indicates a concern for strengthening this aspect, for a sustainable 
and future development. However, it cannot be ignored that at present there are 
still many shortcomings that need to be fixed, some of which can be found in the 
statistical table represented by the specialized institutions, while others are simply 
seen as negative effects or consequences in the long term. 
A weakness of the Romanian educational system is represented by the fact that 
the number of graduates of vocational schools are dropping year by year. The year 
with the highest number of graduates in this respect was 2005 with 152,875, while 
the period 2011-2016 registered the largest decrease. In 2012, the total number of 
graduates of vocational education and apprentices was only 4,570, their absence 
being felt in specific domains.
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Higher education institutions Students/trainees Pupils - total School units
Figure 2: Selected educational indicators 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 2018
Of the high school graduates, the highest weight is held by the graduates of 
theoretical high schools, the economic and administrative high schools scoring a 
significant percentage. In the last decade, however, we notice a greater percentage 
reduction in the number of graduates of military high schools, forest high schools, 
theological seminars, agromontane or agricultural high schools.
However this is not an accidental phenomenon; on the one hand this decrease 
being caused by the lack of jobs, a large number of factories being bankrupt during 
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the post-revolution period, and on the other hand, the desire for a better future 
urged the students to the theoretical high schools instead of the vocational ones, 
thus increasing the tendency of continuity through the university studies.
Although lately, as a result of the development of services, there was a reduc-
tion of the industry importance both in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and in the 
total number of employees or in the volume of investments (Anghelache and Burea, 
2018, p. 110), in the recent years could be seen an evolution of this branch, this hav-
ing a significant influence in the increase of the sustainable development.
3.3. Analysis of the correlation between 
the number of secondary school graduates and GDP
In order to analyze the connection between the dimensions of secondary educa-
tion and the economic growth in Romania, we selected the number of high school 
graduates and the Gross Domestic Product, for the time period 2001-2017. The data 
were taken from the official reports of the National Institute of Statistics, Eurostat 
and the World Bank. This information was entered into the EViews program and 
processed, using the following regression equation, to analyze the relationship be-
tween the two factors:
Y = α + β * X + ε       (1)
Replacing the parameters of the above equation with the factors considered rel-
evant to us, the calculation relation becomes:
GDP = α + β * nGrad + ε      (2)
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Figure 3: High school graduates
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 2018
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The parameter α represents the value taken by the resultant variable Y (GDP), 
when the factorial variable X (nGrad) has the value zero and may have greater or 
less relevance depending on the case. The coefficient β represents the regression co-
efficient, so the value with which the resultant variable Y (GDP) changes when the 
factorial variable X (nGrad) changes with a unit, its sign determining the level of 
interdependence between the resultant variable and the factorial variable. For the 
analysis of the connection between the two variables, the results of the statistical 
tests Student, Fisher and Durbin Watson were used, the table below presenting the 
values obtained in the program. For the evolution of the Gross Domestic Product, 
we took into consideration the data from the following graph, the values being ex-
pressed in billions of dollars.
 
Figure 4: Gross Domestic Product of Romania
Source: World Bank, 2019 
Parameter C(1) represents the value taken by the resultant variable GDP when 
the factorial variables have a null value and may have relevance in the model or 
not, depending on the specific analyzed case. Parameter C(2) is called the regression 
coefficient and represents the slope of the regression line, that is the value with 
which the resultant variable GDP changes when the factorial variables change with 
a unit.
In the case of the present model, the value of parameter C(2) is positive and 
higher than a unit, although it is very little above the null value. It shows, howev-
er, that the influence of the factor variable nGrad on the outcome variable GDP is 
direct, albeit with very little influence. The value of the R-squared correlation co-
efficient, resulting from the data sample processing, is 0.221200, indicating a direct 
but weak influence of the factorial variables on the studied outcome variable. If 
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R2=0.221200, we conclude that the variable nGrad influences the evolution of GDP 
in a proportion of approximately 22.12%.
In order to be able to declare the obtained results as relevant to our study, the 
regression model is required to meet some specific characteristics, including: a high 
level of R-squared correlation coefficient, a normal distribution of residual values 
and a high level of significance of the independent variables, relevant from this 
point of view being the T test. From the above conclusions, we observe that at 
least one of these conditions is not met, the R-squared coefficient having no major 
influence.
Statistical verification of the one-factor regression model was performed based 
on the Durbin-Watson and Fisher statistical tests.
Statistical verification based on the Durbin-Watson test showed that, based on 
the statistical tables related to the DW test, depending on the processed data sam-
ple, its theoretical values are: lower limit 1.13 and upper limit 1.38. The value cal-
culated in EViews for this test is 0.31, being a lower value than the two theoretical 
limits, indicating that the hypothesis of random variables autocorrelation is accept-
ed, the values of random variables are dependent on each other, which implies that 
even the data recordings in the samples were dependent, thus the studied model 
requires statistical corrections.
Statistical verification based on the Fisher test showed that, according to the 
obtained result in EViews, the calculated value of this test is 4.26. The critical value 
Table 3: Regression analysis output 
Dependent Variable: GDP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 01/18/20 Time: 20:48
Sample: 2001 2017
Included observations: 17
GDP=C(1)+C(2)*nGrad
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -104.3739 122.3171 -0.853306 0.4069
C(2) 0.001381 0.000669 2.064075 0.0568
R-squared 0.221200 Mean dependent var 146.6147
Adjusted R-squared 0.169280 S.D. dependent var 59.88708
S.E. of regression 54.58338 Akaike info criterion 10.94747
Sum squared resid 44690.17 Schwarz criterion 11.04549
Log likelihood -91.05347 Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.95721
F-statistic 4.260405 Durbin-Watson stat 0.312311
Prob(F-statistic) 0.056755
Source: The authors
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of the Fisher test, from the Fisher-Snedecor distribution table, in relation to the 
processed data sample, depending on the significance level α and the number of 
degrees of freedom, is 4.49. The calculated value obtained from the data processing 
in the Eviews program is lower than the critical table value, indicating that the null 
hypothesis is accepted, with 0.95% probability and the model must be reconsidered, 
choosing another influence factor.
4. Conclusions
In addition to the above conclusions, regarding the significance of the obtained 
results after the application of the statistical tests, we can mention the following:
 – The level of representativeness of the data is a moderate one, which indicates 
that the number of high school graduates, considered as the only factor influ-
encing the economic development of a region, is not sufficient.
 – This first conclusion reinforces the idea that the theoretical profiles are to be 
complemented by the vocational ones, for a more significant development in 
the region.
 – It is also essential to underline the role of tertiary education, the graduates of 
higher studies not being considered in the present study, their role being how-
ever a basic one, as we concluded in other previous articles. We refer here to a 
previous study (Demyen and Martin, 2019), which analyzes the intensity of the 
connection between the total number of new doctoral graduates and the Gross 
Domestic Product of the country.
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Figure 5: The graph of theoretical values
Source: The authors
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The level of development of a region or even of a country is closely correlated 
with the level of human resource training. A motivated workforce with advanced 
knowledge in specific areas can in time determine a significant progress that has a 
greater or lesser impact, depending on the economic and administrative situation in 
which it occurs, or the changes in the political and legislative environment.
We can consider the present study as a starting point of a much larger research, 
that aims to address, among other things, the above-mentioned issues, thus having 
a great potential for continuity.
One of the topical issues that is closely linked to the red thread of this article is 
the theme of the dropout, both at the secondary and high school level, as well as at 
the undergraduate level and the influences on the community. It is interesting to 
further analyze the means by which schools, universities, local authorities and even 
the state have tried to reduce the rate of this phenomenon so far, the success rate of 
the strategies applied, and the directions of future action.
References:
1. Anghelache, C. and Burea, D., ‘Analiza evoluției industriale în România’ (An Analysis 
of the Industrial Evolution of Romania), 2018, Revista Română de Statistică, no. 1 (Supli-
ment), pp. 109-116.
2. Demyen, S. and Martin, M., ‘Human Resources in a Changing Landscape. Does Higher 
Education Matter?’, 2019, Annals of ‘Eftimie Murgu’ University of Reșița. Fascicle II. Eco-
nomic Studies, vol. XXVI, pp. 62-79. 
3. European Commission, ‘Cooperarea pentru atingerea obiectivelor politicilor în dome-
niul educației (cadrul ET 2020)’ (Cooperation for Achieving Educational Policies – ET 
2020 Framework), [Online] available at https://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/europe 
an-policy-cooperation/et2020-framework_ro, accessed on November 18, 2019.
4. European Commission, ‘European Semester: Assessment of Progress on Structural 
Reforms, Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, and Results of In-
depth Reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011’, Country Report Romania, 2018, 
[Online] available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester- 
country-report-romania-en.pdf, accessed on November 18, 2019.
5. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Country Report 
Romania 2019’, [Online] available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/ 
2019-european-semester-country-report-romania_ro.pdf, accessed on November 18, 
2019.
6. Ishola, A.A, Adeleye, S.T. and Tanimola, F.A., ‘Impact of Educational, Professional Qual-
ification and Years of Experience on Accountants Job Performance’, 2018, Journal of 
Accounting and Financial Management, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 32-44.
7.  Ministerul Educației Naționale, ‘Educatia uneste’ (Education Unites), [Online] available at 
https://www.edu.ro/sites/default/files/Educatia%20ne%20uneste%20%20Viziune%20asu 
pra%20viitorului%20educatiei%20in%20România.pdf, accessed on November 18, 2019.
235
8. Ministerul Educației Naționale, ‘Strategia educației și formării profesionale din România 
pentru perioada 2016 – 2020’ (Strategy of Education and Vocational Training in 
Romania for the Period 2016-2020), [Online] available at https://www.edu.ro/sites/defa 
ult/files/_fi%C8%99iere/Minister/2016/strategii/Strategia_VET%2027%2004%202016.pdf, 
accessed on November 18, 2019.
9. Ministerul Educației Naționale, ‘Strategia Națională de Învățare pe tot parcursul vieții 
2015 – 2020’ (National Lifelong Learning Strategy 2015 – 2020), [Online] available at 
https://www.edu.ro/sites/default/files/_fi%C8%99iere/Minister/2016/strategii/Strate 
gie%20LLL%20(1).pdf, accessed on November 18, 2019.
10. Ministerul Educației Naționale, ‘Strategia Națională pentru Învățământ Terțiar 2015 – 
2020’ (National Strategy for Tertiary Education 2015 – 2020), [Online] available at https://
www.edu.ro/sites/default/files/fisiere%20articole/Strategie_inv_tertiar_2015_2020.pdf, 
accessed on November 18, 2019.
11. Ministerul Educației Naționale, ‘Strategia pentru reducerea părăsirii timpurii a școlii 2015 
– 2020’ (Strategy for Reducing Early School Leaving 2015 – 2020), [Online] available at 
https://www.edu.ro/sites/default/files/_fi%C8%99iere/Invatamant-Preuniversitar/2015/ 
Strategie-PTS/Strategia-PTS-2015.pdf, accessed on November 18, 2019.
12. Ministerul Educației Naționale, Order no. 5090/2019 of August 30, 2019 for the approval 
of the Methodology regarding the substantiation of the enrollment figure for the state 
pre-university education, the enrollment of the number of pre-schools and pupils en-
rolled in the private education units, as well as the issuance of the approval in order to 
organize the network of the school and education units 2020 - 2021, [Online] available at 
https://www.edu.ro/sites/default/files/fisiere%20articole/ORDIN%20%20Nr.%20509020 
19%20din%2030%20august%202019.pdf, accessed on November 18, 2019.
13. Ministerul Educației și Cercetării, ‘Educație pentru Dezvoltare Durabilă’ (Education 
for Sustainable Development), undated, [Online] available at https://www.edu.ro/edu 
cație-pentru-dezvoltare-durabilă, accessed on December 18, 2019. 
14. Murga-Menoyo, M.A., ‘Educating for Local Development and Global Sustainability: An 
Overview in Spain’, 2009, Sustainability, vol. 1, pp. 479-493.
15. National Institute of Statistics, ‘Anuarul Statistic al României’ (Statistical Yearbook of 
Romania), 2018. 
16. Ozturk, I., ‘The Role of Education in Economic Development: A Theoretical Perspective’, 
2001, Journal of Rural Development and Administration, vol. XXXIII, no. 1, pp. 39-47. 
17. Popescu, C. and Diaconu, L., ‘The Relationship between the Level of Education and the 
Development State of a Country’, 2009, Analele Științifice ale Universității ‘Alexandru 
Ioan Cuza’ din Iași, vol. LVI, pp. 475-480.
18. Thompson, A.F., ‘The Role of Higher Education in Rural Community Development’, 
2014, [Online] available at http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/2117, accessed on Novem-
ber 18, 2019. 
19. Veladat, F., Yazdani, F. and Navehebrahim, A., ‘School Brands Engaged in Cost-benefit 
Analysis: Schooling Market’, 2011, Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 29, pp. 
1342-1348.
236
BUILDING TRUST IN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS. 
ROMANIAN ONLINE NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS 
 OF THE MAIN EU INSTITUTIONS AND CONCERNS*1
Andreea Alina MOGOȘ 
Hanna Orsolya VINCZE 
Radu Mihai MEZA
Andreea Alina MOGOȘ (corresponding author)
Associate Professor, Department of Journalism and Digital Media, 
Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, 
Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
E-mail: mogos@fspac.ro
Hanna Orsolya VINCZE
Associate Professor, Communication and Public Relations Department, 
Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, 
Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
Radu Mihai MEZA
Associate Professor, Department of Journalism and Digital Media, 
Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, 
Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
* This work was supported by a grant of the Ministry of Research and Innovation, CNCS – UEFISCDI, 
project number PN-III-P1-1.1-TE-2016–0731, within PNCDI III.
Abstract
The confidence in EU institutions is regularly measured in all the Member States of the European Union. 
Recent Eurostat results show that the European Parliament is the most trusted European institution, fol-
lowed by the European Commission. The citizens’ perception on the EU institutions needs to be understood 
in the context of internal factors like domestic economic and political developments, as well as media repre-
sentations of European and national identities and values.
The present study aims to identify which are the most visible European institutions in the Romanian me-
dia, how the most visible European institutions are associated with major concerns (migration and refugees, 
terrorism, Brexit, populism and alt-right, EU foreign policy, EU economy, and data protection) and which are 
the major media sources used by the Romanian news media in the coverage of the EU institutions.
Keywords: EU concerns, EU institutions, media representations.
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1. Trust in European institutions
The study proposes an analysis of Romanian media representations of European 
institutions from 2016 to 2018. It focuses on the coverage of the main EU institu-
tions: the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of the Europe-
an Union, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions of the European 
Union, the European Central Bank, the Court of Justice of the European Union. In 
the EU’s institutional set-up, the EU’s broad political priorities are set by the Euro-
pean Council, which brings together national and EU-level leaders. Directly elected 
MEPs represent European citizens in the European Parliament and the interests of 
the EU as a whole are promoted by the European Commission which, even if its 
members are designated by national governments, is independent from all national 
inferences. Finally, members of national governments (ministers) defend the na-
tional interests of their home country in the Council of the European Union.
Eurostat measurements of the confidence among Romanian citizens in key EU 
institutions show that, in 2018, 60% of Romanians declared they tended to trust the 
European Parliament (the EU28 average was 48%), 55% declared they tended to trust 
the European Commission (the EU28 average was 43%), and 51% expressed confi-
dence in the European Central Bank (the EU28 average was 41%) (Eurostat, 2019). 
According to the Eurobarometer 91 (Spring 2019) data, at national level, more than 
half of the Romanians (52% tend to trust the European Union, compared to those 
who tend not to trust the EU (41%).
Romania is thus among the EU countries with relatively high public confidence 
in European institutions, although the trends are decreasing. In general, Romanian’s 
overarching positive outlook on the European Union and European institutions has 
been explained by a comparably lower lack of trust in national institutions, point-
ing to the fact that understanding citizens’ optimism as well as their skepticism 
towards the EU and EU institutions need to be understood in the context of internal 
factors like domestic economic and political developments, as well as representa-
tions of European and national identities and values (Chiciudean and Corbu, 2015).
2. Media coverage of the European institutions and concerns
News about the European Union (EU) present a different outlook in different 
countries at different points in time. The concept of a European ‘public sphere’ 
builds on the notion of convergence of how the EU is dealt with in the news 
across Europe, for instance the presence of EU institutions and actors in the news 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2013, pp. 608-629), but media attention to EU affairs is cyclical, 
with a tendency to vanish from the public agenda shortly after major events, such 
as European integration, and European elections (De Vreese, 2001, p. 285).
During the past decades, two major media frames have been shown to dominate 
representations of the relationship between the country and the European Union: a 
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so-called messianic one, characteristic of the period of the country’s accession, with 
European institutions expected to solve major domestic issues like poverty; and the 
marginal or peripheral position of the country, sometimes coupled with representa-
tions of EU institutions as punitive, for example in the case of the refusal to accept 
Romania as a member of the Schengen area (Bârgăoanu, 2011).
From the point of view of the EU institutions’ success, or rather lack of success 
in sharing information about and drawing attention upon their work, this has long 
been discussed in terms of a ‘communication deficit’, linked in its turn to a per-
ceived democratic deficit (Martins, Lecheler and De Vreese, 2012). This deficit has in 
turn been linked to both communication practices of the EU institutions and actors 
(Krzyżanowski, 2018), as well as to the fact that ‘they are in strong competition 
with national governments that are not willing to relinquish their predominant role 
in EU communication’ (Pfetsch and Heft, 2015, p. 41).
Studying the visibility of EU actors and institutions in national news media 
contributes to understanding the development of a European public sphere or the 
Europeanization of national ones. Research into representations of the European 
Union in the Romanian public sphere has previously showed that when issues of 
concerns arise, as was the case of the 2008 economic crisis, collective actors are 
generally held responsible, and, apart from the political class and Member States, 
European institutions are seen as accountable (Bârgăoanu and Durach, 2013, p. 12).
Apart from investigating the visibility of the main actors, there are a series of 
recurrent topics identified in various national cases that have defined the media 
representation of the EU and the sense of crises around it. These have been recently 
inventoried as ‘the euro; Greece; Ukraine; terrorism/internal security; migration/
refugees; Schengen; Brexit; export crisis; the fragility of the German banks; the rise 
of anti-establishment and populist movements’ (Bârgăoanu, Buturoiu and Radu, 
2017, p. 7).
Knowing that public trust is partially determined by individual experience and 
partially shaped by public and media discourses, the current research focuses on 
identifying discursive patterns in the way Romanian media coverage connects Eu-
ropean institutions with a set of European and global concerns (migration and ref-
ugees, Brexit, populism and alt-right, EU foreign policy, EU economy, and data 
protection) identified by EU officials (see Bildt, 2017).
3. Research questions
RQ1: Which are the sources used by the Romanian news media in the coverage of 
the EU institutions?
RQ2: Which European institutions are prominent in the sampled Romanian news 
media?
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RQ3: How are the major European concerns connected with the European institu-
tions in the sampled Romanian news media coverage?
RQ4: How are Romania and Romanians connected to the EU institutions in the 
sampled Romanian news media coverage?
4. Methodology
Data was collected automatically through Web scraping of the public archives 
of the two websites (digi24.ro and adevarul.ro) using Web Scraper (webscraper.io) 
Chrome browser extension. Web scraping is a process through which HTML/CSS 
selection templates are used to extract content elements that display similar char-
acteristics in dynamic Web pages such as the ones generated by the Web content 
management systems used to publish news websites. For the purposes of this re-
search, for each news article web page, the extracted elements were: title, full text, 
category, date, author and keywords. Archive pages for the international/foreign 
news sections of the two websites were scraped for the 2016-2018 range.
The dataset consists of 21,591 news articles published in the international/for-
eign news section of digi24.ro news site and 18,032 news articles published in the 
international/foreign news section of adevarul.ro from January 1, 2016 to December 
31, 2018.
Mixed methods were used to achieve the proposed goals. A semi-automated 
content analysis was performed on digi24.ro and adevarul.ro datasets. The quan-
titative analysis was used to reveal through coding which were the most visible 
European institutions and the most prominent European concerns, starting from 
a list proposed by prominent European officials (migration and refugees, Brexit, 
populism, EU foreign policy, EU economy, and data protection).
In order to identify the sources of the coverage, we created a subcorpus of 
sentences using terms customarily employed by Romanian news media to index 
sources (e.g. reports, transmits). We then employed named entity recognition using 
Wordstat to identify named entities in the corpus, and manually examined these, 
creating a list of 151 news outlets that occurred at least three times in the whole 
foreign news corpus. We then coded the presence of these in the subcorpus refer-
encing EU institutions using computer-assisted, dictionary-based content analysis.
5. Data analysis and discussion
The sources that define the Romanian news media coverage of European institu-
tions are the major news agencies, AFP, Reuters and The Associated Press, as well 
as a Romanian news agency, news.ro. Anglo-Saxon media also has a significant 
presence, with the BBC, The Guardian and Politico figuring prominently among the 
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news sources. 67% of all articles indexed another news outlet as a source, reflecting 
the fact that with regard to European institutions, news is framed as foreign news, 
and are covered with reference to other news sources. Thus, the level of intermedia 
agenda setting can also be expected to be quite high. Table 1 presents the promi-
nence of the news sources present in at least 1% of the coverage.
Table 1: Sources of the news coverage of EU institutions (article frequencies and percentages)
  Documents Percentage
AFP 423 24.79
Reuters 340 19.93
news.ro 169 9.91
BBC 84 4.92
Politico 73 4.28
The Associated Press 54 3.17
The Guardian 49 2.87
DPA 47 2.75
Bloomberg 38 2.23
The Financial Times 35 2.05
EFE 28 1.64
Deutsche Welle 26 1.52
Le Monde 26 1.52
Bild 25 1.47
EU Observer 23 1.35
PAP 22 1.29
Spiegel 21 1.23
Euronews 19 1.11
Le Figaro 19 1.11
MTI 18 1.06
Sky News 18 1.06
With regard to associations between sources and themes, we note that, as can 
be expected, the largest news sources cover all the major themes examined, while 
national news sources are referenced with regard to locally salient topics, like the 
Hungarian national news agency, MTI with regard to migration and refugees. 
British media, a traditionally important source of Romanian foreign news coverage, 
is also predominantly referenced with regard to Brexit. Figure 1 below presents the 
weight of topics by news sources cited in form of a heatmap.
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Figure 1: Themes and sources of the news coverage of EU institutions (frequencies)
There is a similar pattern for the coverage of the key European institutions 
in both news sites. The most prominent institution is the European Commission 
and the highest frequency of its mentions is partly due to the both intensive and 
extensive negotiations for Brexit (on May 22, 2017, the General Affairs Council 
nominated the Commission as the EU negotiator for Brexit). The articles mention-
ing the European Parliament focus on debates related to the main political groups 
of the European Parliament (European People’s Party, Progressive Alliance of So-
cialists and Democrats, Party of European Socialists, Renew Europe, etc.) and the 
increase of people’s lean toward alt-right parties in the perspective of European 
elections. 
Figure 2: European institutions in the adevarul.ro sample (frequencies)
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Despite the bigger size of the digi24 sample, more mentions of the key European 
institutions are identified in the adevarul.ro sample, a media agenda configuration 
that suggests a more prominent presence of the external affairs in the discourse of 
adevarul.ro.
 
Figure 3: European institutions in the digi24.ro sample (frequencies)
In order to understand how specific European institutions are connected to spe-
cific European concerns, a network map of co-occurrences in the same article was 
constructed.
Major European concerns are connected with the European institutions in 
the sampled Romanian news sites. In both cases, news stories and analyses about 
Brexit are closely connected to the European Commission, the European Parlia-
ment and the European Council. In the adevarul.ro sample (Figure 4), populism and 
alt-right themes show ties to all key European institutions, but more revealing are 
the stronger ties with concerns such as migration and refugees, European econo-
my and Brexit. In the co-occurrence charts, closer lines represent more frequent 
co-occurrences.
As presented in Figure 5, for the digi24.ro sample, terrorism displays stronger 
ties with migration/refugees and EU foreign policy concerns.
The co-occurrences graphs (Figure 6 and Figure 7) show two types of ties among 
Romania and the European institutions in both foreign news samples. In both cases, 
Romania is strongly connected to three institutions: the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the European Council. Figure 6 – Romania and European 
institutions in the adevarul.ro sample displays loose connections with the European 
Central Bank, the European External Action Service, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and the European Investment Bank. In addition to the institutions 
represented in the adevarul.ro sample, in the digi24.ro sample the European Om-
budsman and the European Court of Auditors are also present, but they are con-
nected to Romania with the same type of loose ties.
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Figure 4: European institutions and European concerns in the adevarul.ro sample (co-occurences)
 
Figure 5: European institutions and European concerns in the digi24.ro sample (co-occurrences)
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Figure 6: Romania and European institutions in adevarul.ro sample (co-occurrences)
 
Figure 7: Romania and European institutions in the digi24.ro sample (co-occurrences)
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6. Conclusions
In the studied media outlets, the European Commission, the European Parlia-
ment and the European Council are the most visible European institutions, and 
these are also the institutions with which Romania appears as the most connected. 
They are mentioned in the context of Brexit, but other concerns, such populism 
and alt-right, migration and refugees, and EU economy are also associated with 
EU institutions. The main sources used for covering EU institutions and issues are 
elite international news agencies (AFP, Reuters, AP) and elite media outlets (BBC, 
The Guardian, Financial Times, Le Monde, etc.), but when geographical proximity 
is involved, smaller media outlets or even national news agencies (news.ro, MTI) 
are cited.
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Although the existence of gender and other biases in student evaluations of teaching (SET) have been 
thoroughly analysed in the international literature, most studies focus on the USA and Western Europe, the 
issue remaining largely unexplored in other contexts. As such, the current research aims to provide empirical 
insights on how Romanian students assess the teaching abilities of male and female professors using an 
experimental approach. During the experiment, public administration students (n = 67) from Babeș-Bolyai 
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The results were inconclusive, as the male and the female professor were evaluated to be statistically 
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who took part in the experiment on the assessed items. Nevertheless, more research is needed and on a 
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1. Introduction
The relationship between effective teaching and student ratings has been exten-
sively studied, particularly in the US and Western Europe. Despite some evidence 
indicating that student evaluations of teaching (SETs) do not effectively measure 
teaching performance (Boring, 2017), SETs remain one of the main means of assess-
ing teaching performance in university settings (Benton and Cashin, 2014), due in 
part to their participative character, as well as the simplicity of their application. 
SETs carry an impact on faculty, as they often contribute to students choosing a 
subject over another, as well as to decisions about promotion or tenure. They may 
also be used by the university administration in selecting the appropriate staff for 
teaching certain subjects (Abrami, d’Apollonia and Rosenfield, 2007). Therefore, the 
existence of any bias – based on criteria such as gender, race, sexual orientation, 
and gender identity, age, social status, etc. – may negatively affect teaching staff, as 
well as the educational outcomes of students. 
The current study aimed to identify gender biases in SETs among public admin-
istration students at Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, through an 
experimental design. Students received mock CVs of a professor, the only differ-
ence being the gender of the professor – approximately half of the students receiv-
ing a CV with a male name and the other half with a female name, together with 
a short description of a potential course offered in their study programme. The 
students were then asked to complete a short survey assessing multiple dimensions 
referring to the qualifications, personal characteristics and teaching abilities of the 
male and female professors. The results were inconclusive as respondents believed 
that there are only two differences between the male and the female professor, 
as (a) the female professors clearly formulate expectations and requirements, and 
(b) female professor treat students more respectfully.
With regard to the structure of the present article, a short literature review of 
gender biases in SETs is followed by a presentation of the methodology used in the 
experiment, as well as the results that the experiment yielded. The article then dis-
cusses potential findings, identifies limitations of the current research, and draws 
conclusions based on the available data. Lastly, it contains potential measures aimed 
at limiting biases in student evaluations of teachers and ensuring better educational 
outcomes, which could be adopted by the university administration and other deci-
sion-makers in the field of education.
2. Gender biases in student evaluations of teaching (SETs)
Bias in SETs may be defined as the observable effect of a known characteristic 
of an educational setting or activity on the ratings of teachers, irrespective of the 
performance of the respective teacher. Gender biases in SETs thus refer to the in-
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fluence of the gender of the instructor on the ratings he or she receives, but also 
to how the gender of the student may interact with the gender of the instructor, 
affecting the evaluation of the latter. 
Research on gender biases in SETs has yielded contradictory results, with some 
studies identifying biases in the student population, while others indicating that 
SETs are unaffected by the gender of the professor. 
For instance, Boring (2017) showed that male students at a French university 
express a bias in favour of male professors, who are perceived by students of both 
genders as more knowledgeable and having stronger class leadership skills, even 
though students appear to learn as much from female professors as they do from 
male professors. Another study found gender biases in SETs at a private liberal arts 
college in the US, with female staff receiving lower scores than their male counter-
parts even when other evidence indicated no real difference between the two sexes’ 
teaching abilities and proficiency (Basow, 1995). Additionally, the study, conducted 
over a period of four years, found multivariate interactions between teacher gender 
and student gender: the ratings of male teachers were unaffected by student gender, 
while the ratings of female teachers tended to be highest from female students and 
lowest from male students, even when confounding factors (e.g. teacher rank) were 
excluded. Gender interactions were also found by Young, Rush and Shaw (2009) at 
a medium-sized university in the Western US, with students of both genders con-
sistently favouring professors of the same gender as them and ranking them higher 
on pedagogical characteristics and course content characteristics. In an experiment, 
assistant instructors in an online class in the US operated under two different gen-
der identities and were rated significantly more favourably when male, regardless 
of the instructor’s actual gender (MacNell, Driscoll and Hunt, 2015). 
A wide-scale 2016 study based on 23,001 SET of 379 instructors by 4,423 stu-
dents at a French university, and on 43 SETs in an experiment at a US university, 
found that SETs are biased against female instructors by an amount that is large 
and statistically significant and that the bias varies by discipline and by student 
gender (Boring, 2017). A comprehensive analysis of 19,952 SETs conducted at a 
Dutch university yielded similar results: female faculty were systematically rated 
more negatively – particularly by male students – than their male colleagues, de-
spite the fact that neither the current or future grades, nor their study hours were 
affected by the gender of the instructor. Interestingly, gender bias is present beyond 
the evaluation of the instructor, with students evaluating learning materials, such 
as textbooks, research articles, and the online learning platform more negatively 
when the instructor is female, even though these are identical regardless of the gen-
der of the professor (Mengel, Sauermann and Zölitz, 2019). A qualitative analysis 
applied to SETs at an American university pointed to differences in the language 
used when assessing male and female professors, with students tending to com-
ment on a woman’s appearance and personality far more often than on a man’s. 
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The study also showed that male instructors received higher ordinal scores in SETs 
than female instructors teaching an online course, even when questions were not 
instructor-specific (Mitchell and Martin, 2018). 
On the other hand, some research has found no gender biases in SETs, includ-
ing no gender interactions or small gender biases which may be due to different 
teaching styles. A study on 1304 SETs at a university in Spain showed no gender bi-
ases and no gender interaction (among student and teacher gender) with regard to 
how students assessed the professors’ teaching competence and motivational and 
interactive skills (Fernández and Mateo, 1997). An older review of laboratory and 
experimental research in the US yielded similar results: in the majority of studies, 
students’ global evaluations of male and female university teachers were not differ-
ent in terms of their performance and professionalism (Feldman, 1992). 
Lastly, one study found statistically significant, but small gender biases in SETs, 
with higher evaluations received by female teachers from females, and in some 
instances from males as well, which the authors partially attribute to differences in 
teaching styles, with female instructors preferring discussions over lecture formats 
and displaying more nurturing behaviour towards students than their male coun-
terparts (Centra and Gaubatz, 2000). 
Existing research, therefore, seems to indicate that studies which find no gender 
biases and no gender interaction in SETs are in the minority and that SETs are in-
fluenced by a multitude of factors, gender being only one of them. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Study design, participants and procedures
The research question that the authors wanted to explore in this study was: ‘Are 
student evaluations of teaching abilities influenced by the gender of the profes-
sor?’, while the chosen method was the experiment. The existence of gender biases 
in students’ evaluation of teaching would offer important insights on women in 
academia, as previous research on gender discrimination in Romania (Macarie and 
Moldovan, 2012a) has shown that women tend to be under-represented in decision 
making positions in universities. The design of the experiment is partially inspired 
by the work of Haslam and Ryan (2008; also see Macarie and Moldovan, 2012b, pp. 
165-166).
First, second, and third-year undergraduate students in Public Administration 
at the Bistrița branch (extension) of the Public Administration study program of 
Babeș-Bolyai University (Faculty of Political, Administrative, and Communication 
Sciences) participated in the study. They were told by the authors, who also admin-
istered the experiment, that they would receive a course description for an optional 
course which the administration of the faculty is considering introducing in their 
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study program, ‘Public Marketing’, as well as a CV of a professor who would be 
teaching the course – the language of both handouts being Romanian. The students 
were assigned to two groups, each receiving an identical course description and 
a mock CVs of a professor, the only difference between the CVs being the gender 
of the professor: one had a male name, ‘Ion Mureșan’, and the other a female one, 
‘Ioana Mureșan’. 
The instrument used to test gender biases was a questionnaire containing 10 
questions used to assess gender bias, with the first question having 11 sub-ques-
tions, all using a 10-item Likert type scale (where 1 meant that the characteristic 
was missing and 10 meant that the characteristic was present/to a maximum), and 
8 questions regarding demographical information. The former questions referred 
to: (a) characteristics of the professor – interpersonal, pedagogical, and academic 
performance characteristics, and (b) course characteristics. For instance, in terms 
of the characteristics of the professor, students were asked to assess whether the 
professor would be able to clearly formulate the course tasks and evaluation crite-
ria, to clearly explain the content of the course, to encourage active participation, 
to stimulate interest for the course, and to provide constructive feedback. Ques-
tions related to course characteristics referred to students assessing how useful and 
interesting they believe the course to be, whether they would choose it, whether 
they would recommend it to other students, etc. The questionnaire also included 
an introductory note presenting the ‘Public Marketing’ course and describing its 
objectives. 
The data was collected in October 2019, in Bistrița, through face to face pen and 
paper questionnaires administered during seminars by the authors of the current 
study. Participation in the experiment/study was voluntary and the students were 
assured of the anonymity of their responses, as well as given de opportunity to not 
participate in the study. 
4. Results
4.1. Demographics
A total number of 67 questionnaires were received, however one was excluded 
from the analysis, as several of the questions were left unanswered. Of the remain-
ing 66 questionnaires, 16.6% were filled in by male students (n = 11), and 83.3% were 
filled in by female students (n = 55), a gender distribution which fits that of the 
study programme and which was also reported in other cases (see Moldovan and 
Raboca, 2019, p. 73). 46.9% of respondents (n = 31) were first-year students, 25.7% 
(n = 17) were second-year students, and the remaining 27.2% (n = 18) were in their 
last study year. In terms of their place of residence, participants were equally divid-
ed between urban and rural residence (n = 33 for each). 
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A majority of respondents, 74.2% (n = 49), were allocated to tuition-free student 
places, while 25.7% (n = 17) were paying tuition for their studies. In addition, most 
respondents were unemployed at the time of the experiment: 60% (n = 40). 
The questionnaire also collected information regarding the baccalaureate av-
erage score obtained by the students. The answers reflect a Gaussian distribution, 
with most students having an average score closest to 7 (n = 17, which means 25.7% 
of respondents), 8 (n = 20, i.e. 30.3%), and 9 (n = 21, i.e. 31.8%), while few students 
reported having an average score closest to 6 (n = 6, i.e. 9%) or 10 (n = 2, i.e. 3%).
Lastly, the questionnaire collected demographical information related to where 
students ranked themselves in comparison with their colleagues, according to their 
grades (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Frequency and percent distribution of the study cohort 
based on their self-ranking in their study year
Self-ranking
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Valid
1st 10% 17 25.4 25.8
1st 25% 19 28.4 28.8
1st 50% 19 28.4 28.8
2nd 50% 7 10.4 10.6
last 25% 4 6.0 6.1
Total 66 98.5 100.0
Missing System 1 1.5
Total 67 100.0
Source: The authors
Interestingly, students consistently ranked themselves unrealistically high: 
three-quarters of them ranked themselves in the first 50% of their class (with rough-
ly one in four students indicating they are in the first 10% of their class, first 25% 
of their class, and first 50% of their class, respectively), which is a mathematical 
impossibility. This may reflect either high self-esteem on the part of students in 
terms of their academic performance or a lack of knowledge of their colleagues’ 
actual grades.
4.2. Data interpretation and analysis
One of the main points of interest for the research was to observe the existence 
of general potential biases in SETs; as such, the first question of the questionnaire 
assessed 11 interpersonal, pedagogical, and academic performance characteristics 
of the candidate/professor who was supposed to teach the public marketing course 
(see Table 2). For 9 of the 11 characteristics included in this battery of questions, 
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although some differences can be observed between the female and the male candi-
date, the differences are not statistically significant. 
As such, the male and the female candidate were evaluated almost identical-
ly regarding: their ability to offer adequate explanations of course topics, present 
real-life examples, stimulate students’ interest for the course, encourage active 
participation, offer feedback, provide new knowledge and skills during the course, 
prepare adequate teaching materials, conduct practical applications and exercises 
during the course and publish articles in the field (see Table 2). 
The male candidate was not rated statistically significantly higher than the 
female candidate on any item, but the female candidate/potential professor was 
evaluated better than the male candidate on two items (see Table 2): the ability to 
clearly formulate the main responsibilities of students (p = 0.05, mean differences: 
female–male = .56417) and their capacity to treat students with respect (p = 0.09, 
mean differences: female–male = .39840). 
Table 2: Assessment of candidate abilities according to the candidate’s gender
Candidate’s
gender N Mean
Std.
Deviation
Mean difference
F-M (significance)
Q.1.1. Clearly formulate the main 
responsibilities of students 
Female 34 9.3824 .92162 .56417
(.050)**Male 33 8.8182 1.35680
Q.1.2. Offer adequate explanations 
of course topics
Female 34 9.1765 .96830 .38859
(.137)Male 33 8.7879 1.13901
Q.1.3. Present real-life examples
Female 34 9.0882 1.11104 .45187
(.145)Male 33 8.6364 1.38785
Q.1.4. Stimulate your interest for the course
Female 34 8.7353 1.28650 .52317
(.175)Male 33 8.2121 1.79857
Q.1.5. Encourage active participation
Female 34 8.8824 2.17095 .79144
(.120)Male 33 8.0909 1.92620
Q.1.6. Offer feedback
Female 34 9.1765 1.19267 .17647
(.582)Male 33 9.0000 1.41421
Q.1.7. Treat you with respect 
Female 34 9.8529 .43571 .39840
(.090)*Male 33 9.4545 1.27698
Q.1.8. Provide you with new knowledge 
and skills
Female 34 9.2647 .89811 .08289
(.760)Male 33 9.1818 1.28585
Q.1.9. Prepare adequate teaching materials
Female 34 9.2941 1.46741 -.06952
(.808)Male 33 9.3636 .74239
Q.1.10. Conduct practical applications/
exercises
Female 34 9.0000 1.41421 -.09091
(764)Male 33 9.0909 1.01130
Q.1.11. Publish articles in the field 
Female 34 8.7353 1.72870 .28075
(518)Male 33 8.4545 1.80435
Note: **significant at the 0.05 level; *significant at the 0.1 level
Source: The authors
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Furthermore, as shown in Table 3, our results also do not show any statistically 
significant differences between the male and the female candidate in the case of 
core public marketing course-related abilities, referring to the professor’s educa-
tional suitability to teach the course, the adequacy of the professor’s professional 
experience/background to teach the course, then ability to coordinate a BA thesis 
or the professor’s general suitability to teach the subject.
Table 3: Candidate general assessment according to the candidate’s gender
Candidate’s
Gender N Mean
Std.
Deviation
Mean difference
F-M (significance)
Q.2. Professor’s educational suitability 
to teach the course
Female 34 9.1765 1.42426 .20772
(.526)Male 32 8.9688 1.20441
Q.3. Professor’s professional experience/
background to teach the course
Female 34 8.7059 1.38234 -.20037
(.525)Male 32 8.9063 1.14608
Q.4. Professor’s ability 
to coordinate a BA thesis
Female 34 8.9412 1.63190 .25368
(.493)Male 32 8.6875 1.33047
Q.5. Professor’s suitability 
to teach the subject
Female 34 9.0882 1.23993 .43199
(.169)Male 32 8.6563 1.28539
Source: The authors
Similarly, we did not find any statistically significant differences regarding the 
perception of the course taught by the male or female professor, as there are no 
statistically significant differences in the way in which students perceive the useful-
ness of the course, how interesting the course is, the difficulty of the course or the 
likelihood to choose or recommend the public marketing course if it were offered as 
an optional/elective course (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Course assessment according to the candidate’s gender
  Candidate’sgender N Mean
Std.
Deviation
Mean difference
 F-M (significance)
Q.6. The usefulness of the course
Female 34 7.9412 1.61323 -.34007
(.398)Male 32 8.2813 1.63104
Q.7. How interesting is the course 
Female 34 7.8235 1.81693 -.30147
(.514)Male 32 8.1250 1.91345
Q.8. Choose ‘Public Marketing’ course 
if offered as an optional course
Female 34 7.2059 1.96607 -.13787
(.794)Male 32 7.3438 2.29459
Q.9. Recommend ‘Public Marketing’ 
as an optional/elective course
Female 34 7.2059 2.05647 -.29412
(.582)Male 32 7.5000 2.25760
Q.10. Subject/course difficulty
Female 34 6.2941 2.13952 -.79963
(.137)Male 32 7.0938 2.17551
Source: The authors
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Last but not least, we need to highlight the fact that both the male and the fe-
male candidates received rather high evaluations from students, above 8 out of 10, 
as shown in Table 2 and Table 3. We believe that this might signal the existence 
of a potential bias in the responses offered by the students, as the scores regarding 
the usefulness and how interesting the course is, as well as those referring to the 
likelihood of selecting or recommending the course if it were offered as an elective 
are lower (below 8). In essence, the fact that the respondents provided a better eval-
uation for the two professors than they did for the course might signal the existence 
of social desirability bias or the fact that they might have feared a potential latter 
backlash, even though they were ensured of the anonymity of their responses.
4. Conclusions and discussions 
Our results show that respondents believed that there are only two differences 
between the male and the female professors, as according to them: (a) the female 
professors clearly formulate expectations and requirements, and (b) female profes-
sors treat students more respectfully. Even if other differences can be observed (see 
Table 2, 3 and 4), they were not statistically significant, probably as a result of the 
rather small sample size. 
Even if we did not manage to find conclusive evidence for the existence of gen-
der bias in teacher evaluations in the case of PA students, it is, however, import-
ant to mention that the female professor was generally assessed better than her 
male counterpart on multiple dimensions, but that the course was perceived more 
favourably (useful, interesting) when taught by a man. Furthermore, as previous 
studies mention, ‘both horizontal (male and females are encouraged/directed to en-
rol in different educational programs/domains) and vertical (the ratio of females 
decreases at higher hierarchical levels – both when referring to teachers and stu-
dents) gender segregation phenomena still prevail in tertiary education’ (Macarie 
and Moldovan, 2015, p. 162).
Furthermore, other potential future lines of research may be developed based 
on the authors’ current work. For example, the two CVs and questionnaires used to 
evaluate bias in student evaluations of teaching can be further tuned, adapted and 
refined in order to ensure a more reliable assessment of potential biases. Secondly, 
the survey/experiment can be easily replicated both on a larger sample size (to 
ensure increased representativeness) and in a comparative approach, by including 
other specializations/ universities from Romania or other countries. Thirdly, similar 
to the work of Haslam and Ryan (2008), the experiment could be more complex and 
use multiple course descriptions (with varying difficulty) in order to explore poten-
tial ‘glass cliff’ phenomena, as well as analyse more complex gender interactions 
in detail. 
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1. Introduction
There are a few people in the world who ask no help from public authorities 
during official administrative proceedings. The best way to get information about 
the procedure is to look up the original source, namely to read the law. Unfortu-
nately, the written law is usually too complex, detailed and the information is not 
easily understandable, which does not help the citizens (sometimes the lawyers too) 
to get answers for their questions. Let’s have two simple examples. If you would 
like to know how you should apply for a new ID card or driving license in Hungary, 
you should read through the 20 pages long orders1. Or if you would like to know 
how much pension you will have in your senior years, the Hungarian Pension Act2 
gives you answer in 45 pages. 
If you give up reading the law, you can ask in writing your specific question the 
public authority, but the answers are usually not individualized or practical because 
they contain the written law word by word, so you did not get closer to your tar-
get although you expect a simple written, understandable answer from the public 
authority. 
If you ask help in words and you get misinformation from the public authority, 
and you act upon it in good faith, later it is difficult or it is impossible to prove what 
the officer told you. The current practice of law expects that everyone knows the 
regulation in the proceedings and it keeps the ancient Roman saying, which says 
ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law excuses not). In my view, keeping 
valid this saying is not efficient in every case. 
I am presenting different but similar solutions from the Common Law, 
European Union, German and Swiss legal system which give answers for the prob-
lem what remedy should the clients in administrative proceedings get if they receive 
misinformation from the public authority and they act illegally upon it, and later 
the same or any other related public authorities adopt negative legal consequences. 
2. Common law
The Anglo-Saxon Common Law was the first legal system in the World, which 
brought the above mentioned Roman legal saying, and it found a sufficient solution 
for the problem, new legal institution, so, the Legitimate Expectation in Adminis-
trative Law was created. 
The legitimate expectation originally came from the private law where the pri-
vate parties have a legitimate expectation about the other party’s compliance ac-
1 Government Orders No. 414/2015 (XII. 23.) and no. 326/2011 (XII. 28).
2 Act LXXXI of 1997 on the public pension.
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cording to the contract between them. The legal institution became an issue first 
in the administrative law when the state started to make administrative contracts 
with clients (Levinson, 1998, p. 550). These contracts are not unilateral administra-
tive acts, but they are two-sided legal transactions. According to Sándor Berényi, 
the administrative contract is a legal institution in administrative law and a legal 
contract at the same time (Fazekas, 2013, p. 85); it mixes the natures of private con-
tracts and administrative acts. 
The common law judiciary system implied the new legal institution in adminis-
trative issues easily because of the monist judiciary system. The Legitimate Expec-
tation in Administrative Law became one of the fundamental principles of common 
law system in the first part of the last century. There are two sub principles which 
confirm the existence of that legal institute. 
The first one is the Consistency Principle, which says the contracted parties cre-
ated not only a contract, but an expectation between them, so all parties expect that 
the other one will fulfil as the contract states. If one party breaches the contract, 
he/she breaches the legitimate expectation of the other party. This system can be 
easily implied to the administrative law where the public authority makes adminis-
trative contracts with the clients. The authority violates the Principle of Legitimate 
Expectation when it makes a decision without any proper justification which differs 
from its previous practice, in other words it violates the expectation of the client on 
the practice of the authority. This sub principle is closely linked to the British Rule 
of Law concept, because every citizen can expect that the acts of the public author-
ities are consistent and they are ruled by the law (Levinson, 1998, pp. 550-551).
The second sub principle is called the Natural Justice. It says everybody has the 
right for impartial decisions (nemo index in causa sua), furthermore everybody 
has the right for the fair trial (audi alteram partem). The decision of the adminis-
trative bodies cannot violate the right and the legitimate expectation of the cli-
ents, except if the administrative authority informed the client about it before the 
decision making, and it is also required that the public authority provides enough 
time for the client to make comments and the authority has to have a personal 
hearing3. 
The Common Law makes a difference between procedural and substantive le-
gitimate expectation. First one arises when the client trusts in the previous law in 
practice of the public authority, the second one is referred when the client trusts in 
the information, which was given by the competent public authority, about future 
applied substantive law4.
3 Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1968] EWCA Civ 1, [1969] 2 Ch. 149 at 170-171, 
Court of Appeal (England and Wales).
4 Legitimate Expectation, 2018.
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When the aggrieved party applies for remedy based on Legitimate Expectation 
in Administrative Law, the court must review the application if the matter of fact 
meets with the Legitimate Expectation’s criteria because not all the expectations 
are legitimate, but the ones which have the following attributes:
 – the representation of the client is clear in the administrative procedure and the 
representative did not have special qualifications for that procedure;
 – the expectation was caused by any activity by the public authority;
 – the public authority must be competent for the above-mentioned activity; and
 – the activity of the public authority must be relevant in the administrative pro-
cedure. 
The person who is not qualified (with other words, who has no special knowl-
edge) for the regulation of the certain administrative procedure can use the Le-
gitimate Expectation in Administrative Law. The one who has qualification for it 
means he/she knows the regulation of the procedure, so he/she cannot use the legal 
institution as a remedy successfully. According to this criterion natural persons can 
refer successfully to the Legitimate Expectation in Administrative Law in the ma-
jority of cases, because legal persons have the qualified staff (solicitors, accountants 
etc.) who must know the nature of the case and its regulation. 
According to the Anglo-Saxon practice of law it does not matter how the public 
authority gave the information. It can give it to you by formal or informal letter, by 
verbal information, or it can give it to you by way of implied conduct (e.g. nod). The 
point is that the public authority must give the information. 
Not all the information from public authorities can serve as a basis of Legitimate 
Expectation in Administrative Law. The public authority must act in its power, so it 
must be competent for the certain issue of law (for example, the information from 
the cleaning or maintenance staff of the public authority is not relevant because 
they do not have power in any official case). Furthermore, the information from the 
officer of public authority is also not relevant if the officer does not have the power 
to give an answer for the question or the public authority is not competent in the 
questioned legal issue (this is called ultra vires).
The party can only use the received information as a basis of Legitimate Ex-
pectation in Administrative Law, which he/she received in the same case. In other 
words, the party cannot refer to information from another case, because it cannot 
serve as a basis of the legal institution. 
It does not mean the party automatically wins the case against the public au-
thority if his/her expectations are legitimate. The legitimate expectation can serve 
as a basis for a temporary disposition given by court, but the public interest can 
overwrite it (Steele, 2005, pp. 304-305).
The Cambridge Dictionary says the meaning of the public interest is people’s 
rights to know the facts about a particular situation. The Hungarian Interpretive 
Dictionary states the public interest is the common interest of the society and com-
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munity (Juhász et al., 1989, p. 789). The meaning of public interest is abstract, it 
changes as time passes. The Anglo-Saxon courts created a three-step test to find the 
current public interest and the private interest and see which one deserves more 
legal protection in the case5:
 – finding the private interest which is affected by the administrative act;
 – finding the violation of the private interest. The available legal remedies should 
be considered in this point; and 
 – finding the interest of the state or government and the administrative expenses 
of the legal remedies which were mentioned in the second step. 
The court uses the following legal consequences if the legitimate expectation of 
the private party has more protection than keeping the law word by word.
1. The court uses its cassation power, so it finds the questioned administrative 
act invalid, and it can order a new administrative procedure. The public authority 
must keep the substantive or procedural legitimate expectation of the party, which 
was found by the court, in the repeated procedure. This is called the mandamus in 
the common law6. In other words, the legitimate expectation of the party can be a 
‘trust’ which is contra legem, so the mandamus can derogate the codified law if the 
private interest of the party deserves more protection than keeping the written law 
word by word. 
2. The court finds the questioned administrative act invalid and it orders a new 
administrative procedure during which the public authority just may take into ac-
count the legitimate expectation of the party. So, this order is not as strict as the 
first one explained.
The party can ask the court not to order a new administrative procedure, but to 
order the public authority to pay damages if the legitimate expectation of the party 
was violated. 
1. The court establishes the infringement if the public authority has already vol-
untarily payed the damages, and the court establishes that there is no reason to 
continue the procedure. 
2. The court can order the public authority to pay damages if the legitimate ex-
pectation of the party was violated without finding the questioned administrative 
act invalid and without ordering a new administrative procedure7.
After having discussed the theory of Legitimate Expectation in Administrative 
Law in Common Law, let’s see some case law in this topic.
5 Mathew v. Eldridge [424 U.S. 319 (1976)]. 
6 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998-1998 No. 3132 (L. 17).
7 R. (Bibi) v. Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 607, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 237 at 250, 
para 56. and R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [1999] EWCA Civ 
1871, [2001] Q.B. 213, at 251, para. 82.
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In ‘Case Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission’8 the 
Federal Communications Commission promised a license to use a certain radio fre-
quency to an applicant (furthermore Applicant 1), and the same Commission sum-
mons another applicant (furthermore Applicant 2) who wanted to use the same 
radio frequency. The Supreme Court said the Commission violated the right of Ap-
plicant 2 for fair treatment, so the Commission violated the legitimate expectation 
of this applicant. The Court said in the arguments of the decision that Applicant 2 
legitimately expected that he could get the license to use the radio frequency in the 
administrative procedure. The Court found the questioned administrative act inval-
id, and it ordered the authority to have a new, real procedure in that issue. 
In ‘Case Ng Yuen Shiu’9 the Immigration Office of Hong Kong promised that the 
immigrants from Macao would be heard before their residence permit was granted 
or dismissed. However, the Office did not keep its promise and it dismissed the resi-
dence permit application of the immigrants, and it excluded them from Hong Kong. 
The Court of Appeal said that the Immigration Office of Hong Kong violated the im-
migrant’s legitimate expectation and it forbade to exclude them from Hong Kong. 
In ‘Case Ex Parte Coughlan’10 the British Health Authority informed a disabled 
lady, that she can live in the provided house in her full life; later the same authority 
made a decision the lady had to leave the house. The Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales said the Health Authority violated the lady’s legitimate expectation, be-
cause she legitimately expected she could stay in the house in her life as the author-
ity promised. The Court found the questioned administrative decision invalid, and it 
ordered that the Health Authority should respect the lady’s legitimate expectation. 
3. The practice of the European Union
The written law of the European Union does not contain any regulation for Le-
gitimate Expectation in Administrative Law. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereafter in this chapter: Court) created the Principle of Legitimate Expec-
tation11 in its practice using the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union12 (hereafter in this chapter: Charter) as a basis, by the time The Principle of 
8 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
9 Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] UKPC 2, [1983] 2 A.C. 629, Privy Council.
10 R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [1999] EWCA Civ 1871, [2001] 
Q.B. 213.
11 In German: Grundsatz des Vertaunsschutzes, in French: Principe de la confiance légitime, in Italian: 
Principio del legittimo affidamento, in Romanian: Principiul protecției încrederii legitime, in 
Hungarian: A jogos elvárás elve.
12 2012/C 326/02.
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Legitimate Expectation became one of the main principles of the European Union 
(Fazekas, Asztalos and Sós, 2003, p. 75). 
The Article 41 of the Charter says ‘[e]very person has the right to have his or her 
affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’. The main focus is on the fair treatment, 
because the Court admits the information given by any bodies of the EU binds the 
European Union during the decision-making process. The Court accepts the fact 
that the alteration of the acts (e.g. providing information, legislation) can cause 
damage or injurious situation for the affected legal entities. 
The Court stated the situation based on the legitimate expectation is not right 
for the parties, so there is no right derived from it. However, it deserves protection, 
because the legitimate expectation should be maintained, so if there is an official 
act by the EU which violates it, the Court can find the act invalid or the party can 
claim for damages. 
In spite of the fact that the Principle of Legitimate Expectation is a non-written 
law of the European Union, it can serve basis to find the codified law invalid ac-
cording to the practice of the Court (Fazekas, Asztalos and Sós, 2003, p. 84). Some 
important cases where the Court stated the Principle of Legitimate Expectation 
is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union are the ‘Case Ditta 
Angelo Tomadini Snc v. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato’13 in 1979, ‘Case 
Dürbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt a. M.’14 in 1981 and the recent one, ‘Case EAR 
v. Karatzoglou’15 in 2007. 
The question is who can use it as the basis of remedy and what circumstances 
must be kept to use it successfully. 
The Court said in the ‘Case Commission v. Koninklijke FrieslandCampina’16 that 
all the legal entities can refer to the Principle of Legitimate Expectation who has 
an expectation which was created by a promise of a body of the EU. The ‘Case 
Salvatore Aniello Pappalardo and others v. European Commission’17 confirms the 
same when it says ‘the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations extend to any person whom an institution of the European Union has 
caused, by giving him precise assurances, to entertain justified hopes’. 
Anybody can refer to the Principle of Legitimate Expectation. It does not matter 
if the affected party is a natural or legal person. One main restriction is that the 
expectation of the party must be well-grounded. 
13 C-84/78.
14 C-112/80.
15 C-2013/06. P.
16 C-519/07. P.
17 C-350/16. P.
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The ‘Case Mardar (UK) v. Commission;18 contains the promise or information, 
which was given by the EU and which can serve as the basis of legitimate expecta-
tion, can be provided in any form by the bodies of the EU. The circumstances are the 
same with the regulation of the common law. The European Union institution can 
give the promise or information in a formal or informal way, in a written letter or 
by spoken words, or it can be provided by way of implied conduct too. Nobody can 
use the Principle of Legitimate Expectation as a remedy if he/she acts in bad faith 
in a speculative way.
The information must be precise, categorical and consistent. It is precisely when 
the message of the European Union has pure logical connections, it is not contra-
dictory, and the message is clear. Furthermore, the affected party may not presume 
on any new decision or a legislative act which alters his/her situation. 
The promise or information must be provided by the competent staff of the Eu-
ropean Union body which has power in the questioned topic. The Court stated in 
the ‘Case Mardar (UK) v. Commission’ that the information or promise must be 
from a reliable source and they must be given by a competent officer. The source is 
not reliable e.g. if the doorman or car driver of the competent European Union body 
gives the information or promise in a certain legal issue. 
The mentioned regulation is really similar to the rules of the common law. 
There is one point where the two regulations significantly differ from each other. 
The regulation of the European Union does not use the terminology of public in-
terest. It means the legitimate expectation always has to be in accordance with the 
law. However, the common law system allows the contra legem solutions. ‘Case 
EAR v. Karatzoglou’ contains that ‘[…] third, the assurances given must comply 
with the relevant rules. […] [T]he advantage arising from the legitimate expec-
tations must comply with the law in force.’ This is written also in ‘Case Vlachou 
v. Court of Auditors of the European Communities’19 when the Court declared 
‘promises which do not take account of those provisions cannot therefore give rise 
to legitimate expectation on the person concerned, even if it is proved that they 
were made […]’.
In three significant cases, the Court successfully applied the Principle of Legit-
imate Expectation. At ‘Case J. Mulder’20 and at ‘Case G. von Deetzen’21 in 1988 the 
Court found a regulation of the Council invalid based on the legitimate expectation 
of the parties. In other case, the Court found the questioned regulation of the Com-
mission valid, but it ordered the Commission to pay damages for the affected party, 
18 C-47/07. P.
19 C-162/84. 
20 C-120/86.
21 C-170/86.
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because the regulation violated the legitimate expectation of the party in ‘Case 
Comptor National Technique Agricole SA’ in 1976.22
4. German regulation
Germany was the first country in civil law countries which codified the Le-
gitimate Expectation in Administrative Law. The legal institute (Vertrauensschutz) 
became part of the German Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrens-
gesetz, furthermore in this chapter: VwVfG) in the second part of the 20th centu-
ry (Knack, 2000, p. 943). It is noteworthy to mention that the Common Law’s Le-
gitimate Expectation in Administrative Law came from the private law contracts 
through the administrative ones, whereas the German Vertrauensschutz was de-
rived from the public law, within two principles of the German Constitution, name-
ly from the Principle of Legal Certainty and the Principle of Rule of Law. 
Before I present the German regulation, I am going to give a short historical 
background of the birth of the Vertrauensschutz. The Federal Republic of Germany 
successfully created the social rule of law after World War II, which means the state 
gives plus welfare over the compulsory core services. It can occur that the public 
authorities give the state allowances unlawfully for the applicants, which allowanc-
es would be withdrawn by the state later. The applicants objected these adminis-
trative decisions, so they challenged them in administrative courts. Because of the 
mass amounts of these cases the German Federal Administrative Court (hereafter 
in this chapter: Court) decided to create the concept of the Vertrauensschutz which 
became part of the VwVfG during the codification of the Act in 1976 (Püttner, 1973, 
pp. 78-114). According to the Court, the Vertrauensschutz underlies the regulation 
of the withdrawal of the unjust enrichment or any other unlawful advantage. Ini-
tially, the Court derived the legal institution from the Principles of Good Faith and 
Legal Certainty, but later the Vertrauensschutz became an independent part of the 
Principle of Rule of Law and it became a criterion of the Equal Treatment whose 
principles are regulated on constitutional level in the Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
The aim of the regulation is to defend the interests of individuals against the 
changing administrative decisions and against the changing legislation; the Ver-
traunsschutz became a fundamental right, which is executable and which can be 
confronted with the unconstitutional acts of the legislative body. 
The VwVfG makes a difference between the withdrawal and the revocation of 
lawful or unlawful administrative acts (‘Rücknahme eines rechtswidrigen Verwal-
22 C-74/74.
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tungsaktes’ and ‘Widerruf eines rechtmäßigen Verwaltungsaktes’). The purposes of 
these are the same: to cancel the advantage which was given by the public author-
ity to the clients. 
Section 48 Paragraph 2 and 3 of VwVfG regulates the Withdrawal of an Unlaw-
ful Administrative Act. It says that an unlawful administrative act which provides a 
one-time or continuing payment of money or divisible material benefit, or which is 
a prerequisite for these, may not be withdrawn so far as the beneficiary has relied 
upon the continued existence of the administrative act and his reliance deserves 
protection relative to public interest in withdrawal. Reliance is in general deserv-
ing of protection when the beneficiary has utilized the contributions made or has 
made financial arrangements which he can no longer cancel, or can cancel only by 
suffering a disadvantage which cannot reasonably be asked from him (Seminar or-
ganized by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania and ACA-Europe, 2016, 
pp. 14-18). 
There are some exceptions when the withdrawal is acceptable. The beneficiary 
cannot claim reliance when:
 – he obtained the administrative act by false pretenses, threat or bribery;
 – he obtained the administrative act by giving information which was substan-
tially incorrect or incomplete; and
 – he was aware of the illegality of the administrative act or was unaware of it 
due to gross negligence. In this case the administrative act shall in general 
be withdrawn with retrospective effect (Knack, 2000; Fehling, Kastner and 
Störmer, 2016, p. 943).
Paragraph 3 of the same section regulates the situation when an unlawful ad-
ministrative act not covered by the previous paragraphs is withdrawn, the public 
authority shall upon application compensate the disadvantage to the person af-
fected deriving from his reliance on the existence of the act to the extent that his 
reliance merits protection having regard to the public interest23.
Section 49 of VwVfG presents the five cases when the Revocation of a Lawful 
Administrative Act is permitted. According to the Paragraph 2 a lawful, beneficial 
administrative act may, even when it has become non-appealable, be revoked in 
whole or in part with effect on future only when:
 – revocation is permitted by law or reserved in the administrative act itself;
 – the administrative act is combined with an obligation which the beneficiary 
has not complied fully or not within the time limit set;
 – the public authority would be entitled, as a result of a subsequent change in 
circumstances, not to issue the administrative act, and if it failed to revoke it 
would be contrary to the public interest;
23 OVG Münster NVwZ 88,740; BVerwG NVwZ 95,704.
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 – the public authority would be entitled, as a result of an amendment to a legal 
provision not to issue the administrative act where the beneficiary has not 
availed himself of the benefit or has not received any benefits derived from the 
administrative act, and when failure to revoke would be contrary to the public 
interest; and
 – in order to prevent or eliminate serious harm to the common good. 
In the event of a beneficial administrative act being revoked in cases covered 
by 3rd to 5th points of Paragraph 2, the public authority shall upon application re-
dress compensation for the disadvantage to the person affected deriving from his 
reliance on the continued existence of the act the extent that his reliance merits 
protection24.
Paragraph 3 contains that a lawful administrative act which provides a one-time 
or a continuing payment of money or a divisible material benefit for a particular 
purpose, or which is prerequisite for these, may be revoked even after it has become 
non-appealable, either wholly or in part and with retrospective effect if: 
 – once this payment is rendered, it is not put to use, or is not put to use either 
without undue delay or for purpose for which it was intended in the adminis-
trative act; and
 – the administrative act had an obligation attached to it which the beneficiary 
either fails to satisfy or does not satisfy the stipulated period (Knack, 2000, pp. 
890-914; Fehling, Kastner and Störmer, 2016, pp. 677-680).
Theoretically, all acts of the public authority can serve as the basis of the Ver-
traunesschutz, but the passivity of the public authority (which is not equal with 
the failure to act of the public authority) cannot be a basis of the legal institute. In 
the German system the Principle of Legality cannot be overruled by the Vertrauen-
sschutz because the public authorities cannot be forced to act against the law (for 
example, if the board of housing gives the building permit illegally, the same public 
authority can withdraw the permit after having realized the failure).
There is one point where the German regulation is similar to the regulation of 
the Common Law and to the practice of the European Union. The informal acts of 
the public authority (including giving misinformation) can serve as the basis of 
paying damages by the public authority for the affected party. 
The German jurisprudence makes a difference between retroactive and retro-
spective effects. The first one, which is generally forbidden, changes finished acts 
belonging to the past, the second one, which is generally permitted, has an effect 
only on current, unfinished situations and legal relations in the future. 
There are some cases when the retroactive effect is lawful and some cases 
when the retrospective one is against the law. The Federal Constitutional Court of 
24 OVG Münster GemHH 83,94; BVerwG NVwZ 2000,202.
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Germany declared that ‘a retroactive effect may be justified if the reliance on a 
specific legal situation was not legitimate. That may be the case if the former legal 
situation was unclear and confused, if a void provision will be replaced by legally 
unobjectionable one or if there are compelling public interest reasons that take 
precedence over the requirement of legal certainty’ (Seminar organized by the Su-
preme Administrative Court of Lithuania and ACA-Europe, 2016, pp. 20-22). 
On the other side, a retrospective effect is against the constitution ‘if there is 
no appropriate balance between the importance of the legislative concern for the 
amendment and the legitimate expectations in the continuance of the current legal 
situation or if the legislator fails to take care of a transition by adequate interim 
regulations’. Furthermore, an infringement of Vertrauensschutz is also conceivable, 
‘if the legislator grants e.g. a time-limited tax concession for a five year period, 
[…] than […] the premature termination of that tax concession by an amendment 
is unconstitutional, because the legislator has bound himself by having given rise 
to legitimate expectations of the investors that the tax concession lasts for at least 
the next five years’ (Seminar organized by the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Lithuania and ACA-Europe, 2016, p. 22).
Finally, the Court could declare the following legal consequences if the void of 
the Vertrauensschutz is well grounded:
 – ‘If the legitimate expectations are derived from the behaviour of [a public] 
authority, the petitioner may lodge an action to oblige the authority to issue 
the requested administrative act’. As the Vertrauensschutz ‘does not have the 
power to overrule the Principle of Legality, no [public] authority can be forced 
to act contra legem. Only if the petitioner has an assurance as provided by the 
public authority, he is able to enforce the claim in natura’. 
 – Otherwise the petitioner ‘may bring an action for compensation by way of lia-
bility of public authorities’ (Seminar organized by the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Lithuania and ACA-Europe, 2016, pp. 15-20)25.
5. The Swiss legitimate expectation in administrative law26
Switzerland is part of the civil law system countries like Germany. The basis of 
the Swiss legal system is the Swiss Constitution, which was accepted on April 18, 
1999. The Swiss legislator did not codify the Legitimate Expectation in Administra-
tive Law27, but it was created by the practice of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (here-
25 BVerwG-3C 50.04; BVerwG-2C 2/01,
26 This chapter is based on the Seminar and course materials held by Prof. Dr. Felix Uhlmann at the 
University of Zurich in 2017.
27 In German: Vertrauensschutz, in French: protection de la bonne foi, in Italien: protezione della 
buona fede.
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after in this chapter: Court). I am going to describe the regulation by presenting a 
recent case from 201028. 
A Swiss Music College pianist student was an aspiring music teacher. He experi-
enced difficulties to perform his final exam in front of an audience due to emotional 
stress. Therefore, he was granted an exception to repeat that same exam in front 
of the examination board and without a public audience. He passed the exam and 
received a written statement that he had successfully completed his educational 
training for his teaching certificate. 
The director of the school requested that the certificate should not be issued be-
cause the student had not completed the exam in front of a public audience. Subse-
quently, the competent authority decided to refuse to issue the certificate. The su-
pervisory authority argued that the exam was not performed in accordance with the 
law and that the initial ordinance (decision that the student passed the exam) was 
therefore incorrect and had to be revoked although it was already legally binding. 
The Court argued that the student had reason to believe that the procedure was 
correct and that the examination board was competent to decide that he could per-
form the exam without the presence of an audience. Therefore, he relied on the ini-
tial decision that he had passed the exam. The decision to revoke an already legally 
binding ordinance is subject to strict rules. Such an ordinance cannot be revoked if 
the interest of protection of legitimate expectations is considered to be higher than 
the interest of the correct implementation of the law (public interest). There are 
exceptions of this rule; in particular if there is a substantial public interest in the 
correct implementation of the law. 
In this case the court considered the student’s interest of the protection of his 
legitimate expectations based on Article 9 of the Swiss Constitution29 to be higher 
than the interest to implement the written law provisions; particularly with regard 
to arrangements he had already made. He would face serious disadvantages if the 
initial decision was revoked. 
The court decided that the authority was bound by the initial ordinance and that 
the ordinance could not be revoked. In conclusion, the Swiss Court uses a four-step 
test in order to establish the protection of legitimate expectation.
First of all, the Court defines the interest of the correct implementation of the 
law and the private interest linked to the legitimate expectation of the affected 
party. Secondly, the Court reviews the background of the case, it finds the relevant 
facts and it makes the matter of facts clear. Thirdly, the Court balances the public 
and private interests in order to decide which one deserves more protection. Final-
ly, the Court makes decision, and it gives its detailed justification of the argument. 
28 BGE 137 I 69.
29 ‘Art. 9 Protection against arbitrary conduct and principle of good faith: Every person has the right 
to be treated by state authorities in good faith and in a non-arbitrary manner.’ 
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6. Tasks for the future
Legitimate Expectation in Administrative Law is becoming a more important 
and ‘hot’ topic at the Administrative Law. The problem, when the misinformation 
or the un-kept promises of the state bodies causes damages of the parties, was 
solved in Western European countries by using different aspects of the legitimate 
expectation in national legal systems. Post-Communist countries face this issue, 
but they do not have clear codified law or court practice to solve these cases satis-
factorily30. 
One of the greatest challenges of present lawyers is to find an adequate solution 
to introduce the Legitimate Expectation in Administrative Law to the legal remedy 
proceedings in administrative cases harmoniously with the national legal systems 
and legal traditions.
Countries which are members of the European Union, where the Legitimate 
Expectation in Administrative Law is a fundamental principle, the legal institute 
should be a subprinciple of Rule of Law and Principle of Good Faith at the national 
constitutions.
We would only win if we introduced this legal institution. The Legitimate Ex-
pectation in Administrative Law would make the precise and professional legal 
work necessary for the staff of the administration which would increase the trust in 
government and administration on the side of the citizens. 
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Abstract
Sensor networks have become ubiquitous in all types of machinery and infrastructure. These sensor 
networks are/will be extensively used in the Smart City, which includes public as well as private sensor 
networks the latter being a much-neglected source of information feed for a smart city administration 
(Komninos, 2014). This can include vehicle (from eScooter to mini-van) sharing data, park house data, etc. 
However, the city’s backbone IT infrastructure must be able to accept and process this data and to draw 
the right conclusions from them. The backbone of this IT infrastructure will for all practical purposes be an 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) System as it is already standard in the private sector (for an example, 
Müller-Török et al., 2019). This contribution analyzes the integration of sensor networks into ERP systems in 
the Smart City. It will also analyze the implications of this development for public sector education. 
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1. Why sensor networks?
Sensor networks have become a standard feature in machinery, vehicles and 
also the kind of infrastructures that build the smart city. Reasons include (i) a mas-
sive decrease in sensor prices, (ii) the internet of things, (iii) the emergence of web 
services, which enable to dynamically build application landscapes (‘the cloud’), 
and (iv) business intelligence systems that can process the data from these sensor 
networks in (near) real-time and feed it into decision-making algorithms1. In many 
cases, such networks can also be supplemented by actuators, where the information 
system performs actions in the real world. Between them, these factors create a 
‘living’ infrastructure whose states can be monitored and processed on a real-time 
basis (Holdowsky, 2015).
However, this does not mean that ‘classical’ means of data processing, such 
as central ERP systems become obsolete; rather, sensor networks, business intel-
ligence and ERP form a triangle to meaningfully process the data collected. One 
should also be clear that such networks are not only a technical innovation, but also 
entail process innovation and completely new business models. Summarizing, this 
contribution will advance the following refutable hypotheses:
H1: Sensor networks need to ‘sink’ their data into central ERP components to 
trigger the necessary events as a response to the sensor state reported.
H2: Sensor networks need real-time business intelligence to analyze the data 
collected and to improve the quality of the response by ERP. 
H3: Sensor networks do not only enable process innovation, but also whole new 
business models (whereby ‘business’ in administration may also mean new public 
services).
2. Why ERP?
Logistically, an ERP system essentially performs flow management, that is it 
combines ‘the information integration and planning capability of MRP with the 
response of a JIT kanban system’ (Jacobs and Chase, 2008). This includes master 
data management (costing data, materials, bills of materials, work centers, routings, 
etc.) as well as demand forecasting and materials requirement planning proper; 
it also encompasses production (where applicable) and the functions associated 
with it (scheduling/sequencing, availability check, order costing, etc.). In a broader 
sense it would also encompass other areas, such as procurement and maintenance 
management (where applicable). Typically, an ERP system manages the back-office 
core processes in logistics integrating them with accounting (Prosser, Bagnato and 
Müller-Török, 2017).
1 For a detailed argument of these points, see Prosser (2018).
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Therefore, any kind of materials flow associated with the sensor networks – ei-
ther to support the network or as a result of states indicated by the network – must 
necessarily be handled by the ERP system. Also, the evaluation or support process-
es have to be processed there. Let us explore some commonly used examples:
1. Forms of predictive maintenance heavily rely on sensor networks. The typical 
arrangement is that of a spare subject to wear and tear that is monitored by a 
sensor. If the sensor indicates that the norm parameters are deviated by a min-
imum threshold value (which is typically configurable depending on replen-
ishment lead time), the replenishment is triggered2. However, what does this 
signal trigger? One would expect some kind of demand carrier being triggered 
as a response to the sensor signaling, for example, ‘Street light number 12345 
has reached the threshold, where within a 99% confidence interval 120 hours of 
useful life are left at a minimum’. Such demand carriers may take many forms 
depending on the service model of the ERP system, examples include:
 – a simple materials requirement showing the stock/requirements list;
 – a service order including the replacement of the spare, which triggers a pur-
chase requisition and/or production order for the part itself or dependents 
(Radner, 2018); and
 – a maintenance order along the same lines. 
In any case, the sensor data triggers a process in the ERP system. 
2. It is becoming quite customary to insert sensors in public garbage bins to read 
out the filling state. If a threshold value is reached, the next emptying can be 
scheduled adaptively to optimize garbage collection. The same principle ap-
plies to every type of optimized collection under constraints, where the in-
formation on what/how much to collect depends on sensor data entering the 
route planning3. In both cases cited, the sensor data must trigger some kind of 
optimization calculus (we shall return to this point presently) and then some 
kind of order in the ERP system, whether to collect garbage or milk according 
to the optimization algorithm. Furthermore, the information must be passed 
on to all downstream processes, such as the dairy processing or recycling ac-
tivities for the glass or plastic collected. In this view, the sensor is simply the 
trigger of a chain of processing events in one or more ERP systems. 
3. Another smart city example may be dynamic parking lot monitoring. All pub-
lic parking lots are equipped with sensors and return to a central monitoring 
2 For typical application scenarios, cf. Günthner and Dollinger (2019); Prosser and Wijayalath (2017). 
3 A real-world example would be sensor/ communication chips inserted in milk churns transmit-
ting how many churns are to be collected by the Lower Austrian Dairy that are obliged to collect 
whatever their contract farmers make available each day; only that information enables them to 
optimize their route planning (Deibler and Kühne, 2010).
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system, which makes the data of empty lots available via an app (and possibly 
a navigation system interface as well) (Šarić and Mihaljević, 2017). Possible 
charging and settlement schemes are done by the central ERP system. 
These considerations lead to H1 in that a sensor network in itself is only of very 
limited use if the sensor ‘trigger’ does not entail any real action steered by the ERP 
system. 
3. Why real-time business intelligence and ERP?
Sensor networks tend to create enormous amounts of data that may also be 
related to existing master or transactional data in the ERP system. Continuing the 
above examples:
1. The threshold value where the signal to the ERP system is triggered is not a 
fixed one. It depends on the replenishment lead time (RLT, typically normally 
distributed) and the probability distribution of the remaining operational time 
of the spare part; both values are subject to the confidence interval desired. An 
example: If in a certain RLT the average remaining life of a part is 100 hours 
with a standard deviation σ =10 hours, then the normal distribution indicates 
that in 68.27% of all cases, the remaining life of the spare is between 100 ± σ 
that is in [90,110]; in 95,45% of all cases in [80,120], etc. The designer of the 
threshold value must then decide which level of certainty is desired and select 
the threshold value accordingly4. The situation is complicated in that also the 
RLT itself will usually be normally distributed and not deterministic as in the 
example. 
However, real situations will be a lot more complicated as other factors 
may influence the residual life of a spare. Street lights in some areas or from 
some vendors may go faster than others, etc. These patterns overlay the above 
normal distributions and should be found out as they potentially influence the 
calculus considerably. 
2. Similar considerations apply to the bin example. The filling does not proceed 
steadily but may vary considerably due to weekends or public holidays. These 
patterns must be found out by analyzing filling patterns over time and identi-
fying factors influencing the patterns. 
3. The data in the parking lot example may be used for predictions of traffic quan-
tities and parking lot utilization; it may also be the basis for an optimization 
calculus for city tolls or congestion charges, all of which requires an analytics 
component. 
4 If 95% certainty is desired, the system must be configured at ‘alarm at 120 hours left’. 
276
Therefore, the sensor networks producing the input, business intelligence iden-
tifying the patterns within the input and the management functions in the ERP 
system must come together to provide this functionality. ‘Classical’ data warehouse 
centered functionality did not and could not provide this. These systems for the 
most part relied on aggregation hierarchies built from the transactional data in 
order to quickly access the aggregate reports. The data warehouse typically re-
sided on disk whose access time is measured in ms. Aggregation hierarchies were 
hence the only way to build a reporting scheme usable in dialog mode (Prosser and 
Ossimitz, 2001). In-memory computing5, however, runs terabyte-sized databases in 
main memory, whose access time is measured in ns. ms and ns, disk and memory 
therefore differ in speed to the extent of 10-6, that is a search task that takes 11 days 
on disk, while it takes 1 s in memory6. This enables sequential search of the original 
documents in memory – the days of aggregation hierarchies needed for speedy 
analysis are gone. This is why in-memory computing plays such a pivotal role in 
analyzing input from sensor networks and we formulated H2. 
4. Architectural considerations
If sensor data input can be analyzed in (near) real-time by an in-memory-based 
Business Intelligence (BI) component, the question arises why not couple it with the 
central components of the ERP system as well. Originally, there was a main obsta-
cle to that, the ACID property (Date, 2012). Apart from periodical data refreshes, BI 
systems only read data for analysis, no transactions occur. ERP systems, however, 
process huge amounts of transactions per minute, accounting transactions, materi-
als postings or sales transactions. Transactional write/create/delete processing re-
quires processing of atomic (unitary), consistent and isolated processing units that 
leave a durable processing result in the database – ACID. The last point seemingly 
contradicts the use of main memory for transaction processing. However, database 
systems were designed (and have become state-of-the-art in business practices) that 
can preserve ACID even though the database is operationally retained in the main 
memory. There are a number of techniques possible including online replication to 
disk-based databases, after-image logging or battery buffered RAM as a hardware 
solution. Therefore, in-memory databases can guarantee ACID and hence can form 
the common data layer for transactional ERP systems and read-only BI. Figure 1 
depicts the resulting overall architecture (Ismaili et al., 2015; Plattner, 2014).
5 For a numeric derivation (Prosser, 2018). 
6 This is of course a schematic example disregarding bus systems, caches etc., however, it shows the 
order of magnitude by which search improves. 
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Figure 1: Architecture in-memory
This architecture is a complete change as compared to data warehousing. BI and 
ERP share the same data base, continuously updated by the ERP transactions. The 
BI component does not use a separate – and certainly not an aggregate – data base 
but uses the transactional data in their original. Sensor – and other external – data 
is continuously fed into the same base via connectors (typically web services).
Another architectural consideration is sensor network authentication. Insertion 
of fraudulent and manipulated sensor data has to be avoided and the integrity of 
the system needs to be automatically checked. There are a number of approaches 
ranging from physical challenge – response algorithms (Shoukry et al., 2015) to 
waveform shaping for authentication purposes (Melo, Machado and Carmo, 2018). 
5. Innovation and sensor networks
Figure 1 essentially describes a technical innovation, which – on a second level 
– may be used for process innovation as described in sections 2 and 3. However, 
process innovation implies that the end-result stays the same, only the process to 
achieve it has been streamlined. The third level is to use the technology to deliver a 
different product. In the domain of industrial machinery, sensor networks have cre-
ated a push for pay-per-use models (OECD, 2017). This is also technically intuitive: 
once the producer may supervise the state of the machinery remotely (even the po-
sition, if the GPS coordinates are recorded), precise usage data can be collected and 
used for billing purposes. An example is the push for the rental of aircraft engines 
(World Finance, 2016). 
Also, municipalities may explore new ‘business models’ utilizing sensor net-
works. The first example that may come to mind is smart mobility, where vehicles 
are not owned any more, but shared. However, beyond that, large parts of a munic-
ipality’s infrastructure may be rented by the city itself (Infrastructure-as-a-Service, 
IaaS). This may include the operation of street lightening or public wireless LAN, 
privatization of parking management or the infrastructure for autonomous vehicles 
(Clohessy, Acton and Morgan, 2014). IaaS exonerates municipal budgets by reduc-
ing capital investment basically turning investment into concurrent costs thereby 
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accelerating innovation and technology adoption (Tsarchopoulos, Komninos and 
Kakderi, 2017). Sensor networks play an important part in this push, as they pro-
vide the link between the physical world and the ICT backbone; a large part of the 
‘smartness’ of the smart city relies on the fact that the analytical and management 
systems steering the infrastructure learn about the current state of the infrastruc-
ture managed via these sensor networks. H3 incorporates these considerations. 
6. And in the classroom?
What does this imply for the university-level education of future leaders in pub-
lic administration? 
We hold that teaching must incorporate these developments on three levels: 
(i) management-level knowledge about the technical infrastructure, its abilities and 
limitations; (ii) the fusion of sensor networks into backbone management systems, 
notably ERP; (iii) the understanding of what this means for city management and 
the economic and organizational design of the smart city (which in itself requires 
an understanding of the underlying technologies). 
We are therefore developing an integrated course for ERP and sensor networks 
covering the following elements:
(i) A PC-based sensor network simulator for predictive maintenance of street 
lights, where students may experience the key parameters and variances rel-
evant to predictive maintenance (wear and tear, replenishment lead time, ser-
vice lead time, etc.); they learn how analysis of the expected values and vari-
ances in these parameters feeds back into the planning of a predictive system 
in general, and in the application at hand; the trainer is highly graphical and 
simulates a section of the city.
(ii) Issue of service orders to the backbone ERP system directly generated by the 
simulator.
(iii) Processing of the service order including link to materials management (and 
possibly procurement of the light bulbs in question). 
(iv) Ex-post evaluation (did the predictive parameters fit?) and possible adapta-
tion of parameters and calculation of service. 
We hope to not only provide a state-of-the-art view on sensor network – back-
bone ERP integration, but also to present-day management concepts for a munici-
pal infrastructure in general. 
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Abstract
According to Kaldor, modern economic growth entails structural change. The share of the broad eco-
nomic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, and services) in value added and employment has undergone a 
significant transformation in the post-socialist Central Eastern European economies, just like in the South 
Eastern European ones. However, the services sector, which now represents the greatest share in the econ-
omy in developed economies, is relatively less dominant in the emerging countries of Europe. In devel-
oped countries, agriculture and manufacturing have experienced a shrinking share in employment since 
the 1970s and the services sector has been gradually gaining ground. Baumol explained this phenomenon 
by claiming that the technological development of the given industry has characteristically a negative im-
pact on the employment of the same industry. Following on Autor and Salomons (2017), who stated that 
own-industry productivity growth decreases employment within the industry which is overcompensated by 
positive intrasectoral spillover effects, the paper analyses 11 EU members from Central and South-Eastern 
Europe with the help of OLS panel regression, and finds that the productivity increase of both agriculture and 
manufacturing goes together with the decrease in employment within the sector, whereas in the services 
sector, including public services, the contrary holds.
Keywords: productivity, employment, sectoral change, emerging European economies.
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1. Introduction
It is a widely known phenomenon that with economic development the share 
of the broad economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and services) in value 
added and employment undergoes a significant transformation. This paper aims 
at examining sectoral transformation in 13 Central and South-Eastern European 
EU member economies with special regard to changes in sectoral employment and 
value added and the impact of own-industry productivity on employment. To un-
derstand why structural change is important in modern economic growth, a se-
ries of empirical research papers and models have been devoted to the issue. The 
paper provides a detailed review of these approaches. The structural processes of 
emerging European economies are discussed with sectoral employment and val-
ue-added data. The employment and value added shares of the selected countries in 
agriculture, industry, and services is compared with the OECD, EU and Eurozone 
averages on the basis of World Bank (WDI) statistics which provide data for all 
these countries for the period between 1991 and 2018 (aside from some years of gap 
in certain countries’ time series). The change in the number of employed persons 
by sector is examined to describe the recent tendencies following the onset of the 
2007-2008 global financial crisis on data provided by the OECD employment by in-
dustry databases. Finally, the relationship between own-industry productivity and 
employment with the help of panel regression encompassing 11 countries out of 
the selected 13 for the years 1995-2017 on the basis of Eurostat National accounts 
employment data by industry (NACE A64). (Croatia and Malta had to be dropped 
from the sample in the lack of sufficient data coverage). The paper closes with con-
clusions and recommendations.
2. Literature review
Herrendorf et al. (2013) point out that so as to better understand structural 
transformation as one of the features of modern economic growth, it is necessary 
to reshape the one-sector-growth models into multi-sector models, and come up 
with various approaches from the literature addressing the changing behavior of 
the various sectors accompanying economic development. They apply different da-
tabases to illustrate how the weight of agriculture, manufacturing and services in 
value added, consumption and employment alternate at different welfare levels in 
industrialized countries. Herrendorf et al. (2013) also reveal some methodological 
problems of measuring economic development and sectoral shares. The level of eco-
nomic development is mostly expressed as GDP per capita which can show large 
deviations from GDP per hours worked in country rankings. As regards the mea-
surement of sectoral shares, consumption may follow quite different patterns from 
value added as consumption measures final expenditure and not additional value 
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created at different phases of production, and nominal versus real figures can also 
reflect contrasting price developments. Measured as a function of economic devel-
opment (expressed as log of GDP per capita in Herrendorf et al. (2013)), in most of 
the cases the sectoral shares of employment and nominal value-added show a de-
clining path in agriculture, a hump-shaped pattern in manufacturing and the service 
sector is gaining ground in most developed countries. The share of the service sector 
shows a sharper increase from the point where manufacturing shifts to a decreasing 
from an increasing trend in the case of nominal value-added shares. These patterns 
generally characterize most industrialized countries whose data series from various 
data sources encompass a long enough period starting from the 19th century. For 
a better comparability of data, they also use the EU KLEMS databases which offers 
methodologically harmonized data series covering the period between 1970-2007. 
Furthermore, they detect similar results even for countries outside the set of rich 
countries for which EU KLEMS has data. Structural change can be captured in mod-
els1 by applying different rates (of labor augmenting) technological progress across 
sectors, change in the relative prices of inputs, and consequently outputs, differ-
ences in input intensities and substitutability of capital and labor, as well as home 
production of services. From the consumer side, non-homothetic preferences and 
differing income elasticities for different products are a prerequisite for explaining 
why sectors become more dominant and why others less. Referring to an early work 
of Clark (1940), Gabardo et al. (2017) summarizes sectoral reallocation as the result 
of differential productivity growth and Engel (income) effects, that is sectoral devi-
ations in productivity growth from the supply side and different income elasticities 
from the demand side are regarded as the major sources of sectoral transformation. 
If income elasticity is greater than one in an industry (if non-homothetic preferenc-
es are characterizing consumers), then an increase in the per capita GDP leads to 
higher expenditure share and also to the reallocation of labor in favor of the same 
industry. First, Engel stated that the lower-income elasticity of demand leads to the 
drop in food prices and the shrinkage of agriculture, but later it was extended as a 
general law for consumption explaining other industries’ rise and downturn (see 
Houthakker (1987) among others). In the second approach, the technological expla-
nation, relative price changes either derive from differences in productivity growth 
across sectors or the changes of relative prices of inputs (presuming different input 
intensities and changes in the relative supply of inputs). Foellmi and Zweimüeller’s 
(2008) model concentrating on the demand side is even able to capture the stylized 
facts on the three broad sectors, but at the same time with a hierarchical representa-
1 Until the beginning of the 90’s sectoral change mostly appeared in empirical research, incorpo-
rating sectoral reallocation in models has recently become a widespread approach (Gabardo et al., 
2017).
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tion of consumer preferences, they show that goods, when launched in the market, 
are classified as luxury and later become necessity products due to changing income 
elasticities. In contrast, Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) construct a model that only 
takes into consideration supply-side effects, varying input intensities and capital 
deepening as causes of relative price dynamics. Boppart (2014) empirically proved 
that both demand and supply-side effects are relevant.
Different data representations result in either a more accentuated effect of rela-
tive prices or that of income movements depending on the input-output relations of 
the economy (Herrendorf et al., 2013). However, apart from these general economic 
interpretations which macroeconomic models are based on, there are still signifi-
cant deviations in the way the three sectors transform with economic development 
as far as particular countries are concerned. This variability among countries can 
be attributed, among others, to different industrial policies, openness, the role of 
international trade, transportation costs, entry barriers in the service sector, the 
behavior of new entrants in the labor market, the change in the number of skilled 
workers, female employment, as well as various economic policy measures (such 
as employment protection rules) and other market-distorting forces (externalities, 
public goods, market power, etc.). Some of the researchers put special emphasis on 
the human determinants of sectoral transformation, the contribution of the skilled 
labor force (Buera and Kaboski, 2012) and women (Rendall, 2010; Olivetti, 2013) to 
the greater share of the service sector in employment and value added. The open 
economy context of structural change is less elaborate, but becomes more and more 
attractive. It is attributed a specific measurement, the so-called Krugman index and 
the proportion of high- and medium-tech export in total exports. 
According to Herrendorf et al. (2013), sectoral composition might also play an 
important role in the business cycle fluctuations. The lessons learned from theories 
on structural change can also be applied to the differences between developing 
and developed countries. Caselli (2005) and Restuccia et al. (2008), among others, 
emphasize the importance of agriculture in economic development. In their view, 
the lower level of productivity in agriculture and the greater share of agriculture 
in employment prevent developing economies to reach a higher living standard 
(Herrendorf et al., 2013). Another reason why less developed countries might not 
catch up with the more developed ones lies in the fact that the difference between 
the two country groups in the level and growth rates of productivity in the agri-
culture and services is greater than in manufacturing, therefore the shift from the 
dominant role of manufacturing to that of services does not support convergence 
in terms of aggregate productivity (Duarte and Restuccia, 2010). Furthermore, Bah 
and Brada (2009) found that post-socialist countries, due to the former planned eco-
nomic system, tend to have a higher employment level in agriculture and manufac-
turing than the service sector compared to industrialized countries, and the service 
sector in these emerging economies is less productive, has a significantly lower TFP, 
thus the expansion in the service sector does not entail growth in GDP per capita. 
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Apart from their deep analysis of determinants behind sectoral transformation 
and a comprehensive review of models dealing with it, Herrendorf et al. (2013) also 
pointed to the limitations of the three-sectoral approach of economic development. 
Jorgenson and Timmer (2011) questioned whether the classical trichotomy among 
agriculture, manufacturing, and services well captures the structural processes of 
an economy. This is reasonable if one thinks about significant discrepancies in pro-
ductivity, value added, consumption and employment patterns within sectors, such 
as the service sector. The service sector can be divided into traditional and non-tra-
ditional, high-skill and low-skill services, etc. among which relative price changes, 
real expenditure and labor shares can show large deviations. Gabardo et al. (2017) 
underline that structural change cannot be restricted to the three broad sectors, 
but instead it covers the change in the structure of production and employment 
between and within sectors as well. Baumol (1967) was one of the first economists 
who explained changes in industrial proportions on value added with differences in 
technological progress using only labor input.
Recent research has shed light on the fact that the contribution of industries 
using higher technology to employment shows a declining trend. At the national 
economy level, technological unemployment can be mitigated by continuous prod-
uct innovation according to Saviotti and Pyka (2004). The technological develop-
ment of the given industry (measured as an increase in productivity) has character-
istically a negative impact on the employment of the given industry (Baumol-hy-
pothesis), which is overcompensated or at least counterbalanced by the spillover 
effect originating from the industry affecting consumption, income, and overall 
employment. Nordhaus (2005) confuted that own-industry technological advance-
ment (with special regard to the New Economy of semiconductors, software, and 
telecommunication) would cause job losses and detected a positive relationship 
between productivity and employment even within manufacturing for the peri-
od between 1955-2001 and 1998-2003. The outcome was opposite to the observed 
shrinkage in manufacturing employment which Nordhaus explained with the more 
rapid productivity growth and price decline from foreign competitors, thus compet-
ing imported goods can more than offset labor augmenting technological develop-
ment in the domestic economy. Concerning the employment effect of technology in 
the various sectors of the economy, Bessen (2017) reveals more nuanced relations: 
employment shows a dramatical increase at the early stages of innovation, then 
starts declining in later stages of maturity due to market saturation and the wide-
spread use of the new technology thanks to mass production and price reduction. 
Therefore, an initial favorable employment impact of product innovation ends up 
in employment depressing processes within the innovative sector. Productivity in-
crease induced by automatization, at the same time, does not impact employees 
with different qualifications uniformly, which was underscored, among others, by 
the examination of Autor and Wasserman (2013) and Dustmann et al. (2014), which 
revealed that the salary of low-wage, less educated workers further decreased in 
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the USA and Germany in the last two-three decades considered. These labor market 
effects are explained by the shift in demand; thus, the aggregate favorable labor 
market effect of productivity can go together with contradicting processes within 
the industry but can affect employees at various skill levels also differently. That 
is, change in labor demand (often referred to as ‘skill-biased demand shifts’) can 
have an adverse impact on broad skill groups even if technological advance does 
not harm the labor market in aggregate. Autor and Salomons (2017) confirmed both 
presumptions in their investigation encompassing 37 years and the statistics of 19 
developed countries. They test the employment effects of productivity (as a widely 
accepted indicator of technological progress) with regards to change in employ-
ment both numerically and as a share of the working-age population across in-
dustries. They partly point out that the employment decrease resulting from the 
productivity increase within the same industry is outperformed by the positive, 
employment augmenting spillover effect of the productivity growth of a given in-
dustry appearing in other industries. These intersectoral advantages stem partly 
from the final output demand increases (income effect), partly from interindustry 
demand connections. Furthermore, they provide statistical proof that the change 
in employment appears in employee groups with unequal skills in a different way 
and polarizes the labor market. Autor and Salomons (2017) rank 28 industries in 
five categories: mining, utilities and construction; manufacturing; education and 
health services; capital intensive (‘high tech’) services; and labor-intensive (‘low 
tech’) services. The interdependence between employment and productivity shows 
a great diversity in intersectoral relations as well: the most positive external effects 
can be detected due to health care, education and other (low- and high-tech) ser-
vices, in contrast, productivity in utility services, mining, and construction causes 
no sizable intersectoral spillover effects. (The low-tech sector merits attention on 
account of its share in employment, whereas the manufacturing industry due to 
the highest efficiency increase in respect of all the industries examined.) The differ-
ences in the response to the change in productivity can be explained by the pres-
ence of sector-specific technology, the level of saturation of the market, and how 
demand effects are shared between domestic and foreign markets. Furthermore, 
it is generally observable that a powerful efficiency in the primary and secondary 
sectors will cause an expansion in employment in the tertiary sector, which prin-
cipally affects low skilled and high skilled labor force, medium-skilled will mostly 
be excluded from the favorable labor market developments. Moreover, Autor and 
Salomons (2017) conclude that other factors, above all, population changes have 
caused significant employment effects aside from the favorable overall employment 
effect of productivity increase. Though this favorable impact can still be recognized 
for the average of the whole period examined but has been moderating (or even 
turned negative) in recent decades just like the interaction between productivity 
and employment, the latter is labelled by the authors as decoupling. A possible rea-
son for productivity growth exercising less forceful effect on domestic employment 
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is that the ensuing expansion in demand is partly satisfied by foreign producers, 
thus trade openness might explain the change in the intensity of productivity and 
employment just like the patterns of structural change.
3. Sectoral reallocation and recent employment tendencies 
in Central and South-Eastern European countries
For the assessment of the changing importance of the three broad sectors, it is 
reasonable to use the WDI statistics of the World Bank as it provides harmonized 
and comparable data for all the 13 countries examined and also for the EU, the Eu-
rozone and the OECD as reference statistics on groups of industrialized countries. 
Unfortunately, most countries have data series starting only in 1991 or even later, 
therefore the maximum interval for analysis is 28 years which can only help ex-
plore recent tendencies. 
In the agricultural sector despite a well observable moderation, there is still an 
evident surplus in value added shares in Central and South-Eastern European coun-
tries compared to the OECD, EU and Eurozone averages which have been around 
1-1.5% in the last five years (Figure 1a). The only exception is Malta with its be-
low 1% proportion in 2018, while Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia with 
their less than 2% figures are very close to the European average. In Romania and 
Bulgaria agriculture still contributed to GDP by above 5% until the 2010s’ but by 
now their statistics have also been depressed below 5%. The employment share of 
agriculture shows a diverse picture apart from the common declining tendency 
and an average approximately 60% decrease in the data between 1991 and 2018 
(Figure 1b). Generally, Central Eastern European countries employ more of their 
labor force in agriculture than OECD and EU or EMU countries. The OECD and EU 
countries’ employment share in agriculture almost coincides over the entire period 
with a value somewhat above 4% in 2018 and the Eurozone can be characterized 
with some percentage points lower values than the other two groups of countries 
over the entire period examined. 
Among the outliers, Romania is the most striking example with a still significant 
proportion of agricultural workers making up somewhat higher than 20% of total 
employment. In contrast Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta, and Slovakia are even 
below the Eurozone average with Cyprus standing out with its 1% share in 2018.
As regards manufacturing, there is no data available on its share in employ-
ment, therefore a broader aggregate industry is used to capture non-agricultural 
and non-service branches’ transformation which includes construction, mining, 
electricity, water, and gas apart from manufacturing. The contribution of industry 
to total value added and employment has been on a downward path from the be-
ginning of the period examined, except for Hungary where data on value added are 
only available after 1995 and since then a slight increase is observable in the share 
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Figure 1a: The share of agriculture in value added (%)
Source: Own figure based on World Bank WDI statistics
Figure 1b: The share of agriculture in total employment (%)
Source: Own figure based on World Bank WDI statistics
of industry in GDP. The largest drop in industrial shares can be traced in the case of 
Malta in both proportions on value added and employment. These shares, however, 
are generally still far above those of Eurozone, EU and OECD averages (amounting 
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to 22% as regards value added and 22-24% as regards employment in 2017 and 2018) 
apart from Malta and Cyprus with statistics much below and to a lesser extent 
Latvia close to or below these averages (Figure 2a and 2b).
Figure 2a: The share of industry in value added (%)
Source: Own figure based on World Bank WDI statistics
Figure 2b: The share of industry in total employment (%)
Source: Own figure based on World Bank WDI statistics
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It is interesting to note that OECD countries have a larger contribution to value 
added than to employment relative to EU countries which leads to the conjecture that 
European countries use more labor-intensive procedures in industrial production. 
According to World Bank statistics, the share of the service sector in value add-
ed has essentially been growing since 1991 and stands at around 70-80% in the 
most developed countries – like typically in the G7 economies – whereas in the 
emerging Central Eastern European, South American and Asian economies this 
indicator fluctuates around 55-60%. Among the countries examined in the present 
paper, Malta and Cyprus are above the OECD average of 70% (2017 data) by some 
percentage points and significantly exceeds the EU/EMU average of 66% (2018 data) 
and Latvia is close to the European average (Figure 3a). As for the employment 
share, very similar conclusions can be drawn, after a general positive tendency typ-
ical of all the countries examined, much over the OECD and EU average of around 
72-73% are the values of Cyprus and Malta with some 80% in 2018 and Latvia is 
representing more or less the European average (Figure 3b). There is, however, 
apparent difference between the OECD and EU value added proportions in favor 
of the OECD, while almost none in employment shares. Furthermore, Romania is 
much more lagging behind in its labor market involvement in services (with its still 
less than 50% share) despite its gradual catching up as concerns its income gener-
ated by the service sector (57% in 2018). (In Hungary the services sector’s share in 
employment has continuously been lagging behind that of the OECD average by 
some 5-10 percentage points and the manufacturing sector has had more or less the 
same surplus employment share since the system change). 
Figure 3a: The share of services in value added (%)
Source: Own figure based on World Bank WDI statistics
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Figure 3b: The share of services in total employment (%)
Source: Own figure based on World Bank WDI statistics
Taking OECD industrial employment data as a basis for comparison of the num-
ber of employed workers, the gradual contraction of the agrarian sector can be de-
tected even with regard to the 2010 employment statistics, there has been an approx-
imate decrease of 4% in the number of agricultural workers in the OECD countries 
and between 5-20% in most of the G7 countries with the exception of the US and 
Italy (in G7 economies the number of persons employed in agriculture decreased 
by 26% between 2000 and 2010 and by more than 100% compared to the 1980s). In 
Central Eastern European economies agricultural employment was further falling 
between 2010 and 2018, with the exception of Hungary with a close to 30% increase, 
after a general decline since data are at all available on their sectoral employment. 
Though the number of employed persons grew both in manufacturing and services 
in the OECD countries (by 8 and 12% respectively) between 2010 and 2018, the new 
jobs created have still not made up entirely for the drop in employment in the manu-
facturing sector since the onset of the crisis whereas employment in the service sec-
tor has shown an uninterrupted increase. In manufacturing the 2008 events caused 
a strong relapse in employment in all industrialized countries, from the most de-
veloped G7 to the less developed Central Eastern European economies, while there 
was just a slight (and often rather upward) correction in employment in services. A 
general tendency – with the exception of Germany – in G7 countries is the shrink-
ing number of employed persons in manufacturing with a moderate rebound after 
2008, in contrast to Central Eastern European Countries where this sector still offers 
expanding job opportunities. The services sector employs more and more workers in 
both developed G7 and emerging European economies. 
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The sectoral rearrangement can also be observed in the EU member states in the 
last two decades. The number of agricultural workers has been permanently falling 
since 2000 (by more than 40% altogether), while there was a significant drop in 
manufacturing workplaces after the global financial crisis which is still detectable 
in the data, the number of employees in manufacturing is 7% less in the EU 28 in 
2018 compared to 2008. The service sector is continuously on the top in its contribu-
tion to job creation and value added, its share in employment has grown from 68% 
to 72% in the EU since the crisis became global. It is worth noting that in the Euro-
pean Union, the number of workplaces has exclusively grown in the service sector 
on average whereas in Hungary all three sectors, in Poland and the Czech Republic 
the manufacturing sector has also experienced an extension in the number of jobs. 
(In respect of the Eurostat domestic concept employment statistics, Malta could ac-
count for an amelioration of employment in agriculture, Latvia experienced a wors-
ening also in the service sector, and Hungary, similarly to other member states, has 
only improved its labor market figures in the different service branches).
4. Empirical testing of the relationship 
between sectoral employment and productivity
For testing the empirical relationship between own-industry productivity and 
employment a simple OLS panel regression is used. Following on Autor and Salo-
mons (2017), apart from analysis of the three sectors, agriculture, manufacturing 
and services separately, the service sector is further divided into low-tech and high-
tech categories. Manufacturing is interpreted in line with the NACE classification 
and does not include construction, water, gas and electricity. Low-tech services 
cover wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation, and food service activ-
ities, and high-tech services include information and communication, financial and 
insurance, professional, scientific and technical, administrative and support service 
activities as well as public administration, defense, education, human health, and 
social work activities, thus high-tech services also comprise public services. Con-
trary to Autor and Salomons (2017), thus education and health are not treated as an 
isolated unit. 
In the regression equation the log change of employed persons as the dependent 
variable is explained by the change of productivity (measured as GDP per employed 
person), the log change of other sectors’ employment and two dummies: one to di-
vide data series between years prior and post EU accession and one to mark the cri-
sis years, the period between 2008 and 2012, to also account for the effect of the sov-
ereign crisis. This representation of the data does not allow to measure intersectoral 
productivity spillover effects but with the inclusion of employment data outside the 
sector, the effect of general positive labor market tendencies can be partially filtered 
and also the potential movement of employees between sectors explained.
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The regression results mostly reflect the expected relationship between intrasec-
toral productivity and employment growth. In the agricultural, forestry and fishing 
sector productivity growth caused a decline in employment and other sector em-
ployment growth also influenced agricultural labor force adversely (Table 1). The 
regressions results reveal very low explanatory power of independent variables and 
low dependence of employment growth on productivity. It is worth mentioning 
that according to one of the estimates, EU accession also contributed to the reduc-
tion in the number of agricultural workers. In one of the regression equations, the 
lagged employment increase is also involved. 
Table 1: Panel regression: Agriculture (OLS, 11 countries, 21-22 time series)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
constant
productivity −0.000845853*(0.000496153)
−0.00128936***
(0.000350185)
−0.00176798***
(0.000335062)
−0.00111812**
(0.000495697)
ln dempl_other sectors −0.321023***(0.0465523)
−0.322273***
(0.0459046)
−0.318703***
(0.0467951)
−0.314906***
(0.0466369)
ln dempl (-1) 0.199015***(0.0588925)
0.213612***
(0.0578066)
dummy1 −0.00792484(0.00813355)
−0.0126827*
(0.00715581)
dummy2 −0.00318505(0.00975259)
R2 0.305696 0.300331 0.258916 0.268530
centered R2 0.085148 0.078078 0.035291 0.047806
Durbin-Watson 1.877774 1.883073 1.358312 1.388311
Notes: *10%, **5%, ***1% significance level, data in brackets under coefficients stand for standard er-
rors, time series are shortened if the lagged employment difference is included in the regression. Only 
those models were selected where the coefficient of productivity was significant.
In the manufacturing sector the presumed negative co-movement between em-
ployment and productivity, reflecting the Baumol-hypothesis, is confirmed by the 
coefficient of the panel regression (Table 2). Productivity, in this case, is significant 
at the 5% significance level if no constant is included and contrary to the agricul-
tural sector, other sectors’ employment positively affects labor force involvement 
in manufacturing. Among the two dummies, only the second variable representing 
the most severe crisis years has a significant negative coefficient. The inclusion of 
the lagged employment variable improved Durbin-Watson statistics, which suggest 
a slight positive autocorrelation of the residuals. The results of the regressions on 
the manufacturing data seem to be more reliable than those of the agricultural sec-
tor as R2 reflects, in the first case the regressors altogether account for more than 
30% of the variance of the dependent variable.
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Table 2: Panel regression: Manufacturing (OLS, 11 countries, 21-22 time series)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
constant
productivity −0.000392596*(0.000230666)
−0.000327428**
(0.000149776)
−0.000361480**
(0.000335062)
ln dempl_other sectors 0.706107***(0.0875152)
0.708561***
(0.0871004)
0.735388***
(0.0806283)
ln dempl (-1) 0.105721*(0.0595783)
0.107701*
(0.0592274)
dummy1 0.00218944 (0.00588560)
dummy2 −0.0182866*** (0.00618729)
−0.0173161***
(0.00559971)
−0.0195522***
(0.00548683)
R2 0.374316 0.373933 0.348434
centered R2 0.351312 0.350915 0.325011
Durbin-Watson 1.702500 1.696792 1.486131
Notes: *10%, **5%, ***1% significance level, data in brackets under coefficients stand 
for standard errors, time series are shortened if the lagged employment difference is 
included in the regression. Only those models were selected where the coefficient of 
productivity was significant.
In the case of the presumably more labor and less technology-intensive ‘low-
tech’ services productivity has a positive impact of employment without a constant 
and negatively with a constant, in the latter case the productivity variable has a 
coefficient with a very low significance (Table 3). In both cases, the change of em-
ployment growth to productivity is lower than 0.1% like in the case of manufactur-
ing and the crisis dummy has a significantly negative coefficient (if EU dummy is 
included, it has a positive but less significant coefficient.)
‘High-tech’ services’ labor force seems not to have been affected by the EU ac-
cession or by the global financial crisis, but it is positively influenced by productiv-
ity growth and employment in other sectors in all regression estimations (Table 4). 
In both service sectors, Durbin-Watson statistics are close to 2 signaling no auto-
correlation in residuals if the lagged change of employment variable is inserted in 
the equation (Table 3-4). The explanatory power of independent variables is higher 
in the case of ‘low-tech’ services, probably because the other artificially compiled 
sector is of a more heterogeneous character.
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Table 3: Panel regression: ‘Low-tech’ services (OLS, 11 countries, 21-22 time series)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
constant 0.0146553***(0.00413344)
productivity −0.000447870*(0.000241131)
0.000409855***
(0.000108201)
0.000502836***
(0.000107155)
ln dempl_other sectors 0.405463***(0.0491981)
0.370546***
(0.0488102)
0.392913***
(0.0478740)
ln dempl (-1) 0.122713**(0.0563927)
0.164092***
(0.0571362)
dummy1 0.00375555(0.00372674)
dummy2 −0.0161034***(0.00412187)
−0.0128535***
(0.00380272)
−0.0143571***
(0.00389812)
R2 0.413704 0.417278 0.372124
centered R2 0.399334 0.368717 0.316878
Durbin-Watson 1.956287 1.908207 1.543375
Notes: *10%, **5%, ***1% significance level, data in brackets under coefficients stand for stan-
dard errors, time series are shortened if the lagged employment difference is included in the re-
gression. Only those models were selected where the coefficient of productivity was significant.
Table 4: Panel regression: ‘High-tech’ services (OLS, 11 countries, 21-22 time series)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
constant 0.00331458 (0.00373230)
productivity 0.000407701**(0.000164004)
0.000509615***
(0.000117111)
0.000592098***
(8.35571e-05)
ln dempl_other sectors 0.272354***(0.0467173)
0.266017***
(0.0461474)
0.273698***
(0.0430379)
ln dempl (-1) 0.111069*(0.0606982)
0.108842*
(0.0606180)
0.116725*
(0.0600076)
dummy1 0.00257803 (0.00379611)
0.00394149
(0.00347017)
dummy2 −0.00212615 (0.00437034)
−0.00230631
(0.00436359)
R2 0.232895 0.379781 0.376240
centered R2 0.215848 0.230206 0.225811
Durbin-Watson 2.049674 2.041860 2.050434
Notes: *10%, **5%, ***1% significance level, data in brackets under coefficients stand for stan-
dard errors, time series are shortened if the lagged employment difference is included in the re-
gression. Only those models were selected where the coefficient of productivity was significant.
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5. Conclusion
According to the theoretical literature, the two main factors inducing sectoral 
transformation are technology-driven change in productivity and differences in in-
come elasticities of demand across sectors in which innovation plays an important 
role. The emerging European economies examined in the paper have undergone 
an apparent convergence to industrialized OECD and EU economies, with Malta 
and Cyprus having experienced even more ‘advanced’ shift towards a dominant 
services sector than the former countries on average. Latvia and Lithuania are al-
most reproducing the EU countries’ general tendencies, while the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia count to the most progressive economies due to the low 
reliance on agricultural activity. Romania and Bulgaria used to be outliers with 
their dominant agricultural sector in income terms, but this difference has dimin-
ished over time, while Romania is still largely deviating in its employment statistics 
from other European countries with a strikingly low proportion on services and 
still a somewhat more forceful presence in the agricultural sector. Following on 
the Baumol hypothesis, we can conclude in respect of the selected countries that 
in traditional branches own-industry productivity deteriorates employment, while 
the contrary holds in the services sector, especially in those subsectors where the 
use of higher technology is widespread. For a deeper understanding of structural 
processes in emerging European economies, relative price effects and intersectoral 
employment effects need to be scrutinized.
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Abstract
The creation of English for Special Purposes interactive learning environment for public administration 
students answering the goals of collaborative governance in the modern world is considered. The current 
state of ESP training of PA students at the Institute for Social Sciences (the ISS) of the Russian Presidential 
Academy of National Economy and Public Administration for the past three years had been analyzed includ-
ing the curriculum, the methods of teaching and textbooks study. The research methods included theoreti-
cal research, the methodology of empirical research and comparative research. The results of the analysis 
showed that the case study method makes it possible to create ESP interactive learning environment during 
studies to develop both foreign language competencies and collaborative governance competencies of PA 
students thus providing better communication of future civil servants with the public and stakeholders. The 
conclusion is that during the study the students acquire not only foreign language competencies but also 
professional competencies needed for collaborative governance goals among which are communication 
skills, decision-making skills, critical thinking skills, etc. Such an approach corresponds both to the modern 
networking international nature of cooperation in the field of PA and the needs of public servants’ collabo-
ration at all levels. The results of the analysis allowed us to make some recommendations for teachers and 
education managers and give some practical advice for the improvement of the educational programs for 
PA students regarding collaborative governance values.
Keywords: public administration, collaborative governance, foreign language competencies, collabora-
tive governance competencies, interactive learning environment.
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1. Introduction
New challenges in public administration (PA), PA reforms and networking, in-
ternational nature of cooperation in the field of PA in the XXI century require the 
new educational approach to collaborative governance competencies development 
of PA students. Foreign language study at the universities having PA faculties could 
be very helpful in this respect. In the author’s opinion, the creation of English for 
Special Purposes (ESP) interactive learning environment for PA students, especially 
PA master students, during ESP studies is needed not only for foreign language 
competencies development but also for collaborative governance competencies de-
velopment. This measure could make the professional development of PA students 
closer to new requirements to PA servants functioning in the conditions of collab-
orative governance, thus making their work more effective. 
For the implementation of this approach, the current state of the level of English 
language training of PA master students at the Institute for Social Sciences (the ISS) 
of Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 
(RANEPA) in Moscow had been analyzed by the author. The analysis included the 
study of the curriculum, the programs, the teaching methods, the study of the text-
book of six groups of PA master students of the ISS of RANEPA, Moscow, for the 
period of the past three years (2016-2019). Master programs analyzed concerned 
such profiles of study as state and municipal government (management in the state 
sector) and digital design in the state sector. The research methods included the-
oretical research, the methodology of empirical research, methods of comparative 
research, etc. The methods of task-based learning and the multiple-intelligence ap-
proach were used as helpful research and learning tools. 
During the research, the curriculum and the methods of teaching have been con-
sidered and then modified both to provide better communication of future civil ser-
vants with public and stakeholders, and to develop their collaborative governance 
competencies. Special attention had been paid to the case study method of ESP 
teaching because the situations produced during case studies made the students’ 
learning closer to real life and could help them in their future work.
The results of our analysis showed that the case study method made it pos-
sible to create ESP interactive learning environment during studies that allowed 
PA students to develop both their foreign language and collaborative governance 
competencies. We have found that case studies are necessary not only for teaching 
ESP at the university but also for providing a responsible and ethical performance 
of PA tasks by public servants. The conclusion was made on the results of the anal-
ysis: during the study, the students acquire not only foreign language competen-
cies but also professional competencies needed for collaborative governance goals 
among which are problem definition skills, communication skills, decision-making 
skills, critical thinking skills, problem-solving skills, etc. The results of the analysis 
allowed us to make some practical recommendations for teachers and education 
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managers and to present some practical advice for mastering the educational pro-
grams for PA master students regarding collaborative governance values.
2. Collaborative governance and communication
The term ‘collaborative governance’, which became popular over the past two 
decades, refers to the new, more effective way of collaboration between public ad-
ministration and citizens. The idea of collaborative governance is considered by 
Ansell and Gash (2008) as a response to the failures of governmental institutions 
and bureaucracy to execute proper collaboration in the network society. Ansell and 
Gash (2008) defined collaborative governance as follows: ‘A governing arrange-
ment when one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in 
collective decision-making or manage public programs or assets’ process that is 
formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement a 
public policy’. Some other authors saw the new advantages for public administra-
tion in collaboration and networking: ‘Although bureaucracies still remain, public 
administrators have begun to recognize that more can potentially be achieved by 
collaboration and networking’ (Morse and Stephens, 2012).
Collaborative governance requires better communication between all layers of 
society. In the era of globalization and internalization foreign languages is one of 
the effective means for public servants to communicate better with each other and 
with citizens. We believe that the development of foreign language competencies of 
public administrators or future public servants seems to be the best way to develop 
also their professional competencies including those needed for better communi-
cation and good collaboration between them and the citizens. Collaborative gover-
nance has become not only a widespread term. Now, in the author’s opinion, the 
practical means of collaborative governance competencies development should be 
introduced into the academic curriculum of today’s public administrators. 
One of the academicians who researched civil service in Russia and abroad, Ve-
ronika Kareva, stressed the importance of the problem of the development of for-
eign-language competencies of future public servants: ‘The institutions from the 
public sector, such as different governmental bodies, ministries, the local govern-
ment, public enterprises, the courts, and other public organizations need adminis-
trators with good communicative skills in English for their contacts with the inter-
national community and the representatives of international organizations in the 
country on topics and with vocabulary related to the field of public administration 
and politics’ (Kareva, 2013). These words apply to PA institutions of all the coun-
tries, and we should add that not only foreign-language competencies of future 
public servants should be developed during studies of foreign languages, but much 
attention should be paid to the development of professional skills of PA servants. 
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As communication at all levels of governance is the core of collaborative gover-
nance, foreign language study should also have a more practical character. That is 
why, in the author’s opinion, the professional skills of PA students should be de-
veloped through cases – the concrete life situations – as well as through examples 
taken from the collaborative activity of public service and citizens. We believe that 
the case study method is the most suitable one for the development of the com-
municative skills of the students. Still, this method should be modified following 
modern requirements for public administration work in modern society. 
3. Creating an ESP interactive learning environment 
through the case study method
The case study method is not new in teaching foreign languages, but our task 
was to modify this method so that it could serve both to the development of foreign 
language competencies of the students and to the development of the skills neces-
sary for communication of future PA servants with citizens and stakeholders. We 
think it necessary in modern conditions to modify case studies to make the process 
of learning more practical and more useful. The hypotheses of our research are 
the following: through case studies, PA students should acquire not only foreign 
language skills but professional competencies such as communication skills, de-
cision-making skills, critical thinking skills, ethical performance skills, leadership 
skills, etc. Creating ESP interactive learning environment through the case study 
method will help the teachers of foreign languages to meet the practical commu-
nicative needs of both public administrators and citizens. Besides, for providing 
interactive work of students and teachers during the study the methods of task-
based learning (Bowen, undated) and the multiple-intelligence approach (Puchta, 
undated) should be used as helpful learning tools. 
A thorough needs analysis should be carried out before study, using interviews 
of the students and questionnaires spread among them by the teachers for a better 
understanding of their needs and challenges. Before the studies, the analysis of the 
textbooks for creating an interactive learning environment should be carried out 
by the teachers to choose the most suitable one, i.e. learning material which should 
not only contain necessary tips for language study but also present popular life 
situations which are close to reality (including moral dilemmas) that could help the 
students to execute the professional and ethical performance of their duties. The 
analysis of the case studies by the students at the end of the lesson will help them 
to choose the right alternatives in their practice of communication with citizens.
Six groups of PA master students of ISS of RANEPA, Moscow, (60 persons in all 
the groups) had been chosen for our three-year analysis (two groups every year of 
study – 16/17, 17/18, 18/19). They were the representatives of all the students of PA 
master programs at the Institute for Social Sciences of RANEPA, Moscow, such as 
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state and municipal government (management in the state sector) and digital de-
sign in the state sector. Questionnaires have been compiled and distributed among 
all PA master students, and interviews had been taken of all of the students both for 
the sake of needs analysis and for monitoring the results at the end of the studies. 
Needs analysis showed us the interests and needs of the students, so we have found 
that all master programs which were built by the teacher in close collaboration 
with the profile teachers were aimed at studying public administration functioning 
in modern conditions of collaborative governance. Language tests of every student 
of the group have been also carried out before and after our case study program. 
The choice of teaching material for ESP and collaborative governance competen-
cies development was very important. For all the groups of PA master students a 
textbook called ‘Citizen-Driven Government Performance’ issued by the National 
Center for Public Productivity, Graduate Department of Public Administration of 
Rutgers University – Newark, the USA, had been used. This Center is a research and 
public service organization devoted to improving productivity in the public sector. 
The case studies highlighted in this book are the core of the ‘Citizen-Driven Perfor-
mance Measurement Curricular Project’. Course Modules are Performance, Trust, 
and Citizenship; Performance, Evaluation, and Budgeting; Managerial Behavior 
and Decision; Managerial Skills and Techniques; E-government. During studies, 
the real cases from the book have been taken. Besides, the texts from newspapers in 
English have been additionally used (Washington Post, The Guardian, The Moscow 
Times, The Economist, etc.). 
The students worked in pairs or small groups during every case study, and the 
whole group discussed every case after it had been ‘played’ at the lesson. The dis-
cussions throughout the process of a case study and the process of the case analysis 
helped the teacher to define which foreign language and collaborative governance 
competencies were learned. 
4. Using the case study method 
for foreign language competencies development
Foreign language professional competencies are based on the integration of the 
four language domains: listening, speaking, reading, and writing. Learners of ESP 
are expected to achieve these English language competencies in their discipline of 
study by the time they complete their degree. In the work ‘Dual Language Profes-
sional Competencies Performance Outcomes and Performance Indicators’ (Soltero 
and Ortiz, 2016) the foreign language competencies for students are described in 
the following way:
‘Listening: Learners understand messages spoken by others, and can listen 
carefully, using specific techniques to clarify what they have heard. Learners apply 
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listening skills as individuals and members of a group in a variety of settings such as 
lectures, discussions, conversations, team projects, presentations, and interviews.
Speaking: Learners orally communicate effectively in professional and social 
settings. Learners speak appropriately according to the situation and make mes-
sages understood, using correct grammar, sentence structure, tone, expression, and 
emphasis.
Reading: Learners read fluently, comprehend, and acquire knowledge through 
a broad range of written materials, both traditional and electronic print, on their 
discipline. Learners use strategies and processes for constructing meaning before, 
during, and after reading.
Writing: Learners demonstrate their knowledge through writing for a variety 
of audiences and purposes through different writing styles that include standard 
rhetoric themes, business letters and reports, financial proposals, and technical and 
professional communications. Learners develop high-levels of writing skills and 
produce documents that show planning and organization as well as conveying ef-
fectively the intended message and meaning’.
First of all, before starting the process of teaching we have analyzed the cur-
rent state of PA master students’ readiness to use case studies in their work at the 
lessons, so foreign language skills evaluation had been provided. For this purpose, 
we applied the Common European Framework (IELTS level). Other tests of foreign 
language command of the students may be also used for this purpose. Learners 
demonstrated the above-mentioned foreign language competencies which allowed 
them to work with cases successfully. The development of all the above-mentioned 
foreign language competencies continued in the classroom during case studies, so 
we can say that a case-study method is used both for developing foreign language 
competencies and also for developing the competencies for collaborative gover-
nance model cases. We assume that learning new terminology, for example, as lists 
of terms, is ineffective. Using the cases for collaborative governance model, PA 
students do not only learn and apply terminology, but they are taught how to op-
erate these or that terms in different working situations. Listening and speaking 
during communication in the process of case studies reproduction make it possible 
to develop the corresponding foreign language competencies. Reading and writing 
in the course of studying cases develop skills for the work of public administrators 
with documents and written applications of citizens. Thus, the case study method 
may be considered to be one of the best suitable methods for developing all for-
eign language competencies. We have found that the implementation of case-study 
method had proved its effectiveness in foreign language study in general and ESP 
study of PA master students, in particular; so we can strongly recommend this 
method for teachers of ESP at PA faculties of universities as one of the best one for 
teaching ESP at PA faculties. 
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5. Using the case-study method 
for collaborative governance competencies development 
We have found that the case study method is one of the most effective ways of 
developing foreign language competencies. Our analysis proved that the case study 
method is good not only for this purpose; it is also suitable for collaborative gover-
nance competencies development. This fact makes this method even more valuable 
for learners and teachers. We suggested that this method of teaching is very helpful 
in the professional development of students, as they acquire not only above-men-
tioned foreign language competencies (listening, speaking, reading and writing), 
but also many competencies needed for their future work as public servants in 
modern conditions of collaborative governance. We know that collaborative gover-
nance principles require that public administration graduates should possess good 
communicative skills and understand the government and the nonprofit sector’s 
discourse with the community. Such forms of case study as collective problem solv-
ing, group discussions and the analysis of real-life cases could be of great help in 
mastering communicative and other professional skills of PA students. The main 
goal of applying all these forms of work is to encourage students to speak freely on 
a subject by setting clear communicative tasks.
During our analysis, we have found that thorough examination of particular 
cases by the students and final discussions of real-life cases allow them to acquire 
such competencies needed for collaborative governance as problem definition, crit-
ical thinking, problem-solving, communication skills, best practices’ analysis skills, 
decision-making skills, skills for work with documents, ethical performance skills, 
leadership skills, etc. 
We have found in our research that the case study method requires several mea-
sures to be taken during creating an interactive learning environment for PA stu-
dents. 
1. The common level of English for the students. The current state of PA 
master students’ readiness to use case studies in their work at the lessons is 
necessary so the evaluation of foreign language command of the students 
should be provided. Tests IELTS or some other tests should be carried out be-
fore case study method implementation.
2. The consultations with profile teachers. The consultations with profile 
teachers concerning the curriculum and the program of study for PA students 
(PA master students in our case) should be provided. 
3. Needs analysis. Before proceeding to cases, we should carry out needs anal-
ysis after distributing the detailed questionnaire among the students or inter-
viewing them. Interviewing or questionnaires should include a wide array of 
questions. (The example of the questionnaire is given in Appendix I). Thus, the 
teachers could understand better what particular area of PA the students are
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 working or planning to work for. The teachers should have a clear vision of PA 
students’ actual working environment for the moment. They should also make a 
forecast for the future to define what language competencies and collaborative 
governance competencies are needed.
4. Teaching material for the learners. To develop the competencies needed it is 
very important to choose teaching material for the learners. Case studies in 
the field of public service should be carefully chosen both for foreign language 
competencies and for all collaborative governance competencies development. 
For example, after a thorough analysis of several textbooks, we used the text-
book Citizen-Driven Government Performance (undated) and several English 
language newspapers. The contents of the book contain problem definition, deci-
sion-making, problem-solving elements, so it was useful for our tasks. 
5. Selection of the most typical working situations. For the most effective ac-
ademic results, we should select the most typical working situations, thus 
providing a simulation of the working environment of the students. To select the 
most appropriate cases we can use some ready-made cases from the textbook or 
use newspapers for this purpose. Before the implementation of the case study 
method and choosing this or that case we should ask ourselves how this or that 
case contributes to the development of collaborative competencies development. 
6. Using particular terminology for the case. As V. Kareva puts it, ‘the teachers 
may create an effective learning environment using particular terminology 
for the case, so the students will use an audience-centered language and provide 
reader-friendly documents for their future career. Feedbacks (after case-studies) 
help teachers and students to evaluate the effectiveness of the study, to under-
stand clearly all the difficulties and discrepancies in problem-solving’ (Kareva, 
2013). For a better understanding of the students’ future professional environ-
ment, the teachers of ISS at RANEPA compared best Russian or European prac-
tices (mostly of neighboring countries). Thus, the case-studies may help gradu-
ates to avoid linguistic discrepancies in the future.
7. Encouraging the students to express their opinion without fear of mis-
take. During the study, the students worked in pairs or small groups. So to-
gether with the students, we had been creating a specific learning environment, 
the context in which they were supposed to operate; we encouraged them to 
express their opinion without fear of mistake, to immerse deeper in the 
environment. Some situations with moral dilemmas had been considered and 
analyzed to provide the ethical performance of PA servants’ duties.
8. The task-based learning (TBL) method (Bowen, undated) and the multiple 
intelligence (MI) method (Puchta, undated) in the case study should be used. 
Task-based learning provides focusing on meaning and reflects real life. To fully 
understand the situation described in the case we applied the multiple intelli-
gence method.
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9. The final analysis of the case by the students. The final analysis of the 
case by the students is not less important than the case itself. The students ex-
press their opinions, experiences and share their visions of real-life situations. 
This analysis helps them to understand better the specific character of work in 
public administration and contributes to the development of their professional 
competencies.
6. Results of the study and recommendations for practitioners
The new interdependent and diverse character of governments’ and public sec-
tor organization’s work, the need for responsible and ethical performance of PA 
tasks for public servants require the development of collaborative competencies 
of future public administrators. We can say after our analysis that there exists 
a gap between teaching only ESP by case study method and developing mostly 
foreign language competencies of PA students, and the new vision of teaching 
ESP for PA students regarding the development of their collaborative competen-
cies. Our analysis for the first time concerns the use of collaborative governance 
cases for teaching ESP for PA students. During our research, we have found that 
though the curriculum contents at ISS, RANEPA, Moscow, in recent years had 
undergone some changes in foreign language competencies development, master 
programs for PA students still require changes and modifications as far as collab-
orative governance competencies development is concerned. We introduced into 
the curriculum of PA master students the case studies which helped them to devel-
op such collaborative governance competencies as communication skills, critical 
thinking skills, problem definition skills, decision-making skills, problem-solving 
skills, teamwork skills, ethical performance skills, etc. During teaching ESP for 
PA students at ISS, RANEPA, Moscow, ESP interactive learning environment was 
created making it possible to develop both ESP foreign language competencies and 
the competencies for the collaborative governance model. According to interviews 
with master students of 6 groups (60 persons), the following results presented in 
Table 1 below were obtained. 
Taking into account global intercultural competence, challenges, concerns, and 
reforms described in English, as well as the term global governance itself and its 
meaning (communication at all levels), we used English as lingua franca. There-
fore, we think it is really important to provide comprehensive knowledge models 
of teaching ESP for future public administrators as well as for the practitioners 
having their retraining programs. The hypothesis of the research was that when 
teaching ESP we should not only focus on the terms and collocations reflecting the 
definitions but work in the interactive ESP learning environment and collaborative 
governance context which implied communication at all levels. We interviewed 
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the graduates about the collaborative governance skills which they had acquired 
during case study method implementation. The overall results showed that most of 
the master students of ISS of RANEPA, Moscow, (81% of the first profile of master 
students and 77% of the second profile of master students), had achieved collabora-
tive governance competencies during the case studies.
The model of interactive learning environment for PA students had been im-
plemented at the ISS of RANEPA, Moscow. The results of the study showed that 
the case study method makes it possible to develop both foreign language compe-
tencies and collaborative governance competencies of the students when ESP in-
teractive learning environment during studies had been created. Some recommen-
dations for practitioners should be given for better implementation of case study 
method for developing collaborative competencies by case study method: choosing 
the common level of the students to start with (IELTS or other tests); providing 
consultations with profile teachers concerning the program; the analysis of PA stu-
dents’ needs; the right choice of teaching material; the selection of the most typical 
working situations; the particular terminology for the cases; creating the specific 
interactive learning environment; task-based learning and multiple intelligence in 
a case study; and the final analysis of cases by the students. 
Table1: Competencies and skills achieved 
by master program graduates through learning case-studies (according to interview results)
Competencies and skills achieved 
by master program graduates 
through learning case-studies 
Management in state 
sector graduates 
(3 groups of students – 
32 persons)
Digital design graduates 
(3 groups of students – 
28 persons)
Problem definition 87% 81%
Decision making 93% 90%
Ethical performance 87% 90%
Critical thinking skills 84% 87%
Problem-solving 87% 78%
Citizen involvement 93% 84%
Personal development of a civil servant 93% 81%
Leadership skills 87% 87%
Best practices use 93% 87%
Teamwork skills 87% 84%
Communication skills 93% 87%
Overall Information 81% 77%
Source: Author’s calculations
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7. Conclusion
The conclusion of our analysis is the following: collaborative governance val-
ues require that the process of teaching ESP for PA students should be organized 
so that during the study the students should acquire not only foreign language 
competencies but also professional competencies needed for collaborative gover-
nance goals. Among these competencies are problem definition skills, communi-
cation skills, critical thinking skills, problem-solving skills, decision-making skills, 
ethical performance skills, leadership skills, teamwork skills, etc. (the most im-
portant skills are listed in Table 1). Such an approach corresponds both to the mod-
ern networking international nature of cooperation in the field of PA and to the 
needs of public servants’ communication with citizens at all levels. In the author’s 
opinion, the case study method is the most suitable for this purpose. Methodical 
approach for introducing the case studies for global governance competencies and 
skills development of PA students into the curriculum might be the best effective 
and productive comprehensive tool for developing collaborative governance com-
petencies thus contributing to the collaborative governance principal idea. The 
results of the research allowed us to make some recommendations for teachers 
and education managers concerning the implementation of the case study method. 
Some practical advice is given for the improvement of the academic curriculum 
and educational programs for PA students regarding collaborative governance 
values in conditions of global challenges and PA reforms. We believe that it is of 
crucial importance that both researchers and practitioners working in the modern 
international environment should change the academic curriculum for public ad-
ministration students to develop collaborative governance competencies during 
foreign language study. 
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APPENDIX I
Questionnaire for PA master students’ needs analysis
1. What is your background? Have you studied PA before (bachelor’s degree)? If 
not, why have you decided to study it?
2. What area of PA are you planning to work at (working already)? Why? If yes, 
please, write about your department. If not, please, say a few words about your 
current area.
3. Are you planning to work in the Public Administration Department? What de-
partment?
4. Are you planning to work in your country or abroad? 
5. What position do you want to obtain?
6. What qualification, in your opinion, do you need to obtain this position?
7. What languages are needed for this position? 
8. What specific vocabulary (area) do you need?
9. Are you going to work with foreign colleagues? Are you working with them 
already? If yes, please mention.
10. What kind of foreign language communication are you planning to have? What 
kind of communication do you have now: friends, foreign partners, etc.?
11. What qualification do you have how?
12. Quality of life indicators – for you?
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APPENDIX 2
The problems to be discussed at the lesson in the frames of the develop-
ment of global governance competencies:
Describe a good communicator. Think of a good communicator you know. Explain 
why he/she is good at communicating. What makes a good communicator? What 
factors are important for communication? When did you last have a communica-
tion problem? Who was it with? What techniques do you use to explain complicat-
ed things?
Principles of communication. What factors are important for communication? 
What do you think is more important for good communication: fluency in the lan-
guage, an extensive vocabulary, or being a good listener?
Advantages and disadvantages of e-mail vs phone and face to face meetings. What 
are the advantages and disadvantages of using e-mail? What irritates you most 
about the forms of communication mentioned? Do you think communication is 
generally best-done face-to-face?
Why is building relationships important? What are the most important relation-
ships for you a) at your place of work/study, b) outside your place of work/study? 
Why? Give an example of a person you know who is good at building relationships 
with citizens. How does he/she do this?
What is networking? Is networking an essential way of establishing good relation-
ships? 
What are the best indicators of an individual’s level of success? What do you think 
makes people successful (Charisma, discipline, drive, imagination, looks, luck, mon-
ey, etc.)? What is being successful in your opinion?
Job satisfaction. Why is it important? What is being successful in your opinion? 
What are the best indicators of success? Do you think job satisfaction makes a 
person happy? Are you satisfied with your job? What do you find satisfying and 
frustrating about your work or studies? Would you prefer a male or female boss or 
teacher?
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Abstract
Citizens are the exponents of conceptualizations in the administrative, political and judiciary fields 
such as courts and legislation applied in administration. The control exercised by the courts can only verify 
the legality of administrative acts, not their opportunity. Political parties, organized in accordance with the 
electoral systems, based on candidates lists and uninominal vote, participate in the race for power. The 
managers of the administrative units with their apparatus represent the executive component of the local 
public administration. Whereas on the central level ‘the political controls the administrative’, as the condi-
tions regarding the positions of central institutions can be negotiated between the political groups, on the 
local level, in exchange for supporting certain candidates, management positions (in departments, sections, 
decentralized services in the territory) can be requested. 
The arguments of the close connection between the political and the juridical field is proved by the 
extreme reduction of politics specificity. This can be called legal imperialism. On the other hand, certain 
political practices - specific to non-democratic regimes - have cultivated the political imperialism, which 
supports the idea that the holders of political power are above the law. Such approaches have led to major 
consequences: the so-called juridicisation and judiciarisation of politics, as a result of the politization of the 
judiciary system - aspects well illustrating the present reality of tension among powers. 
Keywords: legality / opportunity, administrative contentious justice and courts, juridical / political impe-
rialism, juridicisation / judiciarisation of politics, politisation of the judiciary system.
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1. Introduction. Citizens: exponents of conceptualizations 
in the administrative, political and juridical field
Each citizen of a state, in accordance with universal human rights rules, has 
the right to security and protection, freedom of conscience, assembly and associa-
tion, freedom of speech and expression, etc. Obviously, we refer to the states that 
recognize these norms and strive to provide them, by justice also, but when these 
rights are violated for objective reasons, many states have difficulties in ensuring 
the observance of human rights and human dignity. Hence the need for structures 
and institutions exercising these powers, namely a well-structured administrative 
system or mechanism.
Man is not therefore a subject separated from the state mechanism, as citizen he 
has the levers for improving administration, so that the tasks regarding the achieve-
ment of the public interest, the security and the protection can be performed in an 
optimal and efficient time. The citizen is by nature the exponent of these social con-
ceptualizations from the area of the administrative, political and legal phenomenon 
(including both the courts of law and a coherent legislation applied by them).
As regards the ‘political’ concept, Aristotle stated: ‘we are all political beings 
by nature’. The state administration on all levels aims at organizing social life as a 
whole and at coordinating all the processes related to resources, directions of de-
velopment, public order, observance of coexistence rules on the community level 
as well as to promote the interests of that community and of its members. Citizens 
form the civil servants’ apparatus, and the conditions and the possibility of receiv-
ing this responsibility or merit are guaranteed to them by the Constitution.
The ‘political’ term has a complex connotation and aspects depending on the 
subjects using it, and the manner in which it is perceived by different categories of 
citizens. Depending on how they define the politics, citizens actually show the level 
of political culture and socialization, but political culture is precisely the creation of 
a characteristic way of perceiving and interpreting the world (Mathews, 1999, p. 45).
The right to association is consecrated in the Constitution. Political parties, 
based on the various electoral systems ensure this right and, through the lists of 
candidates or uninominal vote, participate in the race for power. 
On the local level, the local elections are held, in accordance with the electoral 
law and the legislation on local public administration, with party lists or with in-
dependent candidates and then we elect the councilors in the local councils, their 
number varying according to the number of inhabitants in the respective territorial 
unit; the mayors of these territorial-administrative units are elected in the same 
manner. Independent candidates must submit supporters’ lists, a percentage of the 
number of citizens with voting rights of the respective territorial-administrative 
unit. So, only in the case of independent candidates, they are not indebted to a 
political formation. Both the mayors and the leaders of the administrative units 
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with their administrative apparatus represent the executive component of the local 
public administration, who implement the decisions of the local councils. Regard-
less of the political party to which the local elected members belong, they must 
represent the interests of the entire community and contribute to the achievement 
of the general public interest. They designate the members of the operation team, 
usually loyal people with whom they think they can collaborate effectively. In this 
appointment, as a rule, people of the same political color may be favored, but there 
are cases when these leaders keep in office persons of a different political color. This 
is due either to the professionalism of those employees, or to the fact that the re-
spective manager does not currently have another candidate prepared to take over 
the responsibilities of the respective position.
In this situation, the relationship of the administrative with the political is obvi-
ous, although the situation varies from one case to another. When we say that ‘the 
political conditions the administrative’ we refer to the fact that, whereas in the cen-
tral organisms the conditions regarding the positions in central institutions can be 
negotiated between political parties, on the local level, in exchange for supporting 
the candidacy of a person, some management positions may be requested.
The appointment in public office should be based on competition, as required 
by law, which in reality is not properly applied. The law stipulates that the public 
office positions whose holders cannot belong to political parties are established 
by organic law. This means that, even if a citizen is a member of the party, he 
can participate in the contest organized by a public authority, and the affiliation 
to a political formation is not a criterion in this respect. Article 16: (3) provides 
that ‘the public office positions and dignities, civil or military, can be filled accord-
ing to the law, by persons who are Romanian citizens and reside in the country’. 
(4) ‘In the context of Romania’s accession to the European Union, the citizens of the 
Union who meet the requirements of the organic law have the right to elect and to 
be elected in the local public administration authorities’. Art. 37: (1) ‘Citizens with 
voting rights who meet the conditions set out in Article 16 (3) have the right to be 
elected, unless their association in political parties is prohibited, in accordance with 
Article 40 (3)’ (The Constitution of Romania). Art. 40: (3) – Right of association – 
provides that ‘The Constitutional Court judges, the Ombudsmen, the magistrates, 
the active members of the army, the police and other categories of civil servants 
established by the organic law cannot join political parties’.
In practice these competitions for occupying a vacant position are often eluded, 
or the objectivity of the evaluation commissions leaves much to be desired, the 
most loyal candidate and not necessarily the most competent being favored. These 
are just a few aspects of some forms of corruption in the local, but also central, pub-
lic administration. Citizens want to be led by competent people both on the central 
and the local level, and politics is the ‘corridor’ setting the mechanisms by which 
teams are formed in the public administration. 
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Therefore, the relationship between the administrative and the political sectors, 
usually perceived in a critical and pejorative way by ordinary citizens must be ad-
dressed, even if it is a working mechanism of the rule of law, in the sense of improv-
ing the electoral legislation and the depoliticization of some activities and tasks of 
the local public administration. The purpose of these activities is to contribute in 
a transparent and objective manner to democracy, not to promote the interests of 
political parties.
It is often the case that inappropriate officials are elected, when the strategies of 
their supporting parties are to be blamed, either if they have no better candidates, 
which is hard to believe, or if they have a greater influence on the leading circles 
of the party. 
We consider this relation-related issue to be a problem because only some key 
positions in the system are pursued, and the parties ignore the strategies meant to 
prepare a structure meant to ensure specialists trained for all positions in the insti-
tution, in the hypothetical case that they were to win the elections by 100%. 
This would avoid a series of scandals and phenomena that usually occur when 
there is a position to fill and it has not been determined in advance who deserves to 
occupy it on clearly defined criteria within the party for this position.
‘In such situations, civil society should be much stronger in pressuring public 
authorities to comply with the law, but also to show respect and trust in citizens’ 
(Dandiş, 2012).
As part of a strategy for the state development in the medium and long run, 
society must include objectives for the electoral system modernization and the op-
eration of the political bodies according to clear ethics principles and codes. They 
are meant to enable citizens to clearly understand the mechanisms and the political 
system and to allow a professionalism development clearly showing the route but 
also the policy-free relation with the administrative.
The modernization and proper functioning of an electoral system adequate to 
reality would also ensure an understanding by the citizens of the relationship be-
tween the political and the administrative. Rules are difficult to change within the 
ruling parties in the sense of creating a route that can enable anyone, just on the 
basis of merit, to be recruited and promoted without depending on a political party, 
a group that easily changes the rules and the people if they do not comply with the 
interests of the group or of specific people.
Another very important topic is the role of ethical codes of conduct within state 
institutions and any entity as a matter of fact, a requirement that could still be in-
cluded in a master strategic document for the country, which would also be a mech-
anism for finding the forms of deviation and even of corruption in their early stage.
The role of the academic environment to secure society’s sustainable develop-
ment is another important factor in the strategic planning of a community or na-
tion. The relation of this environment with the administrative and the economic, 
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their connection with the juridical environment, with society and the juridical and 
political institutions of the state in the present conditions, becomes very important 
although neither the academic environment – alone – nor the other social stake-
holders can directly solve the social issues, they can do it only by a joint endeavor.
The solutions to a number of problems locally, nationally and internationally 
can come from the very cooperation of all the factors of these directions and must 
be provided in the documents and strategies of the country as a priority. These 
relationships, along with the contribution of the academic environment, can assist 
the strategic planning of the communities and the development of the rule of law. 
This idea should start from establishing partnerships and collaborative agreements. 
These should include tasks and provisions for concrete mutual support between all 
the parties, with the participation of specialists. The latter should provide concrete 
analyses and studies in the making of the national impact decisions. 
People’s reluctance and conservative reaction when hearing the terms politics 
and administration is largely due to the low level of political culture, on the one 
hand, or to the increased level of corruption and incompetence in political, adminis-
trative and juridical institutions, on the other hand. For example, the failure to solve 
problems, serious or stringent issues, insufficient presence of competent leaders or 
officials in the administrative or political field proving correctness, competence, 
verticality, lead to the lack of confidence in these areas. Mostly, the political ‘ap-
pears in the form of a court specialized in mediation and arbitration of conflicts’ 
(Hastings, 2000, p. 7), or politics as a whole is defined as ‘conflict, confrontation and 
competition’ (Mathews, 1999, p. 43). Also in the context of defining political culture, 
another definition forwarded by Michel Hastings can be outlined; he believed that 
political culture represents ‘a set of norms, beliefs and knowledge that link social 
behaviors, confer a function to each action and allow individuals to grant a mean-
ing to the experience of their relationships with the governing power’ (Mathews, 
1999, p. 40). We often hear the phrase ‘I have nothing to do with politics’ or other 
such formulations. In principle there are two aspects that justify this position: ei-
ther people do not know that any public activity in any institution is political – as 
politics represents a set of measures, decisions, strategies, action plans – actions 
that have the purpose of achieving all the functions of a modern public manage-
ment; or people confuse terms, interpreting ‘politics’ by ‘party’, with no clear dis-
tinction between them.
A simple example of political socialization is the participation of citizens in the 
electoral process, which involves civic engagement and the delegation of legitimacy 
and power to the representatives (Shively, 1997, pp. 110-121). In 1991, a study was 
conducted in the USA called the Harwood Study, under the leadership of Richard 
Harwood, titled ‘Citizens and politics’, for the purpose of observing the attitude of 
American citizens towards politics. According to this study, people consider the 
entire political process to be corrupt and that it has nothing to do with resolutions 
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that interest people, or serve the public interest, and many of these citizens feel 
that part of the responsibility for this disgust with politics is borne by the press 
(Matthews, 1999, p. 26).
The writer Carlos Fuentes defines politics as a ‘public expression of private pas-
sions’, a close interdependence between the motivation of the politician through an 
active participation in the life of a political formation, and the sense of critical activ-
ity on the subjects and the object of the policy. Although the politics of politicians 
– he says – is not necessarily ‘bad’ politics, even though many people cannot find 
their place there, and citizens’ politics is not necessarily the ‘good’ one, although 
considered more ‘accessible’, both types of politics however are subject to corrup-
tion and produce their own forms of frustration (Matthews, 1999, pp. 153, 165). We 
share the opinion that politics is not necessarily dirty, but ‘the attitude of politicians 
is decisive, whether politics employs ethical tools or not’ and therefore the image of 
the political field in general is the result or expression of the political class quality, 
which is also true for justice.
2. The politics-law (political-legal) relation
This relation was deeply marked by the institutionalist vision, which led to the 
so-called juridical imperialism, namely to the reduction or annulment of the pol-
itics specificity. On the other hand, certain political practices – those specific to 
non-democratic, dictatorial regimes – have cultivated the so-called imperialism of 
the politics, considering that the holders of the supreme political power are above 
the law. Such approaches have led to major consequences: the so-called juridici-
sation and judicialisation of politics, resulting in the politicization of the judiciary 
system – aspects that illustrate the current reality of tension among powers. The 
phenomenon of the social life juridicisation consists in the massive enactment of 
legal norms in the quasi-diversity of the social fields, which can generate litigation. 
In correlation with this phenomenon we are witnessing a massive recourse to the 
courts of law to decide on the issues on which, previously, they would not have to 
decide (the phenomenon of judiciarisation) (Pivniceru and Tudose, 2011).
Without denying the progress made by the legal activism, the specialized doc-
trine critically analyses certain excessive actions that unbalance the powers in the 
state. For example, one criticized the attempt of imperialist extension of the jurid-
ical rationality over the other rationalities of the social systems (Tietz, 2019). The 
criticism is based on the theories of well-known authors such as Niklas Luhmann 
or Marcelo Neves, who envisage society as a complex communication system, 
characterized by multicentricity. In their opinion society has several autonomous 
subsystems, which reproduce from their own codes of distinction (autopoiesis). 
Only autopoiesis, writes Niklas Luhmann, ‘in the strict understanding of the word 
autopoiesis, does not say anything about dependence or independence in relation to 
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the environment’. Therefore, in the application to social systems, in modern society 
an economic system, a system of law or a political system are largely independent, 
but to the same extent dependent on the environment (Marga, 2019).
The legal system, for instance, makes the distinction between the legal and the 
illegal code and its autonomy in maintaining this distinction, which differentiates 
it from the political system, which is reproduced by the power code, not necessar-
ily through the dichotomy (government power versus opposition). In other words, 
although each system tends to impose its own way of describing reality, there is 
no system possessing the ultimate truth. For example, economists want to explain 
everything that happens in society through economic reasons, based on to have or 
not to have … Jurists, in turn, tend to believe that law can solve any social problem. 
However, global society is hypercomplex and multicentric, and this means that no 
matter how hard do imperialist tendencies of one systemic rationality try to overlap 
the other, there is not, in all the complexity that surrounds us, a single center that 
can have a privileged position to observe and describe society. Therefore, there is 
no dominant social system, no system from which all the others derive. There are 
many codes meant to guide communication in different social fields, such as: ‘to 
have / not to have’ – in the economic field; true / false’, fair / unfair, legal / illegal – 
in the field of law; ‘beautiful / ugly’ in the vision of the arts; ‘approval / disapproval’ 
in the field of education, etc. Each system has its rationality and this is just one of 
the possible ways of seeing the world. The rationality of the legal system, for ex-
ample, is justice, and that of the political system is democracy. However, there are 
mutual attempts at imperialism in these two subsystems, generating a tension be-
tween justice and democracy. This kind of tension is also present in the interaction 
between the state powers, contrary to the logic of the harmony propagated by the 
classical political theory (Ramos, 2019). 
In this context, we understand judiciarisation and juridicisation as ‘two concep-
tualised social phenomena that are likely to influence the imperative condition of 
any jurisdictional system’ (Pivniceru and Tudose, 2011) and that of any political 
system. This aspect is considered as an imperialist attempt at legal rationality over 
political rationality, leading to a process of unidirectional self-regulation (Gunther 
Teubner’s conception) incompatible with the complexity of society, as it tries, in 
a partial view, to provide universal solutions. But rational justice cannot to solve 
problems related to economy, world hunger, lack of resources, environment, etc. In 
other words, the law does not solve everything … but this aspect requires broader 
discussions, which can be continued under multiple aspects in the future, in diverse 
periods (Ramos, 2019). That is why the systems theory states that modern society 
is multicentric, meaning that ‘each distinct system’ can be considered or may thus 
become ‘the center of the world’. Polycontexturality implies, therefore, a multitude 
of self-descriptions of society, which leads to the formation of various partial con-
flicting rationalities (Ramos, 2019). 
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This past decade exhibited an intensity of new works on the notion of empire 
in political theory and the history of political thought, the place of empire in the 
thinking of many authors and in the formation of modern liberalism and related 
arenas, such as colonial and post-colonial societies as well as international law. 
The return of political theory to the empire has been restricted in comparison with 
other areas, such as history, literature and anthropology (Pitts, 2010).
Undoubtedly, in a democratic regime, political power supposes the presence of 
the juridical power, in the sense of observing the juridical norms, both in the de-
cision-making nuances (on the level of the political decision) and in the process of 
applying the legally adopted decisions (the execution of the legal norms).
The most conclusive expression of the connection between politics and law, also 
including the act of justice, is constituted by the rule of law - concept shaped since 
the second half of the eighteenth century, as a reaction to the absolutist, despotic 
state, which has undergone successive foundations and reconsiderations ever since. 
Nowadays one considers that the definition of the rule of law is insufficient if it 
contains the mere description of the rule of law, arguing that it is necessary that 
‘the law should be given content inspired by the idea of promoting human rights 
and freedoms’. It follows that the rule of law is a guarantor of citizens’ freedom – 
specifying that freedom must be kept in balance with social order. 
On the other hand, the rule of law, eliminating arbitrary and dictatorial practic-
es, implies the responsibility of politicians, magistrates and civil servants, according 
to the requirements of the rule of law. ‘Nobody and nothing is above the law’ im-
plies therefore that no one should be able to evade from the observance of the law, 
its correct application or from the consequences of its non-observance.
At the same time, democracy, by the well-known principle of separation of state 
powers and the check and balance system, and of the institutions through which 
power is exercised, determines an approach of the political distinct from the ju-
ridical. Whereas the legislative initiative, the adoption of laws (Parliament) and 
their application (Government / executive power) are activities in which the two 
dimensions (political and juridical) are combined, the exercise of the judiciary pow-
er requires the independence and neutrality of the political factor as an essential 
condition of its objectivity. An interesting approach in the political-juridical con-
text is also that of ‘trans-democracy’ and ‘trans-constitutionalism’ and, obviously, 
that of their limits. Trans-constitutionalism refers to the fact that several juridical 
orders of the same type or different are involved simultaneously with the same 
constitutional aspect or case, that is to say with a problem or a certain subjective 
law, regarding the basic rights or the legal limitation and the control of the political 
power. The constitutional problems thus go beyond the state and entangle several 
juridical orders, although there is no new constitution in this context. Consequent-
ly, it underlines the limits of trans-constitutionalism in an asymmetrical world so-
ciety, in order to look for new alternatives beyond it. Two alternatives are consid-
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ered: post-constitutionalism, which requires the transcendence of today’s world 
society and thus denies constitutionalism in general, and trans-democracy, which 
is quite immanent for the social formation of individuals and which claims to be 
complementary to trans-constitutionalism. As the second alternative is preferred, 
an approach to trans-democracy that goes beyond the borders of the state and be-
yond ‘we, the people’, i.e. popular sovereignty, is outlined in order to emphasize 
the sustainable reaction capacity of other people in the same world society. It is a 
question pertaining to the sustainability of democracy. In this context, an ecological 
approach to democracy is developed based on Niklas Luhmann’s theory of systems, 
but from a heterodox and critical perspective (Neves, 2019).
The law reaches its purpose and becomes effective only insofar as its provisions 
are respected on the basis of the principle of legality. Political and administrative 
acts must also have a legal character, but in order to be fully effective they must 
be adapted to the concrete conditions, so that they become appropriate or current. 
The question of opportunity arises with regard to non-jurisdictional administrative 
acts, as in the case of all acts of power of this kind, except the law, which is consid-
ered to be always appropriate while it is in force. The opportunity is evaluated ac-
cording to several criteria: the moment of act adoption, the circumstances in which 
it is intended to be applied, the material means that the application entails but also 
the compliance with the purpose of the law. 
The current administrative code regulates the general framework and the prin-
ciples for the organization and functioning of public administration authorities and 
institutions. In the first part – General provisions; Title III – General principles 
applicable to public administration – Article 6 stipulates the principle of legality 
according to which ‘the authorities and institutions of the public administration, as 
well as their staff, have the obligation to act in compliance with the legal provisions 
in force and the international treaties and conventions to which Romania is a party’ 
(Government of Romania, 2019).
If when it comes to the legality of administrative acts, the assessment of this 
quality is done by referring the act in question to the juridical act with higher force, 
including the law (Draganu, 1970, p. 107), when it comes to the appreciation of its 
opportune character, such a precise reference criterion is missing. Thus, a superior 
legal act can be legal and timely, and a lower act, though issued based on and in 
compliance with a superior act, may be inappropriate or out of date. 
The notion of opportunity is considered to be the characteristic of the juridical 
act that defines a specific feature of it also called present relevance (Diaconu, 2019). 
The present relevance of a juridical act expresses the full agreement, within the 
limits of the law, of the act with the tasks entrusted to the administrative bodies. 
It conveys the agreement between the law and the constantly changing needs of 
society. On the contrary, we consider inopportune the act which, although legally 
by the content of its provisions, contravenes to the specific situations and does not 
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correspond to the reality in which and for which it is applied. Such an act always 
lacks present relevance even though it is legal. The issue of the administrative acts’ 
opportunity is closely related to the right of appreciation of the state administra-
tion bodies, which represents a faculty recognized by law for these subjects of law 
in choosing the most appropriate solutions for the effective application of the law.
The opportunity can be defined as an element closely related to the right of ap-
preciation of the administrative bodies, during the organization and execution of 
the law, which ensures the accomplishment of their legal tasks and attributions in 
the optimal term, with minimum expenses and in accordance with the means that 
best correspond to the purpose of the law. 
As the administrative act must be in accordance with the content of the law, the 
condition of the administrative act validity implies the conformity of its content 
with the hypothesis, the disposition and the sanction of the juridical norms. In 
establishing the conformity of the administrative acts with the legal norms, the dif-
ferent legal force of the normative juridical acts must be taken into account. Thus, 
in order to be valid, an administrative act must be compliant with both the law and 
the normative administrative acts with superior legal force.
As the administrative act must also be compliant with the purpose of the law 
or with the public interest pursued by the law, the literature has shown that the 
purpose of the law, namely the public interest – is an element of legality, and the 
means for achieving a purpose are aspects of opportunity. The opportunity, the 
right of appreciation or the discretionary power of the authorities of the public ad-
ministration, represents a certain freedom enjoyed by the public administration in 
the activity of organizing the execution and the concrete enforcement of the laws, 
aiming to ensure the conformity between the legal norms and the ever changing 
needs of society. The limits of the right of appreciation enjoyed by the public ad-
ministration are set by the law itself, and exceeding these limits attracts the inva-
lidity of the issued act, the act becoming illegal. Therefore, an act considered to be 
timely but illegal cannot be valid, since the opportunity can exist only within the 
limits of the law (Conformity, 2019). In other words, public administration can have 
only a discretionary power limited by law.
The legality and timeliness of administrative acts are controlled by the hierar-
chically superior public administration bodies, which may order the revocation and 
cancellation of the inopportune or illegal acts. 
3. The control exercised by the administrative contentious courts 
over the administrative acts of the public administration
With regard to the control exercised by the courts or the judicial bodies, they 
can only verify the legality of the administrative acts, not their opportunity. If, in 
principle, an administrative act cannot be annulled by the administrative conten-
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tious court on the grounds of opportunity, it may be annulled for excess of power, 
when the administration has exceeded the limits of its right of appreciation. During 
the legality check, the judge must verify that the public administration has not 
abandoned, by the issued act, the general interest, that is, the purpose of the law.
With regard to the legal regime of administrative acts, the following aspects can 
be highlighted: the juridical regime means the set of substantive and formal rules 
drawn from the Constitution and laws, rules that give particularity to administra-
tive acts in the legal circuit; in this context the authors of administrative law have 
come to the conclusion that the legal regime of administrative acts is given by two 
elements: legality and opportunity. 
The legality of the administrative acts means their compliance with the laws 
adopted by the Parliament as well as with the normative acts with superior juridical 
force. The conditions of legality are unanimously accepted:
 – the administrative act is issued in accordance with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution; 
 – the document is issued in accordance with the letter and spirit of the laws and 
ordinances in force; 
 – the administrative document is issued based on all the acts of the public admin-
istrative authorities that are superior to the issuing administrative body; 
 – the administrative document is issued by the administrative body only within 
the limits of its competence; and
 – the administrative document is issued in the form and with the procedure pro-
vided by law. 
The concept of opportunity signifies that the act is issued in accordance with the 
public interest protected by law; an administrative act that protects a private inter-
est may be legal but is not opportune, and under these circumstances it is not valid. 
The letter and spirit of the current Constitution, the need for the implementation of 
the European democratic institutions also in the practice of the administrative con-
tentious courts in our country, justify our opinion that, no matter how we look at 
the opportunity in relation to the legality, the administrative contentious judge has 
the right to check whether the public administration has acted abusively, contrary 
to the public interest, as this results from the law underlying the administrative act.
Opportunity cannot be confused with legality. Legality and opportunity are two 
distinct legal situations of validity (an act may be legal, but not opportune). As for 
the relations between legality and opportunity we can state the following:
 – legality is controlled by the courts;
 – opportunity is controlled by the administrative bodies; and
 – failure to comply with the substantive conditions entails the absolute nullity 
of the administrative acts; failure to comply with the formal conditions entails 
relative nullity; it can be covered.
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4. Conclusions
The entire activity of the administration, including the autonomy of the local 
administration, especially in a unitary state, can only be conceived within certain 
legal limits, some having an objective economic determination, others being de-
termined by political considerations (Iorgovan, 2005, p. 795). In a rule of law sys-
tem, neither the legislative authority and the executive-central authority, nor the 
authority of justice, but the correct application of the principle of local autonomy 
(Bălan, 1997, pp. 49-61) can be admitted. Thus, it is necessary to have an organic 
connection between local autonomy and law, between local and national interests 
expressed by law, even if the local public administration is carried out according to 
the requirements of the principle of local autonomy and decentralization of public 
services. 
The local public administration must be exercised in accordance with the laws of 
the state, both in the activity of solving public affairs and in issuing administrative 
juridical acts. This local autonomy does not confer the autonomous local authorities 
the right to disregard or violate the laws of the state (Alexandru, 2001, p. 376). In 
order to be able to remove the possibility of the abuse of law by local authorities, 
juridical instruments have been made available to the governmental administration 
in order to control their activity and acts, levers intended to remove abuses and 
punish the guilty (Domocos, 2001, pp. 163-170).
The central administrative authorities must ensure in this respect the realization 
of the local public administration in a unitary way, respecting the local specificity, 
which manifests itself, in particular, within the administrative autonomy (Prisăcaru, 
1996, p. 321). This explains why in all democratic countries, in the administra-
tive-territorial units we find a representative of the state, more precisely belonging 
to the executive-central authority. This representative has the role to watch over 
the application of the law by the authorities of the local public administration, in-
cluding of the autonomous communities, a role that, according to the French ad-
ministrative law system, in Romania, is played by the prefect through the admin-
istrative guardianship control. This control only concerns the legality of the acts 
issued by the local public administration authorities, the guardianship authority 
having no jurisdiction to decide on the opportunity of these acts. The administra-
tive guardianship control refers only to the legality of the administrative acts ad-
opted or issued by the local administrative authorities, while the hierarchical con-
trol concerns both the legality and the opportunity of the acts issued by the public 
authorities over which the hierarchical control is exercised. Therefore, the legality 
and the opportunity of the administrative acts are controlled, by the issuing and hi-
erarchically superior public administration bodies, which may order the revocation 
and cancellation of the inopportune or illegal acts. As regards the control exercised 
by the judicial bodies, they can verify only the legality of the administrative acts, 
not their opportunity.
323
The reform of the administrative and judiciary system must improve the cit-
izens’ access to justice through the actions in administrative contentious courts, 
contribute to the strengthening of the institutions and mechanisms that ensure the 
protection of human rights and the rule of law. The observance of the law, of legal-
ity in general, is required both from individuals and from the public administration. 
The principle of legality dominates the whole theory of administrative acts, and 
means that the activity of public administration is subject to the rules of law. By 
subjecting the administrative activity to the law, the law in general, it is desired to 
establish guarantees for citizens against the arbitrariness or ineffectiveness of this 
activity (Morand-Devillers, 2015, p. 235).
The courts are represented as structures, entities through which the judiciary 
power is exercised in the state, as they are required to resolve the attribute of equal-
ity and generality, as values promoted by justice. From another perspective, the 
court is regarded as a component of the notion of magistracy, a context in which it 
is perceived as an institution in which the judges deploy a specific activity, for the 
purpose of carrying out the act of justice, of defending the general interests of soci-
ety, of the order of law, as well as the rights and freedoms of citizens (Lazăr, 2003, 
p. 104). In this latter framework, the court is seen as a special type of organization, 
in which the activity of magistrates is carried out, in order to achieve certain goals 
determined by law (art. 1 of Law no. 303/2004). 
Given that the reason for the existence of any organization is to achieve its 
goals, it is obvious that the judiciary activity carried out by the magistrates, as a 
social activity, is subject to requirements related to the need for forecasting, coor-
dination, organization, training and control-evaluation. Such demands allow the 
approach of judicial management, as a form of general management of the orga-
nization. The specificity of the courts is given mainly by the fact that their perfor-
mance depends on the performance of each judge or member of the auxiliary staff 
and the fact that the chairperson of the court has limited possibilities to intervene 
in the judge’s activity.
As the judiciary manager (the manager - the chairperson of the court), by carry-
ing out the managerial functions, cannot directly influence the judge’s own activi-
ty, since the latter is based solely on the law, evidence and conscience, the judicial 
manager can only intervene collaterally, that is from an administrative perspec-
tive. Nevertheless, this aspect is not likely to contradict the need for judicial man-
agement. On the contrary, it highlights the particularities of judicial management, 
marking its specificity, with all the consequences that derive from it, in the plane of 
carrying out managerial functions. 
‘As a rule, the Parliament adopts laws, and the courts of law adopt decisions and 
judgements, however, in some cases, the mentioned structures also issue adminis-
trative acts, in carrying out specific tasks of the public administration, of managing 
the material and human resources, activity necessary for the proper functioning 
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thereof. Thus, we are in the presence of an administrative act of appointment in 
office when the Chairman of the Lower Parliament Chamber or the Senate appoints 
the officials from the own apparatus of the Parliament or when the President of the 
Court or of the Court of Appeal, charged with administrative tasks, appoints the 
Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director of this institution, which is a 
civil servant’ (Dragoş and Ranta, 2015, p. 7).
The court decision (in the sense of jurisprudence in this matter) may obligate the 
public authority to issue an administrative act in accordance with its provisions, or, 
on the contrary, may obligate it to refrain from issuing another act with the same 
content as the annulled act. Prior to the existence of a dispute, the interpretation by 
decision (in the interest of the law) of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, of a 
legal issue, constitutes an obligation for the public authorities to take into account 
the meaning given to the legal provision when issuing administrative acts. In other 
cases, however, jurisprudence does not play an equally important role: the imposi-
tion of a certain conduct to the public authority by a court ruling is not automati-
cally applicable to other similar cases, but only as a result of a trial.
A big step forward in this area has recently been made by introducing the pro-
vision according to which the decision to cancel a normative administrative act 
can be published, at the request of the applicant or the ruling court, in the ‘Official 
Gazette of Romania’, part I, or in the County Official Gazettes, identical with that 
where the initial act was published (art. 23 of Law no. 554 / 2004). However, we con-
sider that the publication obligation should have been imposed, not left to the court 
or the applicant’s assessment, or, more simply, the publication should be made ex 
officio by the Official Gazette, based on the communication of the decision by the 
court (Dragoş and Ranta, 2015, pp. 16-17).
The idea is widely spread that the interests of individuals can be achieved only 
through the mechanisms provided by the political and juridical system; thus there is 
a motivation to be politically active and not an obligation, given that ‘a political body 
is formed by a voluntary association of individuals … a social agreement by which 
people make agreements with each citizen and every citizen with all people, that all 
should be governed by certain laws of the common good’ (Prisacaru, 1996, p. 210). 
The public opinion about politicians, administration and justice is formed by 
the politicians themselves, although the process of forming the political opinion 
is made of at least four factors (Janda, Berry and Goldman, 1992, pp. 176-181). The 
situation is explained by the media presentation or tendency to usually present 
breaking news or sensational information, largely of a pejorative nature such as: 
 – personal interest in political activity and justice;
 – information political in nature assimilated or disseminated;
 – political leaders and their public performance; and
 – a network of attitudes and opinions that can be associated with a politicized 
problem or a political situation.
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Most citizens perceive the political and the juridical phenomenon only as a prac-
tical translation of some interests and do not necessarily understand the whole 
mechanism that has the purpose of making political decisions or the act of justice. 
If the political decision is also administrative within the public institutions, espe-
cially as, according to the political scientist Oleg Serebrian, ‘the political decision 
is perhaps the most complicated thing in contemporary society, and we continue 
to judge democracy through the clichés inherited from the Enlightenment period 
and the French revolution’ (Serebrian, 2004, p. 80) – the act of justice must remain 
independent of politics.
For a political decision or an administrative normative act to be appreciated, it 
must defend the interests of as many citizens as possible. As a rule, the citizens’ 
polling about the objectives and direction of the state policy is carried out during 
the election campaigns, and at this moment the quality and the ‘list’ of politicians 
for at least one term are presented. Even for a short period, we can have a rath-
er broad picture of the quality and content of the political ground. Politicians are 
known for their promises, or even more for their achievements not promised, but 
intended to be realized. 
For an act of justice to be appreciated, it must also defend the interests of the 
citizens, but from an independent and non-partisan position, thus being at the same 
time an ‘act of justice’. A developed state is a state that has strong civil servants, 
magistrates and managers, who can secure the efficiency of the administrative pro-
cess in general and the justice process in particular.
In the literature, several guiding principles regarding administrative efficiency 
are formulated (Simon, 2004, p. 23): the administrative efficiency is increased by 
the specialization of the tasks assigned to the members of the group; it increases 
along with the placement of the group members in a clear hierarchy of authority; 
efficiency is increased by reducing the control interval, at a small distance at any 
point in the hierarchy; the administrative efficiency is increased by the grouping of 
the employees in order to exercise the control according to the purpose, process, 
competence, etc.
The guiding principles regarding the efficiency of justice are mainly the inde-
pendence and immovability of magistrates. 
As we can talk about a political culture, so can we talk about the administrative 
culture, and the connection between them is the will of the citizens to realize their 
interests, and to display their values (Palmer, 1997, pp. 55-56). 
Another term often used is ‘leadership’; obviously, this term includes the at-
tributes of an environment that needs to be managed. In fact, in an institutional 
environment, the political leadership elaborates guiding principles and implements 
them in the administrative system, and the administration forms resources (infor-
mational, financial, human, material) of the political leadership. John Maxwell sees 
the difference between the concept of leadership and of administration, in the sense 
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that ‘leadership has to do with influencing people to follow leaders, while adminis-
tration focuses on maintaining systems and processes’ (Maxwell, 2000, p. 14). Thus, 
administration, contrary to management – which is usually political – has a more 
technical component and poorer possibilities to get a feedback from the citizens, 
whose interests are realized through the daily activity.
Conceptually, the administrative culture can be polarized, approaching it sys-
temically through two categories or types. In a first category we include adminis-
trative culture as a characteristic of a rule of law, focused on the logic of its guiding 
principles. In another category or type of administrative culture we find a ‘more 
socialized’ administrative culture, where the basic role and emphasis is placed on 
the quality and competence of the civil servants, and the quintessence of this type 
of administrative culture, forms the ‘public interest’ and the volitional qualities of 
those who have the mission to accomplish it (Pollitt, 2004, pp. 67-69). 
The law applicable to the administration is the administrative law, and its appli-
cation is made when need be, when this interest is harmed, in the administrative 
contentious courts.
In a rule of law, citizens can freely associate in parties and other social-political 
organizations. They contribute to becoming and expressing the political will of the 
citizens and, under the conditions of the law, participate in elections. By elections, 
in fact, the exponents of political parties are elected in the public administration. 
On the central level, the Parliament grants a vote of confidence, which, de facto, 
must have a form that would suit the parliamentary factions, or assume the com-
mitment to achieve certain political interests. In this way, the administrative-poli-
tics relationship is very accented and the political in fact conditions the administra-
tive (Dandiş, 2012). 
The idea must be promoted but also supported by local public authorities, ei-
ther by specialized institutions or by persons from central institutions, in order to 
establish direct relations between the communities in the country with other com-
munities in EU countries or outside the EU. Thus, through communities’ twinning 
certain economic branches are developed, such as culture, exchange of experience 
and good practice, etc.
The access to information is also a topic that in the public administration must 
have a very practical connotation, in direct relation with the training and the legal 
and political culture of the citizens. The operation of web pages, publications, news-
letters or other periodic sources of information for communities would also ensure 
the transparency of the administrative and justice processes, but would also allow 
the public to participate in solving community problems (Dandiş, 2012). 
The role of the courts in the process of transforming the legal system is discussed 
in the Strategy for the reform of the judicial system and in the afferent Action Plan. 
In this context, the role of the courts is found in two aspects: on the one hand, the 
courts are represented as structures, entities through which the judiciary power is 
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exercised in the state, and in this respect they are required to solve the attribute of 
equality and generality, as values promoted by justice; from another perspective, 
the court is regarded as a component of the notion of magistracy, context in which 
it is perceived as an institution in which the judges deploy a specific activity, for 
the purpose of carrying out the act of justice, of defending the general interests of 
society, of the order of law, as well as the rights and freedoms of citizens. In the lat-
ter framework, the court is presented as a special type of organization, in which the 
activity of magistrates is carried out, in order to achieve certain goals determined 
by law (art. 1 of Law no. 303/2004). 
Thus, the reason for the existence of any organization is primarily to achieve its 
goals. Obviously, the judicial activity carried out by the magistrates, as well as the 
social activity, is subject to requirements related to the need for foresight, coordina-
tion, organization, training, control and evaluation. So, judicial management can also 
be described as a form of organizational general management. The specificity of the 
courts, their performance depends on the performance of each judge or member of 
the auxiliary staff and on the fact that the president of the court has limited possibil-
ities to intervene in the judge’s activity. The judiciary manager, by carrying out the 
managerial functions, cannot directly influence the activity of the judge, since the 
latter particularly relies on the law, evidence and conscience, but only collaterally, 
namely in the administrative aspect. The need for an efficient judicial management 
highlights the particularities of this type of management, marking its specificity in 
the plan of managerial functions performance, and its principles are also realized 
within the managerial and judiciary activity carried out by the courts of law.
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Abstract
The comparative analysis of the evolution and constitution of the contentious administrative courts in 
various states reveals that only the existence of specialized contentious administrative courts competent to 
judge such matters becomes a guardian against any abuse, as the administration shall hesitate to commit 
violations if it is aware that justice can penalize its behavior. Thus, the contentious administrative courts 
have undergone various modifications during the stages of evolution, all meant to preserve their historical 
and legal tradition contributing to the formation of a classic notion of public administration, authority that 
regulates social relations. This correct image of public administration, guaranteed by judicial control, corre-
sponds to the check and balance system of maintaining social and economic relations in society.
The remarkable degree of perfection of the French system has influenced many countries in the world 
which have organized a similar administrative system in a similar way. The French tradition of maintaining 
the State Councils in the contentious administrative courts’ structure has been adopted by some countries 
such as Finland, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, and so on. Thus, as a matter of priority, the French 
concept of administrative law puts a particular emphasis on the judicial control, among the various forms 
of control of the administration, which allows the elimination of all the difficulties resulting from the admin-
istration activity, except those which are not subject to judicial control.
Keywords: contentious administrative courts, compared law, jurisdictional control, modern administra-
tion, French administrative justice.
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1. Introduction
In the literature dedicated to administrative justice we encounter the common 
opinion according to which these administrative legal institutions appeared in 
France, then in most European states, ad-hoc, following the French Revolution, in 
the 17th – 18th centuries. Other authors claim, however, that the emergence of the 
administrative justice institution is attested in Europe as back as in the Middle Ages.
The tradition of French administrative justice originates from the long experience 
of the old regime and from revolutionary conceptions. A confusion has penetrated 
the revolutionary thinking, which has long mistakenly presented the many notions 
of administrative contentious justice, between the function of administering and 
that of judging, ‘juger l’administration c’est aussi administrer’ (Deblasch and Rici, 
1994, p. 3). The word ‘contentious’ comes from the Latin ‘contentiosus’; the French 
‘contanteux’ means body of jurisdiction, specialized in resolving disputes between 
the state and the natural persons. A second meaning of the word ‘contentious’ itself 
encompasses the notion of a system of norms guiding the resolution of disputes by 
this body. By definition, the administrative dispute brings together all the rules ap-
plicable to the legal settlement of disputes arising from the administrative activity, 
which are aimed both at imposing a legal behavior of the authorities of the public 
administration in their activity, and at repairing the moral and material damages 
arising in connection with the infringement of rights of natural and legal persons. 
The concept of administrative contentious justice and courts allows the dispersion 
of the study of all the difficulties arising from the activity of public administration 
authorities that is not subordinated to justice (Gilescu, 1978, p. 25).
The relevant judicial practice is illustrated by Decision no. 25/2017, ICCJ, United 
Sections, by which the court admitted the appeal in the interest of the law formulat-
ed by the Attorney General, Head of the Prosecutor’s Office within the High Court 
of Cassation and Justice and, as a consequence, it was established with power of 
law that: ‘In the interpretation and application of art. 6 para. (1) and art. 7 para. (1) 
of Law no. 50/1991 regarding the authorization of the execution of the construction 
works, republished, with the subsequent modifications and completions, related to 
art. 2 para. (1) lit. c) and art. 8 para- (1) of the Law of the administrative conten-
tious justice no. 554/2004, with the subsequent modifications and completions, it 
is possible to exercise the control of legality, on a separate way, on the certificate 
of urbanism by which one ordered the prohibition of building or containing other 
limitations’. 
Specifically, in the practice of the Caraş-Severin Court, it was retained that the 
claimant SC C-S SRL versus the defendants P.M.R. and C.L. asked the court to can-
cel the Urbanism Certificate no. 323 / 18.08.2017, as being unlawful and illegal; to 
oblige the defendants to issue a new urbanism certificate that can be used for the 
stated purpose, respectively building of an office space and a travel agency. If the 
urbanism certificate contains certain details regarding the technical regime or a 
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certain list of approvals for obtaining the building permit, we cannot speak of any 
refusal to solve a request and, however, it is possible for the beneficiary to consider 
itself injured as a result of the limitations or conditions imposed by the respective 
act and to be unable to continue its request for obtaining the building permit under 
the conditions it desires (Civil Judgement no. 241, ruled by the Caraș-Severin Tribu-
nal of Reșiţa, Second Section – Civil, Administrative and Fiscal Contentious Court, 
Case no. 3927/115/2017). From the considerations of this decision the court retains 
the following: as regards the certificate of urbanism containing the construction 
ban or other limitations, it would not be possible for the injured person to complain 
only of the refusal, which is implicitly deduced from the content of the certificate 
issued in this form, to issue a certificate of urbanism with a different content, but 
the action must be directed, first of all, against the certificate already issued and 
only subsequently to request the issuance of a new certificate with an appropriate 
content. Furthermore, not all the situations where the urban planning certificate 
contains limitations also imply a refusal to solve a request. The defendant cannot 
plead his own guilt, as the basis of the refusal to use the certificate of urbanism ac-
cording to the requested destination, under the conditions in which this destination 
was established by the local council, at the date of auctioning the land and the con-
tract concluded with it is just for the destination for which the urbanism certificate 
was requested. Even if the court admits the defendant’s defenses, in relation to the 
changes made to the municipality’s urbanization plan, the contested certificate is 
still illegal, according to art. 32 of Law 350/2001 (Civil Judgement no. 1220, ruled by 
the Caraș- Severin Tribunal of Reșiţa, Second Section – Civil, Administrative and 
Fiscal Contentious Court, Case no. 2622/115/2018).
The French authors Laubadère, Venezia and Gaudemet (1994) consider that ‘the 
existence in France of an administrative jurisdiction distinct from the jurisdiction of 
common law constitutes a product of history and it finds its origin in the conception 
of monarchy, systematized on this point by the Revolution and supplemented by the 
natural evolution of things, so that in the nineteenth century progressively detached 
the administrative jurisdiction’ (Laubadère, Venezia, Gaudemet, 1994, p. 75).
During the old French regime there was a development of the contentious com-
petences regarding the administrators of justice, police and finances. The jurisdic-
tion of the administrator is characterized by gratuitousness, speed and absence of 
the formal procedure.
The conception of the relations between the administration and the judiciary 
was also ordered by the concrete historical concerns, namely by a general feeling of 
mistrust regarding the judiciary, inspired by the memory of the parliaments of the 
old regime. If the administrative processes could be judged by the judicial courts, 
the independence of the administration would be compromised, thus the judiciary 
having the necessary mechanisms, according to the expression of the time, to dis-
turb the actions of the administrative bodies (Chevallier, 1970, pp. 38-45 – inspired 
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by these concerns, the revolutionary interpretation of the separation of powers 
found its expression in the famous and fundamental text of the Law of August 
16-24, 1790, art. 13, which proclaims the principle of separation of administrative 
and judicial authorities: ‘The judicial functions are distinct and will always remain 
separated from administrative functions. Judges will not be able to summon admin-
istrators before them in relation to their duties’). 
The contentious-administrative procedure must be understood as a control of 
legality exercised over the administrative acts. The justification of the administra-
tive-litigation jurisdiction lies precisely in ensuring, for the benefit of both private 
and general interests, the submission of the Public Administration to the legal order 
regarding all the activities performed. Thus, in the judicial practice represented by 
the final Civil Judgement no. 1220 / 22.11.2018, disposed of by the Civil Section, by 
administrative and fiscal litigation within the Caraş-Severin Court, with the object 
of cancelling an act issued by local public authorities, the applicant does not criti-
cize the merits of the obligation assumed by the mediation agreement, but the ille-
gality of its adoption, number of validly cast votes, condition of form concomitant 
to the adoption of the act, mandatory, without which the adopted decision cannot 
be legal. Failure to comply with the legal provisions regarding the number of votes 
required for the adoption of a decision regarding local heritage, draws its nullity.
The doctrine defined the nullity of an administrative act, as a legal sanction 
that affects its effects, because it was issued or adopted in violation of the legal 
provisions of substance, form or procedure established by law for its adoption. The 
institution of the invalidity of the administrative acts is provided in art. 52 of the 
Constitution, which consecrates the annulment ordered by the court.
The cease of legal effects produced by the administrative acts can only be done 
by removing them from force by legal means: annulment by the court, withdrawal 
by the issuing body or revocation. In the case analyzed, the court did not accept 
the defendant’s defenses, because this decision adopted by the deliberative public 
authority did not produce legal effects, as one failed to obtain the legality approval 
of the County Prefect institution in question, as it was committed in the mediation 
agreement, given that for the issuer the administrative legal act produces effects 
right from the moment of adoption.
The same type of jurisdictional control over administrative power, lato sensu 
executive, is highlighted by three distinct models on the European level.
The judicial model was first introduced in Spain, through the Cadiz Constitution 
of 1812, being adopted in a definitive form in 1956, as a model of control over the 
activity of the executive power. The current Spanish Constitution enshrined it in 
Article 106, and subsequently, through the provisions of the Organic Law of the 
Judiciary and the Law of Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, a system was 
ensured in which any activity of public administration, of any kind, subject to ad-
ministrative law, it can be controlled by the organs of the judiciary.
334
The French model, determined by the radical conception of the principle of the 
division of power during the French Revolution (detailed above), consecrated a 
system of control of administrative acts (executive) by the same executive power, 
through the State Council and the Administrative Courts and the call dependent 
on it.
The mixed models can be differentiated by:
 – the Italian model, which attributes the control of the acts’ legality to the Ad-
ministration of the ordinary courts and administrative bodies depending on the 
analyzed object. Thus, if the action affects the subjective rights, the competence 
of the ordinary courts will be attracted, and if it affects the legitimate interests, 
it will be brought before the regional administrative courts or the State Coun-
cil; and
 – the harmonic model, introduced in Spain in 1888, seeking the reconciliation of 
the French model, established in Spain in 1845, with the judicial model intro-
duced through the Cadiz Constitution and the liberal one from 1969 respec-
tively, made partly by judges and partly by members of its own administration.
Regarding the principles that govern the jurisdiction of administrative conten-
tious justice, three directions of orientation can be differentiated. First, they involve 
the consolidation of the judicial model, the administrative contentious jurisdiction 
being a jurisdictional order entrusted with the control of the administrative acts. 
It also implies the derogation of certain prerogatives of public administrations and 
its real and effective submission to the legal order. Finally, the administrative-lit-
igation procedure involves a real judicial procedure. The control of the acts of the 
administration by the courts is achieved through a real information process, based 
on the basic rules of any judicial procedure: duality of the parties, contradiction, 
congruence, Iura Novit Curia, etc.
2. The specific character of administrative jurisdictions in compared law
The comparative analysis of the tradition of constituting the administrative con-
tentious justice and courts in several states shows that the legal attributions of the 
State Councils as administrative contentious courts differ according to the degree 
of competence.
In France, the State Council judges in the first instance, certain matters, at the 
same time it functions as a court of appeal against certain administrative jurisdic-
tions and as a court of appeal for all administrative court decisions (Iorgovan, 2004, 
pp. 308-309).
In Finland, the high administrative contentious court is represented by the Su-
preme Administrative Court, which has subordinated the provincial administrative 
courts and judges as a court of appeal all their decisions. It also judges appeals 
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against decisions of the Council of Ministers, ministries, central directorates, as 
well as appeals against decisions rendered by other specialized courts. The judges 
in the administrative contentious courts, including those of the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court, are not magistrates themselves, but administrative officials with 
jurisdictional powers.
As for Spain, the judicial order of the administrative contentious justice is made 
of the ordinary courts of administrative-litigation, the provincial courts of litiga-
tion-administrative (directly superior to the first echelon), the Chambers of litiga-
tion-administrative within the Provincial Hearings, the Chamber of litigation-ad-
ministrative within The National Court, the Contentious-administrative section of 
the Supreme Court.
The State Council in Greece judges the appeals for annulment (for excess of 
power) of the administrative acts, both individual and of the regulatory (normative) 
being, from this point of view, judge in annulment of common law, the appeals in 
cassation against the pronounced decisions by the administrative courts, the ap-
peals of full jurisdiction, given in its competence by a special provision of the Con-
stitution.
Article 19 paragraph 4 of the German Constitution establishes the guarantee of 
an effective legal protection against any act of the sovereign power. In order to en-
sure the legal protection against the administrative action, the contentious-admin-
istrative jurisdiction was created in Germany as an independent legal order, con-
sisting in principle of three categories of courts. Thus, at the lower level, there are 
the courts of first instance administrative-administrative (Verwaltungsgerichte), in 
whose jurisdiction most of the disputes are given. They operate at the level of the 
Federal States, and the courts are composed of three judges, possibly supplemented 
by two more judges acting ad honorem. Judicial assistance before these courts is not 
compulsory. At the next level the Upper Administrative Courts (Oberverwaltungs-
gerichte) operate which, in certain Federal States (Baden-Baden, Hesse, Bavaria, 
Wurttemberg), for reasons of tradition, are called Administrative Courts (Verwal-
tungsgerichtshofe); they, in principle, rule as appellate courts, on the judgments 
given by the Courts of first instance, but they can resolve even in the first instance. 
In their turn, the respective courts operate at the level of the Federal States, the 
courts having a composition similar to that of the first court, but unlike them, only 
lawyers can act in an effective manner before them. At the last level is the Federal 
Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), with the role of courts of cas-
sation for the decisions given by the lower courts. These courts may also have ju-
risdiction at first instance when it comes to executing large projects (Maurer, 1994, 
pp. 260-261).
In Belgium, the State Council, represented by the administrative contentious 
department, has the power to examine over-power disputes. As objects of the liti-
gation for excess of power, the individual or normative administrative acts serve, 
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which necessarily emanate from an administrative authority. In the absence of ad-
ministrative tribunals as substantive courts, the State Council judges in the merits 
and pronounces the final decision (Debbasch, 2002, pp. 691, 719-725).
The State Council in the Netherlands through the Jurisdictional Section judges 
several categories of appeals against administrative acts, emanating from a munic-
ipal or provincial body, or from a ministry.
Thus, based on the analysis, we can mention that in some of the respective coun-
tries the role of the State Councils, as supreme courts of the administrative con-
tentious is important from the point of view of ensuring the judicial control over 
the activity of the administration. However, studying the ways of creating them, 
as well as other tasks of the State Councils of Government consultation, approval 
of the draft laws before being submitted for examination to the Parliament, we can 
draw some conclusions regarding the existence of an alleged mutual influence in 
the judicial activity of the Government, of the State Councils and in the other, of 
representative of the executive power (Leș, 2002, p. 35).
2.1. Distinctions between the continental administrative justice model 
and the Anglo-Saxon model
Although, the German contentious justice was inspired by the French model, a 
specific characteristic exists, namely that of separation first from the active admin-
istration, then from the ordinary jurisdiction. At first, the German administrative 
contentious evolved from the 19th century, forming in several German states; for 
example, in Prussia the system consisted of 3 levels. Characteristic for the lower 
courts was their mixed system of competences, that is, the administrative jurisdic-
tion was represented simultaneously by the state bodies, representing some col-
leagues whose members were chosen simultaneously by the population or named 
by the hierarchically superior authorities including the king. The superior court 
was separated from the organs of power, exercising the functions of appeal, and 
reviewing the decisions of the lower courts. The meetings were public in nature, 
with active debates, with the participation of lawyers as appropriate. During the 
administrative justice of Prussia, it did not undergo major changes and served as a 
model of creation in the other countries. 
The modern German administrative jurisdiction differs from the original one 
by completely separating it from the administration and is characterized by three 
levels of administrative jurisdiction:
 – The Administrative Courts contain the Local Administrative Court, which in-
cludes 33 administrative courts, first-level jurisdictions (competent to judge 
in the first instance all administrative disputes of territorial jurisdiction of the 
Länder, consisting of three professional judges and two judges who have an-
other profession);
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 – The High Administrative Court, which includes 10 higher administrative tribu-
nals, as appeals courts against the decisions made by the administrative courts 
and as a reviewing court for decisions by the administrative courts for the cas-
es in which the appeal path is not opened. These courts judge in different sets, 
from land to land, the number of judges being from three to five; and
 – The Federal Administrative Court resolves appeals against decisions made by 
higher administrative courts and decisions made by administrative courts. It 
also solves the review requests made against its own decisions. It also judges 
the disputes between the federation and the Länder, or between the Länder, 
coordinates all the procedures in which the administrative laws are applied, 
except those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Fiscal and Social Courts.
We can state that both the French and the German administrative jurisdictions 
have a universal character which is within the competence of the courts of common 
law, i.e. the applicant can submit to the administrative court any application that 
has an administrative character, without specifying which specific reports are reg-
ulated. This is in fact one of the most important distinctions between the model of 
continental and Anglo-Saxon administrative justice.
2.2. Administrative jurisdictions in England 
– advantages and drawbacks
In the United Kingdom, an attempt can be identified to develop administrative 
jurisdictions, due to the fact that the modern administration raises really import-
ant technical problems, and the intervention of the judicial judge thus become less 
possible, considered to be decisive in the total or partial emergence of the new ad-
ministrative jurisdictions. This replacement of the judicial judge occurs either by 
assigning jurisdictional jurisdiction to administrative authorities or special bodies, 
the administrative courts. Regarding the control of the normative acts of the admin-
istration, the judicial control was abolished by express provision of the law. Howev-
er, the establishment of administrative jurisdictions in England is a relatively recent 
phenomenon (in the 1960s and 1970s), being created without an overall plan, char-
acterizing their diversity and the fact that they did not provide sufficient guarantees 
for the administrators. There is also mention of the existence of several commissions 
of jurisdictional character, their decisions being controlled either by the ministers or 
by the courts. These jurisdictions are created by special laws that set their compe-
tences. Judges often fall within the jurisdiction of the administration, with no clear 
cooperation between administrative and judicial authorities as in France.
In England the jurisdiction of the bodies of administrative jurisdiction is very 
diverse, sometimes it refers only to deeds, other times it also includes the law. The 
administrative jurisdictions have either only legal powers or quasi-judicial compe-
tence. First of all, the ministers decide on investigations instituted by their offices 
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on the appeal against the acts issued by certain commissions that are under their 
control (for example, the decisions of the Minister of Internal Affairs on applica-
tions for naturalization or complaints regarding expulsion), decisions that can be 
appealed against, either to the special administrative courts or to the judicial juris-
dictions.
The second category of jurisdictional bodies includes the individual commis-
sions or authorities, which participate in the active administration (in the field of 
social insurance, it is competent to resolve such disputes the administrative tri-
bunals, which are under the authority of a national commissioner, as well as in 
matters of taxes.).
Third, we mention the category of jurisdictions with guarantees of independence 
such as the Railway Courts established in 1873, the Transport Court (tariffs, licens-
es), the Land Courts that establish the expropriation allowances. We also men-
tion the existence of single-person administrative jurisdictions (minister, national 
commissioner) or collegial ones, members of the administrative jurisdiction being 
appointed by the minister in the field in which they act, for which sometimes the 
opinion of Lord Chancellor is required, that is to say the minister of justice, in some 
cases even the latter making the appointment. In some cases the members of the 
jurisdictions have to be professional lawyers, at other times they can be members, 
civil servants of the active administration, for the most part the functions in these 
jurisdictions are free, but sometimes they can also be remunerated accordingly. 
Most often only the president is paid. Functions often have a fixed duration (three, 
four, five years), sometimes for an indefinite period, until the appointing authority 
ends the mandate.
The procedure before these jurisdictions presents a great diversity, before some 
can resort to the assistance of lawyers (land courts). In the local social insurance 
courts, defense through a lawyer is not allowed (Popescu, 2004, pp. 77-98). Hear-
ings are sometimes public at other times secret. Decisions are not published, other 
times publishing is mandatory, so is the issue in the case of motivation. The appeal 
against these decisions varies from one jurisdiction to another, generally recogniz-
ing a right to appeal, being made either to the minister or to the special court of 
appeal (Vedinaș, 2002, pp. 136-137).
The judicial tribunals retained control over the administrative jurisdiction 
bodies, through the direct participation of the judges in these jurisdictions, then 
through the appeal, the control over the decisions is retained, in fact only the solu-
tion of the legal problems is sought.
The development of administrative jurisdictions in the UK has a number of ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages we mention:
 – achieving time and money savings;
 – making prompt decisions on the multitude of litigation created by social laws, 
taxes, pensions, insurance, administration activity in multiple fields;
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 – association of persons with special competence in examining complaints;
 – these jurisdictions are not formalistic, that is, they are not related to precedents 
such as in the English judicial jurisdiction.
Among the disadvantages we mention:
 – the litigants do not benefit from guarantees as in the case of judicial jurisdic-
tion;
 – there is much confusion in this diversity;
 – examining cases is often too brief; and
 – advertising is missing. 
In the English doctrine, the establishment of a supreme administrative court 
is envisaged, in the manner of the French State Council (Alexandru, 2007, pp. 
365-366).
At one point in the United Kingdom there were 207 administrative tribunals, the 
purpose of which was to appoint a royal commission to study the reorganization of 
administrative jurisdiction (Heuser, 2003, p. 18-24).
2.3. The particularities of the administrative jurisdictions in the USA
In principle, the system of administrative jurisdictions in the USA is somewhat 
similar to the British one, both in terms of legal construction and in terms of trends, 
noting the same realistic orientation (Leș, 2002, p. 35).
Although an influence of the English legal thinking on the American one has 
been preserved, a common evolution of the two administrative systems is observed:
 – In the USA it is noted that the existence of federalism causes the appearance 
of the control of the constitutionality that is superimposed on the control of 
simple legality and also extends to the acts of the administration;
 – There is a federal administrative code, imitated by many states in the federa-
tion;
 – True administrative courts were created;
 – Although the US lives under a written constitutional regime, rigid, superior to 
the ordinary law, the judge can check whether the delegation granted to the 
administrative authority is possible in relation to the law and at the same time 
examine whether the law is in conformity with the constitution and whether 
the delegation is exercised according to the constitution;
 – The American judge cannot rule the general annulment of the administrative 
act, as in England and France, the action against a regulation has effect only 
with respect to the parties concerned;
 – In the USA, the principle is applied and the administration must take into ac-
count the procedural rights of those administered according to the adage ‘due 
process of law’ (Pacteau, 1978, pp. 914-916 – following the application of this 
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principle, before issuing administrative documents, interested parties should 
be called to state their objections);
 – In case the administrative act is appealed against, the decision of the judge 
must be motivated de facto and de jure;
 – Like in England, the decisions of the administrative courts are not ex officio, 
in order to be the executors needing the authorization of a judge and, on this 
occasion, he examines the legality of the act;
 – There are judgments of the administrative jurisdictional bodies that have an ex 
officio nature, when the law expressly stipulates this, a situation in which the 
administered one may complain and use the so-called ‘writs’;
 – Judicial control is complicated, formalistic, costly and slow, and it is necessary 
to exhaust the administrative resources before notifying the judicial judge;
 – The appeal against the jurisdictional decisions of the federal administration is 
addressed only to the Supreme Court of Colombia, and not to the US Supreme 
Court, and only for legal and procedural issues.
The body examining the complaints of the administrated must be impartial, 
apart from any direct and personal interest in question, the appeal being made ei-
ther through the direct path or through the exception of illegality (Trăilescu, 2006, 
p. 54).
In the US there is also a great diversity of administrative jurisdictions, but, un-
like the United Kingdom, the case withdrawal of the judiciary has not decreased 
to the same extent (according to Supreme Court decisions, the judge’s termination 
of termination only ceases when there is an express text of the law, and when the 
law does not provide that an administrative judicial decision remains final, it can be 
appealed to the court). Also, the court does not have the power to control adminis-
trative acts of a political nature. 
In the US we can outline four types of administrative jurisdiction bodies:
 – the President of the U.S.A., the heads of executive departments;
 – jurisdictional commissions in different departments;
 – commissions with regulatory powers and independent agencies, and some 
with wide autonomy, perform administrative services, but also judge com-
plaints arising from their activity; and
 – administrative courts with guarantees of independence and competence and 
with attributions for certain categories of administrative disputes.
2.4. Administrative jurisdictions in Latin America
The construction of public law in Latin America was initially based on an au-
thoritarian constitutional system, within which administrative law evolved in par-
allel with the gradual establishment of the rule of law. The most important sign of 
the evolution of administrative law in this geopolitical area, during the last decades, 
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is represented by the decoding process, especially by the process of promulgating 
the regulatory normative acts of the administrative procedure in general.
Currently, almost all the countries in the region have such legislation and the 
administrative law can be divided into two major evolutionary stages, before and 
after the respective de-encoding process. The laws of the administrative procedure, 
establishing general forms of functioning of the administration, determined in all 
countries a change of attitude in the form and the mode of action of the administra-
tive bodies, guaranteeing more rights and prerogatives to those served by the state 
administration.
This process of transforming the administrative law through the codification 
of the procedure began in Argentina, where the first of the national laws on ad-
ministrative procedures in Latin America was adopted, namely Law 19549/1972 
of administrative procedures, then amended by Law 21682/1972. Subsequently, 
in Uruguay the Decree no. 640/1973, on the Administrative Procedures, replaced 
then by the decree no. 500/1991, regarding the General Norms of administrative ac-
tion and regularization of Central Administration Procedures. In 1978, the General 
Law of the Public Administration of Costa Rica was adopted, which regulated not 
only the administrative procedure, but all the essential aspects of administrative 
law. Subsequently followed the Organic Law of the Administrative Procedures of 
Venezuela, adopted in 1981, amended and supplemented by the Law of simplifica-
tion of administrative procedures, implemented by the Decree-Law no. 368/1999, 
reformed in 2008 and by the Organic Law of public administration from 2001 (later 
updated in 2008). In 1984, the reform of the Administrative Contentious Code of 
Colombia took place, to which a new part was incorporated, regarding administra-
tive procedures, also supplemented by the provisions of Decree no. 266/2000. It was 
followed, in 1987, by the Law on administrative procedure in Honduras, then in 
1994 the Federal Law on administrative procedure in Mexico and the Brazilian Ad-
ministrative Law no. 9784/1999. In Panama, Law no. 38/2000 regularized the Organ-
ic Statute of administrative procedures, the general administrative procedure and 
the special provisions in the matter. Law no. 2341/2002 regulated the administrative 
procedure in Bolivia, and Law no. 19880/2003 administrative procedure in Chile. 
In Ecuador, the statute of the administrative legal regime of the executive function 
was adopted, through Decree no. 1634/1994, normative act that also regulates all 
aspects pertaining to the administrative procedure.
All these texts, in one form or another, have a common feature and have been 
influenced by the Spanish legislation through the already repealed laws of the legal 
regime of the state administration of 1957 and respectively of the administrative 
procedures of 1958. These texts have been replaced in Spain by Law no. 30/1992 of 
the legal regime of public administrations and of the common administrative proce-
dure (amended by Law no. 4/1999), which, on the other hand, influenced the draft-
ing of the Peruvian law of 2001. Also, in one form or another, Spanish texts have 
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influenced all the legislation in Latin America, to a lesser or greater extent, as was 
the case with the Organic Law on Venezuelan Administrative Procedures of 1981. 
Another common feature is the normative ensemble that has been the basis of 
the entire process of administrative decisions, which leads to a very important reg-
ularization related to administrative acts. For this it can be considered that all these 
laws are, basically, with reference to the legal regime of administrative acts. These 
legal regulations were of enormous importance throughout Latin America, con-
tributing not only to the development of administrative law, but also to shaping 
the principle of legality. In all the Latin American states, the central motivation of 
these normative bodies consisted in establishing a regime of guarantees of those ad-
ministered towards administrators, respectively by the Administration in general. 
This legislation also reflects the ongoing struggle that characterizes its own admin-
istrative law, aimed at finding a balance between the privileges of the Administra-
tion and the rights of individuals. Therefore, the adequate satisfaction of the public 
interests is ensured and the satisfaction of the needs of the citizens is guaranteed 
(Villamil, 1997, pp. 518-519).
3. Dynamics of administrative jurisdictions in compared law
Referring to the development of administrative justice, we must mention that, 
together with the judicial jurisdiction, administrative jurisdictions have emerged 
and are continuing to develop, for reasons similar to the situation in England. 
The administrative courts appeared in France replacing the old councils of the 
prefecture being considered the judges of common law in the first instance of the 
administrative litigation. They coexist with numerous special jurisdictions (region-
al chamber of accounts, the departmental commission of social aid, the commission 
of appeals of refugees, etc., which have replaced the prefectural councils).
The administrative courts of appeal are subordinated to the State Council and 
judge the appeals against the decisions given by the administrative courts, except 
for the litigations regarding the municipal and cantonal elections, these being with-
in the competence of the State Council. The administrative courts of appeal include 
the simple administrative courts and, according to the recent reform, there are the 
Administrative Courts of Appeal and the specialized courts, especially in the finan-
cial system. Any situations or problems that may arise in the activity of the two 
categories of courts are resolved by the Court of Conflicts (Tribunal des conflicts).
The State Council is the most important administrative jurisdiction, cumulating 
the qualities of supreme court of justice and of justice of appeal, of cassation, with 
competence in some cases and of first instance. Being the supreme administrative 
court, the State Council decides sovereignly, because there is no appeal against its 
decisions.
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The State Council presents the epicenter of the administrative jurisdiction, be-
cause within it is the administrative contentious section, which exercises the juris-
dictional function granted to this institution. In the first and second courts, it judges 
the most important disputes regarding the appeals against the acts regulated by the 
ministry and the disputes regarding the elections in the European Parliament. The 
existence of the independence of administrative jurisdiction, contrary to that of 
judicial authority, is not regulated by the French Constitution. 
The State Council is empowered only with advisory powers. At the same time, 
the constitutional jurisdiction conferred constitutional value on the existence of 
the independence of the administrative jurisdiction. The administrative jurisdiction 
system in France is permanently dynamic and is aimed at optimizing its functional-
ity. The most recent changes to this legislation have led to the creation of two new 
administrative courts and administrative courts. Similarly, the urgent procedure for 
examining applications in cases where fundamental rights violations have been re-
viewed has been revised (the following decisions of the Constitutional Council: CC 
22 July 1980, Lois validation, CC 23 January 1987, Competition Council.)
4. Conclusions
The link between the rule of law and administrative law is not new at present. If the 
rule of law represents, to use a classic definition, ‘the state whose power and action 
are controlled and guided by law’ (Diaz, 1969, p. 11), the activity of the most dynamic, 
ubiquitous and complex of its components, the administration will necessarily have 
to be impregnated by legal control. Seen conversely, from the point of view of ad-
ministrative law, the particularity of its content also implies the existence of a rule of 
law: seeking a balance between the privileges of the administration and the guaran-
tees of its citizens, its maintenance and its restoration when it has been lost (Enterria, 
Rodriguez and Ramon, 2002, p. 51). Moreover, according to the doctrine, ‘the rule 
of law is the state of complete administrative law” (Schmidt-Assmann, 2003, p. 55); 
starting from the German and the European Union legal order, Schmidt-Assmann 
deduces certain characteristics of the rule of law, relevant for administrative law: 
a public action in two phases, the decision and the enforcement, which facilitates 
responsibility, control and correction (Schmidt-Assmann, 2003, p. 55). 
In the reference period of the 19th century, the judicial courts were excluded 
from the administrative litigation, the French revolution did not organize admin-
istrative tribunals, but adopted the system of ‘administration – judge’, which itself 
transformed into stages into a system of administrative jurisdiction. Thus, a solu-
tion is adopted, which seems paradoxical today, to entrust part of the function to 
judge to administrative authorities. The formula was to entrust the administrative 
contentious to the administration and in the middle the same administrations to the 
active administrators: king, ministers, department administrators. 
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During the golden age of French administrative law, due to the jurisprudence 
of the State Council, the judicial control is strengthened thus becoming the best 
system of protection of liberties.
The next stage begins with the period of the 1930s, lasting more than 40 years, 
and affects the main sectors of administrative law: the public service, the public 
institution, the public persons and their criteria of competence. The doctrine esti-
mated that each of these crises can find its solution in itself, committing itself to 
release a new criterion of jurisdiction of the administrative jurisdiction and to im-
pose the decisions of the judicial courts, proposing new interpretations to prohibit 
the incorrect application of the law. This doctrine did not delay being challenged, 
reproaching it with the underestimation of the real life of the administration and 
the administrative practice, thus the administrative litigation, appearing as a dam-
aged image of it. 
The modern period begins with the 1970’s and resulted from the fruits of pre-
vious criticism. The specificity of the respective period resides in the fact that the 
remedy of the crises suffered by the administrative contentious is in historical evo-
lution or in the change of the logic of the administrative jurisdiction. Currently 
these crises reflect the deeper movement, which reaches the whole of the French 
administration and in a broader sense the French society itself. From another point 
of view, the classic French model of separation of powers in the state denotes the 
fact that a well-adjusted constitutional administrative judicial system can ensure 
the judicial control of the public administration activity.
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Abstract
The 2014-2020 regulatory provisions to EU Cohesion policy gave our country, Romania, new opportuni-
ties to use ESIF for sustainable development, particularly using Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI). This 
paper analyses the implementation of the Regional Operational Programme (within the new framework and 
provisions) in comparison with the previous programming period (2013-2017). The analyzed area of imple-
mentation is mainly in Tulcea County and a small area in Constanța County, the territory of ITI Danube Delta, 
as stated in the Integrated Strategy of Sustainable Development Danube Delta. 
The paper shows that there has been a significant improvement in implementing the program. The 
territorial provisions have encouraged innovation and adaptation in both thinking and practice. The strategy, 
focused on a particular area, stated clearly the needs of the territory, that would be financed also through 
the Regional Operational Programme. It resulted in more submitted applications, different applicants, more 
needs fulfilled. 
The implementation of the ITI Danube Delta în Romania brought many advantages, but it also had some 
setbacks. So, there is scope for extending the use of the territorial strategies in the future, albeit with the 
simplification of some of the regulatory requirements and more flexibility in programming. Also, more atten-
tion needs to be given to monitoring and evaluating the outcomes of strategies.
Keywords: cohesion policy, Integrated Territorial Investment, Regional Operational Programme.
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1. Introduction
It is increasingly evident that the various challenges facing urban and rural areas 
– demographic, social, economic, environmental – are closely linked, and success in 
local development can only be achieved through an integrated approach. However, 
the policy response at European and national level, regarding the issues mentioned 
above, has been slow and divided. The Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 aims to stimulate 
integrated strategies (measures in terms of employment, education, social inclusion, 
and institutional capacity are supported) that enhance sustainable local develop-
ment in order to strengthen cities’ resilience and ensuring synergies between the 
investments supported by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF).
Taking these aspects into consideration, the new European regulations define 
new tools to implement the Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-2020, respectively:
 – Joint Action Plan – a group of projects implemented under the responsibility of 
the beneficiary, as part of the operational program or programs;
 – Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI) – an integrated approach to urban or 
territorial development strategies that involve investments from several prior-
ity axes, from one or more Operational Programmes;
 – Community-Led Local Development (CLLD) – is achieved through local devel-
opment strategies on integrated and multi-sectorial areas, being placed under 
the responsibility of the community, of the local action groups formed by rep-
resentatives of the local socio-economic interests of the public and private sec-
tors; local action groups develop and implement local development strategies.
Each member state was given the opportunity to choose one or more tools men-
tioned above. Romania has chosen all of the new tools in order to implement prop-
erly the submitted projects. The most important instrument used in Romania in the 
actual programming period (2014-2020) is ITI Danube Delta, financed through all the 
European funds, including the European Regional Development Fund. One of the 
programs financed through this fund is the Regional Operational Programme (ROP). 
2. Research objectives and methodology 
This paper tries to analyze by comparison the methods of programming, im-
plementing and the results of the Regional Operational Programme (ROP) in two 
programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 – only in the area covered by the 
ITI Danube Delta in order to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each 
mode of operation.
The objectives of this research are:
Objective 1: Analyzing the objectives and financeable areas of intervention in a 
comparison between the ROP in the previous programming period (2007-2013) and 
the actual one (2014-2020); 
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Objective 2: Analyzing the results and the indicators reached in implementing 
the two programs;
Objective 3: Stating the advantages and disadvantages of using the integrated 
approach in comparison with the standard approach; and
Objective 4: Concluding on responsibilities, governance method, and ways of 
implementing the ESIF further on.
The methodology consists of an analysis of official/public documents (legisla-
tion, strategies, reports, etc.). Both national and European legislation regarding 
the Regional Operational Programme, the European Regional Development Fund, 
the Integrated Territorial Investments were analyzed. Also, strategies, work plans, 
guides, terms of reference, reports, etc., related to this field, issued mainly at a na-
tional level, were analyzed.
Secondary data analysis implied: analysis of the recommendations of the annual 
implementing reports of the ROP, analysis of the changes made in the organiza-
tional charts of the entities involved in implementing the new tool of financing, 
including the level of the specializations of the experts. 
The analyzed documents are: Common Provision Regulation (CPR), Partner-
ship Agreement, Regional Operational Programme 2007-2013, Regional Operation-
al Programme 2014-2020, Annual Implementation Reports, Final Implementation 
Report ROP 2007-2013, Organizational Charts, The Quadripartite Agreement, The 
Integrated Strategy of Sustainable Development Danube Delta, World Bank Re-
ports, and charts, specific situations published by the Management Authority or the 
Intermediate Body regarding ROP 2007-2013 and ROP 2014-2020.
3. Cohesion Policy and Integrated Territorial Investment 
The influence exercised by the European Union on national public policies is 
now commonly accepted. The European Union’s cohesion policy, more identified 
by its means (structural funds) than by its objectives, is significant in the process of 
Europeanisation of the public action because it contributes to the renewal of forms 
of governance (Radaelli, 2002; Saurruger and Surel, 2006).
Cohesion policy is procedural. Its implementation is decentralized at the region-
al level. If it is important to remember that the European Union is not intended to 
act on the sovereignty of the states, the existence of a regional level is a prereq-
uisite for obtaining structural funds. States may, therefore, choose to transfer the 
management of these funds to the elected region or to create new administrative 
regions (Marcou, 2002; Lepesant, 2011).
By retaining the regional level for the management and implementation of cohe-
sion policy, the European Union has contributed to the assertion of the regional fact 
(Barone, 2011; Picouet, 2012; Keating, 2013), even though cohesion policy is largely 
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dependent on national contexts. This governance mixes a multitude of actors at 
different levels in the context of ongoing negotiation around issues and means. The 
protagonists are linked by chains of interdependence that do not involve hierarchi-
cal relations (Marchand-Tonel and Simoulin, 2004).
Taking into consideration the example of the cohesion policy and more partic-
ularly its urban aspect, materialized by a new tool, the Integrated Territorial In-
vestment (ITI), our contribution questions the effects of the EU intervention on the 
institutional changes within the Member States.
Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI) is an instrument created by the European 
Commission under the urban component of the cohesion policy to facilitate the 
implementation of a territorial strategy. It aims to meet the objectives of ‘smart, 
sustainable and inclusive’ growth as defined by the Europe 2020 Strategy (formerly 
Lisbon-Gothenburg). The use of ITI was allowed, under the 2014-2020 cohesion pol-
icy programming, by article 7 of the ERDF Regulation (1305/2013). This tool can be 
mobilized in various geographical areas (from the neighborhood to the cross-border 
areas) and must also be linked to the axes listed in each Operational Programme 
(OP). The areas targeted according to the OPs are: urban planning, economic devel-
opment, vocational training, the fight against discrimination or the energy transi-
tion. Thus, the ITI can participate in the financing of training courses, workshops to 
support the creation of businesses, innovative equipment, the renovation of build-
ings as well as housing. For the Commission, it is also a question of allowing the 
beneficiaries of the funds to combine the use of the ERDF and the ESF.
There are many tools that this regulation places under urban and territorial di-
mensions, one of them is the Integrated Territorial Investment, not only for urban 
areas but for any type of territory. In line with CPR, all thematic objectives could 
become an object of ITI. 
Thus, a definition of this particular instrument might be that an ITI is a tool that 
offers the possibility to ‘bundle’ together ESI funds to perform activities aimed to 
support sustainable urban development. It has the freedom to join and coordinate 
different funds and priorities that the new programming period wants to promote. 
The ITI needs a financial pot, a bundle of integrated measures under diverss themat-
ic objectives. It focused on areas such as peripheries or urban environments. 
According to the approved legal framework, each Member State planning to use 
this tool must state so in its Partnership Agreement, and has to show in the OPs 
that will refer to that and will finance such an instrument. The architecture of an 
ITI needs time for planning activities and deciding sources of financing, therefore 
it may be complicated for OPs to add them on time. A possible way to ease the 
pressure on delivering the names of the cities that will participate in ITI, might be 
to allow them to plan and implement one even if the new programming period has 
begun, and the national and regional documents have already been submitted and 
approved. 
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Moreover, the current legislative framework asks every Member State to ear-
mark at least 5% of their ERDF for urban-related initiatives and the use of ITI. 
Cities and other intermediate bodies are direct beneficiaries and targets of such 
funds, and in this way the program offers a major role to cities that they did not 
have in the 2007-2013 programming period. 
The choice of cities where the 5% will be delegated to is a responsibility of the 
Member State by consultation with other stakeholders. This mechanism is essen-
tially different from the last programming period, and allows a direct transfer of 
funds from the top to the bottom level. The regulation aims at empowering cities 
with responsibilities to tackle problems and obstacles that arise at the local level.
4. Comparative analysis: ROP 2007-2013 – ROP 2014-2020. 
The implementation of the Partnership Agreement 
In Romania, as a Member State, the ESIF was divided into several programs of 
financing. The main fund is the European Regional Development Fund; the Re-
gional Operational Programme, existing in both programming periods, is financed 
through this fund. 
The Regional Operational Programme implements important elements of the 
National Strategy for Regional Development and of the National Development Plan 
(PND) contributing, together with the other Sectorial Operational Programmes 
(SOP), to the achievement of the strategy’s objective and of the National Strategic 
Reference Framework (CNSR, namely ‘the reduction of disparities of economic and 
social development between Romania and other EU member states’).
The proposed priority axes and the areas of intervention included in the ROP 
2007-2013 were in line with the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy (which takes into 
account the Strategy Gothenburg 2001), of the Cohesion Policy of the European 
Union and with the Guidelines Community Strategies.
On October 6, 2011, the European Commission adopted the provisional version 
of the legislative package that has constituted the framework for implementing the 
Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-2020. The new proposals have been designed to 
strengthen the strategic dimension of the policy and to ensure that EU investments 
will be focused on long-term ‘growth and employment goals’, according to the ob-
jectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy.
In September 2013, the World Bank was contracted to provide support services 
for Romania’s Government to develop a strategic document dedicated for Danube 
Delta and its surrounding areas, named the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve (RBDD), 
which would bring prosperity to this rich ecological and cultural region, but which 
is gradually depopulated. In response, a procedure was developed to achieve a com-
prehensive analysis of the existing situation regarding access to basic services, op-
portunities for job creation, economic growth and development constraints.
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The diagnostic analysis was supplemented by the conclusions of the public 
consultations conducted with the participation of locals and stakeholders on their 
‘preferences’ related to how the future Danube Delta will show (the vision). To-
gether, they justify investment needs and changes in public policies.
Romania decided to apply such an integrated territorial approach that tries to 
capture the potential sectorial synergies. The Danube Delta Strategy and its action 
plan try to balance two objectives: preserving unique cultural and natural values 
of RBDD and fulfillment of inhabitants’ aspiration of improving their economic 
opportunities and living conditions.
The action plan consists of two parts: one includes proposed interventions el-
igible for ITI financing and the second presents interventions non-eligible for ITI 
funding, for which other sources must be sought.
The ITI mechanism was defined to cover certain priority axes and measures 
from all seven OPs and the National Rural Development Programme (NRDP), being 
funded from five European Funds.
Some of the special axes and measures were selected by the Romanian Govern-
ment in order to take into consideration the peculiarities of this region. The na-
tional strategies and priorities are reflected in the Danube Delta (DD) Strategy and 
so on, OPs cover the most important priorities of our country. In this way, a wide 
and strong connection between the OPs and the DD strategy is assured. However, 
some features turn out to be due to the definition of this mechanism that focuses on 
large infrastructure investments. To a certain extent, the ITI 2020 proposal empha-
sizes higher on infrastructure compared to the Strategy 2030, which focuses more 
on the environment (balancing the environmental protection and the objectives of 
socio-economic development).
The interventions proposed by each OP demonstrate complementarity and in-
tegration. The potential of the DD’s tourism sector will remain unexplored if the 
urban services (such as garbage collection, sanitation, and water) and tourism in-
frastructure will not be improved through the ROP. Services, as well as the health 
and education sector, will depend in the future on Information and Communication 
Tools (IC&T). There will be more benefits in tourism after further development 
of many attractions (through ROP) and recreational fishing, aquaculture, organic 
agriculture, guided tours, etc. Because the natural and cultural values are the main 
attractions of the region, the restoration, protection, and improvement of them is 
of crucial importance in the ROP. Beyond integration and the synergies between 
OPs through the global planning process, the links between physical investments, 
changes in policies and regulations, and institutional development and technical 
assistance could increase benefits and support resources.
The area of the DDBR is characterized by a rare and isolated population, eco-
nomic vulnerabilities, unsatisfactory accessibility to services, etc. The institutional 
and administrative functioning of the Danube Delta ITI mechanism is ensured by 
the Inter-Community Development Association ITI Danube Delta (IDA-ITI DD).
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IDA-ITI DD is a private legal entity with public utility status, which includes 
38 Territorial Administrative Units (of which 5 urban administrative units: Tulcea, 
Măcin, Isaccea, Sulina, Babadag), Tulcea County Council and Constanța County 
Council. At the executive level, IDA-ITI DD has its own technical apparatus led by 
the President of the Board of Directors, and benefits from financial support through 
the OP Technical Assistance.
In order to promote the partnership principle in the implementation of the ITI 
mechanism, an Advisory Committee was established as a partnership body with an 
open character on a voluntary basis, constituted by the General Assembly of ADI 
through the active involvement of all stakeholders.
Romania is among the five Member States (together with France, Italy, Poland 
and the Czech Republic) that have benefited from an allocation of more than 1 
billion Euros for this instrument. The interventions realized through the ITI Delta 
Danube mechanism are also an important element for achieving the SUERD objec-
tives. The ITI instrument benefits from a multi-fund allocation of 1,111.7 million 
Euros, representing investments from the ERDF, ESF, FC, EARDF and EMFF which 
have in the foreground the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve with its entirely natu-
ral and cultural heritage. For the Regional Operational Programme 2014-2020, the 
allocation is of 358.11 million Euros.
Therefore, the main difference between the two programming periods regarding 
the implementation of the Regional Operational Programme is represented by the 
new tool/instrument designed by the European Commission: Integrated Territorial 
Investments. This is the reason why in the scheme of responsible institutions for 
the ROP implementation, it appears a new structure, IDA-ITI DD, as represented in 
the table below:
Table 1: Comparative analysis between ROP 2007-2013 and ROP 2014-2020 implementation
ROP 2007-2013 ROP 2014-2020
6 Regions: 
North-West; North-East; South-West Oltenia; 
South-Muntenia; Bucharest-Ilfov, Centre; 
South-East (Counties: Tulcea, Constanța, 
Galați, Brăila, Vrancea, Buzău)
6 Regions: 
North-West; North-East; South-West Oltenia; 
South-Muntenia; Bucharest-Ilfov, Centre; 
South-East (Counties: Tulcea, Constanța, 
Galați, Brăila, Vrancea, Buzău)
Within South-East: ITI Danube Delta
Internal Control System:
Managing Authority 
Intermediate Bodies 
Certification and Payment Authority 
Audit Authority 
Internal Control System:
Managing Authority 
Intermediate Bodies 
Certification and Payment Authority 
Audit Authority 
The Intercommunity Development 
Association ITI Danube Delta
Source: Authors’ own contribution
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The activity of IDA-ITI Danube Delta is supported by the OP Technical Assis-
tance (allocation 5 million Euro) both for ensuring the necessary technical and lo-
gistical conditions, as well as for supporting the necessary expertise for the coor-
dination at a territorial level of the implementation of the ITI mechanism. For the 
project implemented in the period 2015-2018, reimbursement applications amount-
ing to approximately 1.6 million Euros were submitted.
IDA-ITI DD assures the coordination of the Strategy Action Plan Implementa-
tion, playing a central role in the ITI by supporting the beneficiaries, such as local 
authorities, public institutions, private or public members as well as non-members, 
to initiate projects and by endorsing projects prepared by the local beneficiaries 
from the point of view of relevance with the strategy’s objectives, while providing 
a communication channel between the Managing Authority and beneficiaries about 
possible problems.
In 2016, the structure of IDA-ITI DD was functional, through the technical team 
formed by experts on programs. At the same time, in 2016, it was completed the 
recruitment plan, organizing the competitions to fill vacancies. Other competitions 
were held for the following posts: 1 procurement expert, 1 communication expert, 
2 program experts, and 1 assistant manager.
Following these competitions, the personnel scheme of the structure by IDA-DD 
ITI was complete, so that at the end of 2016 it was at its full capacity of 21 people.
The analysis carried out by the Ministry of European Funds through the Direc-
torate General for Programming and System Coordination (in the progress report 
on the implementation of the Partnership Agreement1), regarding the implementa-
tion of ITI, indicated the need to improve the administrative capacity of IDA-ITI DD 
and, starting with 2019, a new technical assistance agreement (approx. 4.4 million 
Euro) is implemented, which included new performance indicators (contracting 
rate of projects supported by IDA-ITI DD, the absorption rate of completed proj-
ects). The implementation of the project also involves providing a helpdesk in the 
process of preparing the projects. The difficulties reported in the implementation 
include the difficulty in obtaining the necessary approvals when submitting the 
financing applications, obtaining the cadastral approvals for the lands covered by 
the investment works, identifying the investment objective in the inventory of the 
assets that make up the public domain.
1 In accordance with Article 52 of Regulation (EU) no. 1303/2013 establishing common provisions on 
the European Structural and Investment Funds (FESI), by August 31, 2019, Member States have the 
obligation to prepare and submit to the European Commission a Progress Report on the implemen-
tation of the Partnership Agreement.
354
5. Administrative functioning 
5.1. General data 
ROP 2007-2013 was approved by the EC on July 12, 2007. The general objective 
of the Regional Operational Program 2007-2013 was supporting ‘economic, social, 
territorially balanced and sustainable development of Romania’s regions’, accord-
ing to their specific resources and their needs, through a focus on urban growth 
poles, by improving infrastructure conditions and business environment in order 
to become more attractive places to live, visit, invest and work. In line with this 
objective, it was structured in five priority axes and thirteen areas of intervention, 
as well as a priority axis of technical assistance.
The value of the Community funds (ERDF) allocated to the ROP for the previous 
programming period 2007-2013 was 3,726,021,762 Euros.
On the other hand, ROP 2014-2020 was approved by the EC on June 23, 2015. Its 
main objective is increasing ‘economic competitiveness and improving the living 
conditions of regional and local communities’ through supporting the development 
of the business environment, services, and infrastructure, in order to assure the 
sustainable development of Romania’s regions, by effective management of their 
resources, a capitalization of their innovation potential and by technological prog-
ress. It is structured in 14 priority axes and 37 areas of intervention, as well as a 
priority axis of technical assistance.
Also, in terms of financing data, the two programming periods are different. 
With an allocation of 3.72 billion Euro ERDF, ROP 2007-2013 gave the South-East 
Region 411.57 million Euros. Whereas, ROP 2014-2020 offered ITI Danube Delta 
an allocation of 358.11 million Euro out of 6.7 billion Euro allocation for the entire 
program. One could state that, from the beginning, the actual programming period 
is more appealing for the covered territory. If in 2007-2013, the whole region that 
includes six counties was allocated approximately 400 million Euro, in 2014-2020, a 
small territory covering parts of two counties within the region is allocated almost 
the same. This is the main reason why the value of the submitted applications and 
implemented projects in the Tulcea County area is reduced compared with the val-
ue of submitted applications within ITI Danube Delta. So, if the value of submitted 
applications in ROP 2007-2013 is around 82 million Euros (at the end of program-
ming period), the same value for ROP 2014-2020, at the level of October 2019 is 
about five times higher, approximately 389 million Euro. The report is diminished 
to approximately 2.5 in terms of the value of signed contracts.
The detailed situation of the submitted applications and signed contracts is 
shown below in Table 2.
We took into consideration only the projects implemented within Tulcea Coun-
ty area. After we requested the information from the Regional Development Agen-
cy South-East Region, they sent us data regarding the implemented projects within 
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the region in the previous programming period, in Excel documents, also with the 
final report of implementation regarding ROP 2007-2013, in the South-East region. 
Given the fact that in the report, the gathered data referred to the region as a whole, 
the main documents used to extract data regarding the projects implemented in 
Tulcea County were the Excel documents given by the agency representatives. The 
data are for December 31, 2016.
The data gathered in this table is based on the monthly situations published 
by the Regional Development Agency South-East Region and by IDA-ITI Danube 
Delta regarding the submission of projects and signed contracts within the ITI in-
strument. The shown data is referred to as September 30, 2019.
Analyzing the two programming periods, we reached the following conclusions:
 – both programming periods finance investments in county roads, health infra-
structure, social infrastructure, educational infrastructure, cultural heritage, 
development of SMEs, tourism infrastructure;
 – the new financed actions introduced by ROP 2014-2020 are: investments in ener-
getic efficiency, business incubators, mobility plans, development of small cities;
 – the allocation for the South-East Region in 2007-2013 is similar to the alloca-
tion for ITI Danube Delta in 2014-2020;
 – the number and value of submitted applications is considerably higher in 2014-
2020 than the ones in 2007-2013.
Taking all these facts into consideration, we analyzed the reasons why the situ-
ation is different. This analysis is represented below. 
6. Analysis of the governance model. Proposal for improvement 
As a new mechanism introduced by CPR during ESIF programming period, In-
tegrated Territorial Investment aims to facilitate territorial strategies’ implemen-
tation, that needs to attract funding from different sources and to promote a more 
local-based policy-making process. 
It is clear that for Romania, the ITI Danube Delta initiates some improvements 
in implementing the Regional Operational Programme opposite to the previous 
programming period. However, the governance model could be improved in the 
upcoming period. We stated several proposals for improvement after analyzing the 
given situation.
6.1. Advantages 
The existence of a structure in the territory that is close to the beneficiaries 
could be considered an advantage. There is a perception of confidence in the admin-
istrative culture of the territory that is higher in a structure that is of the same rank 
and in the same territory with him, who understands his problems being near him.
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IDA-ITI DD, being in contact with all the programs, with all the Managing Au-
thorities, it has the vision on all that means ESIF financing. In this context, we can 
make a comparison between the programs, by identifying what works well, and 
where is potential, and where solutions can be proposed for improvement.
IDA-ITI DD studied all the guides of all the programs, studied all the programs 
and a beneficiary does not have to go to three different places to different authori-
ties if he needs support or information about several programs. Specifically, mayors 
have projects on three programs RDNP, ROP and HCOP, and they could obtain 
information from a single place from IDA ITI where the program experts provide 
support.
Reduction of travel costs and time consumed by traveling only to Tulcea and not 
to Brăila for meeting with representatives of ROP, HCOP, AFIR/OJFIR Constanța 
could be considered another advantage.
The experience accumulated by the IDA-ITI DD experts during the 6 years since 
this structure operates is put at the service of the beneficiaries.
Providing an interface between the Managing Authorities that manage at the 
central level and the local beneficiaries is another advantage.
The involvement of IDA-ITI DD in the writing stage of the strategy helps: it 
knows all the problems of the territory and where it must be reached with the im-
plementation of the strategy.
IDA-ITI DD is the only structure that concretely implements a strategy dedi-
cated to a territory. It is an independent and apolitical structure that ensures equal 
treatment of all the beneficiaries.
6.2. Disadvantages 
The involvement of IDA-ITI DD is required more in the absorption of funds, but 
its powers are limited, being not involved at all in the life cycle of a project.
IDA-ITI DD not being part of the system implies not having access to the infor-
mation from the electronic applications of the programs.
During the project implementation period, it has access to those beneficiaries 
with which it has concluded a collaboration agreement, the form found by IDA-ITI 
DD in order to be able to monitor the projects from the perspective of the strategy.
6.3. Proposals for improvement
Seeing the benefits that the implementation of the ITI instrument gets, we con-
sider that it is necessary to keep the existing structure of the IDA-ITI DD, possibly 
with an increasing number of experts. Other aspects that should be improved are: 
formalizing a collaboration with each Management Authority separately, in ad-
dition to the Quadripartite Agreement, giving increased powers, respectively, the 
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selection of projects. Recommendations for improving the implementation: open-
ing calls with continuous submission; correlating the projects between them and 
opening the calls in a logical order of the interventions (e.g. first water-sewerage, 
then the road, then investments in educational, social, cultural infrastructure, etc., 
at the same time as financing the improvement of the administrative capacity of 
the personnel involved); monitoring projects implemented through ITI by IDA-ITI 
DD, as part of the system, to intervene if there are problems in implementation; 
monitoring the indicators of the strategy to be carried out on some measurable 
indicators, the data coming from each project, then to be aggregated, and the indi-
cators referring to statistical data to be separated within the strategy. Thus, there 
should be project indicators (e.g. newly created jobs) that will be quantified at the 
level of each project, and IDA-ITI DD staff will quantify them at the territory level, 
as well as the statistical data (e.g. the number of tourist arrivals); these statistical 
data do not reflect an exclusive result of the implementation of the funded projects, 
but of other actions taken. Therefore, it does not measure exclusively the result of 
the implementation of the strategy.
The benefits of using this tool were seized by the representatives of the 
Romanian Government, and the next programming period 2021-2027 brings signif-
icant changes in both institutional and strategic structure.
Within the cohesion policy, the Ministry of European Funds proposes nine types 
of programs, and the Regional Operational Programme is to be managed decentral-
ized at the level of the Regional Development Agencies in each of the 8 regions of 
the country (Polish model).
Also, the ITI mechanism for Danube Delta will also continue between 2021-2027 
to complete the actions to achieve the specific objectives, established within the 
Integrated Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Danube Delta (SIDD DD).
Furthermore, given that the financial period 2014-2020 showed us that the ITI 
Danube Delta mechanism has shown its usefulness for the territory it covers, the 
necessity of the continuation of the ITI project is implied for the next financial pe-
riod. In order to identify the best solutions for territorial development through ITI, 
the Association for Inter-Community Development ITI Danube Delta opened the 
consultation process with the general public, until January 31, 2020. The purpose of 
the consultation is to identify the priority areas of intervention and those measures 
that will continue to contribute to the implementation of the Integrated Strategy for 
Sustainable Development of the Danube Delta.
7. Conclusions 
It was made clear that ITI offers significant potential in terms of added value in 
the debate on future reforms. Specifically, it has the potential to target development 
needs and issues and to project bottom-up responses with the active involvement 
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of citizens and local institutions to ensure that ‘no person or region is left behind’. 
It also has the potential to respond to localized shocks or unexpected developments 
through integrated packages that provide substances to action plans. However, it is 
necessary to design and implement strategies to be more ‘agile and flexible’, to en-
sure that beneficiaries can access funds and deliver projects quickly, which involves 
a significant reassessment of regulatory requirements.
In the Romanian Memorandum regarding the use of the European funds in 
2021-2027, it is stated that regarding ITI, the proposal for the financial period 2021-
2027 is:
 – to continue the investments related to the Integrated Development Strategy 
Sustainable Danube Delta (ITI DD); and
 – to implement a new ITI instrument in the Jiu Valley region, taking into account 
the new initiatives promoted at European Union level, respectively The Plat-
form of Carboniferous Regions in Transition to which Romania joined with pi-
lot region Valea Jiului, as well as the establishment of the Fair Transition Fund 
(Just Transition Fund), meant to help affected communities in the area, and to 
build new strong, resilient and diversified energy savings. For this region, the 
financing of the elaboration of the strategy was approved, which aimed the 
reconversion of the area within the Support Program for Structural Reforms, 
under direct management at EC level.
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Abstract
The present study aims to observe the evolution of women occupying research positions through a long 
period of time in order to establish if they face discrimination regarding access to this profession and which 
are the research fields preferred by women. The main objectives of the study are (1) to investigate the pres-
ence of horizontal segregation inside all the sectors of performance and fields of research and development, 
and (2) to analyze the evolution and the proportion of female researchers inside the research fields and 
sectors of performance during the 2000-2017 period.
The research revealed that the whole number of researchers from all sectors of performance has de-
creased in the studied period on average with 1.67% per year. The number of women has decreased by 
1.79% per year compared with 1.57% in men’s case. The proportion of women among researchers from all 
sectors has decreased from 47% in 2000 to almost 46% in 2017 but the gender parity existed taking into 
account that both genders occupied more than 40% of the positions.
The horizontal segregation was observed among the research sectors because women were better rep-
resented in Higher Education and Government sectors, the only areas where the gender balance has been 
almost at parity. From 2011, women researchers in Romania have worked more in the Higher Education 
Sector in comparison to the other main sectors of the economy and registered an increase in the proportion 
of the researchers from this sector (from 41% in 2000, 49% in 2011 to 51% in 2017). The Business Enterprise 
Sector (BES) still had a disproportionately high share of men researchers and the proportion of women de-
creased from 42% to 34% in 2017. Women researchers were still underrepresented in the field of engineering 
and technology (39.55%) and overrepresented in the medical sciences (64%). In the other fields, the gender 
balance has been reached.
Keywords: horizontal segregation, research sectors, fields of research and development.
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1. Introduction
The development of the R&D sector is a complex process influenced by various 
stakeholders. Governments, universities and private companies should collaborate 
in order to create a sustainable research area with long-term positive outcomes. 
Due to the high importance of research for societies’ evolution, gender equality 
should be present also in this field and women should have the same career oppor-
tunities as men. It would be expected for the scientific population to be gender-bal-
anced and the gender gap to be very narrow.
In Romania, research is not a well-developed sector and the number of research-
ers has decreased almost every year in the last 17 years (The National Institute of 
Statistics, 2019). According to the European Innovation Scoreboard (2018), Romania 
was considered a modest innovator with a constant low level of performance in this 
area (31.4 points at the Innovation Index in 2018). The Rio Country Report (2018), 
indicated that Romania has the highest number of researchers who are working 
abroad. Even if Romania’s target was 2% of GDP allocation, the situation is not even 
close. Research continues to be underfinanced and Romania allocated in 2019 only 
0.18% of the its GDP, meaning the lowest allocation per capita among the Member 
States, 14 times lower than the European average.
The National Institute of Statistics revealed that in 2018 the expenditures from 
the R&D sector represented 0.5% of the GDP. Only 0.21% were spent by the Gov-
ernment and the other expenditures were supported by universities and the private 
sector.
Considering the unattractiveness of this working field and assuming the pres-
ence of occupational segregation which leads to a higher presence of women in 
positions with lower levels of remuneration, gender equality should also be ap-
proached related to the R&D sector.
Observing female researchers’ situations among the Member States and the 
presence of occupational segregation inside the R&D sector, the present paper stud-
ies gender equality in the Romanian Research and Development sector in order to 
observe the presence of gender segregation and the situation of female researchers. 
The study also aims to observe if women are well represented in all the research 
areas or if this sector is divided into masculine and feminine fields.
2. Literature review
2.1. Female researchers across European Union Member States
Gender equality in research is important for equity and for lowering the deficit 
of skilled employees inside the EU labor market. At the European level, women 
are still underrepresented in the R&D sector, especially in Science and Technology 
and in management positions which leads to a considerable loss of talent. Even if 
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the position of female researchers has improved over the years, in order to create a 
comprehensive picture, gender equality should be studied inside the research sector 
and from many perspectives.
As the European Commission (2018b) and the European Institute of Gender 
Equality (2019) revealed, the annual growth of women scientists is less than half the 
annual number of female doctoral graduates. This indicates that each year, less than 
half of the female Ph.D. graduates choose to follow a career in the R&D sector. Even 
if in some sectors of performance (as Higher Education and Government) female 
distribution among researchers is over 40%, considering the whole population of 
researchers and scientists, it could be observed that at European level, women still 
represented only 33%. This situation maintained over the years, and even if the pro-
portion of female researchers during 2008-2015 registered a higher increase (3.8% 
in women’s cases and 3.4% in men’s cases), women still represent only one-third of 
the research population (European Commission, 2018b).
Women’s underrepresentation in the research sector could be explained by 
a series of factors namely, stereotypes, social values, the social roles of men and 
women, the criteria for advancing in an academic career or by gender segregation 
(European Institute for Gender Equality, 2019). 
As Blackburn et al. (2002) explained, gender segregation in the labor market 
represents the fact that women and men tend to have different occupations, which 
divides the market into feminine and masculine professions. As a consequence, 
men are most likely to occupy leadership positions, to become scientists, engi-
neers, to work in logistics or informatics and technology and women could be 
considered more suited for being teachers, nurses, civil servants or to occupy po-
sitions with less power of decision. The occupational segregation takes two forms: 
horizontal segregation – the situation when men and women tend to occupy dif-
ferent sectors inside a working field or to work in different industries and vertical 
segregation – when women are represented within the same sector as men but 
they cannot achieve positions with high power of decision on top of the respective 
sector. Vertical discrimination leads to women’s underrepresentation in top man-
agement positions and overrepresentation in middle and low management posi-
tions (Moldovan, 2016).
The She figures (European Commission, 2018a) showed that, at the European 
level, the horizontal segregation inside the research sector is still present. Female 
researchers are concentrated in the Government sector as well as in Higher Educa-
tion, where the gender balance has been reached due to each gender representation 
of more than 40%. As far as the Business Enterprise Sector is concerned, men’s rep-
resentation is higher and women’s proportion is only 20% (European Commission, 
2018a). The situation disadvantages both groups, as women will be reluctant to 
develop a career in a masculine research sector. The same situation could influence 
men’s career choices, as they would hesitate to work in a feminine sector.
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Also, gender segregation leads to unequal levels of remuneration between the 
two groups. Consequently, men are usually developing careers in fields with higher 
levels of remuneration than women’s (Silber, 1989; Hutchens, 1991, 2004; Mora and 
Ruiz-Castillo, 2003, 2004).
Considering that the Romanian research sector is underfinanced and sometimes 
unattractive for human resources, due to the low level of remuneration, and to the 
fact that men are often concentrated in well-paid sectors, it is possible that wom-
en’s representation among researchers to be very high. If in European countries, fe-
male researchers are underrepresented (33% in 2012), (European Institute for Gen-
der Equality, 2019), the situation could be the opposite in Romania. The situation 
could be similar to the Romanian public administration and educational system, 
where women represented the majority of the employed population, but the posi-
tions with power of decision and with high levels of remuneration were dominated 
by men (Profiroiu and Nastacă, 2018a, Profiroiu and Nastacă, 2018b). 
2.2. Gender differences in the R&D sector
Studies regarding men and women developing scientific careers revealed that 
the gender gap is narrowing and the gender differences between scientists are de-
creasing (Lind, 2006; Alaluf et al., 2003). Even if the proportion of women among 
researchers is increasing, it could not be stated that women have equal opportuni-
ties to develop a scientific career as men. Regarding the Higher Education Sector, 
the gender differences are observed initially, from the fields of study chosen by men 
and women. Even if progress has been made and women are equally represented 
or even outnumbering men in many fields of study, mathematics, computing, and 
engineering, manufacturing and construction are still mostly chosen by men (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2012). Consequently, the horizontal segregation appears as 
the research positions from the mentioned fields will be occupied predominantly 
by men. Also, inside the Higher Education Sector (HES), the gender segregation in 
both its forms is still present from many points of view. 
Authors (Machado-Taylor and Ozkanli, 2013; Teelken and Deem, 2013; Renzulli 
et al., 2013) studied gender segregation in higher education and revealed that wom-
en in academia are mostly occupying positions with a lower level of remuneration. 
Also, vertical segregation could be observed as in assistant positions women are 
represented three times more than men. Moreover, the lecturer positions are occu-
pied by a double number of women. Considering the highest position in academia 
– full professor, women are represented in even lower proportions (18%) (European 
Commission, 2012).
Data collected from the Member States (European Commission, 2012) showed 
different situations. There are states where men and women are equally represent-
ed in teaching positions within academia, excepting the full professor position and 
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states where gender inequality starts from the Ph.D. studies and increases when 
graduates occupy teaching positions. Overall, among Member States, it could be 
observed a general tendency of female underrepresentation in the higher grades of 
the teaching profession. Even if women’s situation has improved and a higher num-
ber of them are occupying positions within the Higher Education Sector, vertical 
segregation is still present (European Commission, 2012). 
Also, the horizontal segregation divides all the research sectors into masculine 
and feminine fields. Humanities are a female-dominated research area and Science 
and Technology presents a higher concentration of men. Considering this situation, 
it could be assumed that vertical segregation will exist mostly in the masculine re-
search fields. However, studies revealed (see De Henau and Meulders, 2003), that 
women are facing vertical segregation in the majority of scientific fields, including 
the female-dominated areas. A high gender gap was observed in Humanities, as 
well as in Science and Technology, and also in Economics (European Commission, 
2012, Ginther and Hayes 2003, Kahn, 1993).
Some authors (Hopkins et al., 2013) tried to explain female underrepresentation 
in Higher Education through the fact that men are more published at each academ-
ic level. Other authors (Eloy et al., 2013) considered that unequal representation is 
influenced by gender differences in research projects’ funding where they observed 
that men received higher levels of funding than women did.
Also, gender inequality in research was approached through the scientific pro-
ductivity perspective. Authors tried to investigate research productivity in different 
fields of study from social sciences (see van Arensbergen, van der Weijden and van 
den Besselaar, 2012) to material sciences (Mauleón and Bordons, 2006) using per-
formance indicators like the number of citations, the number of first authorships 
or the number of publications. These papers revealed that the research productivity 
was higher in men’s cases and this could be an explanation of the low number of 
women with full professor grade (see Garg and Kumar, 2014; Larivière et al., 2013; 
Malouff, Schutte and Priest, 2010; Prpić, 2002).
Regarding leadership positions in R&D, women still face difficulties in occu-
pying positions with decision power in all the fields and sectors of performance. 
Women are underrepresented in leadership positions (in scientific decision-making 
committees) both in feminine and masculine research fields. Among these fields, 
the situation differs and the lowest number of female leaders is being registered in 
Science and Technology (Osborn et al., 2000). 
Regarding the Business and Enterprise sector (BES) it has been observed that 
scientists are leaving academia in order to work in this research sector (European 
Commission, 2012). Women’s representation in BES has increased in the 2008-2015 
period at a faster rate than in men’s case but the men’ presence is still very high 
(79.8%). Also, a low number of women (28%), working as scientists in BES, have one 
or more children comparing to women occupying other types of positions in the 
368
same sector (34%). Activating in this sector implies sometimes long working hours 
and women could be reluctant to developing their careers in BES as they have to 
manage both professional and personal lives (Rübsamen-Waigmann et. al., 2003).
In conclusion, the literature review showed that gender segregation in the re-
search sector is still present, but female scientists’ situation is starting to improve. 
Also, gender balance has been reached in Higher Education and Government sec-
tors. Even though there are still many differences between men’s and women’s 
choices regarding their scientific careers, which leads to a continuous gender segre-
gation in the research sector, the gender gap is narrowing.
2. The research methodology
The methodology of the research consists of an exploratory study conducted 
using secondary data analysis for the 2000-2017 period, regarding researchers from 
the Romanian Research and Development sector. The research is part of a series of 
exploratory studies regarding gender equality in the labor market.
Regarding Romania’s R&D sector, the research staff is represented by people 
who participate in research projects or provide services directly related to this area. 
The research personnel are grouped by occupation in: research specialists, techni-
cians and assimilated staff as well as other categories – workers and administrative 
personnel who participate in the execution of research and development projects 
or are directly involved in the execution of such projects. (National Institute of 
Statistics, 2019).
Also, the human resources of R&D sectors are analyzed by sectors of perfor-
mance, according to the methodology presented by the Frascati in the OECD Manu-
al (2002). There are four sectors of performance, as follows: the Business Enterprise 
Sector (BES), the Government Sector (GOV), the Higher Education Sector (HES) 
and the Non-Profit Sector (NPS).
Also, researchers are analyzed by research fields, namely: natural sciences, en-
gineering, and technology, medical and health sciences, agricultural sciences, social 
sciences, and humanities.
For the present study, data concerning the research staff from all sectors of per-
formance as well as from all the research fields were gathered from the National 
Institute of Statistics and from the European Institute for Gender Equality. The data 
were analyzed for the 2000-2017 period, in order to observe the situation of the hu-
man resources of this sector, for a long period of time from the gender perspective.
The purpose of the study is to observe the evolution of women occupying re-
search positions through a long period of time in order to establish if they face 
discrimination regarding access to this profession and which are the research fields 
preferred by women. 
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The main objective of the study is to establish if, in the Romanian R&D sector, 
the horizontal segregation phenomenon is present and female researchers are con-
centrated only in some research fields and sectors of performance, as well as if the 
population of researchers is gender-balanced.
The study has two specific objectives:
O1: To investigate the presence of horizontal segregation inside all the sectors of 
performance (business enterprise, government, higher education and non-prof-
it) and fields of research and development (Natural Sciences, Engineering and 
Technology, Medical and Health Sciences, Agricultural Sciences, Social Scienc-
es, and Humanities).
O2: To analyze the evolution and the proportion of female researchers inside the 
research fields and sectors of performance during the 2000-2017 period.
The study has started from the following research questions which were for-
mulated after exploring the situation from the Member States in order to establish 
if in Romania the situation is similar:
R1: Which is the proportion of women among researchers?
R2. Which are the sectors of performance where women are better represented?
R3: In which research fields the proportion of women is higher than the propor-
tion of men?
R4: Is horizontal segregation present inside the R&D sector?
R5: Does gender balance exist inside the R&D sector?
3. Main findings of the study
3.1. The research personnel’ evolution during 2000-2017
In order to respond to the first research question (R1: Which is the proportion of 
women among researchers?), data regarding the population occupied in the research 
field was collected and analyzed from the gender perspective. The whole population 
of researchers was analyzed, as well as the number of research specialists (gradu-
ates of Ph.D. studies).
The analyzed data showed that the share of women among researchers was over 
45% for all the analyzed period. At first glance, the gender balance in research was 
present for all the studied years. Observing the whole research sector, without di-
viding it into fields and sectors of performance, it could be affirmed that gender 
equality in the Romanian research field was always present and apparently, women 
did not face discrimination when trying to occupy research positions. From gender 
equality in the research field perspective, Romania ranked on superior positions 
among the Member States. According to the European Institute for Gender Equality 
(2012), European Union’s Member States face female under-representation in the 
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field of research. For example, in 2009, female researchers represented 33% of the 
total population occupied in the R&D sector. Romania ranked fifth place among 
Member States with a female share with almost 46%, similar to countries like 
Bulgaria, Portugal, Slovakia, and Poland. In 2015, the gender imbalance amongst 
researchers still existed, and the share of female researchers at EU level remained 
at 33%. Romania ranked 13 amongst Member States, with almost 46% of female 
researchers (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2018). The data indicated that 
the Romanian R&D sector could not be considered either a feminine work field nor 
a masculine one, as the gender balance existed for all the studied periods.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Women 2,32% 1,75% 2,90% 0,10% 5,06% -0,59% 1,97% 2,27% -3,08%-8,95%11,09% 0,91% 1,90% -1,35% 0,18% 2,19% 0,91%
Men 0,29% 2,13% 5,03% 3,33% -2,76% 5,97% -0,49% 2,50% -1,99%-7,03% 6,26% 0,58% 1,42% -0,60% 1,94% 2,13% 0,96%
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Figure 2: The annual growth rate of the research personnel, by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute of Statistics (2019)
Analyzing the annual growth rate of the research personnel (Figure 2), a major 
decrease could be observed in 2010, in both female and male researchers’ cases. The 
number of women researchers decreased to a higher extent (almost 9%) but also 
registered a higher increase in the next year (11%) than in the men’s case. Another 
revealed aspect was that the proportion of women among research personnel de-
creased in four years from the studied period, namely in 2006 (-0.59%), 2009 (-3.08%), 
2010 (-8.95%) and 2014 (-1.35%). For the rest of the period, the female researchers’ 
growth rate increased from 0.10% up to 11.09%. A significant difference could be ob-
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Women 45,9 46,4 46,3 45,8 45,0 46,9 45,4 46,0 45,9 45,6 45,1 46,2 46,3 46,4 46,2 45,8 45,8 45,8
Men 54,0 53,5 53,6 54,1 54,9 53,0 54,6 54,0 54,0 54,3 54,8 53,7 53,6 53,5 53,7 54,1 54,1 54,1
0,00%
20,00%
40,00%
60,00%
80,00%
100,00%
Figure 1: Research positions on the national level, by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute of Statistics (2019)
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served in 2005, when the share of women increased by 5% while the number of men 
decreased by 2.76%. In the next year, the situation reversed and men’s proportion 
increased with almost 6% while the share of women decreased (-0.59%).
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Women 2,70%7,71%2,69%4,05% 15,28 -2,79 5,45%0,52% -0,80 -1,37 -13,1 7,05%0,37%0,46% -0,56 1,03%0,49%
Men 1,14%1,93%7,56%5,63%3,70%5,48% -0,54 0,31% -0,64 1,48% -20,0 11,07 -1,86 -0,82 -1,42 2,85% -3,29
Figure 3: The annual growth rate for research specialists, by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute of Statistics (2019)
According to the National Institute of Statistics (2019), at the beginning of the 
studied period, there were 23,179 research specialists, 13,338 being men and 9,841 
women. Their number increased until 2008 when Romania had 30,864 specialists 
(17,047 men and 13,817 women). Since then, the number decreased systematically. 
At the end of the studied period, Romania had 27,367 research specialists (14,577 
men and 12,790 women). The number of research specialists decreased for many 
years, even if in 2017 it was higher than at the beginning of the studied period. Fig-
ure 3 presents the annual growth rate only for the research specialists’ case.
During the studied period, there were many years when the number of research-
ers registered a decrease. The situation could not be related to gender issues as the 
phenomenon was observed amongst both men and women working in the research 
field. The major decrease was registered in 2011, when there were 13% fewer wom-
en working in research. The decrease was even higher in men’s cases (20%). The 
situation could have been related to the impact of the economic crisis and the low 
level of the sector’s financing. During the economic crisis, the number of female 
researchers registered a negative trend. From 2009 until 2011, the share of female 
researchers decreased annually; however, the situation improved in 2012 and there 
were 7% more women than in the previous year. The increase in men’s cases was 
higher (11%), but in the next three years, their proportion decreased annually, even 
if not in a significant manner. During all the studied period, the proportion of fe-
male researchers maintained between 45% and 47%. The small increase of the re-
search population, without considering gender should be a matter of concern for 
the central authorities, due to the fact that the R&D sector is important for the sus-
tainable development of the country and is still unattractive for researchers.
Considering the main findings regarding the evolution of research employees 
during the 2000-2017 period, it could be affirmed that the gender balance existed 
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inside this sector for the whole studied period. Women did not seem to face dis-
crimination regarding access to this profession, as they were represented in a pro-
portion of more than 40% during all the analyzed years. If the problem of gender 
equality is approached with regard to the whole population of researchers, without 
considering the sectors of performance and research fields, it could be stated that 
in the Romanian research sector, gender equality has been reached. The findings 
respond partially to the fifth research question (R5: Does gender balance exist inside 
the R&D sector?) because even if women have been granted access to this profes-
sion, the situation must be analyzed inside the R&D sector too, where the share of 
women should be equal with men’s proportion among the sectors of performance. 
If women aren’t represented equally in all the areas of the research sector, it cannot 
be said there is gender equality. In conclusion, at first glance, Romania is placed 
in a better position regarding women’s representation in the R&D sector, as other 
Member States and gender balance was definitely present.
3.2. Female researchers among R&D sectors of performance
In the next section, the proportion of female researchers across R&D sectors 
of performance will be presented. The analysis is trying to respond to the second 
research question (R2: Which are the sectors of performance where women are better 
represented?), as well as to observe the presence of horizontal segregation inside the 
R&D sector.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Men 57,8059,1458,0859,2660,0059,0058,6460,2961,5562,8362,2159,5660,0160,2261,1265,3565,2965,32
Women 42,2040,8641,9240,7440,0041,0041,3639,7138,4537,1737,7940,4439,9939,7838,8834,6534,7134,68
Figure 4: The distribution of research personnel from the Business Enterprise Sector (BES), by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute of Statistics (2019)
Comparing the data regarding researchers from the Business Enterprise Sector 
it could be noticed that the situation was different as in the whole R&D sector. 
The figures showed that the gender balance did not exist, as men were over-repre-
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sented, for the whole studied period. In the first year of study, the share of women 
amongst researchers from BES was 42.20% which could indicate a certain level of 
gender equality. The gender gap leveled up and in the last six years of the analysis, 
male researchers dominated the sector. Women under-representation in BES indi-
cate the presence of horizontal segregation inside the R&D sector and the potential 
existence of feminine and masculine areas inside the research field. The unbalanced 
participation of men and women does not affect only the current situation but has 
a negative impact on the evolution of this particular sector. If a working field is 
perceived as being male-dominated, women will be reluctant to try to develop a 
career, because it will be incongruous with their gender role and status. Even if 
the evolution of female researchers registered a negative trend, the situation was 
better as in most of the European countries. In 2009, the average share of female 
researchers amongst BES was 19% compared with Romania, where the proportion 
of women was of almost 40%. Romania was in fourth place in the European rank-
ing even if women’s presence lowered every year. In the European Union, women 
represented 20% of the researchers’ population working in BES in 2015. Even if in 
Romania’s case, the proportion of female researchers lowered almost at 35%, our 
county ranked on the ninth position in the European ranking, with almost twice as 
many women researchers as France, Germany or the Netherlands (European Insti-
tute for Gender Equality, 2018).
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Women 40,8945,9946,2042,7641,2843,2543,4346,1745,2346,7545,6548,8748,6849,0949,2550,2550,5851,16
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Figure 5: The distribution of research personnel from the Higher Education Sector (HES), by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute of Statistics (2019)
As far as the Higher Education Sector was concerned, the share of female re-
searchers increased from 40% at the beginning of the studied period to 51% in 2017. 
The distribution of men and women researchers in HES was balanced as each gen-
der had a more than 40% representation. The situation was similar to the distri-
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bution of men and women researchers among the Member States. In 2009, more 
than 40% of the researchers were represented by women, Romania occupied on a 
superior position in this case, too. In 2015, 42% of women researchers were working 
in the HES, while in Romania, the proportion reached 50% (European Institute for 
Gender Equality, 2018). The results were in accordance with a previously conducted 
study regarding gender equality in the Romanian education system (Profiroiu and 
Nastacă, 2018b).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Women 60,22 53,07 53,57 54,99 56,40 58,00 57,23 54,08 54,20 53,62 50,41 47,73 48,81 48,64 48,79 49,46 49,07 48,81
Men 39,78 46,93 46,43 45,01 43,60 42,00 42,77 45,92 45,80 46,38 49,59 52,27 51,19 51,36 51,21 50,54 50,93 51,19
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Figure 6: The distribution of research personnel from the Government Sector (GOV), by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute of Statistics (2019)
The figures showed that in the Government Sector the presence of female re-
searchers decreased almost in each analyzed year. Between 2003 and 2005, women’s 
proportion increased, but for the rest of the studied period, the trend was negative. 
If in the first analyzed year, women’s proportion among GOV researchers was 60%, 
in the last 17 years, the share of female researchers decreased up to almost 49%. 
Even if the number of female researchers presented a negative trend, the popula-
tion of researchers working in GOV was gender-balanced as both men and women 
were represented in a proportion of more than 40%.
The distribution of men and women in the Government sector situated Romania 
at the top of the European hierarchy because, in 2009, women represented 40% of 
the GOV researchers. In 2009, in the Romanian Government sector, almost 54% of 
researchers were women and in 2010 both genders were equally represented. Even 
if women’s presence lowered, in 2015 Romania still registered a higher proportion 
of female researchers (49.4%) as the European average (42.5%) (European Institute 
for Gender Equality, 2018).
Regarding the Non-profit sector, the data was available only for the 2003-2017 
period. It could be observed that the share of female researchers decreased dramati-
cally, from 64% at the beginning of the analyzed period to almost 38% in 2017. From 
2006 until 2016, the population from Romania’s research field was gender-balanced, 
but at the end of the studied period, female researchers were under-represented. 
Considering that the number of employees working in this sector is extremely low 
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(162 persons in 2003, 69 persons in 2017), the data do not have an impact on the 
gender equality problem.
The analyzed data showed that the presence of female researchers is predomi-
nantly in the Higher Education and Government sectors. In both sectors, the pop-
ulation of researchers is gender-balanced as men and women are almost equally 
represented. Even though, the horizontal segregation could be observed as men 
dominated the Business Enterprise Sector. As the presence of female researchers 
decreased on the long term, the negative trend is likely to continue, which would 
not be in women’s favor. The findings indicated that the BES might be perceived as 
a masculine field which might be an impediment for women who would want to 
activate in this research sector. Overall, even if in Romania the proportion of female 
researchers was significantly higher than in most of the Member States, the general 
trend was similar to the European countries. As in the European countries, female 
scientists chose to work in HES and in the Government Sector in Romania, being 
represented by over 40%. As in the Member States, the population of researchers 
from these fields was gender-balanced. The situation from BES was similar to the 
European average, where women were under-represented. Female researchers did 
not choose to develop their careers in BES and this fact has negative impact on the 
long-term development of this research sector.
3.3. The evolution of women in research positions 
from	the	fields	of	science	and	technology
In the next section, the results regarding the presence of female researchers in 
research fields will be presented. The analysis is trying to respond to the third re-
search question (R3: In which research fields the proportion of women is higher than 
the proportion of men?) as well as to observe the presence of horizontal segregation. 
For the analysis, data concerning men and women researchers in the main scien-
tific fields were collected, from the European Institute for Gender Equality, for the 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Women 64,03%64,32%58,78%40,00%43,52%48,61%46,79%48,29%46,61%56,70%41,99%43,33%49,66%49,71%37,70%
Men 35,97%35,68%41,22%60,00%56,48%51,39%53,21%51,71%53,39%43,30%58,01%56,67%50,34%50,29%62,30%
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Figure 7: The distribution of research personnel from the Non-profit Sector (NGO), by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute of Statistics (2019)
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2000-2014 period. The scientific fields included in the analysis were: Natural Scienc-
es, Engineering, and Technology, Medical and Health Sciences, Agricultural Scienc-
es, Social Sciences, and Humanities.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Men 51,49 54,53 52,83 48,51 51,99 50,14 48,81 50,12 51,63 52,45 55,54 54,38 52,91 50,51 55,51
Women 48,51 45,47 47,17 51,49 48,01 49,86 51,19 49,88 48,37 47,55 44,46 45,62 47,09 49,49 44,49
Figure 8: The distribution of research personnel from the Natural Sciences field, by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute for Gender Equality (2018)
The collected data showed that the population of researchers from the Natural 
Sciences field was gender-balanced for all the studied period. Regarding women’s 
presence, the figures showed a negative trend as their proportion lowered from 
almost 49% in 2000 to 44% in the last analyzed year. The data could indicate that 
this research field could be perceived as being more accessible to men. The situa-
tion might influence women’s choice of getting a Ph.D. in Natural Sciences as they 
might choose other fields of study.
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Men 55,41 55,72 56,15 57,26 56,69 58,92 58,62 59,26 57,96 61,52 60,70 58,91 59,03 59,38 60,45
Women 44,59 44,28 43,85 42,74 43,31 41,08 41,38 40,74 42,04 38,48 39,30 41,09 40,97 40,62 39,55
Figure 9: The distribution of research personnel from Engineering and Technology field, by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute for Gender Equality (2018)
In the Engineering and Technology research field, it could be observed that at 
the beginning of the studied period, even if the male proportion was 10% higher, 
the gender balance was present due to the fact that each gender had more than 40% 
representation. As a general trend, the proportion of female researchers lowered 
and men dominated this research field, for all the studied period. Engineering and 
Technology was a field dominated by men’s presence where women began to be 
under-represented, starting with 2009. The figures indicated that this research field 
was preferred by men to a higher extent. 
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Women 73,14 72,01 68,06 62,96 64,16 68,97 70,30 62,39 63,87 65,79 66,39 69,51 67,27 65,02 64,37
Figure 10: The distribution of research personnel from the Medical and Health Sciences field, by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute for Gender Equality (2018)
The figures showed that Medical and Health Sciences were a research field defi-
nitely preferred by women, as they dominated the whole studied period. Wom-
en were over-represented in all the studied years, even if their presence lowered 
during time (from 73% at the beginning of the studied period to 64%). The gender 
balance did not exist, but even if women’s presence was in high proportion, the 
situation is not beneficial for any of the studied groups. If females are concentrated 
in a field of study or work, this has consequences over men, who will be reluctant 
on choosing a career in a sector dominated by women.
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Figure 11: The distribution of research personnel from Agricultural Sciences, by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute for Gender Equality (2018)
Regarding Agricultural Sciences, it could be considered a research field preferred 
by both men and women in almost an equal extent. The population of researchers was 
gender-balanced for all the studied years as men and women represented more than 
40% of the researchers. For the whole period, men’s presence was higher and the pro-
portion of women continued to lower. The Agricultural Sciences seemed to by pre-
ferred more by men, but it continued to be an important choice in women’s cases, too.
The research population from the Social Sciences and Humanities field was gen-
der-balanced in all the studied years. Men’s proportion changed during years and 
gender inequality was present only in 2005 when the field was dominated by female 
researchers (65%). This was the only field where the share of women researchers 
was higher at the end of the studied period, compared with the first year of analysis.
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Figure 12: The distribution of research personnel from Social Sciences and Humanities, by gender
Source: Authors, adapted from the National Institute for Gender Equality (2018)
Considering all the main scientific research fields, the data showed balanced par-
ticipation of men and women in Social Sciences and Humanities, Agricultural Sci-
ences and Natural Sciences. Medical and Health Sciences were definitely preferred 
by female researchers, as they were over-represented among all the studied years. 
Engineering and Technology became a predominantly masculine area since 2009, a 
situation that is not in women’s favor. The data showed the presence of horizontal 
segregation as Science and Technology is preferred by men, Medical and Social 
Sciences presented female over-representation and in the other research fields, de-
spite the gender balance, the proportion of men was higher among all the analyzed 
years. On the whole, gender equality has been reached only in three research fields. 
However, in the future, as the feminine presence lowers in the three research fields 
where the gender balance was present, the situation of female researchers might 
not improve. Regarding the scientific research fields, the situation in Romania was 
similar to that in the Member States. In the European Union, as in Romania, women 
preferred to work in Medical and Social Sciences and Engineering and Technology 
were highly preferred by men. Also, the Natural Sciences seemed to concentrate a 
higher number of male researchers (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2018).
4. Conclusions 
The study revealed that Romania’s position among the Member States is supe-
rior regarding the share of female researchers among the entire R&D sector even 
if the whole number of researchers (including technicians and supporting research 
staff) has decreased in the studied period on average with 1.67% per year. At the 
end of the studied period, the research staff was almost 18,000 less than in 2000. The 
number of women has decreased by 1.79% per year compared with 1.57% in men’s 
case. The proportion of women among researchers from all sectors has decreased 
from 47% in 2000 to almost 46% in 2017, but the gender parity existed taking into ac-
count that both genders occupied more than 40% of the positions. The data showed 
the presence of gender equality in the R&D sector but the concerning aspect is the 
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low number of research personnel. The central authorities should create and imple-
ment a policy regarding the human resources from the research sector and raise the 
expenditures with R&D. As Romania’s target established through the ‘Europe 2020 
Strategy’ was an allocation of 2% of the GDP, it is recommendable for the national 
authorities to allocate more resources to the development of this sector concomi-
tant with a package of measures for stimulating the participation of research per-
sonnel in more research projects.
Regarding the research specialists, women’s representation increased by 30% in 
2017 compared with 2000 while the number of male researchers increased by only 
9%. Women’s representation among the research personnel was balanced and in-
creased from 42% to 47% in 2017. The situation revealed an improvement of female 
researchers’ situation as their representation among the research personnel who 
graduated Ph.D. studies increased. The balanced representation of men and women 
in research positions which require higher education showed that the vertical seg-
regation from this perspective did not exist.
Therefore, the horizontal segregation was observed among the research sectors 
because women were better represented in the Higher Education and Government 
sectors. Starting with 2011, the Higher Education Sector was preferred by female 
scientists in comparison to the other main sectors. Female representation in HES 
registered an increase from 41% in 2000, 49% in 2011 to 51% in 2017. The Business 
Enterprise Sector (BES) was male-dominated with a disproportionately high share 
of men researchers. Also, the proportion of women in BES decreased from 42% to 
34% in 2017. In the Non-profit Sector, women were underrepresented, too. Only 
38% occupied research positions at the end of the studied period. The population of 
researchers was gender-balanced only in the Government and in the Higher Edu-
cation Sectors. 
The horizontal segregation was observed across the fields of research and de-
velopment too, because women seemed more likely to choose to work in Medical 
Sciences or Social Sciences and Humanities while men researchers seemed more 
likely to work in Natural and Agricultural Sciences as well as in Engineering and 
Technology. Women researchers were still under-represented in Engineering and 
Technology (39.55%) and overrepresented in the Medical Sciences (64%). In the oth-
er fields, the gender balance has been reached.
On a whole, the study revealed the presence of horizontal segregation among all 
sectors and fields of research, dividing the R&D sector into feminine and masculine 
research areas. The study also revealed the existence of the gender balance in the 
majority of the research areas.
In the development of the R&D sector, various stakeholders should be involved. 
The national authorities should develop partnerships with the Higher Education 
Sector in order to transfer know-how and use the expertise from the academic area. 
Also, the Business Enterprise Sector should be more involved in academia from 
380
where they could recruit their next potential scientists. Also, BES could sponsor 
research projects in universities where they could involve both students and prof-
fessors. Consequently, the two sectors should be in continuous cooperation in order 
to exchange information, expertise and even personnel. Also, the national author-
ities should adjust the legal framework in order to help Ph.D. graduates to develop 
careers as scientists and make the research sector more attractive for young people.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the level of academic burnout among the senior students 
enrolled in the public administration bachelor’s degree program at the Faculty of Political, Administrative 
and Communication Sciences, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, using the Oldenburg Burnout Inven-
tory. Burnout has a long tradition of academic studies, mainly regarding employees, being associated with 
reduced productivity and satisfaction. The increasing evidence that it is a condition that can be transposed 
in other settings, such as universities, gave us a reason to investigate the level of burnout among students. 
This paper includes a literature review of the main hypotheses regarding the appearance and factors 
associated with burnout, mainly in universities and among students. Based on a sociological survey applied 
among students, it identified the level of exhaustion and disengagement, in order to establish which of 
those aspects were related to burnout. The survey reveals the existence of burnout among students, mainly 
regarding a quite high level of exhaustion, but the figures point out that burnout among Romanian students 
is not as high as in other countries. 
Finally, conclusions and future perspectives are drawn based on identified perceptions and attitude 
towards burnout among students.
Keywords: burnout syndrome, exhaustion, disengagement, Oldenburg Burnout Inventor.
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, the burnout syndrome has gained more and more atten-
tion from specialists, due to its negative impact on employee health (Bianchi et. 
al., 2015; Hakanen and Schaufeli, 2012; Kahill, 1988; Jonsdottir et. al., 2013; Ahola 
et. al., 2010), of negative attitudes generated at the workplace and not least about 
the harmful organizational behavior: the emergence of a high level of absenteeism 
(Ybema et al., 2010; Petittaa and Vecchionea, 2011), work engagement (Trépaniera 
et al., 2015; Mäkikangas et al., 2017), intention to quit (Kim and Stoner, 2008), and 
organizational cynicism (Özler and Atalay, 2011).
Basically, no socio-professional category is immune to burnout, this syndrome 
being viewed both as an extremely important social problem and as a medical diag-
nosis that affects most employees (Schaufeli et al., 2009; Dehelean et al., 2016; Ahola 
et al., 2013).
One of the social groups vulnerable to developing burnout syndrome are stu-
dents of the higher education system. The university education system is often a 
stressful time for many students as they go through the process of adapting to the 
new imposed academic, educational and social environment demands. From this 
point of view, academic burnout can be defined as the phenomenon that occurs 
among students characterized by a chronic state of exhaustion (both emotional, 
physical and cognitive) due to high or inadequate imposed academic requirements 
they have to cope with, as well as a negative attitude (of non-involvement and dis-
engagement) towards study and academic preparation.
The purpose of the research is, on the one hand, to highlight the level of burnout 
among students enrolled in the bachelor’s degree program in public administra-
tion at the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences from 
Babeş-Bolyai University, and to see to what extent this program can be considered 
stressful for students, leading to the appearance of burnout syndrome among them.
2. Burnout among students 
Generally, burnout syndrome occurs when individuals are exposed to chron-
ic emotional and interpersonal stressors related to their activity (Maslach et al., 
2001). Although there is no unanimously accepted definition of burnout, there is 
still a relative consensus regarding this syndrome. Thus, on the one hand, burnout 
syndrome can be defined as either a consequence and a response to chronic ‘work’ 
stress, characterized by negative attitudes and feelings towards the people with 
whom an employee works (depersonalization attitudes), respectively a reduced lev-
el of commitment to one’s own professional activity, as well as a chronic state of 
emotional exhaustion (Maslach and Jackson, 1981). Other authors (Schaufeli and 
Enzmann, 1998) have defined burnout as a persistent, negative, work-related men-
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tal state, which is mainly characterized by emotional exhaustion, which is accom-
panied by suffering, low competence feeling, low motivation and the development 
of dysfunctional attitudes in the workplace.
One of the problems that students face is related to the appearance of burnout 
syndrome. Changes that have occurred in the duration and complexity of the 
university educational processes, the new reality that emerged in the university 
context, lead to a resizing and repositioning of the student’s role, in terms of 
assuming increasing academic requirements and rigor imposed by universities. 
Although, of course, students are not formal workers, from a psychological and 
social point of view, many of the activities they carry out are comparable to those 
of any worker (Caballero et al., 2015). In this regard, a series of researches have 
shown that students develop exhaustion, cynicism and inefficiency in their ac-
ademic activities when they experience high levels of burnout (Caballero et al., 
2015; Palacio et al., 2012).
Therefore, of course, like any socio-professional category, students can develop 
(over time) emotional and physical exhaustion, as well as psychosocial damage gen-
erated by different stressors. As these stressors accumulate, students’ ability to cope 
or adapt to this environment leads to depletion of their physical or psychological 
resources. In the absence of a solution or method of recovering from the exhaus-
tion, it inevitably leads to the appearance of burnout syndrome. Studies confirm 
that students may be stressed by factors related to both academic aspects – exces-
sive or inadequate academic requirements (Salanova et al., 2005) and interpersonal 
or intrapersonal aspects (Panda et al., 2015). On the other hand, the operationaliza-
tion of stress sources that may contribute to the appearance of burnout syndrome 
among students can be done based on the JD-R model (Bakker et al., 2014, Bakker 
and Demerouti, 2008), respectively in terms of academic requirements, educational 
resources (social support, access to information and different sources of documen-
tation, organizational climate, interaction with different teachers or students, etc.), 
professional practice (practicum stage) activities (Moldovan and Raboca, 2019), and 
personal resources (optimism, self-efficacy, resilience, self-esteem) of response to 
the job demands (inappropriate student behavior, workload and physical work en-
vironment). From this perspective, the academic demands are positively correlated 
with the level of burnout, while the educational and personal resources are nega-
tively correlated with this syndrome.
In the academic context, burnout among students can be interpreted as a con-
sequence and a response to chronic stress related to the role, activity and academic 
context, of a negative and dangerous nature that may affect the performance, com-
mitment and satisfaction of the students regarding their preparation, respectively, 
may affect their psychosocial health. On the other hand, burnout developed by stu-
dents can be defined as a negative, persistent, emotionally related response, formed 
by a feeling of being exhausted, of not being able to do more student related tasks 
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(exhaustion), a cynical or distancing attitude towards the meaning and usefulness 
of the studies performed (cynicism); and a sense of academic incompetence (ineffi-
ciency) as a student (Caballero at al., 2015).
The most commonly used instrument for measuring burnout syndrome among 
students is the Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) (Maslach and Leiter, 2016). In this 
respect, the measurement of burnout syndrome in the academic field was made 
by adapting the MBI instrument to the specific academic context. In general, MBI 
as a tool is operationalized on three dimensions, which according to the authors, 
characterize and describe the burnout syndrome, namely: emotional exhaustion (in 
the sense of energy draining), cynicism, and reduced professional efficacy. Another 
instrument for measuring the level of burnout used to highlight stress levels among 
students is the tool called Oldenburg Burnout Inventory (OBI). This instrument in-
cludes a number of 16 items through which two basic dimensions of burnout syn-
drome are investigated and evaluated (Demerouti et al., 2010), namely: (1) exhaus-
tion, and (2) disengagement from the workplace. 
Last but not least, another tool used to investigate student burnout is the Co-
penhagen Burnout Inventory (CBI) (Kristensen et al., 2005). This tool, although op-
erationalized on a number of dimensions that are not suitable for the academic 
system (operational dimensions: personal burnout, work-related burnout, and cli-
ent-related burnout), can be used by modifying and adjusting to the specific in the 
university field, especially the medical one (Stein and Sibanda, 2016). Last but not 
least, regarding the operationalization and the use of the different instruments for 
measuring the level of burnout among the students, it should be remembered that 
Maroco and Campos (2012) have highlighted that this syndrome is best reflected 
and investigated in the perspective of two large dimensions namely: (1) physical 
and psychological exhaustion produced by educational/academic activities, respec-
tively (2) cynicism and disengagement from these activities.
3. The research methodology 
As mentioned above, the purpose of the research is to highlight the level of 
burnout among students, respectively to highlight the factors that influence and 
lead to the development of this syndrome. It should be mentioned that the research 
was carried out on the basis of a sociological survey conducted among the senior 
students enrolled in the public administration bachelor’s degree program (students 
from the final year). In this regard, the survey was conducted on the basis of com-
pleting an anonymous questionnaire by the students, the number of interview-
ees, taken in the analysis, being 131 (which covers 100% of the total number of 
students in the final year enrolled in public administration bachelor’s degree pro-
gram the at Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences from 
Babeş-Bolyai University).
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To highlight the degree of burnout, we used as a measuring instrument, the 
Oldenburg Burnout Inventory (OBI) adapted to the academic requirements. Gener-
ally, this tool uses two subscales and relies on 16 items formulated in positive and 
negative terms to evaluate the two aspects of burnout: exhaustion and disengage-
ment (Demerouti et al., 2010; Campos et al., 2012), high values for the two subscales 
indicating a high level of burnout. On the other hand, it should be remembered that 
to investigate and describe the level of burnout we used a single variable statistical 
processing, the scores of the level of burnout being calculated separately on each 
subscale. In this respect, we first calculated the values of the arithmetic mean on 
each subscale (the values reported by each student on each item divided by 8), fol-
lowed by the calculation of the average values (also on each subscale separately). 
Also, to determine the limit values (cut-off value) needed to define the level of 
burnout we used two methods. Thus, the limit levels used to investigate burnout 
level are those proposed by Campos et al. (2013), namely: for the exhaustion sub-
scale ≥2.57, and for the disengagement subscale ≥2.17. Other authors have proposed 
other limit values (Peterson et al., 2008; Thun et al., 2014), a little lower, namely: 
exhaustion ≥2.25, and disengagement ≥2.1. On the other hand, for the analysis of 
the burnout syndrome among the students we also resorted to dividing the respon-
dents into four major categories (the categories of students whose scores on the 
two scales are below or above the limit values).
4. Data analysis and processing
If we consider the average values on the two OBI scales (Table 1) it can be ob-
served that the highest values are those related to exhaustion. In this respect, the 
values on the exhaustion subscale (values below the limit value) show the occur-
rence of the exhaustion phenomenon among the students, while the values on the 
disengagement subscale (greater than the limit values) show that we cannot yet 
speak of the phenomenon of exhaustion, an increased distance towards academic 
activities, respectively the emergence of the phenomenon of depersonalization or 
cynicism.
However, if we divide the group of students interviewed into two categories for 
each subscale (the group of students having values greater than the limit values, 
respectively the group of students whose values on the subscales are below the 
limit values), it can be seen that the percentage of students developing the disen-
gagement process is high (over 38% of the total students).
Also, if we analyze the percentage of students who develop both exhaustion and 
disengagement (the values obtained on the two scales being concurrently below the 
limit values), it can be observed that this percentage is, in our opinion, quite high 
(over 1/3 out of the total respondents consider that they suffer from both exhaus-
tion and disengagement).
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Table. 1: Values on the two OBI subscales (average values and percentages)
Dimension Mean S.D.
Low value 
(out of total interviewees) 
%
High value 
(out of total interviewees) 
%
Cut-off value
Disengagement 2.32 .37 38.9 61.1 2.17
Exhaustion 2.37 .49 58.00 42.00 2.57
Note: MEAN - obtained as a result of using a measurement scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents a very high 
level and 5 represents a very low level
Source: Authors’ own contribution
Also, the results of the research suggest that there is a difference between gen-
der and level of burnout (Table 2). In this sense, male students tend to develop 
relatively higher levels of burnout syndrome comparative with female students (es-
pecially when we consider the issue of exhaustion).
Table 2: The level of burnout between genders
  Male students Female students Cut-off 
valueVariables Mean SD Mean SD
Disengagement 2.23 .24 2.37 .43 2.17
Exhaustion 2.07 .61 2.52 .49 2.57
Source: Authors’ own contribution
From the point of view of the burnout syndrome developed by the students of 
the bachelor’s degree program in public administration compared to other students 
from different countries (Table 3), it can be observed that the same tendency as the 
average values of the appearance of the burnout syndrome is maintained.
Table 3: Comparative data related to burnout among international students
  German students*
Greek 
students*
Romanian 
students
Brazilian 
students**
Portuguese 
students** Cut-off 
value
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Disengagement 1.99 .55 1.90 .51 2.32 .35 2.25 .46 2.03 .53 2.17
Exhaustion 2.28 .61 2.59 .49 2.37 .38 2.70 .48 2.47 .37 2.57
Note: Mean – obtained as a result of using a measurement scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents a very high 
level and 5 represents a very low level
* Reis, Xanthopoulou and Tsaousis (2015)
** Campos, Carlotto and Marôco (2012)
Source: Authors’ own compilation
Compared to students from Germany, undergraduate students in public admin-
istration from Romania tend to develop a lower level of burnout (especially on the 
disengagement dimension). Obviously, this could be explained by the differences 
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that exist between the educational systems of the two countries in terms of educa-
tional/academic demands, respectively educational (organizational) resources and 
personal resources.
5. Final remarks 
Burnout among students represents a study field because of the complexity of 
the educational program and academic progress that influence the appearance of 
different stressors with high direct and positive effect on the emergence of the burn-
out syndrome. The consequences of burnout are extremely dangerous for them. In 
this sense, burnout syndrome is often associated with mental and behavioral dis-
orders (anxiety, sleep disorders, depression, absenteeism and intention to drop out 
of school).
Using the Oldenburg Burnout Inventory, we identified a relatively high level 
of burnout among senior students enrolled in the public administration bachelor’s 
degree program at the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication 
Sciences from Babeş-Bolyai University. The data indicates that students developed 
both exhaustion and disengagement, aspects that highlight a quite high level of 
burnout (over 1/3 out of the total respondents have a high level of exhaustion and 
disengagement). Compared to other international research data, from some point of 
view, the finding of our research reveals that students have the same trend regard-
ing the burnout level comparative with students from other countries. On the other 
hand, the level of burnout developed by students seems to be relatively low if we 
consider that for certain academic domains, such as medicine, the level of burnout 
developed by students often exceeds 45% (Ishak et. al., 2013; Dyrbye et al., 2006; 
Almalki et al., 2017).
Although some studies have concluded that female students tend to develop 
higher levels of exhaustion compared to male students (Győrffy et al., 2016) the 
results of our study do not confirm this. In this sense, although the differences 
are not very significant, the results of the study show that male students develop 
not only higher levels of exhaustion but also higher levels of disengagement. Al-
though burnout among students is influenced positively by academic demands and 
negatively by personal resources (self-confidence, self-effectiveness, control, anx-
iety and neuroticism) and educational resources (academic infrastructure, access 
to academic information, organizational support), the current and ever-growing 
reforms regarding public administration in Romania, could influence the actual lev-
el identified among public administration bachelor program students. Further re-
search could be conducted on the relation between academic burnout and different 
educational programs, taking into consideration social-cultural characteristics of 
students and different factors that influence the appearance of burnout. 
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1. Introduction
Over the last few years in Europe big debates have been steered over the concept 
and practice of the rule of law, a Medieval concept revisited by the end of the 19th 
century in Britain (Dicey, 1885). For years to come, rule of law, as well as its quite 
different versions, French and German, was coined as the foundation of liberal de-
mocracy and also canonized as such. Nobody had seriously challenged the liberal 
and democratic understanding of the rule of law up until the 1980s, when along 
with the rise of neoliberal policies and the ‘rolling back of the state’, as former 
British PM Margaret Thatcher had put it, when new uses and tools of the rule of law 
where developed. 
Our hypothesis is that while the classical liberal democracy which has reached 
its peak between the Second World War and 1980-1990s in Western Europe was 
in many senses a compound political regime made up from political liberalism and 
democracy, nowadays, as we are approaching the era of post-democracy (Crouch, 
2005) lots of classical routinized instruments and tools of governance have changed 
their nature. Among these we find the very concept of religious freedom, the sub-
ject of the very first amendment to the Constitution of the United State of America. 
While for decades religious freedom was a consensual topic in most of the rep-
resentative democracies and implemented by the governments in a rather liberal 
manner, that is quite bureaucratized (e.g., supporting financially religious organiza-
tions, ruling against cases of discrimination on religious grounds and so on), now-
adays, due to the resurgence of religious extremism and fundamentalism, the rise 
of religious persecution worldwide and also the rise of the importance of religious 
diplomacy, religious freedom tends to become a more politicized field. 
The issue analyzed in this paper is rather new for political science, meaning that 
it does not contain a classical methodological approach. We found no literature 
dealing with our topic, neither in the United States, nor in Europe. We have used 
a new-Weberian approach along with the theory of post-democracy as coined by 
British sociologist Colin Crouch (2005). Thus, we believe that in the contemporary 
political sphere many political institutions are now personalized, rather than bu-
reaucratized. It is also called ‘the presidentialization of political power’, meaning 
that not only political parties and political regime tend to be presidentialized, but 
also junior positions such as the position of Special Envoy for the Promotion of 
Freedom of Religion or Belief, discussed in this paper.
2. The nature of the rule of law
The very first academic work on the concept of the rule of law belongs to Albert 
V. Dicey, an Oxford scholar who had presented at the end of the 19th century three 
meanings of the concept in Britain by comparison to France and Germany. For 
Dicey (1885) the ‘rule of law’, as a fundamental principal of any constitution, has 
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three major meanings: 
 – Liberal meaning: The supremacy of regular law as opposed to the influence of 
arbitrary political. The government cannot have discretionary authority and 
prerogatives. People are then ruled by the law and only by the law. 
 – Republican meaning: Equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all, re-
gardless their background, to the ordinary law. Therefore, there are no exemp-
tions of officials or others from the duty to obey the law and the jurisdictions 
of regular tribunals. 
 – Liberal-democratic meaning: The law is not the source of rights and liberties, 
but the very outcome of rights and liberties of the individuals. 
The way Dicey was trying to define the concept of the rule of law is not very 
straightforward, but is tells us a lot about the 19th Century Britain, one the very few 
countries that had been considered democratized. It means that, the rule of law as a 
foundation of democracy is nothing else than the process of maximization of rights 
and liberties of individuals. 
Years afterwards, Juan Linz (1964, p. 255) provides a definition for the authori-
tarian regimes as opposed to the rule of law: ‘political system with limited, non-re-
sponsible political pluralism; without an elaborated and guiding ideology, but with 
distinctive mentalities; without either extensive or intense political mobilization, 
except at some points in their development, and in which a leader, or, occasionally, 
a small group, exercises power from within formally ill-defined, but actually quite 
predictable, limits’. 
For Italian political scientist Leornardo Morlino (2010, pp. 39-63), rule of law 
implies effective protection of civil and political rights and freedoms, independent 
judiciary that allows equal access to justice, higher administrative capacity of the 
government to enforce the law, transparent policy-making process, neutral and 
professional state bureaucracy, civilian control over the military and effective fight 
against corruption and the arbitrariness of the state agencies. 
As this approach towards the rule of law was consolidated in the West and has 
helped decisively the construction of democracy, new challenges had appeared to-
wards most the rights and liberties of individuals. It is the case of LGBT+ family of 
rights, in which case the legal scholars still have no consensual approach. Are they 
some kind of new civil rights? Or, on the contrary, they form a new family of rights, 
different from those already known. 
3. Religious freedom revisited 
Drawing on religious norms and interfering directly in the religious communi-
ties’ affairs may affect democracy in many ways, especially for ill. Most of religious 
traditions have a theological-political approach towards politics and society and 
even a set of social thoughts that influence political views. This treasury of very 
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profound thinking needs to be represented also in the political sphere, with or with-
out acceptance. 
When religion is embedded in culture or there is a default religion of the nation, 
it could easily influence the birth of authoritarian regimes, whether secular of theo-
cratic and increase religious extremism. At this moment, democracy is not the most 
spread political regime in the world, but the authoritarian ones, which are, as so-
ciologists prove, the birth place of religious extremism. While in the representative 
democracy there is an empty space of political power (Marchart, 2011) waiting to 
be occupied by the pluralistic civil society, in the authoritarian regimes that empty 
space is filled by the sovereign, whoever that may be. 
We often think in simplistic terms: democracy is good per se, while authoritar-
ian regimes the other way around. While this could be true, we still do not have 
straightforward answers for many questions such as ‘Why do we have so many 
extremist gestures, speeches and actions in well-consolidated democracies? How 
should we cope with that?’ The answer could be very simple: less bureaucratization 
and more politicization of the rights and liberties. As a sum up at the presentation 
of his work and recommendations, Jan Figel, Special Envoy for the Promotion of 
Freedom of Religion or Belief Outside of the EU (2016-2019), stated: ‘We need FoRB 
climate change!’ (Figel, 2019). This means that there is a state of bureaucratization 
of freedom of religion or belief at the level of the European Union that does not 
manage to respond to the current challenges. The routinization became a climate 
that needs to be changed. But in what way? Could the European and American 
models of freedom of religion or belief shed some light on some very serious issues 
regarding freedom of religion or belief worldwide and moreover in the authoritar-
ian regimes? Our answer is yes, only if it was upgraded alongside with an increase 
of political representation. 
For decades now, but moreover from 1990s onwards in the European Union, 
as Peter Mair (2009, pp. 18-22) stated in his famous article Rulling the Void, we 
are living in democracies with ‘output-oriented legitimacy’ that require ‘solutions 
that are beyond the state’ and, also beyond the normatives of old-style represen-
tative liberal democracy. This process is associated with the decline of popular 
involvement, lesser party membership, populist elections and referenda, and so 
on. It is not anymore the elections that make a good democratic regime, but the 
combination of the rule of law and a vibrant civil society, or as Peter Mair puts it 
‘democracy = NGOs + judges’. 
Maybe for this reason citizens retreat into the leisure of private life or adhoc 
forms of political representation, while politicians retreat into institutions as tech-
nocrats concerned mostly with governance and not with representing the people. 
Most of the political parties have become organizations that govern rather than 
represent, that mediate between the rule of law and NGOs rather than to give voice 
to the people as an indivisible entity. 
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The growing gap between citizens and political leaders is to be filled with the 
voices of intermediary bodies and associations, the religious and secularist organi-
zations, the media, trade unions and so many others. It is their blended knowledge 
that manage to fill the emptiness of political representation as mourned by political 
scientists these days. 
Recently, OSCE/ODIHR has carried out a very sensitive task. That is to facilitate 
for governments, media and civil society a better understanding of the intersection 
of Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) and security. Freedom of Religion or Belief 
and Security. Policy Guidance is almost like a surgical cut through hundreds of opin-
ions on this topic, and the only one up until now that promotes, hand in hand, both 
FoRB and security as fundamental rights. Readers and policy makers will find that 
FoRB and security are not competing or opposite rights, but complementary, in-
ter-independent and mutually reinforcing objectives in any democratic regime. The 
guidelines offer a sense of political representation as this book is both a handbook 
for governors, legislators, intelligence agencies and also a voice speaking on behalf 
of the people that want more than ever to feel represented. 
In relying on the ideas of some influential political scientists/ thinkers of the 20th 
century, such as Hannah Arendt (1963, pp. 32-33), Jurgen Habermas (2013), Juan 
Linz (1963), etc., one should bear in mind that all fundamental rights and freedoms 
have a negative side (freedom from the state…), as well as a positive side (freedom 
to…). The current perception is that of a rather confined paradigm in which civil 
rights and freedoms are given mainly a negative reading as they often miss reso-
nating with their originating moment or ontology. Let’s take, for instance, the right 
to live: the negative dimension of this right (freedom from the state) means that the 
private life is free from the state, which is not entitled to harm the private life. It can 
therefore be inferred that the death penalty or torture are absolutely incompatible 
with democracy. 
There is however a positive side of the right to live (freedom to…) which trans-
lates into a person’s right to live in safety conditions and generate other successive 
rights: the right to a healthy environment or the right to health care and medical 
assistance. In the case of religious freedom, the negative side (freedom from the 
state) translates into a citizen’s right not to be forced by the state to embrace any 
form of religious belief. On the other hand, the positive side of religious freedom 
(freedom to…) means that the state facilitates the freedom of association of citizens 
in the name of their religious beliefs or, as theologian John Milbank (Milbank and 
Pabst, 2016) claims, it is the liberty to pursue a joint purpose. 
We think Europeans have a well-preserved Christian legacy which has histori-
cally opened up the secular space by both desacralizing the political and by creating 
the space of free association which later turned into the space of civil society. As 
French political scientist Marcel Gauchet (1999) argues, civil society was born due to, 
or through, the separation of church and state, and of religion and politics. Civil so-
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ciety, in its original meaning, includes religious bodies and all kinds of organizations 
regardless of their cultural or religious legacies. This means that civil society is per se 
a space of free association, an exercise of religious freedom and of multiculturalism. 
This is one of the key messages we need to refer to governments, namely that reli-
gious organizations should be considered as parts of civil society and be assisted to 
fulfill their vocational responsibilities (Milbank and Pabst, 2016, pp. 247-276). The 
topic becomes more complex once we add the fact that religions and beliefs are not 
subordinate to regional or national establishments, being rather a global phenome-
non and also more publicized than two or three decades ago. It follows that global-
ization can augment religious identity, but not also religious freedom. 
If, at its historical peak, religious freedom has been the root of all freedoms, it now 
seems at variance with freedom in general. Today, religious freedom might seem 
to be a general right of freedom of expression, practice, and worship, but drained 
of its spiritual content. This happens because we have not paid sufficient attention 
to how rights and freedoms were articulated in the past decades in our societies. 
The mainstream public discourse is usually focused on the negative side of rights 
and freedoms, overlooking the positive side. As Hannah Arendt (1963, pp. 32-33) 
argues ‘all […] liberties to which we might add our own claims to be free from want 
and fear, are of course essentially negative; they are the result of liberation, but 
they are by no means the actual content of freedom, which is participation in pub-
lic affairs, or admission to the public realm’. Arendt’s interest in positive political 
freedom… the freedom to do things in the public sphere as opposed to the negative 
freedom of civil rights, needs to be linked with the construction of democracy. With 
that in mind, we should assert that religious freedom in its negative sense does not 
recognize religion as a social good, and thus defines religion as a mere feeling or a 
private manifestation, which is, of course, not enough for religious bodies and their 
members. Thus, we have the negative meaning of religious freedom, which could 
be described as freedom from the state… freedom from any kind of authority to ex-
ercise religious beliefs. But, at the same time, there is the positive side of religious 
freedom, meaning freedom to worship, freedom to freely associate in the name of 
religion, freedom to express the deepest religious belief even in the public realm, 
and so on.
Our argument here is that in today’s postmodern, post-secular, and post-demo-
cratic establishment, ‘religions’ or ‘beliefs’ need to be recognized by governments 
as social assets, even at a constitutional level, in order to ensure a further consol-
idated democracy. Our vision on church and state relations outlines an upgraded 
balanced European model, an adequate synthesis between the demands for mod-
ernization and Europeanization, enhancing the cooperation between religions and 
the state, the neutrality of the state regarding religion and belief, further protection 
of the autonomy of religious organizations, and so on. Over the past few years, in 
particular as religious extremism and fundamentalism have escalated in European 
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countries with a deep secular tradition in respect of the relationship between the 
state and religious organizations, a question arises more and more often: how to 
revive and promote the positive side of religious freedom through political gestures 
and actions. The US State Department fights for decades for the rights of religiously 
persecuted people worldwide and to promote religious freedom, France contem-
plates redefining the principle of laïcité, Great Britain established a Ministry of 
Faith, Germany created a taskforce within the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to promote peace through religion, Austria created a governmental taskforce titled 
‘Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue’ within the Federal Ministry for Europe, 
Integration and European Affairs, Finland, Denmark and others adopted the Amer-
ican model and created the position of Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom, 
etc. A position of Special Envoy for Promotion of Freedom of Religion outside the 
EU was even created in May 2016 within the European Commission. Now 28 coun-
tries worldwide (of these 13 EU member states) have created a position of represen-
tation on FoRB (ambassadors, dignitaries, special envoys, etc.) trying to reconnect 
the religious freedom as a basic democratic right with the current political estab-
lishment characterized through rising populism, continuous struggle for cultural 
liberation and the decline of political representation. 
All of Europe is now concerned with changing the paradigm of the relationship 
between the state and religious organizations, the recovery of the positive side of 
religious freedom by consolidating the state-religious organizations partnership 
through various public policies, such as social, environmental or educational strat-
egies, the creation of a predictable framework for financial support intended to 
help the activities of religious organizations, boosting the religious literacy efforts, 
enhancing religious literacy of career diplomats who will be offered professional 
training programs on the state-church relationship, encouraging the freedom of ex-
pression of religious organizations in respect of public issues, etc. At the same time, 
the positive dimension of religious freedom is intended to revive the integrating 
and community character of religion, to help religious organizations get involved 
in activities which are close to their theological and missionary vocation according 
to the principle of subsidiarity, and to convey the message that religion is a social 
phenomenon which unites rather than divides people. 
In our opinion, the international community should address the following: 
1. The elaboration of a North-Atlantic strategy on religion, to encompass both 
the potentially discriminatory elements which religion may trigger (persecutions, 
hate crime and speech), and those elements which boost the efforts of religious or-
ganizations for society. This strategy may be defined by the joint efforts of EU, US 
Department of State, UN and OSCE/ODIHR, and may be used as a practical guide 
for all stakeholders. 
2. Bearing in mind that religion is often presented as a pernicious force with 
social consequences and that it is better to keep it in people’s heads and souls, it 
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is important that international institutions elaborate easy-to-read guidelines with 
good practices on public manifestations of religion, pertaining to dress, ritual, or 
civic invocations, the limits of free speech inside places of worship, the fiscal status 
of religious organizations, the judicial status of places of worship, and so on. 
3. Religious identity has recently become the subject of legal protection, and 
what once would have been deemed legitimate expressions of free speech in re-
lation to religion can now be regarded as prejudiced and abusive, on a par with 
racism and sexism (this is, for example, the case of Romania: during the 2018 ref-
erendum campaign on the introducing in the Constitution of an explicit definition 
of family as being the union of a man and a woman, we have witnessed lots of hate 
speeches and actions against Christians). In such situations, governments should 
rather promote inter-faith dialogue and religious identity. 
4. It seems that today religious tolerance, including tolerance of the non-reli-
gious, a value that was secured three or four centuries ago as the contingent foun-
dation of many liberties, can no longer be taken for granted. With the exception of 
North-Atlantic countries, this protection of religious identity is often the reverse 
of pluralism: a particular religion that is bound up with a national culture as the 
‘default religion of the nation’ can enjoy increased favor and protection, while sup-
pressing other faiths. This leads to religious extremism and anti-Semitism, and trig-
gers all kinds of secular backlash and further restrictions on free public expression 
of religious bodies or free self-organizations. It seems that the more we see religion 
as a threat, the less people are willing to tolerate other beliefs. The solution is not 
mere legal pluralism, but developing some practical measures to assist states to live 
up to their commitments to freedom of religion and belief in the name of democracy.
5. Finally, a real re-politicization of religious freedom would have to address the 
problem of representation of people, of religious organization and of governments. 
Following the American model launched by the US State Department in 1999, al-
ready 28 countries1 worldwide from which 13 EU member states have created a 
form of political representation in the field of freedom of religion or belief. Some of 
them have created the position or only the mandate for the promotion of freedom 
of religion or belief for diplomats or dignitaries as shown in below. 
 – United States of America – the position of Ambassador at large for Internation-
al Religious Freedom, since 1999 (Farr, pp. 15-70). He/she also carries out the 
task to coordinate the Annual Report on Religious Freedom compiled by each 
American embassy;
 – European Union – Special Envoy for the Promotion of Freedom of Religion 
or Belief Outside of the EU, European dignitary mandated with the task to 
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, South Coreea, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Greece, Indonezia, Irland, Italy, Japan, Jordania, Latvia, Mexico, Mongolia, Marocco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, United State of America, Sweden and Tunisia. 
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promote religious freedom as a European brand and to denounce the cases of 
religious persecution, discrimination and hate crime. 
 – United Kingdom – PM’s Special Envoy for Religious Freedom or Belief (either a 
junior minister from the Foreign Affairs Office or a member of the Parliament) 
to promote religious freedom externally and also the position of Minister of 
Faith (since 2014) with no bureaucratic apparatus to promote religious freedom 
internally;
 – Canada – Religious Freedom Ambassador;
 – Finland – Ambassador at large for Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue 
Process;
 – France – permanent adviser to the minister of home affairs;
 – Sweden – Ambassador for Human Rights, democracy and the rule of law (in-
cludes the mandate on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief) and also 
Special Envoy for Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding;
 – Germany – Task Force on the Responsibility of the Religions for Peace, part of 
the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and also a high commissioner for 
the promotion of freedom of religion;
 – Denmark – special Representative for Freedom of Religion or Belief as of 2018;
 – Austria – Task Force Dialogue and Culture part of the Federal Ministry for 
Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs;
 – Hungary – state secretary for the promotion of religious freedom and support 
for the persecuted Christians;
 – Poland – state secretary for humanitarian aid and also Special Envoy for Free-
dom of Religion or Belief; and
 – Norway and the Netherlands – Special Envoy on Freedom of Religion or Belief. 
Most of these countries have either well consolidated democratic regimes, either 
are in an advanced process of democratization. Almost all of them are important po-
litical players in the field of international relations. The portrait of the new special 
envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief is made up from very few 
lines. Firstly, all of them have a resume that testifies a high-level academic expertise 
on the topic, as the field of faith and politics is not a general one, but a very narrow 
one. He is an expert in a field that had not been much emphasized in academia or 
in practice over the last decades. Secondly, they all have a clear mandate and work 
if not for the national Foreign Affairs Office very closely with the Office. Most of 
them are under the mandate of the national governments, subordinated directly to 
the prime-minister and are also limited to involve their country in different inter-
national projects. More important are the facts the international community needs 
to create awareness on. According to Pew Research Center figures, in 2019, 79% of 
the global population lives in countries with high or very high obstacles against 
freedom of religion or belief (Lipka and Majumdar, 2019).
402
Important steps towards de-bureaucratization and re-politicization of FoRB 
have been made recently: the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of 
freedom of religion or belief adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting in 
Luxembourg, on June the 24th 2013 by all the 28 Member States; the creation of the 
European Parliament Intergroup for freedom of religion and belief and religious 
tolerance; the International Contact Group of Freedom of Religion and Belief and 
the establishment of the EU Special Envoy for Freedom of Religion Outside EU. Af-
ter a work of three and a half years (2016-2019), Jan Figel (2019) has advanced five 
key recommendations: work on the freedom of religion and belief within a human 
rights framework; boost the freedom of religion and belief literacy; support the 
engagement with religious actors and inter-religious dialogue; implement a more 
strategic and contextualized approach at the country level; step up coordination 
among member States and European Union on religious freedom. 
4. Conclusions
This process of empowering different diplomats (representatives of the states) 
or state dignitaries (representatives of the people) with the mandate to speak 
on behalf of their country on religious issues, to promote worldwide their home 
model of freedom of religion or belief and also to gather intelligence from the 
international community for the benefit of their national governments is clearly 
a step further towards de-bureaucratization of the field of church and state rela-
tions, and religious freedom. Having in mind that some serious facts and figures 
are well known worldwide: Christianity is the most persecuted religion in the 
world (only in 2019 there were reported more than 500 cases of anti-Christian 
offences in Europe), hundreds of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic acts and so on, 
we might have to consider that freedom of religion and belief is a precondition of 
good governance and welfare. 
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Abstract
Between January 1 and June 30, 2019 Romania held the rotating Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union. This position is often related to higher international media coverage that can have an impact on 
a country’s image. Scholars in the field of public diplomacy and country branding have emphasized the role 
of country image in attracting foreign investors and tourists (Nicolescu, 2008). According to a study pub-
lished in 2013, foreigners usually associate Romania with natural richness, corruption, economic problems, 
cultural richness and political problems (Popescu and Profiroiu, 2013). A relevant role in building the image 
of a country is played by international media (Dolea and Țăruș, 2009), and, often, mediated public diplomacy 
is involved (Dolea, 2015). 
The aim of our research was to map Romania’s image as it was presented in the international media 
in articles related to the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The method we used was the 
content analysis of 231 news articles about Romania published during the time frame January 1, 2019 and 
March 15, 2019 in the online editions of Euronews, Politico, Radio Free Europe, Associated Press Europe, 
Euractiv and Reuters. Results showed that the subject of the presidency was salient in international media 
but Romania was often depicted in a negative way, being associated with corruption issues.
Keywords: country image, Romania, international media, EU presidency, content analysis.
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1. Introduction
We live in a world where the image you have counts; image is important wheth-
er we are talking about public people, brands, institutions, or even cities, regions 
and countries. The focus of this paper is country image, more precisely the image 
that Romania had at the beginning of 2019 when it took over the Presidency of the 
European Council.
Major events related to a particular country, in this case holding the rotating 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union by Romania, may create favorable 
circumstances whereby a country can improve its image, or at least, attract the 
attention of international media. At the same time, there are opportunities to inten-
sify the efforts of public diplomacy and mediated public diplomacy.
The aim of the present work is to analyze how the international press present-
ed the image of Romania during its EU presidency and to highlight the efforts of 
mediated public diplomacy, in case there were any, of the Romanian institutions 
authorized to do so.
2. Romania’s country image
According to Kunczik (1990, p. 44) ‘an image of a nation constitutes the totality 
of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that na-
tion’. That image then consists of three components: a cognitive component linked 
to what we know about the country; an affective component attached to how we 
feel about a country and an action component that reflects the definite behavior 
towards the country (Tarasheva, 2014). 
The image of a country can be positive, negative or neutral. The country image 
plays an important role in a country’s branding. There is often confusion between 
the country brand and the country image, but the latter is only a component of the 
brand, while the country brand can form ‘its economic, political and cultural desti-
ny, influencing people’s decisions to buy, invest, or change the place they reside or 
travel’ (Popescu and Profiroiu, 2013, p. 148).
To date, several studies have investigated the factors that influence people’s 
perception of a country. For example, Anholt (2005) uses the term ‘nation brand 
hexagon’ to point out the factors discussed above: tourism, exports, governance, 
investment and immigration, culture and heritage, people. Dolea and Tăruș (2009) 
list the main factors as follows: media, cultural beliefs, stereotypes, and state that 
international audiences perceive a country in different ways. In a study conduct-
ed by Popescu and Profiroiu (2013) it was shown on a sample of 1,150 foreigners 
from 10 different countries, that the main features that foreigners associate with 
Romania are: natural wealth – 32.2%, corruption – 24.3%, economic issues – 19.1%, 
cultural richness – 16.5% and political issues – 7%. The authors also concluded that 
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Romania’s image abroad can be improved if there are investments in the following 
areas: people, tourism and image (Popescu and Profiroiu, 2013, p. 155).
3. Public diplomacy and mediated public diplomacy
Public diplomacy is a complex concept that marks a new dimension of interna-
tional relations beyond traditional diplomacy, the cultivation by governments of 
public opinion in other countries, and it is a process of intercultural communication 
(Dolea, 2015). Cull (2008) emphasized the dimensions of public diplomacy: listen-
ing, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and broadcasting. Public 
diplomacy is often related to soft power.
Entman defined mediated public diplomacy as a reliance on ‘mass communica-
tion (including the internet) to increase support of a country’s specific foreign pol-
icies among audiences beyond that country’s borders’ (Entman, 2008, p. 88). Thus, 
actor visibility, agenda and frame building are means of mediated public diplomacy 
(Jungblut, 2017). News shapes our perception of the world and helps us ‘understand 
and construct ourselves as subjects within local, national and, increasingly, global 
context’ (Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch, 2009, p. 3). Media coverage can be seen 
as an indicative of public opinion and policy response. In our case, news media 
plays an increasing role in shaping the public perception of events, as it is the main 
interface through which the public comes into contact with the reported issues. As 
Kral (2009, p. 2) states: ‘Mass media play a crucial role in influencing and changing 
the perception of the country because they combine many factors that make the 
message credible and trustful for the consumers’.
4. The Presidency of the Council of the European Union
The Council of the European Union represents the framework in which all min-
isters from EU countries meet, in order to adopt legislation and coordinate Euro-
pean policies. The main responsibilities attributed to the Council of the EU are: 
the conclusion of external agreements, the adoption of different policies and the 
approval of the EU budget.
The Presidency of the Council of the EU is held by a rotating member state over 
a period of 6 months. At a macro level, in fact, the presidency is held in groups of 
three, over a period of 18 months, for the simple fact that the six-month period is 
not enough to debate and adopt the priorities on the agenda. The aim of the pres-
idency is to represent the Council in relations with the rest of the EU institutions, 
among which the most important are the European Commission and the European 
Parliament (Europuls, Centrul de Expertiză Europeană, 2017).
On the 1st of January 2019, Romania took over the Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union for the first time. Romania held this mandate until June 30, 
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2019 and collaborated closely with Finland and Croatia, the other two countries in 
the trio in which it belongs. This mandate provided Romania with the opportunity 
to stand out externally and prove its organizational capacities. All eyes were on 
Romania and on how it chose to address different issues (such as the Brexit negotia-
tions, the EU elections or the Multiannual Financial Framework), organize meetings 
and negotiate certain treaties.
Prisecaru (2018) argued that this mandate of Romania was not sufficiently 
known to the public: ‘not only many citizens do not realize the importance and the 
magnitude of the subject, but even business environment does not seem too con-
cerned or interested therein’ (Prisecaru, 2018, p. 181). The aforementioned author 
also stated that Romania had proposed quite challenging and ambitious targets for 
this mandate, which were in addition to the compulsory mandate.
This was Romania’s first presidency in the EU Council and the way in which 
the international press chose to present the events that took place during this 
Romanian mandate is important to observe and analyze. In this context, the follow-
ing research questions were raised:
 – Research question 1: How was Romania described in the international press 
during its Presidency of the Council of the EU?, and
 – Research question 2: What was Romania’s image during the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU according to the international media?
5. Research methodology: Instruments, data collection and sample
The content analysis was designed by the authors and included the following 
categories: subject/topic, tone (positive, negative, neutral), keywords describing the 
article. Formal categories were: the name of the publication, the article link and the 
date of publication. 
A total of N=231 press articles were analyzed from six European online publica-
tions between January 1, 2019 – March 15, 2019. The publications were: Euronews, 
Politico, Radio Free Europe, Associated Press, Euractiv and Reuters; the number of 
analyzed articles from each source is included in Table 1.
Table 1: The structure of the sample
Publication Reuters Euractiv Politico Associated Press Radio Free Europe Euronews
No. of articles 56 55 45 34 25 16
Source: The authors
The reasons for choosing these publications are: they are in English; they enjoy 
international credibility and are in most cases international media organizations. 
The articles had to contain ‘Romania’ at least twice and focus on the presidency of 
the Council of the EU. The encoding was performed by a single coder, so it is not 
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necessary to calculate the inter-coder reliability. In addition to the frequency anal-
ysis of the themes, a qualitative analysis of the articles was conducted in order to 
answer the research questions.
6. Results
In the sample of 231 analyzed articles, ten major topics were addressed as shown 
below.
Table 2: Frequency of issues
Topic No. of articles Percentage
Presidency 59 25,54%
Kövesi 33 14,29%
News 29 12,55%
Romanian economy 26 11,26%
European politics and EU elections for the EU Parliament 25 10,83%
Romanian politics 22 9,52%
Corruption 14 6,06%
Laws of justice 8 3,46%
Health care 8 3,46%
Sports 7 3,03%
Source: The authors
In the next section, we will present the main findings of our investigation into 
the ten topics. Most articles were written on the subject of the ‘Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union held by Romania’ in the first half of the year 2019: 
59 out of the total of 231 which were published in the sample period. Many of these 
articles tackled corruption in Romania in the context of the presidency. Various 
European leaders gave statements on corruption, claiming that this problem could 
affect the presidency of Romania at the Council of the EU. Other articles referred 
to the agenda of the presidency, i.e. past and future meetings, major events, work-
shops, etc.
The ‘candidacy of Laura Codruţa Kövesi’ for the position of European Chief 
Prosecutor was the topic of 33 articles. The former head of Romania’s National 
Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) decided to apply for this position and, follow-
ing rigorous tests and interviews, was among the three shortlisted candidates. This 
application reached the attention of the European media for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, because this position was new, as it had not existed until then. Secondly, 
the international press was interested in Romania’s opposition to Kövesi’s appoint-
ment to this position. Certain Romanian politicians, in particular from governing 
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parties, publicly declared that they disagreed with her candidacy and even voted 
against her in the European Parliament. Most of the articles referring to Kövesi’s 
candidacy had a positive tone as the press supported her candidacy and condemned 
the corruption in Romania, against which Kövesi had fought as chief prosecutor of 
DNA. Only one article had a negative tone, and it was written by Norica Nicolai, an 
ALDE representative in the European Parliament, for Euractiv.
For the next category, entitled ‘News’, we counted 29 articles (or 12.55%); this 
category includes various topics, which could not be integrated into any of the oth-
er categories, so it was decided to group them separately. Most of the articles in this 
category were written in a neutral tone and referred to the following topics: results 
of various studies (on religion, poverty, taxes), Ştefan Mandachi and the one meter 
of highway he built near Suceava, weather phenomena, commemoration of events, 
natural gas prices, unmasking a fake surgeon, etc.
The ‘Romanian economy’ represented another point of interest for foreign me-
dia since 26 articles (11.26%) covered this issue. Reuters published 25 articles on this 
subject, which leads to the conclusion that this publication covers more econom-
ic and business matters compared to the other publications. The articles written 
on this topic included various statements by Romanian economists, the Romanian 
Minister of Finance, analyses of different taxes, like the digital tax, bank tax, etc.
The subject of ‘European elections’ and events related to European politics 
were referred to in 25 articles (10.83%). These articles were selected because they 
referred to matters involving Romania, such as certain decisions at the EU level 
or the participation of Romanian politicians in congresses. The European Par-
liament elections had a higher coverage because they took place in May 2019, 
and preparations for the event were in full swing in the months before. Thus, 
the international media wrote about the formation of the USR-PLUS alliance or 
about announcing the candidacy of Rareş Bogdan or Ilie Năstase, with the articles 
maintaining a neutral tone.
‘Romania’s internal politics’ is the subject of 22 articles; most of the news was 
written on the adoption of the budget for 2019 in Romania. Other articles focused 
on various meetings that Romanian politicians had: the adoption of new laws; the 
pension fund, and statements given by Iohannis on different occasions.
The topic of ‘corruption in Romania’ was also addressed by the international 
press, as 14 articles were written on the subject, all of which have a negative tone. 
These articles referred to corruption exclusively, but it needs to be noted that the 
topic ‘corruption’ was highly debated in almost all other categories. Thus, these 14 
articles discussed the corruption allegations against Liviu Dragnea, then president 
of the Social Democratic Party in Romania, the European corruption index and the 
fact that Romania ranks among the first, Adina Florea as the head of the Nation-
al Anticorruption Directorate, or several statements by European leaders asking 
Romania to continue the anti-corruption fight.
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The ‘laws of justice’ were the exclusive subject of eight articles but, as in the 
case of corruption, this issue was addressed in other articles as well, and the tone is 
also negative. The articles referred to the protests in February, when thousands of 
Romanians took to the streets to show that they were against the changes in the ju-
diciary system, the protest of magistrates, the criticism of European leaders against 
the proposed amnesty and pardoning law, etc.
The ‘health care system’ (8 articles) and ‘sports’ (7 articles) are two other topics 
that the international press wrote about. In sports, all the articles were positive and 
largely related to Simona Halep and her performances in the Fed Cup tournament. 
The articles on the health system in Romania had a negative tone in general; only 
one article was positive, which presented the construction of the oncology hospital 
by the organization ‘Asociația Dăruiește Viață’. Politico examined the state of the 
Romanian health care system and its incompetence in six articles.
Table 3 illustrates the online publications and the number of articles they pub-
lished on each subject. We will continue by discussing the tone of the articles that 
focus on the Romanian presidency of the EU Council.
Table 3: Number of articles per topic
Topic Euronews Euractiv Politico Reuters Radio Free Europe
Associated 
Press
Presidency 7 19 20 6 3 4
Kövesi 2 10 7 1 10 3
News 2 1 2 7 3 13
Romanian economy 0 0 0 25 0 1
European politics/
EU elections for the EU Parliament 0 13 4 2 5 1
Romanian politics 0 10 4 5 0 3
Corruption 5 1 2 0 1 6
Laws of justice 0 1 0 5 1 0
Health care 0 0 6 1 1 0
Sports 0 0 0 4 1 2
Total 16 55 45 56 25 33
Source: The authors
In Euractiv, 55 articles referring to Romania were written in total during the 
reference period (January 1, 2019 – March 15, 2019). Out of a total of 19 articles re-
ferring to the Romanian presidency of the EU Council, one was identified as having 
a positive tone, seven articles were classified as negative and 11 neutral. The only 
positive article mentioned the people behind this mandate, the ones who handled 
all the details on this matter. The main political actors – Klaus Iohannis, the presi-
dent of Romania and Viorica Dăncilă, the prime minister of the country at the time, 
were presented at first. 
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The author of the article chose to mention only their achievements until then, 
and their competences. This article was sponsored by the Romanian Presidency of 
the Council of the European Union (this information is mentioned at the beginning 
of the article), so it can be considered a part of the public diplomacy campaign of 
the Romanian government.
The negative articles can be distinguished by simply observing keywords such 
as ‘corruption’ or ‘rule of law’. Two out of seven articles mentioned ‘Dăncilă’, while 
other negative articles contained keywords such as ‘PSD’, ‘Iohannis’, ‘Dragnea’, 
‘climate change’, ‘Euro skepticism’. These seven articles included negative state-
ments against Romania given by European leaders; doubts about Romania’s ability 
to carry out this mandate; references to corruption in the country or changes to the 
laws of justice. 
The neutral articles referred to the president’s agenda, events or meetings, with-
out any comments from the authors of the articles.
Euractiv wrote the most consistent and detailed articles on the main subject of 
this paper, compared to the other five publications analyzed. This publication pub-
lished most of the articles in January.
Table 4: The tone of the articles referring to the Romanian Presidency of the Council
Publication Neutral Positive Negative
Euractiv 11 1 7
Politico 15 2 7
Reuters 3 0 3
Radio Free Europe 1 0 2
Associated Press 1 0 3
Euronews 2 0 5
Source: The authors
Politico published 45 articles referring to Romania in the reference period, and 
20 were written about Romania’s Presidency of the EU Council. January had the 
greatest coverage, Politico’s journalist mainly focusing on the comments made by 
the European leaders before Romania took over the presidency. 
Most of the articles (11) were labeled as neutral, seven as negative and two 
articles as having a positive tone. Of the two positive articles, one is sponsored by 
the Romanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and the author 
talked about European companies and their competition in the USA and China, 
and he also praised the Start-up Nation Program implemented in Romania. The 
second positive article had a Romanian author who presented a guide for for-
eigners who wish to come to Bucharest during Romania’s mandate. Moving on 
to the seven articles with a negative tone, they largely summarize the statements 
of Jean-Claude Juncker, then President of the European Commission, and Donald 
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Tusk, then President of the European Council, about their expectations from 
Romania, as well as their fears. They stated in various contexts that the high de-
gree of corruption recorded in Romania can negatively influence this presidency 
and the rule of law. Other negative articles referred to the presidency’s agenda, to 
Eugen Teodorovici, the Romanian minister of finance, who tried to keep postpon-
ing the adoption of the tax haven law, an act which was noticed and criticized by 
the international press. Other negatively toned articles referred to the Euro skep-
ticism of some Romanian parties. 
The keywords in these articles were ‘rule of law’, ‘corruption’, ‘Dăncilă’, ‘PSD’, 
‘Dragnea’, ‘Euro skepticism’. With regards to the articles with a neutral tone (11 
in total), ten of them referred to the presidency’s agenda and one had a statement 
from Donald Tusk. The articles published in Politico show that Romania’s mandate 
at the EU Council was also linked to the corruption issues that the country was 
facing and the attacks on the rule of law.
Reuters published a total of 56 articles and we will focus on the six articles re-
porting on the presidency. Three were classified as having a negative tone and three 
a neutral tone, while no articles with a positive tone were identified. All three arti-
cles with neutral tone concerned topics on the presidency’s agenda and statements 
from Eugen Teodorovici and George Ciamba, the Romanian Ministers for Finance 
and European Affairs, respectively.
In the case of articles with negative tone, the journalists quote Juncker, who ex-
pressed his concern about Romania and said that the rule of law must be protected. 
Another article included the statements of Romanian leaders who argued that there 
was no cause for concern and that Romania would carry out the mandate. The last 
article examined the situation in Romania, in the context of the country holding the 
presidency: the protests against the proposed justice laws and the various attacks 
on the rule of law. The keywords of these articles were: ‘rule of law’, ‘corruption’, 
‘Juncker’, ‘Brexit’, ‘Dragnea’ and ‘Dăncilă’. Most of the articles referring to the 
presidency of the EU Council were written in January.
The next publication is Radio Free Europe, where a total of 25 articles were 
written on Romania. Three of the articles had the presidency of Romania at the EU 
Council as a main subject, two of which with a negative tone and one being neutral. 
One author quoted Juncker’s statement made before Romania took office, in which 
he said that the country was not really aware of the implications of that mandate. 
The keywords in this text were: ‘Juncker’, ‘Romania’ and ‘presidency of the Council 
of the EU’. The second negative article on Romania referred to corruption in the 
country, the amnesty and pardoning laws, and highlights the countless requests 
that European leaders had made to Romania on those issues. The neutral article 
discussed meetings on the agenda and used statements of the Romanian Minister 
Delegate for European Affairs, George Ciamba. Radio Free Europe published most 
articles on this subject in January. 
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Associated Press published a total of 33 articles during the reference period (Jan-
uary 1, 2019 – March 15, 2019) referring to Romania. Of the four articles on the 
subject of the presidency published in Associated Press, none were identified as 
having a positive tone; three of the articles were classified as negative and one as 
neutral. The article with a neutral tone, like other articles analyzed so far, discussed 
meetings on the presidency’s agenda and quoted George Ciamba’s statements.
Moving on to articles with a negative tone, two of them dealt with Juncker’s 
famous statements, according to whom Romania was not ready and the situation 
in the country could affect that mandate. The other negative article referred to the 
takeover ceremony, which took place in Bucharest, and during which there was 
also a protest; the press recounted that event, connecting it to corruption and prob-
lems in the Romanian justice system. Most articles related to the subject mentioned 
above were published in January.
Euronews is the sixth and last publication analyzed and a total of 16 articles 
were related to Romania during the reference period. Of the total of 16 articles 
published during the research period, seven referred to the presidency held by 
Romania. Five of them were identified as negative and two neutral. The two articles 
with neutral tone described, as was the case with other publications, the meetings 
on the agenda and the responsibilities of Romania.
The five articles classified as negative referred to Juncker and other Europe-
an leaders stating that, due to corruption and problems in the judiciary system, 
Romania may not cope with this mandate. All of these articles referred to corrup-
tion in Romania. This can only mean that the issue of corruption is a major one 
for Romania and this problem could take the spotlight from any other major event 
during Romania’s presidency mandate at the EU Council. Euronews journalists 
wrote most articles on the subject of the Presidency in January.
6. Discussions
The present study was designed to determine how the international press pre-
sented the image of Romania during its EU presidency and to highlight the efforts 
of mediated public diplomacy. The results of the content analysis show the quali-
tative and quantitative differences and similarities between the publications. These 
can be determined by the topic of the articles, the month they were published and 
the general tone of the text. Firstly, there are quantitative differences, in the sense 
that the number of articles referring to the subject of Romania’s presidency differs 
greatly from publication to publication, so most articles on the subject were written 
in Politico (20) and the least in Radio Free Europe (three). Another difference be-
tween publications can be observed in the tone of the articles: in some publications 
the neutral tone is prevalent, while in others the negative or the positive one is. 
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The greatest similarity between all publications is the correlation between the 
topic and the tone, in that all negative articles from all the publications referred to 
either the statements of European leaders on the situation in Romania, or consisted 
of research done by the authors on corruption or the rule of law in Romania.
As observed in the initial analysis, most articles on the subject of the presidency 
were written in January 2019. Thus, out of the total of 59 items analyzed, 38 (i.e. 
64.41%) were written in January alone, which can be linked to the fact that Romania 
took office on the first day of the year. January was also the month in which most 
statements were given about the expectations and concerns that came with this 
mandate.
Compared to January, February was quieter, without major events, and only 
nine articles (15.25%) were published. In March, only 15 days were analyzed, for 
reasons related to the organization of this research, but more articles were written 
in these 15 days than in February, namely 12 articles (20.34%).
Regarding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the tone used in the arti-
cles on the topic of Romania’s presidency, most of them were written in a neutral 
tone: out of a total of 59 articles, 29 were identified as neutral, or 49.15%. More than 
90% of the neutral articles discussed meetings on the agenda and statements of 
Romanian ministers.
We counted three positively toned articles written on the subject of Romania’s 
mandate. Two of them were part of the Romanian government’s effort for mediated 
public diplomacy. Therefore, they were sponsored content. The third one was writ-
ten by a Romanian woman as a guide for foreigners who want to come to Bucharest 
during Romania’s mandate. It can be said that the situation does not look very good 
for Romania, out of a total of 59 articles written on this subject, only 3 items, i.e. 
5%, had a positive tone. Unfortunately, due to internal turmoil, Romania did not 
make the most of the media coverage at the start of the Romanian presidency of the 
Council of the European Union.
Overall, these results indicate that a percentage of 45.76% (27 items) of negative 
articles is very high. Negative media coverage has a significant impact on how a 
country’s image is perceived. Romania is seen by the international press as a deeply 
corrupt country, and the results of this research underline this. Thus, in 21 out of a 
total of 27 articles (77.78%) with a negative tone about Romania’s Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union, the topic of corruption is also mentioned.
Another aim of the research was to show the opportunity that Romania had 
during its presidency of the Council of the EU. This period was a very important 
one, as shown by the fact that in two and a half months 59 articles were written 
about the country’s presidency in six European publications. The following state-
ment, found in an article from the sample, underscores the scrutiny Romania faced 
at the beginning of its mandate: ‘Europe is looking at Romania. Europe is look-
ing at Romania more intensively than at any time since the fall of communism’ 
(Euronews, 2019).
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7. Conclusions and limits of the research
Country image is a complex concept, consisting of several factors. Major events 
related to a particular country, in this case Romania’s presidency of the Council of 
the European Union, may constitute favorable circumstances whereby the image of 
the country can be improved, or at least, the attention of international media may 
be drawn to it.
The results of our research prove that Romania was not presented in a favor-
able way in the international press in the first half of its aforementioned mandate. 
As a main conclusion of the content analysis it can be stated that Romania’s im-
age was not a positive one, but rather negative, or at best neutral. In addition to 
the presidency, the main topics addressed in the international press referred to: 
Laura Codruţa Kövesi and the efforts of Romanian politicians to stop her from 
being the European Chief Prosecutor, corruption in the country, problems in the 
justice system and in the Romanian economy. Topics related to domestic politics 
massively influenced the content and the tone of the media coverage during this pe-
riod in a negative manner by emphasizing corruption issues, attempts to change an-
ti-corruption legislation, etc. Regarding possible public diplomacy campaigns of the 
Romanian government, the results are limited, at least for the publications analyzed. 
The main limit of this research is the sample, since only articles written in En-
glish were analyzed. This research analyzed the articles that were written in the 
first two and a half months in which Romania held this mandate, whereas the ideal 
period would have been all six months. It would also be interesting to note what 
other publications in different European countries wrote about this subject, not 
just those chosen in this research. Therefore, the results of this research cannot be 
generalized.
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Abstract
Many democratic countries are confronted with a growing disconnect between citizens, politics and 
politicians. This disconnect leads to a growing aversion to traditional politics, to an increasing polarization 
within society and to a growing support for the populist right. Opinion leaders, civil society organizations 
and politicians who recognize this evolution are looking for alternatives to give democracy a new impetus. 
Citizen participation and participatory budgeting are considered possible paths that can help to close the 
gap between citizens and politics, and to re-involve citizens more closely in policy. Most participatory bud-
geting initiatives that are currently developed are implemented at local government level. The question aris-
es whether participatory budgeting can also be introduced in a meaningful way at the central government 
level. This paper tries to find an answer or at least a part of an answer to this question from a practitioner’s 
point of view.
Keywords: participatory budgeting, budget developments, central government, accountability, alterna-
tives. 
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1. Introduction
Politicians, academics, citizens and media in many democratic countries fre-
quently state that there is a growing disconnect between citizens and politics. Citi-
zens have a strong feeling that politicians don’t hear, don’t see and don’t care about 
their needs and concerns; they have the impression that politicians live in their 
own little world and are only interested in themselves. This growing gap leads to a 
growing aversion to traditional politics, to an increasing polarization within society 
and to a growing support for the populist right.
In several countries, opinion leaders, civil society organizations and politicians 
who recognize this worrying evolution, think about possibilities, alternatives and 
initiatives to give democracy a new impetus (Kantor and Greab, 2016). Citizen par-
ticipation and participatory budgeting are considered possible paths that can help 
to close or at least to narrow the gap between citizens and politics and to re-involve 
citizens more closely in policy. Participatory budgeting initiatives are developed 
in a number of countries; most of these initiatives are with varying success imple-
mented at local government level (Wolf, Rys and Van Dooren, 2018).
Experience shows that there is no one way to organize participatory budgeting; 
the initiatives range from a consultation of citizens regarding the budget involved 
over diverse forms of active involvement of citizens in the decision-making process 
to granting an actual decision-making authority to the citizens (Kantor and Greab, 
2016). The way the participatory budgeting process is designed and organized is de-
termined by the objectives the authorities want to attain; three main objectives are 
defined in literature: (1) activating citizens by giving them a clear voice, (2) obtaining 
citizens’ input to come to a more efficient and effective public policy, and (3) devel-
oping citizenship (Wolf, Rys and Van Dooren, 2018). 
The Participatory Budgeting Project (Participatory Budgeting Project, 2019) de-
fines participatory budgeting as a democratic process in which community mem-
bers decide on how to spend a part of the public budget thus giving people real 
power over real money, deepening democracy, building stronger communities and 
creating a more equitable distribution of public resources in accordance to citizens’ 
needs and concerns. 
With the exception of Portugal, literature does not give examples of participato-
ry budgeting being introduced at the central government level. The question aris-
es whether participatory budgeting can in a meaningful way be introduced at the 
central government level, and what conditions have to be fulfilled to do so (Wolf, 
Rys and Van Dooren, 2018). For Belgium this question can be translated as: can 
participatory budgeting be organized in a meaningful way at the level of the federal 
Government or of the Flemish state Government?
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2. The central government budget
The budget is the financial translation of the policy that the government wants 
to develop and implement during the fiscal year concerned. The resources budget 
estimates mean that the government can collect and therefore can dispose of during 
the fiscal year. The spending budget estimates the expenditures that the govern-
ment can incur during the fiscal year, and gives the authorization to actually incur 
these expenditures. The spending budget is an authorization to spend the available 
means within the limits of the parliamentary democracy and the rule of law; it con-
tains no obligation to spend the funds.
Drawing up the budget and determining on which policies public funds will be 
spent, are much more than just dividing money over initiatives and projects that 
seem interesting. A budget is only legitimate if the resources are allocated to the 
agreed policies that the government wants to continue or to develop and imple-
ment. The funds must be allocated to the various expenditure items in function of 
the objectives and priorities set by the government, Parliament and society; it is 
therefore important that clarity and consensus on these objectives and priorities 
exist before the financial issues are discussed (van Sprundel, 1998). 
However, the method to draw up the budget starting from objectives and prior-
ities is not yet widely acquired. Various ministries still do not have the habit, the 
knowledge or the data to define objectives and priorities, to translate those into 
results that need to be attained during the fiscal year and to calculate the means 
required to achieve these results. Practice shows that drawing up the budget often 
goes as follows: 
 – (1) The budget minister issues the instructions for drawing up the budget. In 
order to meet the budgetary goals that are pursued, these instructions mostly 
assume a zero growth of the expenditures; the funds that were in previous fis-
cal years allocated are however never really questioned.
 – (2) As the previously allocated funds are normally not questioned, the minis-
tries propose a number of activities, projects and initiatives they want to devel-
op and execute, aimed to justify these resources without making a clear link to 
policy objectives and priorities. 
 – (3) Taking into account the budgetary goals and the political priorities, the bud-
get authorities determine the funds that each ministry can actually dispose of. 
 – (4) The ministries reformulate the activities, projects and initiatives they pro-
posed in order to remain within the allocated funds.
This way of working makes budgeting a rather technical and arithmetic exer-
cise which pays only very limited attention to the objectives that the Government 
wants to achieve in order to steer society and to respond to the citizens’ needs and 
concerns. 
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In the 1980s and 1990s, New Public Management emerged and performance be-
came the key driver for any government action: the government has to be effective, 
efficient and economic. Government has to determine the objectives it wants to 
attain in the short, medium and long term, set priorities within these objectives 
and monitor whether these objectives are actually met. Monitoring requires that 
indicators measuring the extent to which the objectives are met, are developed and 
implemented (van Sprundel, 1998).
Within this framework performance budgeting was introduced. OECD (OECD, 
2019) defines performance budgeting as the systematic use of performance infor-
mation to inform budget decisions, either as a direct input for decisions on the 
allocation of resources or as contextual information for budget planning, and to 
create more transparency and accountability in the budget process by providing 
information to Parliament and the citizens about the spending targets set and the 
results achieved. OECD differentiates different stages in the implementation of 
performance budgeting, whereby pending the stage of maturity the link between 
performance data and the budgetary decision-making becomes increasingly stron-
ger. Direct performance budgeting is the most far-reaching form of performance 
budgeting, whereby performance information directly steers the decisions on the 
allocation of resources. Direct performance budgeting contains the following steps: 
 – (1) the government defines long-term strategic objectives to attain; 
 – (2) these long-term objectives are made concrete in medium-term operational 
objectives; 
 – (3) the government defines the results to achieve during the fiscal year con-
cerned as a step to attain the operational objectives; 
 – (4) the government determines the activities that are required to attain these 
results;
 – (5) on the basis of available cost data, the government calculates the cost of the 
activities that need to be performed to attain these results; and
 – (6) the cost of the activities and the number of activities that have to be deliv-
ered, determine the amount and the allocation of the funds that are entered in 
the budget. 
An OECD survey conducted in 2018 (OECD, 2019) shows that no country uses 
direct performance budgeting; the political nature of the budget and the many con-
ceptual and practical problems that arise when establishing the link between the 
allocation of resources and the results, and the objectives to be achieved hamper the 
introduction of direct performance budgeting. 
Experience shows that in Belgium, governments are reluctant to set clear objec-
tives for the medium and long term, or to define clear results they want to achieve 
during the fiscal year. Clear objectives allow citizens and civil society to hold poli-
ticians accountable if these objectives are not met, even if this is due to unforeseen 
changes in the context and environment within in which the government operates. 
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In addition, it is very difficult to determine comprehensive indicators to measure 
the impact of the political action on achieving the results and objectives as also 
external events or environmental factors on which politics have no direct hold may 
impact on this achievement. 
3. EU’s budget policy and other evolutions
A number of political and societal evolutions took place over the past years 
that have a significant impact on the budget (process). The EU took a number of 
initiatives to achieve and ensure the budgetary health of the Member States; these 
initiatives have a direct impact on the Member States’ budgets. 
Following the 2008 economic and financial crisis, the EU strengthened the coor-
dination and monitoring of the macroeconomic and fiscal policies in the Member 
States. New rules were imposed to support Member States to achieve sound public 
finances by avoiding and correcting excessive debts or budget deficits; these rules 
are much stricter for the Member States that are part of the Eurozone than for those 
that do not belong to the Eurozone. As a general rule, the budgets of the Member 
States should be in balance. However, if the budget is deficient, the annual budget 
deficit must not exceed 3% of the GDP. The debt ratio of a Member State must not 
exceed 60% of the GDP; a higher degree of debt can however be accepted under a 
number of strict conditions. These EU rules limit the space national governments 
have to draw up their budget and to allocate resources. 
Other recent evolutions that impact the budget and the budget process are gen-
der budgeting and sustainable development budgeting. Gender budgeting was in-
troduced some years ago as people started to realize that gender inequalities appear 
to be more or less embedded in government policy and in the allocation of public 
funds. Various organizations pioneered to promote gender mainstreaming, assess-
ing the impact of a policy on the different genders during the elaboration, adap-
tation or implementation of this policy in order to gradually eliminate gender in-
equality in the public sector, in the wider economy and in society. Gender budget-
ing is the translation of gender mainstreaming in the budget process (Downes, von 
Trapp and Nicol, 2017) integrating a clear gender perspective in the budget process 
and promoting a policy that tackles gender inequality. According to a 2016 OECD 
survey (OECD, 2017), about one third of the OECD countries have introduced gen-
der mainstreaming in their budget process. The way in which gender budgeting is 
implemented differs from country to country. Nonetheless, there appear to be three 
broad systems of gender budgeting: 
 – (1) gender-informed resource allocation: the gender impact assessment pro-
vides information for individual policy decisions and/or individual decisions 
on resource allocation; 
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 – (2) gender-rated budgets: the entire budget is assessed for gender impact; and
 – (3) gender-based budgeting: the assessment of the gender impact is integrated 
in the budget process and thus in drawing up the budget.
Sustainable development budgeting is based on the sustainable development 
goals that were adopted at the United Nations summit in September 2015. The Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) want to put an end to all forms of poverty, to 
combat inequality, to tackle climate change and to ensure that no one is left out. 
The 17 objectives set an ambitious development agenda for the next fifteen years 
and cover the various aspects of sustainable development, economic prosperity, 
social development and environmental protection. Just as gender budgeting screens 
the budget for gender aspects and integrates gender mainstreaming in the budget 
process, sustainable development budgeting requires the budget to be assessed on 
its contribution to achieve the 17 SDGs. This assessment should become an inte-
grated part of the budget process. 
The EU directives, gender and sustainable goals budgeting will all have to be 
observed when a government decides to involve citizens and civil society more 
actively in drawing up and executing the budget e.g. by implementing participatory 
budgeting.
4. The conditions for implementing participatory budgeting
Budgeting and certainly performance budgeting are much more than allocating 
resources to an activity, a project or an initiative. The budget should be the finan-
cial translation of the societal objectives that the government pursues; this requires 
that objectives are defined and priorities are set. In addition, the budget has to be 
screened for its gender impact and its ability to contribute to the achievement of the 
SDGs. The EU directives on a sound financial and budget policy have to be applied. 
Due to the EU directives on the budget deficit and the debt ratio, a major re-
orientation of the budgetary means can, from a financial and budgetary point of 
view, at the short term only be operated through a reallocation of resources or an 
increase of taxes. From a policy point of view, major budget reallocations often 
require changes in legislation or regulations that are difficult to realize at short 
term. From an operational point of view, major budget reallocations often require a 
drastic cut in personnel and operating resources that risks to seriously hamper the 
operational effectiveness of the public administration causing a significant negative 
social and economic impact. 
These elements apply regardless the budget processes and procedures applied. 
This has, as a result, that also when shifting towards participatory budgeting at the 
short and even medium term no major reallocations of resources will be possible. 
But not only the budgetary environment impacts on the feasibility and the im-
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plementation of participatory budgeting, also a number of organizational require-
ments have to be met (Participatory Budgeting Project, 2019): a dedicated source of 
public funding, a clear process and time schedule, administrative staff to mediate 
the process, the involvement of a large enough number of citizens who are well 
informed and consider the public interest. 
4.1. Citizens can decide on a dedicated source of public funding
Key to participatory budgeting is that citizens provide a direct input to support 
the decisions on how (a part of) the public funds are spent or have even a direct 
decision-making authority over a part of the budget. But even when citizens decide 
on the activities, projects or initiatives that are funded the final decision-making 
authority remains with the legislative authority (Parliament or City Council at the 
local government level). However, the government that draws up the final budget 
proposals and the Parliament that ultimately approves the budget and authorizes 
the expenditures, both should respect and take into consideration the input that the 
citizens provide or the decisions they make, in order not to endanger the process 
(Wolf, Rys and Van Dooren, 2018).
To convince citizens to participate in the process, it is important that citizens 
know at the start what their impact will be and what funds are involved (Ruesch 
and Kohake, undated). There are no guidelines to determine the amount of the pub-
lic funds that can be allocated through participatory budgeting. This amount must 
be in proportion to the objective pursued while introducing participatory budget-
ing, and be relevant enough to convince citizens that their input is appreciated and 
taken serious (Wolf, Rys and Van Dooren, 2018).
Most examples of participatory budgeting in Europe described in literature re-
late to the local government level where the available funds are often limited. A few 
years ago, the city of Antwerp (Belgium) introduced participatory budgeting in one 
city district. For 2020 citizens could decide on an amount of € 1.4 million, which is 
somewhat more than 6% of the total district budget of € 22.5 million. The question 
arises however as to what is a relevant amount at the level of the central govern-
ment. The expenditure budget 2019 of the Flemish state amounts to approximately 
€ 44.95 billion; allocating 6% of these funds or €2,7 billion on the basis of a partici-
patory budgeting process seems due to legal prescriptions, political considerations 
and the lack of experience with participatory budgeting not feasible in the near or 
even medium-term future. 
4.2. Clear procedures and a clear time schedule are set out
Participatory budgeting is more than just deciding on the allocation of resourc-
es. The process normally consists of several steps (Participatory Budgeting Project, 
2019): (1) a brainstorming about the activities, projects and initiatives resources 
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can be allocated to; (2) developing the ideas resulting from the brainstorming into 
concrete projects, initiatives or activities; (3) assessing the legal, financial and ad-
ministrative feasibility of these proposals; and (4) discussing and deciding on the 
activities, projects and initiatives resources are allocated to.
This process is quite intensive and requires not only an active input from the 
citizens but also an open, clear and intensive involvement of the administration. 
The administration has an important role to play in translating the brainstorming 
ideas into concrete proposals and in assessing the feasibility of these proposals; 
more than the citizens the administration has the legal, financial, budgetary and ad-
ministrative knowledge and experience that are required to make this assessment 
(Kantor and Greab, 2016). The support the administration has to provide, must be fit 
into the normal budget cycle that is quite intensive and runs at the level of central 
government from May to October. It is not evident for the administration to take up 
additional tasks during this period; participatory budgeting may therefore have the 
effect that the timing of the budget cycle will have to be adjusted. 
The question arises whether participatory budgeting is or can be useful during 
the budget control that takes place every year in the January – April timeframe. 
The budget control assesses the budget of the current fiscal year, and adjusts it if 
justified due to changed volume factors or the index evolution; but the government 
can also decide to impose additional economies due to a change in the economic 
environment or to political or social evolutions. It can hardly be guaranteed that at 
a moment that additional economies are required, funds allocated by the citizens 
remain out of scope of any saving measure. 
Participatory budgeting is not only for the administration very intensive, it also 
requires an important investment from the citizens who actively participate in the 
process. It is not certain that interested and motivated citizens always have the time 
required to actively participate throughout the entire process. However, clear pro-
cedures and a clear time schedule may facilitate the citizens’ participation and the 
involvement of the administration. 
4.3. The administration has to mediate the process
Citizens should have a clear and reasonable view on the subject matter con-
cerned to be able to discuss the budget proposals and to take the required decisions. 
As most citizens are not familiar with and have often a (very) limited knowledge 
of the financial, legal and technical aspects of a budget, they are in need of solid 
support on these issues during the entire budget process.
To provide the required support the competent authorities must assign a moti-
vated and dedicated team of civil servants to guide and to help the citizens through 
the whole process. These civil servants need to collaborate intensively with the 
citizens to provide them with the required information, to guide them through the 
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formal procedures, to support them while balancing the proposals, to point out the 
consequences of their decisions and eventually reflect with them on alternative 
options without however taking over the budgeting process (Wolf, Rys and Van 
Dooren, 2018). 
The communication between the government and the citizens must be orga-
nized in a way that suits the different target groups that the government wants 
to address in the different phases of the process. Differentiations in information 
and in the way, information is provided may be required depending on the level of 
education, the age, the socio-economic background, or other socio-demographics 
characteristics of the different target groups. The use of new and social media can 
be important for this communication to be appropriate, quick and smooth.
4.4. A large enough number of citizens is involved
The legitimacy of participatory budgeting depends on the support it has within 
society. This support is influenced by various factors such as: the quality, reliability 
and robustness of the process, the quality and relevance of the activities, projects and 
initiatives to which resources can be allocated, the participation and involvement of 
a sufficient number of citizens in the budget process (Kantor and Greab, 2016).
A sufficient number of citizens participating does not only relate to the num-
ber of citizens participating; it also requires that citizens stemming from all layers 
within society can and effectively do participate in the process. The risk is indeed 
eminent that participatory budgeting mainly attracts the ‘usual suspects’: higher 
educated citizens who have the interest, resources and opportunities to participate 
in the process. Lower educated or social and economic weaker citizens or citizens 
belonging to minority groups often fall out (Participatory Budgeting Project, 2019).
Participatory budgeting therefore requires that the process is set up in an inclu-
sive manner involving citizens stemming from all layers of the society. The govern-
ment bears the responsibility to guarantee equal access for all interested, to remove 
any obstacle that can hamper the participation of any societal group and to invest 
in mobilizing participants from the various societal groups. At the end of the day a 
sufficient number of citizens stemming from all layers within society without any 
distinction based on gender, origin, nationality, age, education, socio-economic sit-
uation or health, should participate and be involved in the process.
There are no guidelines that determine how many citizens, both in terms of 
number and diversity, must participate and be involved in the process to ensure 
the legitimacy. This number will vary depending on the objectives the government 
wants to attain with participatory budgeting (Wolf, Rys and Van Dooren, 2018). 
One can however suppose that at the central government level, the required num-
ber of citizens participating in the process is probably quite large. 
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4.5. The citizens are informed and consider the public interest
A last condition requires that citizens participating in the process are well-in-
formed about the policy and the budget, and they put the public interest above their 
own personal interest during the whole process. 
The government can develop the necessary initiatives to inform the citizens 
properly in an open and transparent format that everyone can easily consult and 
understand, and that contains the policy and budget information that citizens need 
to participate in the process. The information provided should include financial and 
non-financial information, the objectives the government strives for, the indicators 
monitoring to which extent the objectives and results are achieved.
A survey shows that governments worldwide still have a long way to go in pro-
viding open and transparent information (International Budget Partnership, 2019). 
Almost 70% of the world population has no access to important budget documents 
or audit reports that can provide insight into the spending of public funds. 
It is however more difficult to ensure that the citizens participating in the pro-
cess place the public interest above their own personal interests. Open and clear 
information, a strong and valid procedure for drawing up the budget, involving cit-
izens stemming from all layers and groups within the society, and a strict guidance 
of the participants can most probably help to transcend personal interests.
5. Is accountability an issue?
Participatory budgeting gives citizens a real power over the way a part of the 
public funds is spent. This power that will vary depending on the way the participa-
tion of the citizens is organized cannot stop the moment that the budget is approved 
by the legislative authorities. To be really meaningful, the input of the citizens has 
to imply that the citizens are also involved in the execution of the budget or can at 
least follow up very closely the budget execution.
During the drawing up of the budget, citizens can in consultation with the ad-
ministration decide on who is best placed to execute the budget or the part/parts 
of the budget that is/are allocated through participatory budgeting: the adminis-
tration, the citizens or the administration in close cooperation with the citizens 
(Citizenlab, 2019). But regardless of who executes the budget, citizens should be 
able to monitor closely the budget execution. This monitoring capability is not an 
issue particularly related to participatory budgeting; it is a normal and inherent 
part of the decision-making process in a democratic society.
Participatory budgeting should be a means to close or at least to narrow the gap 
between citizens and politics, to involve citizens more in the policy making pro-
cess, to build stronger communities and to come to a fairer distribution of public 
funds in accordance with the real needs and concerns within society (Halloran and 
Khan, 2019). 
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These objectives should however not be limited to the funds on which citizens 
can decide, and the related policies; they have to apply to the entire budget and to 
all government actions.
To have a real impact on the public funds and to ensure a correct and equitable 
use of these funds, citizens must be able to hold those who draw up and execute the 
budget to account for the way they fulfill their responsibilities. Being accountable 
means that all involved in setting out policies, in drawing up the budget, in execut-
ing policy and spending the public funds are called to account for their actions and 
for the way they take up their responsibilities (Brown, 2011). 
It seems very difficult to set up a workable structure that allows citizens to as-
sess and evaluate policies and the related financial management apart from general 
elections. This issue becomes even more complicated when not only politicians and 
the administration are responsible for policies and the financial management, but 
when also citizens are directly involved in this process. Can citizens hold co-citi-
zens accountable for the responsibilities they take up when deciding on the allo-
cation of funds to different activities, projects or initiatives and are maybe even 
actively involved in performing these activities and spending the related resources? 
If no, process can be thought out to hold co-citizens accountable, there is an effec-
tive risk that a part of the public funds is spent without anyone to account and to 
be held accountable for the use of these funds. In that case, participatory budgeting 
does not contribute to reducing the democratic deficit, but even contains the risk to 
increase it as the democratic control of a part of the budget becomes very difficult 
or even impossible. 
6. Are there alternatives for participatory budgeting?
A lot of issues arise with regard to participatory budgeting concerning the pro-
cess, performance budgeting, the impact of EU directives, gender and sustainable 
development budgeting, the assignment of responsibilities and the accountabili-
ty (Dey, 2019). Citizens stemming from all socio-economic groups within society, 
irrespective of gender, origin, nationality, age, education, status or health should 
participate and be involved in the process; they have to be well informed and put 
the public interest before their own personal interest.
The government must ensure that citizens are well informed and provide all 
relevant financial, legal, administrative and technical information; this information 
needs to be accessible in the clear and comprehensible way that is best suited to 
address the different target groups (e.g. young people, the low-educated) that the 
government wants to reach. Currently clear, concise and comprehensible informa-
tion on the budget is not yet acquired. 
In the participatory budgeting cases described in the literature, citizens allo-
cate funds or provide input to allocate funds to activities, projects and initiatives 
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without having any decision-making authority on the objectives and results to 
attain nor on the activities to be performed. This way of allocating resources does 
not fit with the logic of performance budgeting. The question arises however to 
what extent citizens can actively be involved in the decision-making process on 
the objectives and results the government wants or needs to attain. In addition, if 
citizens should be involved in deciding on objectives and results, the conditions 
of representativeness (a relevant number of citizens from all groups within soci-
ety) and of the required legal, financial, administrative and technical knowledge 
are much stricter than in the case of a mere allocation of resources. Currently the 
minimum conditions on representativeness and knowledge cannot or can at the 
best hardly be met. 
While citizens decide on the activities, projects or initiatives to be funded, they 
need to take into account the budget directives issued by the EU and budgetary 
evolutions such as performance, gender and sustainable development budgeting. 
Gender budgeting and sustainable development budgeting require that the budget 
proposals are screened on their gender impact and on the extent to which they 
contribute to the realization of the SDGs such as clean energy and climate action. 
The public debate over recent years on gender equality, climate action, clean energy 
and other SDGs has led in many countries to a serious polarization within society. 
It is highly questionable that citizens can in a serene way be directly involved in 
decisions on objectives and results to attain on such polarized topics. 
Finally, participatory budgeting can only have an impact if citizens are allowed 
to allocate a relevant part of the public funds. It is difficult to determine at the level 
of the central government what can be considered as a relevant part of public funds. 
These concerns are reinforced by the fact that there are currently no structures 
or possibilities to hold co-citizens accountable for the actions and decisions they 
take within the participatory budgeting framework. The difficulty to hold co-citi-
zens accountable makes the concerns with regard to participatory budgeting extra 
delicate and complex.
Those issues do however not mean that no initiatives can be taken to involve 
citizens more closely in the budget process (drawing up and execution) and to arm 
them better to hold the government and the administration accountable. Open, 
transparent, clear and understandable information on the budget is an important 
first step in this regard. In some countries, governments already provide informa-
tion that makes it possible for non-specialists to understand the budget and the 
budgetary situation of the country (International Budget Partnership, 2019); they 
provide information on the objectives and results pursued by the government, on 
the economic assumptions that serve as the base for drawing up the budget, on the 
revenue estimates for the fiscal year and the way these estimates are substantiated, 
on the allocation of the resources. Significant increases or decreases in revenues or 
expenditures in comparison with previous fiscal years are explained. This informa-
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tion can also indicate who bears the responsibility at the various stages of drawing 
up and/or executing the budget.
To ensure the involvement of the citizens, this information has to contain the 
essential financial data that citizens need to understand the drawing up and the 
execution of the budget, and the information has to be provided in the way that 
is most suited to reach the different societal groups taking into account socio-eco-
nomic parameters, age, gender, etc. This way the required trust between society and 
the political level can be re-installed while amongst others it provides the means 
allowing citizens to hold politicians and administrations accountable for the man-
agement and use of public funds (International Budget Partnership, 2019). This in-
formation goes well beyond the limited and superficial information that appears in 
the media, and must make the complex issues such as budget planning, the limited 
availability of resources, the necessity to prioritize while defining objectives and 
results and assigning resources, transparent. Such information may increase the 
legitimacy of the budget and make harmful decisions on tax raises, cost cuts and 
savings more acceptable. 
The issue remains regarding what procedures need to be put in place to hold 
politicians and the administration accountable for the management of the public 
resources: periodic general elections are definitely an important means, but it may 
be advisable to develop also other means that allow a much quicker and more direct 
response from citizens. A societal debate can probably produce useful insights and 
proposals in this regard.
7. Conclusions
Participatory budgeting is considered a means to close the gap between citizens 
and politics and to strengthen democracy by giving citizens a real direct impact, 
sometimes even a real decision-making power over a part of the public funds. 
The participatory budgeting initiatives that are currently operational are mainly 
developed at the local government level. The question arises whether participatory 
budgeting can also work at the central government level. In this paper is argued 
that still a lot of issues and concerns regarding the implementation of participatory 
budgeting at the central government level have to be solved.
To strengthen democracy and to combat populist tendencies citizens should be 
better informed about and involved more closely in drawing up and executing the 
budget, providing them the means to effectively hold politicians and administra-
tions accountable. A clear path to achieve this goal has to be set out. A first import-
ant step seems to be to inform citizens in an open, transparent, clear and compre-
hensible manner on all aspects of the financial management including the way the 
policy objectives and results are set out and monitored. A second step may be the 
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development of a framework that allows citizens to call politicians and administra-
tions in a direct way to account.
Taken into account the issues and concerns that arise with regard to participato-
ry budgeting at the central government level, it is very doubtful that participatory 
budgeting is currently a good way to achieve these goals. Not realizing these goals 
or not fulfilling the expectations that are created in this regard entails a risk that the 
trust of the citizens in politicians, politics and democracy is further undermined.
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1. Introduction
In discussing how European rural regions cope with economic change, in a con-
text where communication is improved by the use of Internet and allows people 
to expand their work to non-farming activities, The Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development presents the new rural paradigm (OECD, 2006). 
While traditional administrative hierarchies are not able to develop effective place-
based rural development policies alone, the new rural paradigm calls for cross-sec-
torial and cross-regional bottom-up initiatives (OECD, 2006). The main challenge 
stands in bridging the research and intelligence gap around rural policy. The new 
rural paradigm stands as a framework that encourages ‘the competitiveness of rural 
areas, valorization of local assets, and exploitation of unused resources’ (OECD, 
2006, p. 4), and the involvement of all levels of government, together with local 
stakeholders such as NGOs, private organizations, and citizens. Romanian local 
fairs are an ‘unused resource’ that stands at the intersection of community devel-
opment, tourism management, and social work. They have the potential to become 
drivers of rural policy change and to reduce urban-rural disparities while improv-
ing overall economic outcomes.
Examined more closely, however, the literature on fairs as drivers for rural de-
velopment has done little to clarify the role of local fairs in community develop-
ment. Does it indicate that local fairs pose as competitive advantage in the strategic 
and comprehensive development of rural communities? Do policy changes really 
reflect issues of social justice and equity in Romania? What are the impacts of local 
fairs on the economic, socio-cultural, environmental, and political context of the 
community? More fundamentally, are traditional local fairs considered and treated 
as local growth engines for rural development?
The unanswered questions can only be approached through a clearer and fo-
cused conceptualization of and more rigorous empirical research into the role of 
local fairs in community and rural development. The purpose of the research is to 
highlight the impacts of local fairs by closely examining the case of Negreni Fair 
from Cluj County, Romania. We begin with a literature review, focusing mainly 
on the definition of local fairs and their impacts on development. Based on some 
identified distinctions, we then present a typology of fairs. The goal of this paper 
consists in identifying the role that local fairs have in reducing regional dispari-
ties, but also to identify the economic benefits which fairs have on communities. 
Socio-cultural and political impacts are also taken into consideration. We conclude 
with a discussion on the implications of this typology on different concepts: so-
cial justice issues, rural development for reducing economic disparities, community 
participation and cultural competence.
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2. The impacts of local fairs 
In their discussion on sustainability and social justice in Romania, more specif-
ically in order to strengthen economic justice and reducing economic disparities, 
Balaceanu, Apostol and Penu (2012), state that ‘the economic process should be 
based on the ability to assume a complex of institutional and market measures 
to stimulate the growth of local economies by exploiting the human capital, the 
ecological capital, and the incomes generated by the acts of production and sales’ 
(Balaceanu, Apostol and Penu, 2012, p. 681). According to the World Bank, the ru-
ral population living in Romania in 2018 accounts for 46% of the total population 
(World Bank, 2018). It experienced a steady decline of 0.71% since 2017 (World 
Bank, 2018). Regional disparities in Romania are present not only between the ur-
ban-rural dimensions, but also within accessing basic services and relational capi-
tal (Sandu, 2011). However, rural communities advocate for development in terms 
of attracting new investors and projects, investing in infrastructure, applying for 
European funding, and creating different events that make these communities at-
tractive. Within this context, local fairs have the potential to contribute to reducing 
regional disparities and to create economic benefits, and a more in-depth look at 
their role and their impacts.
2.1. Evolution of fairs in Romania
Fairs have a long tradition in European history and play a role in putting a re-
gion on a map and highlighting its competitive advantage. Fairs help capture at-
tention and promote infrastructure and attractions, and their impacts go beyond 
what is economically measured. In Europe, fairs would include a fiscal privilege, 
and this helped localities evolve into cities (e.g. Baraolt, Târgu Secuiesc). Matei 
Corvin offered the ‘fair privilege’ to the village of Lugașu de Sus1 in 1439, and 
Corvin Fair functioned until 1930. Last year the fair was revived and became very 
successful. 
Industrial revolts influenced the way trades were made, and this influenced the 
administrative rank of various localities. Today, fairs and markets are organized 
only for local supply needs, but they should not be overseen as community devel-
opment factors.
Commodity trade fairs date back in ancient history and they still play an im-
portant role in people’s lives, being the places where they meet and exchange goods 
that would ensure their living (Allix, 1922). They are defined as a concentration 
of business places or a marketplace where different stakeholders gather as part 
of an ever-changing industry that allows for a variety of competing interests and 
1 Village in Bihor County, Romania.
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products (Power and Jansson, 2008). Trade fairs were part of long-distance trade, 
and always took place in cities or temporary townships (Moeran and Pendersen, 
2011). Romanian trade fairs also took place in villages. They had an international 
character by hosting documented international merchants. The location was cho-
sen based on easy access for caravans, given that some villages were isolated and 
poor infrastructure and mountainy location were oftentimes posing barriers (Allix, 
1922). Medieval trade fairs gradually became different than retail markets, because 
products were sold not only for residents, but also for visitors (Skov, 2006). How-
ever, commodity trade fairs evolved into local fairs because trading was gradually 
replaced with selling, and merchants would bring samples and sell based on prod-
uct orders (Allix, 1922). The literature emphasizes the need to go beyond the role 
of fairs as part of economic networks, and seek ways to improve collaboration be-
tween community actors and sellers (Skov, 2006; Rubalcaba and Cuadrado-Roura, 
1995). Fairs contain both an economic/ exchange function, but also a cultural/ local 
mentality function. People perceive fairs in various ways stemming from being a 
space for sales and contracts, to a space for creating network and symbolic capital, 
and goes all the way to a space for knowledge diffusion and recruitment (Power, 
2008). Fairs adapt their name and purpose depending on their function, which can 
be agricultural, food-related, fashion-related, auto-related, and so on, however their 
designation is usually the same.
Romanian fairs have a long tradition. A study based on document analysis from 
the Ottoman Archive of the Prime Minister revealed the existence (in the 17th cen-
tury) of Gula Fair in Timișoara, Arat Fair, Valat Fair, Fohsan Fair, and Karasu Fair 
(Constanța County) and Tolci Fair (Dobrogea region) in the 18th century (Caliskan 
and Sonmez, 2018). Other fairs date back in the 16th century. 
One place where merchants from Râmnicu Vâlcea2 met with other Romanian 
and international traders was the famous Râureni Fair, one of the largest fairs in 
the Romanian Country (Wallachia)3. The fair is mentioned in historical documents 
dating back to Matei Basarab, but it is possible that it existed also in the 14th 
century during the ruling of Mircea cel Bătrân. Râureni Fair had a commercial 
character, since historical records mention: ‘Here you found ferries from Romania; 
horses and horned cattle from Hungary; the chosen grocers from Czarigrad; fur 
and leather clothing from Russia; and garments from Vienna’. The fair was abol-
ished in 1968.
Nowadays, Romanian fairs are organized in a specific time and place, they can 
be seasonal, and extend over more than one or two days. In the past, fairs were 
organized in spring and fall, given that their utility was related to farming and 
2 The capital city of Vâlcea County, Romania.
3 Middle age/ Modern history historical and geographical region of Romania.
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agricultural activities. Fairs are different than markets because they target a larger 
population, while markets mostly sustain the local residents. Markets take place on 
specific days of the week, and they facilitate immediate exchanges, unlike periodi-
cal exchanges as in the case of local fairs (Moeran and Pendersen, 2011). 
The research on local fairs in relation to rural development in Romania is lim-
ited. While there is no national database regarding the actual number of fairs and 
attendees, we made use of data provided by local councils from the North-West 
Region of Romania. The following Table 1 presents information on the number of 
fairs organized in the region in 2019. The tendency to organize fairs in Romania is 
still present at regional level, given the rich historical heritage. Other related events 
include weekly agro-foods markets and animal fairs that take place at different 
frequencies. Some weekly markets are reminiscent of famous fairs from the past 
and are worth reconsidering by building on their story (e.g. Teaca, Bistrița County). 
Table 1: Number of fairs in the North Western Region of Romania in 2019
County Number of fairs and related events
Cluj 56
Satu Mare 15
Maramureș 64
Sălaj 11
Bihor 14
Bistrița 22
Source: Administrative data from County Councils
The concept of community fair received some attention in the literature on fairs 
(Delgado, 2016; Better Evaluation, 2005). According to Better Evaluation (2005), a 
community fair is ‘an event organized within a local community with the aim of 
providing information about the project and raising awareness of relevant issues’. 
Community fairs have the potential to engage community actors in an enjoyable 
manner, through a variety of activities and events, but their goal is to inform and 
raise awareness around certain issues. Given that communities generally have great 
flexibility in staging and organizing fair models, community fairs can help facilitate 
citizen engagement through various innovative means. 
2.2. Economic impacts
There are few studies that include the economic impacts of small-scale fairs (Kim 
and Dombrosky, 2016), however there is an increased interest on the economic im-
pacts of events in general (Anderson and Solberg, 1999; Burgan and Mules, 2000; 
Dwyer, Forsyth and Spurr, 2005; Jackson et al., 2005; Mules and Faulkner, 1996; 
Ryan, 1998; Tyrrell and Ismail, 2005; Tyrrell and Johnston, 2001).
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According to Skov, nowadays the thing which needs to be researched is not how 
fairs help in spreading the economic networks, but how it can make them help each 
other, given the fact that the sellers from the fairs are in competition when they 
participate at this type of event (Skov, 2006, p. 771). 
Economic impacts are critical, because they sustain the strategic and long-term 
development of the community. Fair organization includes high expectations relat-
ed to increasing local incomes, both at local and regional level (Felsenstein, 2003, 
p. 386). The economic impact is considered to be the most important one that fairs 
had over the local economy, since fairs create temporary jobs, develop new services 
(food, transportation, accommodation, etc.), and perceive taxes for visitors and ven-
dors. Even though, at a first sight economic impact is something good for locals, 
there is a small line which can make it something bad for the community. It has to 
be taken into consideration also the idea that fairs attract visitors, vendors, but once 
that this event is perceived as a source of development by offering different services 
to the attendances, local prices can increase, and this will affect local residents, that 
is why the economic impact should be supervised by local authorities for not affect-
ing local residents’ quality of life.
Fairs are not simple markets or meeting points, but economic spaces where sell-
ers and buyers are concentrated in a given space and time, where people com-
municate and change information, in order to exchange or buy goods or services 
(Rubalcaba and Cuadrado-Roura, 1995, p. 383). 
If back in time fairs only had an economic significance, nowadays they are con-
sidered to have other significance, such as improving competition between commu-
nities or attracting foreign people (Rubalcaba and Cuadrado-Roura, 1995, p. 379). 
Small scale events, such as local fairs, are considered to be the most important 
source of money for local community, because it produces economic activities at 
the local level, activities which are transpose in money at the local budget. 
To put it in a nutshell, fairs as any other event, can attract external investors 
and financial resources into the local communities, which lead to economic benefits 
which in some cases can help rural communities to pass through economic impasse 
(Reid, 2007, p. 89). 
The economic impacts stem mostly from the trade/ sales function of fairs that 
includes managing commercial distribution networks, exporting, and selecting and 
recruiting local distributors (Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-Roura, 1995). Ex-
hibitions for example, contribute to spreading innovation, accessing new markets, 
generating employment opportunities, developing services but also foreign trade. 
Factors that drive the success of a fair include the extent to which it distributes the 
flow of money in the area/ region, and the way it increases visitor expenditure in the 
region. Other impacts include leveraging human capital and cultural resources in or-
der to generate economic vitality, improving the quality of life of residents, expand-
ing the tax and business revenue base, and creating a positive community image.
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2.3. Socio-cultural impacts
The culture function impacts not only transmitting and sharing the regional 
or national culture, but also the development of new ways of ‘thinking and run-
ning the economy, ways or organizing work and strategies, and expressing work 
methods and job specializations’ (Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-Roura, 1995, 
p. 384). It is believed that the buyer-seller interaction creates opportunities for cre-
ating personal relationships that move beyond the simple economic exchange, and 
it provides educational information to the seller (Ball and Wanitshka, 2016). Fairs 
can help renew social ties with neighbors and friends, and build bonds and bridges 
also with local governments, therefore they facilitate the development of social 
capital. The success of a fair in socio-cultural terms can be measured in terms of 
the extent to which it increased civic pride, community solidarity, and destination 
awareness. Other socio-cultural impacts include the preservation of heritage, en-
hanced international recognition of region and its values, increased local interest 
and civic participation. 
2.4. Political impacts
Governments are using fairs and related events for socio-economic develop-
ment, and fair-related expenditures can be justified in terms of their economic 
impact on the host community or region. Political impacts include opportunities 
for securing political power and influence to gain moment among residents and 
businesses, opportunities for promoting positive local and regional development, 
improving the relationship with the local community, and improving social justice 
and equity through involving underrepresented populations.
Fairs being perceived as social events, are organized based on people implica-
tion. Not forgetting the most important goal of fairs, bringing people together for 
celebrating their community, traditions and beliefs. In order to organize such an 
event, it is needed to involve not only local residents, but also local authorities and 
other important local institutions (church, local parties, private sector, and third 
sector). For taking place an event, the politics must interfere in the form of policies 
whose role is to manage the event, in terms of regulations regarding planning, en-
vironmental issues, fees, settlements, activities and more others. 
The significance of the fairs is perceived twofold according to Brent Ritchie 
(1994). The author considers that, on the one hand, fairs can contribute to the im-
age of the community, and how it is perceived by others at other levels (county 
level, regional level or, why not, at the national level). On the other hand, fairs may 
mirror the wish of different local actors to follow their personal interest, hiding 
underneath on the name of local community development (Ritchie, 1994, p. 4). To 
continue his idea, Ritchie claims that political impact can manifest both positively 
and negatively.
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In a positive way, political impact is positive and can be measured in terms 
of the recognition of the community and its values at higher levels (county, re-
gional, national, international), but also in terms of propaganda made by govern-
ment among population regarding political values. Negative manifestations are felt 
through economic exploitation of local satisfaction to please political parties or by 
misrepresentation of the nature of the event, reflecting only the political system 
and not the event (Ritchie, 1994, p. 4).
By supporting the fairs, local authorities can, in some cases, only look after their 
own interest, and misrepresent the fair by not highlighting its importance and role 
for locals and other people and the real role that it has for and in the community. 
2.5. Negreni Fair
The first historical mention of Negreni village dates from 1406 with the name 
of Fechetău (Fekethethow, Feketeto), accoding to the Historical Dictionary of 
Transylvanian Localities. Starting with the 1895, Negreni commune was known as 
the Negreni Circle in the Aleșd Squre, Bihor County. 2,352 residents (2018) inhabit 
the commune (now part of Cluj County), according to the Romanian National Insti-
tute of Statistics (NIS, 2019). Negreni commune hosts a very important commercial, 
cultural and touristic bi-annual fair, known as the Negreni fair. It is the largest fair 
in Romania, and the largest flea market in Eastern Europe. This fair maintains its 
traditional character where people from different regions would meet annually to 
buy, sell and meet relatives and friends who would otherwise be divided by moun-
tain passes during most of the year. It sells traditional clothing, tools, antiques and 
farm animals, as well as increasingly imported products. The sellers are a mix of 
local Transylvanian, Romanian, Hungarian, and Roma people. The fair is one of the 
major meeting places for Transylvania’s largest Roma population, and is a major 
social event where families feast until dawn.
Starting with 1815, the commune organizes the fair twice every year, in the 
second week of June and second week of October. Negreni fair preserves authentic 
elements from the past: there are no designated places for products exhibitions, the 
prices are negotiated, and the fair takes place outdoors, stretching over a distance 
of more than 1 km. There is a slight influx of new imported products into the fair, 
but overall the traditional character is kept alive. The fair represents a key strategic 
factor in the socio-economic development of the commune. Its conscious use de-
fines the commune and its local touristic character, along with its local production.
Key strategic factors are those which will affect the community over a long peri-
od of time, in a decisive manner. On this behalf, the key strategic factors of the com-
munity should be identified correctly in order to succeed with key stakeholders, 
which in this case consists of customers, suppliers, local residents, local authorities, 
and other interested actors. 
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The local traditional fair is a key strategic factor. The conscious use of the fair 
as an event that defines the commune and as a basis for the development of local 
tourism, can add value to local production. The community should be stimulated 
to define by cooperation certain local products, to carry out their processing and 
marketing, and finally to capitalize them through tourism. Starting from an existing 
product with a high reputation, the community can develop it, correlate it with oth-
er local advantages and turn it into the main engine of the local economy.
Community cooperation is considered to be another key strategic factor. It in-
volves stimulating local participation to generate competitive advantage, local co-
operation in all development areas: agricultural production, services, local culture, 
and integrated local tourism. The commune must gradually support cooperation 
projects between different local actors (private environment, local administration, 
church, school). It can be started from small projects with tangible results, which 
can be further developed into larger projects (for example the development of local 
products).
Another key strategic factor taken into account is quality of life. It can affect 
the community on the long term in the sense that if no action is taken to increase 
the specific indicators, depopulation phenomenon will increase and the social-eco-
nomic situation will suffer. On the other hand, if the commune manages to increase 
the quality of life, the prospects of a development based on local tourism increase 
substantially.
The next section introduces the study’s methodology, followed by discussion 
and implications for practice, conclusions, and a series of recommendations.
3. Methodology
Negreni Fair received the official approval for organizing fairs in 1815, and start-
ing from then annually there are organized two editions of this fair with the support 
of local authorities and local residents. As Bowdin et al. explain, the event typology, 
community events, local festivals or fairs are generated by the local government 
(city councils), but also by the industry associations (Bowdin et al., 2006, p. 100). 
The two editions of the fair attract around 20,000 visitors in the summer edition and 
71,000 visitors in the autumn edition. 
Case studies have a significant role in researching and evaluating local fairs, 
since they capture the context of the events, and help practitioners formulate 
narratives for lay audiences (Yin, 2014; Mehmetoglu, 2001). Besides facilitating 
academic-practitioner conversations and exchanges, case studies help understand 
the community’s reasoning of choosing a specific site for activities, or its percep-
tion upon the fair’s role in order to facilitate decision-making and future policy 
directions. 
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The literature on community events and festivals brings up additional methods 
that can be useful in approaching this topic, such as: participatory observation, 
social investigation (using surveys, both of vendors and participants) and focus 
groups. 
4. Discussion
Dolocal fairs pose as competitive advantage in the strategic and comprehensive 
development of rural communities? In order to ensure the development of a com-
petitive advantage already existing in the community or to create a competitive 
advantage, it is necessary to develop the local economy through the diversification 
of activities, to solve social problems related to obtaining a job, reducing the mi-
gration, attracting young people into the commune or keeping them in the com-
mune, providing quality education and health services, and to improve road infra-
structure, which all will lead to an increased quality of life (Kulish, 2016, p. 13). 
For attaining a competitive advantage which can lead to community development, 
rural areas in general should focus on exploiting and valorizing their unused re-
sources and the local assets. In this regard, we find out that local residents consider 
that the existence of fairs in their community is a source of competitive advantage. 
People get a hold of the unique elements of the fair such as its historical tradition 
(the fair dates back in 1815), the commercial profile (the autumn edition is a fair 
of antiquities known in all Eastern Europe), and also its connectivity – easy to ar-
rive at fair (it takes place near the train station, and also near national road 1 and 
European road 60). These characteristics supported and sustained the fair to grow, 
because the fair led not only to an economic growth, but also to the recognition 
by non-local attenders, because there are not only participants4, but also vendors5 
who come especially for this event from all over Romania, but also from other 
countries. Other features which make this fair unique are the geographical loca-
tion and duration; on average a fair lasts one or two days, while Negreni fair lasts 
more than four days.
In numbers, Negreni City Hall came forward with estimative data related to 
both fairs (see Table 2 and Table 3). The tendency in both editions, from the visitors’ 
point of view, number of vendors, food providers, revenues to local budget and 
revenues to commons undoubtedly continue to grow from year to year. Commons 
4 1.1% from other countries in summer edition, 59.1% from other counties of Romania, excepting 
Cluj. In autumn edition 9% come from other countries, and 52% come from other counties of 
Romania besides Cluj.
5 71.9% from other counties of Romania, in summer edition. 2% from other countries in autumn edi-
tion, 64% from other counties of Romania, excepting Cluj. 
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(composesorat in Romanian) are an associative form of ownership of land with for-
est vegetation, pastures and meadows, meadows in the wilderness, undivided rad-
ishes, composite, meadow forests, urban forests, political communes, cooperatives, 
other communities with different forms of association (Law no. 247/2005). 
Table 2: Summer edition of Negreni Fair in numbers (estimated numbers) 
Year Number of visitors
Number 
of vendors From which food
Revenues to local budget 
(Romanian RON)
Revenues to commons 
(Romanian RON)
2015 18,000 300 8 12,000 10,000
2016 19,000 320 9 20,000 12,000
2017 18,000 320 11 22,000 20,000
2018 20,000 350 11 24,000 26,000
2019 20,000 400 12 26,000 20,000
Source: Author based on data provided by Negreni City Hall
Table 3: Autumn edition of Negreni Fair in numbers (estimated numbers)
Year Number of visitors
Number 
of vendors From which food
Revenues to local budget 
(Romanian leu)
Revenues to commons 
(Romanian leu)
2015 68,000 910 18 85,000 27,000
2016 68,000 920 20 96,000 42,000
2017 68,000 900 20 110,000 43,000
2018 71,000 920 22 120,000 67,000
2019 70,000 960 22 145,000 75,000
Source: Author based on data provided by Negreni City Hall
Fairs generate money both for organizers and community. The economic impact 
experienced at the community level is related to increased employment and busi-
ness opportunities, development of new facilities and services both for locals and 
visitors, and development of local infrastructure (Yolal et al., 2016, p. 3). Studies 
show that organizing fairs does not require much money as they are usually or-
ganized using the available infrastructure (Litvin and Fetter, 2006), not to mention 
that such events attract more visitors, investors, vendors, sponsors (Yolal et al., 
2016, p. 4). Considering all the mentioned information, we can postulate that the 
analyzed fairs are contributing to the development of the community, bringing in 
money for public sector, private sector and also for local residents. Taking into ac-
count the mentioned information, fairs can be considered as a source of competitive 
advantage in strategic and comprehensive development of rural communities.
Socio-cultural impact is manifested through the wish of participants and ven-
dors to attend these fairs due to their tradition in time, culture, reputation, but 
also for socialization, opportunity to create networks or new connections. Good 
collaboration between local authorities, local residents and vendors should exist in 
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order to organize a proper event. Literature identifies a lot of positive socio-cultural 
benefits for communities which run events, such as: community cohesion, social-
ization, entertainment, cultural recovery, well-being and recreational opportunities 
(Yolal et al., 2016, pp. 2-3). The political context is considered to have a high impact 
over the course of the fairs, since in Romania, the legal framework states that the 
mayor coordinates the activity of these types of events (Framework Regulation for 
the organization and operation of markets, fairs and sheds adopted on January 17, 
1996). Political impacts on events (in our case, fairs) are accepted by public authori-
ties, due to their economic benefits, job opportunities and potential development of 
the community not only during these events (Bowdin et al., 2006, p. 58). 
In parallel with the mentioned impacts, participants’ and vendors’ opinions are 
required in preparation of reaching a sustainable development of Negreni com-
mune, using its crucial element, the fairs. The respondents mentioned problems 
related to infrastructure (sanitary spaces, roads, bridges, alleys), the organization of 
stall – people considering that by arranging the vendors in a certain order it would 
be easier for participants to find what they are looking for. But as we mentioned, 
one unique feature of the fair is the traditional character which can be lost if the 
producers will be arranged after the product type that they are selling or will have 
special places for the exhibition of the goods. To respond to the identified problems, 
the organizers should solve the infrastructure problems first, and after that they 
should develop some permanent arrangements designated for a versatile use, which 
means that they can create a roof for stalls, which can have a permanent utility 
– during the fairs is used as roof for stalls, and during the rest of year it can host 
shows, different events, and fair markets. In this sense, the traditional feature will 
not be destroyed and it can also lay the foundation for sustaining the development 
of other events in community, and for community. 
People are looking to buy antiquities, sundries, clothing items, tools or different 
products such as (furniture, ironmongery, electronics, traditional costumes, jew-
elries, fishing tools, old money, etc.). People are attracted to come at these events 
mainly for the diversity, the antiquities, but also because of their tradition devel-
oped during the time. Doubtless, there are others reasons, such as atmosphere, 
amplitude of the event, the originality of the event, low prices, reputation or just 
curiosity or pleasure. 
In terms of duplicating more editions of Negreni fair, sellers were on the same 
line with the participants, meaning that they want more editions of Negreni fair to 
be organized, because of the beautiful landscape, proximity to the fair, tradition, the 
geographical position between counties, communication, profit, experience, social-
ization and clients. 
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5. Limitation of the study
For composing a tool to determine the economic impact of Negreni fair, data 
provided by local authorities and other organizers were needed, and the absence 
of them restricted the author to develop a measurable instrument for determining 
the economic impact. In the future, organizers should be more careful in managing 
the number of visitors, vendors and fees, for having raw data which can be used in 
further research. 
6. Conclusion
Becoming not only a source of competitive advantage, but a real competitive ad-
vantage, local authorities and local residents should valorize fairs more in-depth. In 
this manner they should cooperate between them, in organizing the two editions of 
the fair, and coming up with new ideas for combating the problems identified both 
by participants and vendors, in order to ensure their competitive advantage. Anoth-
er aspect which came to our attention, is related to the origins of vendors at the fairs. 
As surveys show, numerous vendors are not locals, not even from Cluj County.
In this regard, local authorities should adopt a local policy in which they encour-
age locals to produce more, and sell their production, because we can’t speak about 
a social justice or equity since local producers are not selling their products. This 
policy will encourage not only the local production, but it can lead to local devel-
opment. Bringing into being a mechanism between market and production could be 
the starting point of a community development and also of a touristic development. 
The local tourism should be coordinated through locals, City Hall and Negreni tour-
ist center, in a way in which all of them are helping each other and cooperate not 
only in their personal interest, but in the community’s interest. A coordinated tour-
ism contributes to a sustainable development of the community, and it strengthens 
the relations between people and also decreases the social exclusion6 by integrating 
the problematic groups into cooperative activities. 
Economic impact can be more exploited, both by local authorities and local res-
idents. Local authorities can invest in creating more parking lots, in solving the 
infrastructure problems that fairs face, creating jobs in different domains such as 
marketing, security, cleaning, and once these problems are solved, more people will 
fell attracted to attend the fairs.
Local residents should develop more services and diversify the existing ones, by 
creating new ways of spending time in their community not only when the fairs 
take place. They can develop the tourism in the local area, a tourism which can be 
coordinated by them and the local authorities. 
6 Both participatory observation and focus group showed that some minority groups are excluded.
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Fairs can increase cooperation between local producers and can encourage the 
sale of the local products in the fair by defining the local producers, supporting 
producers by offering privileged stands and local promotion, but also by creating 
events that give the fairs a cultural connotation, and also, by using the fairs to in-
crease the bonding (networks established within a group) and bridging (networks 
established between social groups) social capital of the community (Putnam, 2000). 
Analyzing the community, we found that social capital at the level among 
Negreni’s residents is at a lower level (lack of NGOs, poor connections of the com-
mune with other communities or organizations). For finding a solution to this prob-
lem, both authorities and residents can cooperate (can constitute different associ-
ations, NGOs or other structures which can be a mediator between public sector 
and local residents or private sector). In this sense, existence of social capital can 
strengthen not only the relations between residents, but also between them and 
other sectors (private or public), or between residents and culture providers, which 
in the end can make them aware of their community resources, potential and com-
petitive advantage. This awareness may well lead to a development of the commu-
nity, based on socio-cultural assets bottomed on an existing social capital at the 
resident’s level. Still and all, we can note that it exists an example of cooperation 
(from which arises the presence of local social capital) between Negreni City Hall 
and commons, since the fairs takes place on the land which belongs to both of them. 
The agreement to put together their land in order for the fair to take place illus-
trates their good collaboration. 
Albeit the political impact can be positive (prestige on a higher level, social co-
hesion, attractiveness of investors, qualitative administrative expertise) or negative 
(endanger the fair progress, unwise fund allocation, lack of responsibility) (Bowdin 
et al., 2006, p. 38), it has an important role in handling the fair’s success, because it 
not only allocates the community resources, but also funds, and more important, 
it involves also residents, behaving in the interest of residents and community as 
well. In this regard, Negreni City Hall cooperates with commons, and together they 
support the fair to take place, offering their administrative expertise, money and 
infrastructure needed.
Environmental impact is another issue while we are talking about organizing 
events. Due to the fact that Negreni fair is held outdoor, the organizers and the 
residents should be aware of increasing environmental awareness not only among 
them, but also among vendors and participants through examples of best practice, 
assuring the necessary infrastructure (trash cans), all of these being possible only 
based on a good communication among all of them. Pollution is another item that 
should be taken into account, as well as destruction of heritage, traffic jam and 
noise pollution. Using the good expertise of the organizers, involving also the in-
habitants, environmental issues may not be solved, but at least kept under control. 
This is the reason they take care of garbage after the fair takes place, and during 
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the fair they take care of the traffic jam by offering parking lots, and encouraging 
people to leave their cars there and walk to the fair. More events regarding environ-
mental issues need to be developed, and residents should be offered the necessary 
education on this topic; brainstorming on this topic involving City Hall, commons’ 
members and locals is needed. Local authorities could also issue a regulation related 
to the environmental conservation in light of the fair’s progress.
In an era of digitalization, preserving the traditional character of Negreni fair, 
digitization needs to consider helping non-local participants and vendors to take 
care of them in the commune during their stay. In this regard, applications should 
be developed and free to download for everyone. The apps should include different 
information related to: the place where fair takes place (a map), a map which shows 
all the vendors (this map can include all the vendors and what they are selling, or 
it can include only the division on sectors – sector of food, sector of antiquities, 
sector of clothes, etc., number of free parking lots and a map of parking, available 
accommodation places, restaurants, etc. Being a tourist in a new country, access to 
needed information for living, ‘from a click’ away are essential. 
To give strength to a sustainable development by use of Negreni fair, the or-
ganizers (Negreni City Hall, commons) should cooperate more not only between 
them, but also including local residents and private sector, for having a coordinated 
community development based on their competitive advantage (fair), which is the 
base of their development.
Further research is needed for identifying the perception of local residents in re-
spect to Negreni fair, and also on the subject of community sustainable development. 
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Abstract
The institution of the local referendum is an institution that, at this moment in Romania, is unclear and is 
treated superficially in the legislation. Even if the Romanian society requires a legislation regarding the local 
referendum, it is regretted that the current Administrative Code only refers to this institution in an exhaustive 
and incomplete way. We consider the new Administrative Code to be a codex, a complex of texts than an 
Administrative Code which could bring concrete explanations on the relation between the citizen and the 
administrative-territorial unit. 
In 2016, a modification of the law no. 3/2000 on the referendum was also made due to the needs of the 
society in order to allow the possibility of organizing local referendums at the same time with the local elec-
tions. This paper is an attempt to demonstrate the need for a clear and unequivocal legislation in the area 
of the local referendum precisely because of the needs of today’s society. The more the local community 
manages to make its contribution regarding the decision-making at the administrative-territorial unit level, 
the more that administration will be able to be closer to the citizen. Thus, participatory democracy at the 
level of administrative-territorial unit is born, and it is a way in which the citizens of the European countries 
can get involved and participate in the local decisions. 
Keywords: local referendum, public administration, Administrative Code, local community.
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1. Introduction
At the level of the European Union, the practice of the referendum is on two 
levels, one with a tradition and the other with a recent appearance. The recommen-
dations of the Council of Europe regarding the local referendum are meant to call 
for a referendum in this exercise, this being the means to legitimize the political 
decision democratically, or to strengthen the responsibility of the representative 
institutions; or to increase the decision-making transparency of decision-making as 
well as to stimulate voter participation in the political process.
The referendum is a democratic instrument that allows people to voice their 
opinion on a decision of an authority. In modern society, the referendum is an in-
evitable process. It is noted through different analyzes carried out by the Council 
of Europe that the political systems are different, and the institution of the refer-
endum is integrated in the constitutional texts of the member states. If we take 
Switzerland as an example, we will see that it has used the referendum since the mid-
dle of the 19th century, while in Western Europe, the referendum took shape only 
after World War II, and of course in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism.
We can say that the referendum is the direct involvement of the people in the 
decision-making process, and has become an instrument of constitutional democra-
cy as replicated in the French Parliament on September 21, 1792 ‘il ne peut y avoir 
de constitution que celle approuvée par le people’ (there can be no constitution 
except that approved by the people) (Mercier, 2003).
2. Analysis on the situation of the local referendum in Romania
In the title of the paper it was specified that the notion of local referendum is still 
pending in the national legislation. To support this assertion, in the following part 
of the article we will analyze the normative texts regarding the local referendum.
From the analysis of the texts of the existing normative acts, namely the law 
no. 3/2000 (with the additions and modifications made on May 8, 2019), we find the 
following provisions.
‘Article 5 (1) The national referendum and the local referendum are organized 
and carried out according to the provisions of the present law. (2) The referendum is 
valid if at least 30% of the numbers of persons registered in the permanent electoral 
lists participate. (3) The result of the referendum is validated if the validly expressed 
options represent at least 25% of those registered on the permanent electoral lists.
Article 13 (1) The problems of special interest from the administrative-territorial 
units and the administrative-territorial subdivisions of the municipalities may be 
submitted, under the conditions of the present law, to the approval of the inhab-
itants, by local referendum. (2) The local referendum can be organized in all the 
villages and component localities of the commune or city or only in some of them. 
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In case of the referendum at county level, it can be held in all communes and cities 
in the county or only in some of them, which are directly interested. (3) The draft 
laws or legislative proposals regarding the modification of the territorial limits of 
the communes, cities and counties shall be submitted to the Parliament for adop-
tion only after the prior consultation through referendum of the citizens from the 
respective administrative-territorial units. In this case, the organization of the ref-
erendum is mandatory.
Article 14 (1) The issues submitted to the local referendum are established by 
the local or county councils, as the case may be, at the proposal of the mayor, re-
spectively the president of the county council or a third of the number of the local 
councilors, respectively of the county councilors. (2) Citizens are called to say ‘Yes’ 
or ‘NO’ on the issue submitted to the referendum, deciding with the majority of the 
valid votes cast at the level of the respective administrative-territorial unit.’ (Law 
no. 3/2000).
The article 5 regulates in many ways the referendum in Romania, respectively 
the quorum required for its validation. Article 13 stipulates which could be the 
object of the referendum, where it can be carried out, a possible subject being the 
modification of the territorial limits. Article 14 sets out who could be the originator 
of the referendum and the way of pronouncing ‘Yes’ or ‘NO’ on the problem subject 
to the referendum.
The Administrative Code was adopted through Government Emergency Ordi-
nance (GEO) no. 57/2019 and published in Official Gazette of Romania no. 555 from 
July 5, 2019. From the analysis of the title II of the mentioned normative text we 
find that it operates with terms such as local autonomy, local collectivity, decen-
tralization, respectively with principles such as principle of legality, principle of 
transparency, principle of proportionality, principle of adaptability, and principle 
of consulting citizens in solving problems of local interest.
The article 84 paragraph 2 from GEO no. 57/2019 refers to the possibility of ‘re-
sorting to the consultation of the inhabitants by referendum or any other form of 
direct participation of citizens in public affairs, according to the law’. Thus, the local 
autonomy guarantees the authorities of the local public administration the right to 
have initiatives in all areas, except those expressly given to the competence of other 
public authorities.
Article 144 of the law regulates the situation in which the local council can be 
dissolved through local referendum, following the request addressed for this pur-
pose to the prefect by at least 25% of the citizens with voting rights registered in the 
Electoral Register and who have their domicile or residence in the administrative 
territorial unit.
The following article, the article 145, stipulates the way of organizing the local 
referendum, talking about the task of the expenses, respectively of who organizes 
the referendum, as well as of the quorum necessary for its validation.
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Article 162 (2) presents the situation of organizing the referendum for the ter-
mination of a mayor’s mandate as a result of the request addressed to the pre-
fect by the inhabitants of the commune, city or municipality, having as object the 
non-compliance by the mayor with the general interests of the local community or 
the non-exercise of his/her duties, according to the law, including those whom he 
exercises as a representative of the state.
Articles 184 and 185 present the situation of the local referendum at county lev-
el for the dissolution of the county council. However, we appreciate that through 
the GEO no. 57/2019 significant additions have been made, but we consider them 
insufficient and not adapted to the needs of the society. We consider the institution 
of the prefect to oversee the organization and conduct of the local referendum as a 
positive element brought by article 46 (1). But we consider the subject of organiz-
ing a referendum regardless of its object as being exclusively the task of the local 
authorities.
The text of the Administrative Code should shed a light on this institution of 
the local referendum because we refer to a new technology in administration, to a 
much more current public debate that favors the participation of citizens in the life 
of the city.
It is true that in Romania the local referendum exercise has not been used very 
often, with referendums being organized only in the last 10 years.
Unfortunately, we do not have the democratic experience of other states such 
as France, which in 1969 managed to determine for the first time a head of state to 
resign; General de Gaulle undertook the political responsibility to adopt a reform 
of the Senate and local government through a referendum. He failed, and therefore 
he resigned.
The Professor Gérard Marcou at a conference in St. Gallen said about the ref-
erendum: ‘The referendum is more an instrument of mobilization than a tool for 
democracy’ (Marcou, undated). The same professor said that ‘In reality, as valuable 
as it is, today, the referendum cannot be regarded as a major tool for strengthening 
local democracy. If we look at all the Council of Europe States, only a minority of 
them makes provision for referendums to decide matters at local level, and even 
fewer use them as a real decision-making tool. Most countries either hold what 
are merely consultative referendums – which are not really referendums but a 
procedure for putting a question to the public – or provide for referendums on 
very narrow issues, such as changing territorial boundaries or choosing between 
institutional models provided for in legislation and the like. In addition, it cannot 
be said that the referendum is something that functions in isolation from other 
factors. Certain conditions have to be met for it to achieve positive results at local 
level. Take the issue of public information for example – it has to be guaranteed 
that the information on the decisions to be taken is full and accurate. Likewise, it 
has to be ensured that the wording of questions is not biased or somehow likely to 
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determine the reply. Otherwise, the referendum becomes a tool for manipulation.’ 
(Marcou, undated).
From the report adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections at its 14th 
meeting, ‘Referendums in Europe – An Analysis of the Legal Rules in European 
States’, we learn about the experience of different states such as Switzerland where 
the regional or local referendums are most frequent (at cantonal and municipal 
level). The use of referendums is fairly frequent in Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands 
(solely at municipal level), Sweden and ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia’. Local referendums are held from time to time in the Czech Republic, 
Denmark and Russia (over 130 examples, but the number of existing local and re-
gional authorities in this country must be borne in mind). In Estonia and Finland, 
local referendums primarily concerned mergers of municipalities. In France, nine 
institutional referendums have been held since 1958, including five in 2003; con-
sultative referendums were held in a large number of municipalities before the in-
troduction of local decision-making referendums. Belgium has a few experiences 
of consultative referendums at local, but not provincial level. Only two local refer-
endums have taken place in Portugal, and only one in Malta. In Poland, local ref-
erendums have only been held concerning dismissal of directly elected authorities. 
In Spain, only five regional referendums have been held, all relating to approval of 
statutes of autonomy. Lastly, a number of states where regional or local referen-
dums are permitted have no practical experience of them to date (European Com-
mission for Democracy in Law (Venice Commission), 2005). 
3. Conclusions
An evaluation of the diverse experiences of various member states of the Council 
of Europe concerning the local referendums indicates that: the use of local referen-
dums can form a positive element of the direct democracy. An institutionalization 
of the local referendums in national or regional legislation allows basic uniform 
rules to be laid down guaranteeing the proper use of this instrument of popular 
consultation and avoiding defects of organization. The referendum may be consid-
ered as a justifiable institution of direct democracy, in that it makes all citizens di-
rectly aware of their responsibilities and may be conducive to the settling of strong-
ly contested situations.
We can underline that in Romania the local referendum is not a sufficiently 
regulated institution, but it is not a commonly used instrument. Perhaps this is the 
reason why the legislature has stipulated only certain situations in which this insti-
tution can manifest itself. On the other hand, the legislation must be adapted to the 
needs of the society and the local community. We consider it necessary in the case 
of the local referendum to take the decision at the local level from the beginning of 
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the organization of the referendum to the end when the result of the referendum is 
implemented.
The advantages of active participation of citizens through a local referendum are 
various; we mention here the improvement of the public services, the implemen-
tation of the citizens’ requests or the request of the administrative-territorial unit 
by supporting the citizens by their expressed vote. In this way, the guarantee given 
to citizens is confirmed by the vote of the administrative-territorial unit to adopt a 
decision based on the results of the referendum. The need to make the decision at 
local level according to the specificity of the area is more and more current, so this 
is the reason why the legislator has to adapt the legislation to the needs of the new 
society.
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